HL Deb 21 May 1896 vol 41 cc48-53

On the Order to go into Committee on the Bill,

*LORD MONKSWELL

said the object of the Bill would commend itself to the House. It was desirable that gaps in the ranks during war should be partly, at all events, filled up by trained soldiers if possible, and the particular plan of the noble Marquess was probably the best that could be adopted, as being calculated to produce the least disturbance of industry. There were two dangers ahead to be considered. In the first place, if the Bill became law it was possible that recruiting might be injuriously affected. He did not suppose that would happen just at present, because in troubled times recruiting was always brisk. Again, in the more remote future, when these men were drafted into the Reserve after seven years, under the new conditions it might possibly turn out that employers were not very willing to take them into their service. This was a very real danger, a danger which the noble Marquess had himself alluded to in bringing in the Bill. When last the Reserves were called out there was great commotion in industrial circles, and it might be found that apprehensions then entertained would be renewed if this Bill became law, and particularly if its provisions were ever acted upon. It was possible that difficulty might be met by giving some advantages to those men in consideration of their rendering themselves more liable to military service, either in the way of increased pay or in a preferential claim to Government employment. The first clause of the Bill, however, seemed to go rather farther than was necessary. He should have thought the noble Marquess might have been content to take power to call out these Reserve men when a warlike expedition was "in progress," or if the military advisers of the noble Marquess were of opinion that power to call out the Reserve should be taken not only while a war was in progress, but as part of the preparation for war, he (Lord Monkswell) would suggest that the words "in preparation" should be substituted for "in contemplation," for the former expression would surely meet every requirement. He could not understand why he should take power to call them out when any warlike expedition "was contemplated." They might contemplate a warlike expedition years before any preparations were made at all.

*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE)

I am not sorry to have an opportunity of supplementing by a few words the explanation of this Bill which I gave to the House when I presented it. I wish, in the first place, to have it clearly understood that we ask that the Measure may be considered on its own merits and as one which we regard as necessary in the interests of the Army without respect to any other Measures which may be desirable for improving its efficiency. It is not a substitute for any other steps which experience may show to be necessary, and the passing of this Bill will not in any sense relieve us from the obligation to deal with other weak points in our military system. The object of the Bill is perfectly simple. Short service has given us a Reserve of about 80,000 trained soldiers. We can use them in a case of imminent national danger or great emergency, but we cannot use them in military operations of a minor character, such, for example, as the dispatch of an expedition on foreign service. We propose therefore that a part of them—viz., those men who are in the first year of their Reserve service, should be liable to be called up under circumstances falling short of a great emergency. With the addition of the Reservists thus made available we should be able at any moment to send on service a perfect force of 20,000 men; Without them it is, under present circumstances, impossible to send out such a force, except by seriously disorganising our home Army and having recourse either to the vicious and universally- condemned practice of drafting men from other battalions, or to that of forming composite battalions, to the employment of which so much exception has on more than one occasion been taken. It seems to be considered in some quarters that it is a matter of surprise that our home battalions without assistance from the Army Reserve should be unfit for service abroad. As to that, I wish to repeat that it was never intended that our home battalions should be fit for foreign service as they stood. A reference to the statements made by the late Lord Cardwell at the time the system of linked battalions was introduced will show that he constantly spoke of the home battalion as the ''feeder'' of the battalion abroad. It was always contemplated that the younger soldiers should have their place in the home battalion, and that, if the latter were required for active service, the younger soldiers should go to the depôt and their place be taken by the Reservists. I should like to quote what was said by the present Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, before the Wantage Committee in 1891:— Do you contemplate any possible way under your system by which any portions of the home battalions could be effective without the Reserve? (A.)—No, except the Guards, and I would add two battalions of the Guards. In fact you would accept your home battalions as nurseries? (A.)—Yes, I would regard them as large depôts; I would keep the great bulk of the men three years before sending them abroad, which we do not attempt to do now. It has, in fact, always seemed to me that the use of the term "Reserve," as applied to those men, was somewhat of a misnomer. The word "Reserve" is suggestive of a body of troops maintained as a second line of defence on which you would fall back when your first line was exhausted. Our Army Reservists are, on the contrary, an integral part of our first line of defence and may more properly be regarded as men belonging to the home battalion who are allowed to go on furlough, on condition of their being available when required for foreign service. I may mention to the House that I understand that in France, though a general mobilisation can only be ordered by Presidential decree with the consent of the Chambers, a partial mobilisation—i.e., one that does not involve the calling up of all the men liable for service—may be ordered by the War Minister on his own responsibility. In Germany, I believe, the Reservists may be mobilised at any time by the Emperor for any purpose he may think fit. It will therefore be seen that in other countries, where the army without its Reservists is unfit for active service, powers exceeding those for which we are asking are possessed by the Government. But it is sometimes said, "these difficulties would never arise if you kept a certain number of your home battalions on a higher establishment and therefore ready for active service," and we are told that this was Lord Cardwell's original intention. I believe the latter statement to be perfectly correct. In the earlier days of short service it was usual to keep a certain number of battalions—the number varied from time to time—on a higher establishment than the rest. The practice was, however, abandoned, and for sufficient reasons. In order to bring up these battalions to their higher establishment as they came to the top of the roster, it was found necessary to augment them by the addition of a large number of recruits. The number thus added was, I believe, sometimes as many as 500 in one year. Now this gave rise to a twofold difficulty—a difficulty of obtaining the recruits at the time, and a second difficulty which arose subsequently when this large batch of men simultaneously completed their service and left the colours and had to be replaced by another influx of young soldiers. But I wish to point out that, even if the home battalions next on the roster for foreign service were stronger, they would always of necessity contain a considerable number of young soldiers whom it would be impossible to send on active service. In fact, the question is one of degree, and so long as the home battalion continues to be the feeder of the battalion abroad so long will it contain recruits who must be sent to the depôt if the battalion is to be employed on active service, and who must be replaced by men taken either from the Reserve or from other regiments. Then there is the argument on which the noble Lord founded his criticism, the alleged objection of employers to employ men of the Army Reserve. It is alleged that employers have already an objection to employ Reservists, and that that objection may be increased when it becomes known that the Reservist is liable to be called up not only in the event of a "great emergency," but during his first year in the Reserve for a minor military operation. I will not say that this argument has no force, but I believe that it is certainly not conclusive against the Bill before your Lordships. The reluctance of the employer to employ Reservists is, I believe, considerably exaggerated. When the matter was inquired into by Lord Wantage's Committee it was reported that the majority of the Reservists were at that time in regular employment, and there is no reason to suppose that the additional liability which we now propose should be incurred by a small number of these men during one year, and one year only, of their Reserve service will seriously interfere with their prospects in civil life. I may mention in connection with this point that we are at this moment taking steps which will, we hope, result in giving our old soldiers a better chance of obtaining civil employment, and I trust the effect of those steps will more than counterbalance any injury which this Bill can be supposed to occasion to them. I shall be glad to consider the suggestion of the noble Lord that in Clause 1 we should make use of some word less far-reaching than "contemplated" in our description of the circumstances under which power is taken to call out Reservists. There is another argument which I wish to notice. It is said that in resorting to this Measure we are merely shirking a difficulty which we ought to face. "Your home battalions," it is said, "are too few, and instead of increasing their number you are laying hands on the Reserve." Now, it is perfectly true that the number of the home battalions ought to equal that of the battalions abroad, and it is, I am sorry to say, equally true that at no time since the introduction of linked battalions has that equality existed. The needs of the Empire have grown; military liabilities at first regarded as only temporary have lasted longer than was expected, and in order to meet them the balance between the home and the foreign portion of the Army has been again and again disturbed. This is no doubt a material departure from the intention of the framers of the present organisation, and the matter is one which has for some time past been seriously engaging the attention of the War Department. The inequality has been to some extent reduced, but it is still, in our opinion, greater than is consistent with the satisfactory working of our Army system, and your Lordships may depend upon the question of it receiving the attention which it deserves. I wish, however, here again to point out that if, instead of having, as we have at this moment, 75 battalions abroad and 66 at home, our battalions were equally divided, it would still be essential, whenever it might be found necessary to send more troops abroad, to send a certain number of the younger men from each battalion to the depôt and to replace them by drafts from other battalions or by men from the Army Reserve. I apologise to your Lordships for having taken this opportunity to reply to criticisms most of which has been addressed to us out of doors. I recommend the Bill, not as a Measure which will remove the whole of the imperfections in our present system, but as one which will remove, at any rate, a very grave blot and add not a little to the efficiency of the British Army. [Cheers.]

Bill considered in Committee (according to Order): Reported without Amendment; and re-committed to the Standing Committee.