THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI rise to ask the noble Marquess opposite the Question of which I have given him private notice, and it is simple and broad in its terms. I rise to ask him whether he is prepared to make to this House any statement as regards the nature, the object, and the extent of the Soudan expedition. I know perfectly well that I have no right to make any speech myself, but I will give the two reasons which induce me to ask this question. The first is that, as has been the case once or twice before, I find myself in the unexpected and anomalous position of acting as the protector of the privileges of this House, and as demanding for this House an equal measure of consideration to that which is extended to the other House of Parliament, and I think, therefore, that I am not exceeding the bounds of Parliamentary etiquette in making a request that upon so important a question and on one in which all classes of the community feel so deep a solicitude we should have direct information from the Government, possessing, as we do, the privilege of including among our number the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of this country. My second reason has reference to the noble Marquess himself. I think he is placed under some disadvantage with regard to making known his policy. We endeavour to extract the nature of his policy in the House of Commons, and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who so ably and so admirably represents the noble Marquess there, invariably replies; but he is only the mouthpiece of one sitting elsewhere, and he is only able to give us partial information. I think, therefore, it is only due to the noble Marquess himself, presiding as he does over the Government and over the great Department that is chiefly concerned, that he should have an opportunity of making to us a direct and full statement of his own policy. ["Hear, hear!"]
§ THE PRIME MINISTER (the MARQUESS of SALISBURY)I am very much obliged to the noble Earl for the courteous language in which he has put his Question, and I can assure him that I am the last person in the world to think that he has exceeded in any manner his right of asking for information on this subject. I can assure the noble Earl that I feel that it is my duty, whenever asked to do so, to furnish the noble Lord with all information which the exigencies of the public service will allow, and I am not aware on the present occasion of any exigency of the public service which will prevent me from answering his question. The noble Earl asks me the nature of the Soudan expedition, and I am rather puzzled by the word "nature."
§ THE PRIME MINISTERThat makes it much more easy for me to answer the noble Lord's Question. Our motives are these. We have been for a long time of opinion that sooner or later it would be necessary to take a step in the direction of reclaiming for Egypt the territory that was lost to her in the years 1882 and 1884. Those years have passed into history, and I am not now going to raise controversial points in reference to what was done in them. Neither the Parliament nor the Government of that day can decline all responsibility for what occurred, but at the same time I think it is just and fair to say that a more singular and extraordinary conjunction of circumstances never happened than that which presented itself to the rulers of England and of Egypt at that time. But, without dwelling upon the causes of those occurrences, the result was that we, not entirely of our own will, accepted the responsibility of the whole occupation of Egypt in 1882. In 1884 the trust of which we had become the trustees was diminished by something like one-half. It was not a satisfactory state of things, and I freely admit that I did not consider that Egypt would be safe, under whatever guidance, if Khartoum was left permanently in the hands of any hostile Power. That is the general policy which impressed itself upon my mind. But I frankly confess that I would much rather have waited for some 935 time before any steps were taken to recover the ground then lost. There are many reasons—financial, political, and others—which made such a delay expedient; but we were suddenly confronted with this fact—that Kassala was threatened by the Dervishes, that there appeared to be every probability that it might be carried, and carried by a frightful catastrophe. And the condition of things has this peculiarity—that prestige, which is a word sometimes unduly exaggerated in other countries, in that country is all important, because the Khalifa's following consists of one faithful tribe, the Baggaras, and the rest of the following consists of those Arabs who think that he is likely to win. To allow the occurrence, if we can prevent it, of any great and far sounding triumph, would have been to place on the Khalifa's side the masses of those neutral Arabs; and I should be sorry to say that the interests of Egypt or the frontiers of Egypt would have been safe if such a large concurrence of feeling in his favour had been caused by any remarkable achievement. ["Hear, hear!"] It was, therefore, a matter of high interest, not only to Italy, but also to Egypt, that this capture of Kassala should not take place. I say not only to Italy, because we have been accused of using Egyptian troops mainly, if not exclusively, in the interests of Italy. That is not correct. We have been using the Egyptian troops mainly in the interests of Egypt; but on this particular occasion, I do not deny it, we were largely influenced by the position of Italy. Our sympathies with Italy are very great and sincere, and they are not dictated by sentiment, but by considerations of interest which bind the various nations of Europe together. ["Hear, hear!"] We were, therefore, very glad if the policy which we honestly adopted in the interests of Egypt could at the same time be of assistance to Italy in a critical and dangerous moment of her career. [Cheers.] That is the account of the expedition to Dongola. Sooner or later it was to take place. It took place at that time because we felt the interests of Egypt in the first instance, and the interests of Italy and all that depends on the interests of Italy, were affected by the result. Now, the noble Earl asks me next the objects of the 936 expedition. The objects are very simply stated. Dongola is the objective. We desire to occupy Dongola. We believe it is a very fertile country which will be of great value to Egypt. We believe the reconquest of it and the opening up of the Nile so far will draw great, rich, and vivifying streams of commerce into Egypt, and will be of great permanent benefit to the people of that country, and that the occupation of Dongola will be a protection to the frontier further north and will save us from the dangerous and somewhat humiliating incursions of the Dervishes to which we have been too much accustomed of late years. For that reason the object of the expedition is to take Dongola. The conduct of the expedition I need not dwell upon. It has been singularly gratifying to all who value the qualities of the Egyptian people, to all who take an interest in their future, to all who desire the peaceful restoration of commerce to the valley of the Nile. There were persons who told us, relying on the experience—I may say the irrelevant experience of 12 years ago—"You will find that the Egyptians will never fight, and that your expedition, if it is to be carried out, must be carried out by English troops." I do not attempt to forecast the future of the campaign, but I am justified in saying that the calumny that the Egyptian troops will not fight has been satisfactorily disposed of. [Cheers.] They have fought as gallantly as any other troops could fight, and it is no wonder that they should have fought well. For 10 years they have been trained up by British officers. They have undergone the enlightenment and humane treatment which British superintendence was certain to bring with it, and it is idle to compare their conduct with that of the wretched peasants who were dragged in irons to the battlefield, and expected to display the virtues of heroes when they were attacked. ["Hear, hear!"] I need not say that we owe this success—on which I dwell rather because it is a type than because it is itself of large dimensions—we owe all this success in the first instance, I think, to the efforts of the men who for 10 years have been steadily devoting themselves to the elevation of the character and to securing the efficiency of the Egyptian soldiers. We owe it 937 also to the high qualities which have been displayed by Sir Herbert Kitchener—[cheers]—who, I think, has shown himself a singular master of the particular warfare he is called upon to conduct. ["Hear, hear!"] The noble Earl asks me as to the future conduct of the campaign. I can only tell him that Dongola is our objective, that the instructions which Sir Herbert Kitchener has are not to go beyond Dongola without leave, and that up to that point we give him an entirely free hand. We believe that any attempt to manage the campaign from England, any attempt to imitate on a small scale the disastrous precedent, and traditions of the Aulic Council, would be a lamentable thing. We therefore give to the Commander a full and free hand to take such measures as he may think necessary for carrying out the campaign. The end of it is Dongola; but I do not for a moment desire to conceal that in selecting this particular plan of operations we have looked further than Dongola. Dongola has many advantages, and one of its advantages is that it is on the road to Khartoum. [Cheers.] You will ask, Why did you not then conceive the campaign in that spirit and take the measures requisite for carrying this object to the end? My answer is that the Egyptian Government stands alone amongst the Governments of the world in relation to its powers over finance. It may be an advantage or it may be a serious impediment, but the Egyptian Government is the only Government in the world, I believe, which cannot borrow. A very curious combination of international arrangements in whose validity I am much too unlearned to venture to pronounce an opinion—arrangements which are a perfect labyrinth, even to the learned mind—have, I am told, the effect of preventing the Egyptian Government from borrowing beyond a certain very narrow margin. The consequence is that unless it wishes to run into hopeless debt, its military proceedings must be governed by its financial capacity. We do not see our way at present to go beyond Dongola. If any of those millionaires who spend their money in supporting raids and invasions—[laughter]—would come forward and offer to us facilities for going further, I do not say that we 938 should be deaf to their appeals. [Renewed laughter.] But, in the present financial position, I am compelled to say that our object terminates at Dongola. It may be that we, or others who succeed us, will be prepared to go on in the future. For myself, I repeat the opinion that we shall not have restored Egypt in that position of safety in which she deserves to stand, until the Egyptian flag floats over Khartoum. [Cheers.]
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI have only one observation to offer on the very courteous and explicit statement of the noble Marquess. I am not going to discuss for one moment the propriety or impropriety of the reconquest of Khartoum; and, as for the policy of 1883 and 1884, I will refer the noble Marquess to a colleague who sits on his right (the Duke of Devonshire) who will be able to give him much more explicit explanations than I am in a position to do. Whether, following the precedent of yesterday, they prefer to carry on their discussions within the walls of this House or in more secret places is a matter of no moment to me. The policy of 1883 and 1884 is not one which touches me in any respect; but I would point out with regard to the limitation—the limiting condition I had better, perhaps, say—to which the noble Marquess referred as rather restraining the character of the forward movement, that that is not exactly on a par with what was said by a prominent colleague of the noble Marquess in the House of Commons. The noble Marquess says that the restricting consideration in connection with this advance is the financial consideration; but Mr. Chamberlain has told us that it was the amount of resistance that might be encountered in the expedition. It would now appear that the skirmish that has recently occurred has changed the policy of Her Majesty's Government. But there is another inconsistency which I would like to point out to the noble Marquess. I admit that it was impossible for him in his statement to avoid some inconsistency with some of his colleagues, but there was one declaration so notable in its character that it will hardly escape the notice of the noble Marquess, though I doubt if he is an attentive reader of the Debates of the other House. The Chancellor of the 939 Exchequer, who is an authority on finance, gave an explicit declaration, from which he declined to withdraw, that nothing in the nature of the reconquest of the Soudan was contemplated by Her Majesty's Government. At this moment I am not attempting to decide between the merits of the competing policies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and of the Foreign Secretary, but I do, at least, say this, and I do not think any one will be found to deny it, that the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is wholly inconsistent with the declaration of the Prime Minister.[Cheers.]
§ THE PRIME MINISTERI am very sorry if I have failed to convey my meaning to the noble Earl. There is no discrepancy between the orders now given and the general view of the future policy which we may think expedient. I do not pledge myself to any forward policy beyond Dongola this year, next year, or at any period of which I can fix the date. It depends upon conditions, which are wholly uncertain. I think, however, that one of the recommendations of the movement to Dongola is that it is so far a contribution towards the occupation of Khartoum. It is not in the contemplation of the Government to go any further than Dongola; but, as I have already said, if the noble Lord will advance us the money, I will alter my opinion. The controlling factor is the question of finance, and it seems to me that it is quite appropriate that that should have been the consideration that guided the utterances of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. ["Hear, hear!"]