THE MANNING OF THE NAVY.

HL Deb 22 March 1895 vol 31 cc1665-83

LORD BRASSEY,

in calling attention to the manning of the Navy, and the state of the Naval Reserves, said: At a time when a great national effort is being made to provide for the security of the Empire, my noble Friend who so ably directs the business of the Admiralty will, perhaps, welcome an opportunity of personally explaining his policy on a subject so important as the manning of the Navy. In 10 years we have doubled the tonnage of our Fleet. The additions we are making to our ships have called for an increase in the men. Thus far we have made additions chiefly to the permanent force. While fully recognising the necessity for those additions, and glad that Parliament has readily voted them, my object to-day is to press that the reinforcements of the future shall be raised more largely through a well-trained and effective Reserve. My proposals are briefly these: To raise the Naval Reserve to 50,000 men—20,000 in the first-class, 20,000 in second, and 10,000 firemen; the first-class men to be entered as boys, passing after five years in the Navy into the Reserve; the second-class to be recruited as at present, but to serve one or two years in the Navy; all seamen in the Reserve to go through an annual course of drill as at present. The conditions of service in the Reserve should be revised. The men should be liable for temporary service in the Navy in peace. I leave all details to the consideration of a Departmental Committee. As a groundwork for a short statement in support of this scheme a few statistics may be quoted. In 1885 I had the honour of moving the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons. The total force then voted for the Fleet, including Marines and Coastguard, was 59,000. The numbers proposed for 1895–6 are 88,850, or an increase of more than 11,000 men in the last two years. Meanwhile, the Naval Reserve has been raised from 19,000 to 25,000 men. Expenditure has grown proportionately. In the 10 years 1885–95 the Votes for pay and provisions have increased from £4,116,166 to £6,021,137, to which must be added in future years possibly £1,000,000 for pensions. In France, where more dependence is placed on Reserves for manning the Fleet, the Votes for pay and victualling show a trifling increase from £2,617,320 in 1885 to £2,640,146 for 1894. Comparisons cannot fairly be made between the cost of manning a fleet by conscription and by voluntary enlistment; but it is a circumstance to be noted that, while our expenditure has largely increased, the French has remained practically stationary. The inference may be drawn that the French have full confidence in the elasticity and the efficiency of their system of manning handed down from the great Administration of Colvert. From the dawn of history until now, as Captain Robinson has shown in his admirable work on the British Navy lately published, every maritime Power has followed the plan of providing for the expansion of its Navy from a peace to a war footing by means of Reserves. No country has ever maintained afloat in peace the numbers required in war. The reason is obvious. Such a policy would involve an enormous expenditure, not only on pay, provisions, and pensions, but in the maintenance in commission of ships to give the practice at sea which is essential. If men remain too long in harbour they lose their sea habits. For the purpose I have in view I do not wish, nor would it be consistent with facts, to speak in a despairing tone of our position. Our ability to raise our continuous service men to any strength which might be thought desirable is undoubted. Our stationary training-ships are always full, and the experiment of the Northampton as a sea-going training-ship appears entirely successful. For the demands of peace the Admiralty have full numbers at their disposal. No less than 21,000 men were embarked for the manœuvres of last year, besides upwards of 500 Naval Reserve, and yet our resources were not exhausted. We may have been short of officers; we were not short of men. When, however, we turn from manœuvres to a great struggle, possibly with a combination of Powers, every effective ship on the list must put to sea. Taking their total complements at not exceeding 100,000, how far should we be able to supply that number? The Estimates for 1895–6 provide for 89,000 men under Vote A. If we add to the permanent force two-thirds of the Naval Reserve, or, say, 17,000 men, our total strength would be raised to 106,000. We were never so well prepared as we are to-day, but yet the margin in reserve is small to meet the rapid wastage which would certainly occur. We are, by comparison with our requirements, far behind the French, who, with fewer ships, have a Reserve of 157,000 in their inscription maritime, 114,000 having been reported by a recent commission of inquiry as fit for service. Making every deduction, the effective, Reserve of the French Navy was reckoned by the Commission at 53,000 men, all having served three years in a ship of war. It cannot be putting the standard of strength for the British Navy too high if we fix it at 50,000. The last Manning Commission, of which Lord Cardwell was a member, recommended a Reserve of 30,000; and no such fleets were in existence then as we are now creating. If the Commission could not anticipate the developments of the present time, they had in view the experiences of the past. They alluded in their Report to the fact that during the great war we had 147,000 men afloat Coming down to the history of our own times, in the Crimean War we had 76,000 men afloat, an increase of nearly 40,000 in four years. In the American Civil War the Northern States fitted out no less than 750 steamers, manned by 50,000 men; and the force of the Southern States was insignificant in comparison with the fleets to which the British Navy might possibly be opposed. It is, perhaps superfluous to remark that for manning the Navy, even in war, impressment is no longer possible. It was disapproved by Lord Nelson. More men were lost by desertion than were pressed into the Service, and 3,000 good sailors were employed on shore in the press-gangs. Having to rely on voluntary enlistment it is imperative that we should have be hind the Navy proper an adequate and an efficient Reserve. What are our resources for raising the number we require? I will endeavour to describe concisely our position. For the second-class reserve, composed of the class forming the chief seafaring element in the French inscription maritime, we have a large body of eligible men in our fisheries and coatsing trade. Firemen we can certainly obtain from the mercantile marine. The best men are eager to join. We do not stand equally well for the first-class Reserve. It would probably be difficult to increase our 12,000 men to twice that number. Mr. Williamson, of Liverpool, a well-known authority, submitted to the last annual meeting of the Chamber of Shipping a statement showing that of 235,000 of all ratings in our merchant service not more than 55,000 are British seamen. Many of these, through age or physical disability, would not be eligible. At the period of the Crimean war there were afloat in our mercantile marine 284,000 men. Of these it is certain that at least 100,000 were seamen. These figures would seem to show a serious falling-off in the class of seafaring men most suitable to constitute the auxiliary forces of the Navy. If the further expansion of our resources for manning is to be provided for through the Reserve, the Admiralty must do more for the training of the men. I may supplement the information supplied by Mr. Williamson, with the results of inquiries personally made among those competent to form an opinion. During a stay of many weeks in Calcutta last year, I had frequent opportunities of consulting the large body of merchant officers employed in the sailing ships lying in the port. The general opinion was that the supply of prime British seamen is falling off. Good men are still to be, found, and first-class steam liners are always well manned; but the crews placed on board foreign-going sailing ships are, sometimes little better than an undisciplined rabble. Want of discipline and too slender complements may be the cause of fatal disaster. A case of mutiny on board a ship leaving Calcutta has recently Occurred. It is no exaggeration to describe the state of the Merchant Service, in regard to the training of seamen, as deplorable. It calls urgently for a remedy. We may look for valuable suggestions from the Committee on the Manning of the Mercantile Marine, now completing its labours under the guidance of Sir Edward Reed. With regard to the qualifications of seamen, when I asked the shipmasters at Calcutta what should be done to improve the manning of the ships under their command, the hope was expressed that a reform might be brought about through the establishment of closer relations between the Mercantile Marine and the Naval Reserve. At present the Naval Reserve is recruited from the Mercantile Marine. The shipmasters desired that the direction of the stream should be turned, and that the Mercantile Marine should be, to some extent at least, recruited from a reserve trained in the Navy. The same view was ably presented by that great-sea officer whom we have lately lost, Sir Geoffrey Hornby, in the "Naval Annual" for 1893. For the suggestions I am endeavouring to commend to your Lordships, I am largely indebted to my lamented friend. The causes for the diminished supply of good seamen are not far to seek. Compulsory apprenticeship has been abolished, and sailing ships have largely given place to steamers. In the month of January last, of the total number of seamen shipped at the principal ports of the United Kingdom, 28,902 were for steam vessels and some 1,500 only for sailing ships. These are the usual proportions, and they show how great is the change in the nature of employment at sea. Competition carried to excess has brought freights to an unremunerative point. Shipowners art driven to every expedient which makes for economy. The result is that in British ships, especially those sailing out of ports abroad, a large proportion of the complement before the mast consists of foreigners, who are ready to accept comparatively low wages. It is not the duty of the State to favour any particular industry by supplying it with skilled workmen; but we want more seamen as a reserve. On this ground it may consistently be argued that the Navy should undertake the training of boys in greater numbers than are necessary to supply the demands of a time of peace. In this connection it may be argued that technical education in every other brand of employment is now receiving liberal assistance from the State. There is no calling more important, there is none in which systematic instruction is more neglected than that of the seamen before the mast in the Merchant Service. In the Navy the training of boys is perfect. It would be a national benefit that the Merchant Service should be in part at least recruited with some of these well-trained men drawn from a respectable source, with ties to home and kindred, and attached to their native country. These were the arguments of the Registrar-General of Seamen before the Manning Commission, and they are as sound to-day as they were then. The proposal I am advocating for the entry and training of boys for the first-class Reserve was strongly pressed by the Commission on Manning. The existing Naval Reserve was organised on the lines traced by Lord Cardwell and his colleagues. All their recommendations have been adopted except in the establishment of training-ships. I have referred to the report of the Commission on Manning and the proposals of Sir Geoffrey Hornby. A scheme of recruitment and training of our Naval Reserves on similar lines has recently been put forward in the Pall Mall Gazette. In all these proposals actual service in the Hoot is a main and primary feature. The Reserves of all foreign powers are so trained. It must be acknowledged that the system involves us in some difficulties. But it is the part of the statesmen to grapple with difficulties. In the case before us, the problem is to find employment for short-service men after they leave the Navy. Men entered for the second-class Reserves from the fisheries and coasting-trade will readily fall back into their former occupations. To provide suitably for the men in the first - class Reserve who have been entered as boys would demand more consideration. In the case of all steamers in receipt of mail subsides conditions should be imposed that a proportion of the complement should be seamen of the first-class Reserve. Other openings are possible, and after ten years' service at seamen might take employment on shore, subject to periodical requalification in gunnery. I will not attempt to deal exhaustively with the questions I am raising for the consideration of the Admiralty. The strength, training, and conditions of some of the Naval Reserve demand inquiry by a strong Departmental Committee. The appointment of such a Committee is a definite and a practical, proposal which I desire to press. I will deal briefly with the officers of the Reserve. In the Royal Navy there is an admitted deficiency in the lieutenants' list. To make an efficient Naval officer is the work of years. To raise the number of lieutenants to the standard equal to the demands of war would be a great mistake. They could not receive promotion or be sufficiently exercised at sea. Our mercantile marine is the only available resource, and, well used, it would give us an enormous advantage over other Powers whose navies have not behind them the vast sea service created by British maritime enterprise. It is the less necessary to dwell on this branch of the manning question, important as it is, because it has recently been examined by a Departmental Committee, by whose recommendations the Admiralty will certainly be guided, rather than by anything which might come from an outside source. In conclusion, I have only to say once more that, in making these observations, I have nothing to offer in the nature of criticism of the steps which have been taken under the advice of the able and distinguished officers now serving on the Board at Whitehall. But I cannot believe that it is sound to go forward through the next ten years on the lines which have been followed in the last ten years. I repeat my hearty approval of what has been done; but to add 30,000 more men to the permanent force of the, Navy would, I believe be a misapplication of the public money. I would much prefer an efficient Reserve raised to 50,000. If we train our reserve as the French, the Russians, and the Germans train theirs, by passing every seaman through the fleet, as we are now passing their officers, they will be more efficient than at present. Having a reliable Reserve the growth of expenditure on a continuous service force might be checked. The money so saved would be available for cruisers, works, coaling stations, and many other services. Do what we may in the work of national defence, something must be less perfect than we could wish. It is not the least of the arguments in support of a policy of strengthening the Reserve that it affords the means of improving our vast merchant service. In an age in which we seem fated to see, on every side, legions of men standing idle under arms, is it not a consideration to which statesmen should attach some weight that our Naval reserve, while ready to obey their country's call, will be able to give their lives to peaceful and useful employment.

LORD HOOD OF AVALON

said that this question of manning the Navy and the state of our Naval Reserves was one of the most important in connection with the maintenance of the command of the sea by the British Empire in the time of war, for in the event of any emergency ocurring which might necessitate putting forth the full strength of the Navy it would then be of little avail that we might have spent millions in building a large number of the very best vessels of all classes—if at the same time we had not provided the necessary number of officers and trained men to fight in them. Hence the extreme necessity of watching very carefully our requirements and resources in order to man all available vessels in case of emergency, not only at the present, time, but three years hence when the whole of the vessels now building and those that had been provided for in the Estimates for the present year would have been completed. In his speech last year, when dealing with our requirements and resources, he stated that our total requirements of officers and men to man the whole of the available ships at the end of 1894 was approximately 91,000, of whom about 6,100 were officers, and about 84,900 men; that, with regard to officers, we were fairly well off for captains, commanders, and engineers, but that there was a serious deficiency of 390 lieutenants, and as to available active seamen there was approximately a deficiency of 22,400. His noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, replying to his speech, said the figures he had quoted were mere conjecture. He asserted that they were not mere conjecture, but based on many calculations which he fully belied to be accurate. During last year some 6,700 men were provided, in which number were included some 800 seamen whom it was proposed to take from the merchant service and enter in the Navy. That experiment had turned out, as he knew it would, to be a complete failure. Who could expect men who had been for years in the Merchant Service, receiving high pay and under lax control, to join the Navy, where the pay would be much lower and they would be subject to strict discipline? We obtained only 50 men of the 800 desired. For many years our seamen had been recruited solely from our own boys, who entered upon training at 15½ or 16, and who, after 18 months very careful training, were sent to ships at sea, and at 18 were rated as Ordinary Seamen. The system had succeeded excellently, and he was informed there was not the slightest difficulty in obtaining any number of most satisfactory boys of both good character and good physique. At present we wanted to enter more boys to take the place of deficient seamen. Our training-ships were full, and the simplest course was to have another boys' training-ship, for which he was glad to see that provision was made in this year's Estimates. It was stated in. the Estimates that 6,223 had been added to the Navy during last year. This would reduce the deficiency, according to his calculation, which was 22,400 in March last, approximately to 16,000 at the present time. But we should require in three years a very large addition of officers and men to provide for all the vessels now building; and for those provided for in this year's Estimates we should require an addition of about 220 lieutenants, about 215 engineer officers, and approximately 16,000 seamen. The addition of lieutenants and engineers was a very difficult question to deal with. It was remitted to a Committee, presided over by Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins, than whom no better Member could have been selected; the Committee's Report was now under the consideration of the Admiralty and the Treasury, and he trusted that it would suggest some practical remedy for the deficiency. Whatever it recommended, we ought to offer every inducement to the officers of the Naval Reserve to serve one year in our Fleet and to go through a course of gunnery and torpedo instruction, which would greatly increase the value of their services if ever they were called out in an emergency. In view of the existing deficiency, he entirely concurred in the proposed increase in the number of cadets in the Britannia and in the increase of the cadetships allotted to the Worcester and the Conway training ships, and in the addition made to that valuable class, the warrant- officers of the Navy. Having put down the existing deficiency at 16,000 men, and having estimated that 16,000 would be required for the vessels now building or to be built, he made the total deficiency in the next three years 32,000 men. Our resources in Reserve consisted of from 7,000 to 8,000 Naval Pensioners, of whom we might possibly find 2,000 or 2,500 still fit for sea service, and about 24,000 Royal Naval Reserve men, very many of whom were always absent from the country, in the service of the Mercantile Marine, so that if an emergency occurred we should probably not obtain more than about 7,000 at once. If we were to provide for the manning of all our vessels in an emergency, a very large increase must be made during the next three years in the numbers of both Active Service and Reserve men. In addition to the 5,450 men who were to be provided this year, there should be an annual addition of 6,800 Active Service, men in 1896 and 1897, and these additions would give an approximate total of 19,000 men. In the Reserve he should propose to increase the First-class Reserve to 15,000, the Second-class to 11,500, and the stokers to 3,500, making a total of 30,000. These were the very smallest additions that would enable us to provide for manning the vessels building and to be built. He was sorry to see that no addition had been made to the Marines, because, now that masts and sails were done away with, we specially required trained gunners; and in the Marines we could obtain trained gunners in half the time and at half the cost of training boys until they became Ordinary Seamen at 18. The boy cost the country £102; and the marine recruit joined the force as a man, and in 14 months had completed his training and was ready to embark as a gunner, and cost the country £48. The Marines had always been a very valuable addition to the Navy personnel; wherever and whenever they had been on active service they had distinguished themselves; and if their number were raised gradually from 15,500 to 19,000, the addition would be a great benefit to the Naval Service. He much regretted the total omission of battleships from the new programme this programme comprised 10 cruisers and 20 torpedo boat destroyers. He entirely approved of the addition to the number of torpedo boat destroyers, because in in future warfare they would prove of great value for the protection of our harbours and vessels. The additional cruisers would be of great assistance in protecting our enormous seaborne commerce, but battleships were essentially the class which would in future do most to decide finally the fate of Naval wars. Therefore it would have been much more desirable that the programme should have provided for three battleships of The Barfleur class instead of two of the first-class cruisers and two second-class cruisers. Last year the First Lord said, in a speech in this House:— It is the anxious desire of the Government to maintain the Navy in a condition which will insure our supremacy at sea; and we believed that the programme we have prepared, extending over five years, will be amply sufficient for this purpose. That was a satisfactory and reassuring statement; and now they knew the provision that had been made for strengthening the Navy during the first two of this mysterious five years' programme, the full details of which they were not permitted to know. According to his calculations, which he had made pretty closely, the result of the provision for the first two years was to leave us in this position: our armoured Navy of ships built, building, and provided for, compared with a combination of the Russian and French armoured fleets under similar conditions, left us in a minority of two battleships, 14 very powerful armoured coast-defence vessels, and two first-class armour-belted cruisers. Under these conditions he had no hesitation in saying that in his opinion the omission of the battleships from the present building programme could not be considered satisfactory.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Earl SPENCER)

This is not the first time I have had to rise in this House to take part in discussion initiated by my noble Friend behind me (Lord Brassey). When I see the noble and gallant Lord opposite, who, from his experience on active service and at the Admiralty, is undoubtedly one of the highest authorities on Naval affairs in this country, I wish that, instead of having my noble Friend behind asking me questions and raising discussion, I had him in reserve to help me in replying to the speeches of other noble Lord who are masters of this subject. I do not complain of my noble Friend for raising this discussion. He has an almost unique experience and authority outside the service in Naval matters; he has done great service to the Navy in many ways, and, besides that, has had the advantage of holding office at the Admiralty. I therefore feel some difficulty in differing in any degree from my noble Friend, and, though I shall be obliged to differ from him to some extent to-night, I am glad to think that on the whole I can agree, with my noble Friend. My noble Friend laid down this proposition—that in considering the forces that we ought to raise for our naval service, we are not entirely to rely on those employed on active duty. He says, with great truth, that other countries do not rely entirely on those employed actively in the Navy, and that we ought not to do so cither. I generally concur in that proposition. It would, I quite admit, be inordinately extravagant on our part if all the men who are required for fighting warships in time of war should always be kept on full pay and on active service. We should have either to increase very largely the number of ships in commission, or keep a larger number of men in our ports, either in hulks or in barracks, unemployed. I therefore agree generally in the proposition that, in order to secure the numbers we must eventually have to man our ships in time of war, we must look to the Reserve, and if we look to the Reserve, beyond the pensioners, we must look to the Royal Naval Reserve, who are men taken, in a great measure, from the great merchant service of this country. In regard to this I should differ from my noble and gallant friend, probably, as to the proportions he desires to be taken from our Reserves. I will venture to say this, however, that the principle on which we propose to man our ships in time of war is a very sensible one and a very sound one. What we propose is that in every ship the large leaven of the crew should consist of men trained in the active service of the Navy. A certain proportion may be found from the Royal Naval Reserve. But there is another point to be considered. When a war breaks out we shall probably haves the best part of our fleet, the most likely part to come into contact with an enemy, abroad. We cannot, therefore, recruit from those ships or send out to them any large proportion of Naval Reserve men. Even if we could it would be foolish, just at the moment when we wish them to be most efficient, to deprive them of some of their most efficient men. This is true of the Mediterranean Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the China Fleet, and other fleets on distant stations. No doubt, as war went on and vacancies occurred, we might supplement them to some extent from the Royal Naval Reserve, but at the outset of a war we should not be able to man ships engaged in active warfare with men of the Naval Reserve. Coming to the ships nearer home, there, no doubt, we should be able to employ a certain proportion of Royal Naval Reserve men, and the more efficient you make them the more you may increase their number; but, at the same time, it is essential, in the opinion of our naval advisers, that a very large proportion of the ships' crews—not only the blue-jackets, but also the engine-room complement—should be men who are highly trained in the service. There is a point in this which, I think, is worth referring to. No doubt in times gone by ships in our Navy have, under distinguished officers, fought most gallant actions and done great service with crews picked up for the Commission itself, but as a general rule it is of the highest importance to promote what has been called the solidarity of our ships' crews. It is of the utmost importance that men should know their officers, and that officers should know their men, and that they should be accustomed to act together. It increases enormously the efficiency and power of our ships of war. That is especially true of ships that have now come prominently forward in naval warfare—ships of the torpedo-destroyer type. These ships are driven at a speed never dreamed of in past days. Many of them travel at the rate of 30 miles an hour. If anybody entered the engine-room of a torpedo-boat destroyer and noticed what was going on, he would at once see the absolute necessity of having highly-trained men. I have here a paper prepared in answer to a question I put to the Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy on this point, and it is worth quoting to illustrate the enormous strides that have been made in these torpedo-boat destroyers, and what immense stress is put on the officers and men on those vessels. I find that whereas in the second-class cruiser the revolutions are 140 per minute, and in the third-class cruiser 160 to 180, in the torpedo-boat destroyer the revolutions are 370 to 400 a minute. That alone shows what an enormous change has come over the service, and what enormous stress is placed on all those who have to do with this kind of vessel. If a mistake was made in attending to such engines or in stoking their fires, you might at once have an accident of a very serious kind, and, certainly, the whole efficacy of the vessel in regard to speed would be lost. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Admiralty to see that these torpedo vessels not only have officers highly trained, but engine-room artificers and stokers equally highly trained. I mention this to show the absolute necessity for maintaining a large number of highly-trained men in the Navy. I do not think my noble Friend will disagree with that. [Lord BRASSEY: "Hear, hear."] I do not quite follow him in all his figures. He says that in the next few years we shall require to add 30,000 men to the strength of the Navy. The noble and gallant Lord opposite does not put the number at quite such a high figure. I bow to the authority of the noble and gallant Lord, and I do not differ very seriously from him with regard to the number he puts forward. I quite admit that in the next few years we shall probably have to add to the number of men of all classes in the Navy, but I think it must be a gradual process, and I do not think that the noble and gallant Lord himself would wish the increase to be made at once; I do not think, in any case, it would be necessary to increase the number to the extent proposed by my noble Friend behind me. While on this subject I might refer to another point which the noble and gallant Lord has touched upon. He referred to the experiment we tried last year of raising 800 men from outside direct for the Navy. I quite admit that that experiment has not succeeded. We never were very sanguine that it would, but we thought it deserved to be tried. We are able, however, to try another experiment and to endeavour to tap a new source of recruiting for the Navy. That is to say, we are endeavouring to obtain boys of an older class than those who have hitherto been such admirable pupils in the training ships. The Northampton was commissioned for the purpose of engaging older boys for the Navy. That ship was directed to cruise along the coast, visiting the different ports of the country, as we thought it was of great importance to get boys from the various ports of the country, in that way creating a new field for recruiting and increasing the interest of all classes of the community in the Navy. These older boys are not trained for so long a time as those in the training ships, and boys are now going out to the Fleets abroad; but it would be rash on my part to say that the experiment has been perfectly successful, though, as far, as we know, we have succeeded quite as well as if not better than we expected. The noble and gallant Lord opposite referred to the question of the marines. I know he very properly and justly approves highly of this part of Her Majesty's forces, and I do not differ from him in that. I believe no more efficient forces of the Crown can be found than the marines, whether you take the marine artillery or the marine light infantry. Since we have been in office we have added 1,000 men to the Royal Marine forces. We did not make any addition this year, and I will give our reason for not doing so. The emergency was not so great as to make us think that we ought to sacrifice, any efficiency in the men's training. We were told that if we raised further the number of men we should run a considerable risk of losing their efficiency, because our barrack accommodation was not sufficient. We are taking measures to increase the accommodation at Walmer, and I hope that the policy which we have pursued before may, when we have more accomodation, be again adopted, because I fully agree with the noble and gallant Lord that if we want to increase the force of the Navy we cannot do so better than by increasing the Marines. Now, I come to what I conceive to be the most important part of my noble Friend's speech. He proposes that we should train a considerably larger number of boys for the Navy, and engage them for five years' service, to be followed by 15 years' connection with the Royal Naval Reserve. I am not quite clear about the meaning of my noble Friend's proposal. Does he mean that we are to have a number of men engaged for five years, in addition to those who are now trained in various ports, and who are engaged first for 12 years and then for 10 years more if they wish it, or are we to alter the whole present system of training for the Navy? [Lord BRASSEY: "I meant in addition."] That would involve very serious difficulties. My noble Friend says that it is the part of statesmen to overcome difficulties. I admit that it is the part of statesmen to endeavour to do so, but there may be difficulties which it is impossible for them to overcome, and there would be most serious difficulties in the way of carrying out my noble Friend's proposal. We should have, in the same ships, men engaged for 12 years' service and for five years' service. That alone would create the greatest possible confusion on board ship. It would be detrimental to discipline, and would cause discontent among the older men engaged for the longer period. The idea of altering altogether the system of training for the Navy, and of introducing a five year' service has presented itself to the minds of a good many people, but if we accepted this plan we should be training in the Royal Navy for the Merchant Service, instead of using the Merchant Service as a means of training Naval Reserve men for the Navy. This would be a most expensive operation, and I doubt greatly whether it would be efficacious. We should not know where to find the men when we might require their services, and after they have been trained at a great cost they would go from the Navy just when they were becoming really efficient. This plan would be such a change that we ought to pause before adopting it. My noble Friend wishes that this question should be referred to a Departmental Committee. But before a matter is referred to a Committee of that kind, the Ministers appointing it must lay down the principles upon which it is to work. I do not think that a Departmental Committee ought to lay down principles in a matter of such great importance as this. It is a subject that ought to be discussed by the, Board of Admiralty itself. My noble Friend referred to the French. I always think that it is rather a dangerous thing for anybody in this country to attempt to lay down precisely the conditions under which a foreign service is carried on. We, no doubt, have information about it, but we cannot be so informed about it as to be able to state with authority exactly what is going on in a foreign service. The noble Lord has referred to the large number of men who belong to the inscription maritime in France. I believe that the number of men attributed to this reserve force in France has been very much exaggerated. There was a very interesting letter not long ago in one of the newspapers which showed that, account being taken of the British seamen in our Mercantile Marine, and comparison being made between their numbers and the number of French seamen who remained in the inscription maritime after serving in the French Navy and at various ports, the difference in numbers was rather in our favour than against us. But I shall not dwell upon this, because I do not think that it is a very desirable thing to try to pass authoritative criticisms upon an institution abroad. But we must remember that in foreign countries they rely entirely on Conscription, whereas we rely on voluntary enlistment, and this alone makes such a difference that a comparison cannot be usefully made. I do not suppose that in this country, as long as the present conditions prevail, we shall ever have anything but voluntary enlistment for our Army and Navy, It is on this account that I think that comparisons between the French and the Russian and the British Navies are not fair nor wise. But I quite agree, of course, that if we are to have a Reserve, as I think we ought, we must make, it as efficient as possible. I claim for the Admiralty that they have done a great deal to make the Royal Naval Reserve a more efficient force. We have encouraged officers in the Reserve to serve in the Royal Navy for a year, and we intend now to allow officers to serve for two years in the Royal Navy. We attach great importance to the training, believing it to be invaluable. Then, we encourage officers and men to go to guardships for drill purposes, and during the manœuvres we give employment to several hundred Naval Reserve men. We think it very important to draw more closely together those who manage our great Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy. Already we have to thank most of the great companies con- with the Merchant Navy for the assistance which they have given to us. It is very satisfactory to find that the training which their men obtain in the Navy is exceedingly valued by them. The discipline which the men learn when serving with the Fleet is such as they do not acquire in the Mercantile Marine, and that is one of the reasons why we find the great merchant companies willing and desirous to co-operate with us. We wish to make this co-operation still closer, for I am sure that the prosperity of one Service is largely dependent upon the prosperity of the other. One subject has been referred to, which I can only now touch upon lightly. I quite admit the great importance of having a sufficient number of officers for the Royal Navy. The number of lieutenants at this moment is much less than it should be, and lieutenants take, as has been said, about ten years to train. The want of sufficient young officers is greatest at the present moment, when we are increasing the number of ships in commission. Not many years ago the number of officers training in The Britannia was increased, but we are not yet feeling the benefit of that increase. We shall, however, feel the benefit of the change as time goes on. Then we have this year increased the number of the cadets in The Britannia, and we also propose to increase the number of naval cadets whom we take From The Worcester and The Conway. The question of the increase of the number of lieutenants is one that the Admiralty are very carefully considering, and they are preparing a plan to meet this want for the present and the future. The noble and gallant Lord referred to the Committee presided over by Sir Anthony Hoskins. That Committee has investigated the whole subject of the efficiency of the Navy. The scheme adopted in 1870 or 1872 has, of course, by this time, been tried, and the deficiencies in it have been discovered. The position of officers in the Navy, their numbers, and the subject of promotion were all referred to the Committee to which I have alluded, and it has prepared a most useful and exhaustive Report. I hope, in a few weeks, if not a few days, to be able to announce what is proposed to be done, and we trust that our proposals will give satis- faction to the Service, and prevent the serious state of things which would exist in the future if things were allowed to remain as they are now. I shall not follow the noble and gallant Lord in what he said with regard to the ship-building programme, for the reason that this was not part of the subject of my noble Friend's proposal. I should have been quite prepared to go into the matter if notice had been given, but I certainly shall not go into it at this moment. All I will say is this, I absolutely abide by the quotation he was good enough to make from a speech of mine made, I suppose, in this House last year. The present Board of Admiralty have proposed a programme which they have thought necessary for maintaining the supremacy of the Navy on the sea. We adhere to our views, and we believe that what we have proposed, with regard to ships and to other requirements of the Fleet, will put Her Majesty's Navy in that efficient position which I believe the country requires and expects of the British Navy.