HL Deb 05 February 1895 vol 30 cc5-14
THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I deeply regret to have to interpose before this House proceeds to the ordinary course of business to-day, but I am quite sure that your Lordships will grant me indulgence while I make a personal statement. During the last two weeks grave imputations of misconduct have been made against me. If they had touched me alone I should not have troubled your Lordships at the present time, but they relate to my discharge of the duties of the high office which I hold. If they were true I should be unworthy to remain Speaker of this House. I am told that they are unchallenged and un-contradicted. It seemed to me that the proper place in which to challenge and contradict them was in this House, over whose deliberations I have the honour to preside, and I seize the earliest opportunity of doing so. My Lords, the charges relate, to my action in relation to the proceedings in winding-up Companies which are in liquidation. All that I have done can be briefly told. In the year 1892 the hearing of these causes was assigned to Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams by my noble and learned Friend who preceded me. In the summer of that year difficulties arose owing to the learned Judges absence on circuit, and an arrangement was made by which he was replaced during his absence by Mr. Justice A. L. Smith. In the following year, 1893, similar difficulties arose, and strong representations were made to me on the subject. I received communications from the Incorporated Law Society and from the Bar Committee, and it occurred to me that the difficulty might be met by an arrangement under which another Judge should be named who, in the absence of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, might take the, winding-up cases. That arrangement was made with the full concurrence of both of the Judges concerned, Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams and Mr. Justice Wright. In the summer of last year, when the circuit arrangements had been made, I found that both those learned Judges were going circuit, and a new arrangement became absolutely necessary. Mr. Justice Romer, during that circuit, undertook to hear these cases. The suggestion that he should do so came from Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams himself. When on the present occasion Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams was again to be absent from London on circuit duties, I asked Mr. Justice Romer, and he assented, to take the cases now which he had taken before. My Lords, that is all I have done, and it is now practically admitted that as regards anything I have done no complaint can be made. But it is said "the complaint is not of what you have done, but that you contemplated a more permanent transfer of these causes, and that you contemplated it, not on grounds of public policy, but from corrupt and discreditable motives." My Lords, it is, I think, somewhat unusual for a public man to be called on to explain, not anything he has done, not anything he has announced his intention of doing, but something which it is said he contemplated doing. But as in nothing I have done, so in nothing I have contemplated doing is there any occasion for me to fear the light. There is just this grain of truth, and this alone, in all the statements that, have been made, that the expediency of a more permanent transfer of winding-up cases has been under consideration. Of course such a change contemplated on public grounds alone would involve no discredit to anyone, even if opinions might differ as to its expediency. But as it has been stated that corrupt motives, and not regard for the public interest, dictated its consideration, it is necessary, in order to meet these base charges, that I should state the facts which forced mo to consider the expediency of the change. My Lords, when the Winding-up Act was passed these cases were heard by the several Judges of the Chancery Division. In the year 1892 my noble and learned Friend who preceded me in this office assigned the hearing of these cases, under the powers conferred on him by the Act, to Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams. At that time, as my noble and learned Friend will no doubt remember, apprehensions were expressed by some that this change might give rise to difficulty when the Judge was on circuit; and, in addition to this, some thought it might interfere with the due progress of the business in the Queens Bench Division. But there were public grounds which seemed to my noble and learned Friend at that time—and I do not for a moment suggest he was wrong—to render it expedient that the cases should be assigned in the manner in which he assigned them. But the circuit difficulty soon presented itself, and, as I have already told your Lordships, on the first occasion on which there was a circuit after this assignment of causes, another Judge—Mr. Justice A. L. Smith—took the place of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams. In the Spring of the following year the same difficulties were experienced, and considerable complaints were made to me that winding-up cases were not heard with the speed and continuousness that was desirable. My Lords, the learned Judge to whom the work had been assigned made the most strenuous efforts to avoid, as far as possible, any inconvenience arising from his absence on circuit. He came up frequently from great distances on spare days to discharge the duties assigned to him; and I desire to pay my fullest tribute to the energy and zeal he displayed to render the inconvenience to the public as small as possible. Nevertheless that inconvenience was felt, and the strongest representations were made to me of the necessity of a change, by the Bar Committee and by the Incorporated Law Society. It was impossible in the face of these representations not to recognise that an evil existed for which a remedy was to be found. As I have said, I asked another Judge—Mr. Justice Wright—to assist, so that when Mr. Justice Vaughan. Williams was on circuit Mr. Justice Wright might hear these cases. At the same time I expressed a hope that it might be possible to arrange so that both those Judges should never be absent on circuit at the same time, and the learned Judges told me they thought it would be possible to secure such an arrangement—in which case, of course, all that was desired would have been accomplished, and matters would have gone quite smoothly. It is right I should state here, in consequence of some observations that have been made, that it does not rest with me what Judges shall go circuit or what circuits they shall go. The practice from time immemorial has been for the Judges in rotation, to select their own circuit. It is a matter of arrangement between them. If a Judge whose turn has arisen to go circuit remains in London, another takes his place. With that I could not interfere. All I could do, of course, was to make any suggestions that occurred to me from time to time. Well, my Lords, in the summer of last year I saw from the Assize List that both Judges were to leave town, I think on the same day, or almost on the same day, and that they would be absent for several weeks. Upon that I inquired whether an arrangement could not be made by which one of them should remain in town. I found that was not possible, apparently, and consequently, as something had to be done, this business was undertaken during the summer of last year by Mr. Justice Romer. When I communicated to the Bar Committee the arrangement made, Sir Henry James, writing on their behalf, used this language:— The Bar Committee desire to express some doubt whether the stop mentioned in your letter which the Lord Chancellor suggests may be taken to remedy the existing evil will adequately do so. On behalf of the Committee he called my attention to the joint report of February, 1892, as pointing out the measures which the joint committee thought were desirable to meet the now admitted evil. The Bar Committee, therefore, at that time, notwithstanding the arrangement I had made, reiterated that view. But, of course, if the difficulty had not arisen from both Judges being absent on circuit, I should have remained perfectly content with the arrangement that had been made. The cases were heard by Mr. Justice Romer, and it was found that he could discharge the duties which that work involved without interfering with the other duties which he had to discharge as a Judge of the Chancery Division. At that time another difficulty confronted me. Mr. Justice Barnes, one of the Judges of the Probate Division, was ill and absent, and I found that that illness was likely to last a considerable time. It has lasted down to the present time. I rejoice to think that the learned Judge is recovering, and that we may hope to see him again discharging his duties. The consequence was, that the President of the Probate Division made the most pressing suggestions to me that I should endeavour to arrange for his assistance by one of the Judges of the Queens Bench Division. I communicated with the Lord Chief Justice on the subject, and one of the Judges of the Queens Bench Division took his place. This, of course, interfered with the arrangements of the Queens Bench Division, and it certainly then did occur to me whether there might not be relief to that Division by assigning the work which was then being done by a Judge of the Queens Bench Division to a Judge of the Chancery Division, there being two additional reasons for supporting such a change; the one was, that the absence of the Judge from the Queens Bench Division seriously interfered with new arrangements, made in the public interest, to secure the continuous presence at particular seasons of a certain number of Judges, and the other being that the work of the Chancery Division by that time was in a state so satisfactory that I thought that the time, which would be occupied by allotting this company work to a Judge of the Chancery Division, might well be spared from the time which was required for the ordinary duties of that Division. Upon this I had confidential communication with Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams and Mr. Justice Romer, but beyond this nothing was done. The change was not definitely determined, but whilst the reasons in its favour seemed to me, and still seem to me, to be weighty, I was not unconscious that there were grave arguments on the other side; and before the present controversy arose, before these articles were written, before these attacks were made, I had determined—and I had communicated that determination to my secretary, whose duty it would have been to draw up the Order if I had come to the conclusion that I should make one—to leave matters as they were at present. My Lords, I have now stated the facts. What are the charges? It is said that there was friction between the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams in regard to the action of the latter in the New Zealand Loan case; that the sacrifice of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams was definitely intended to be carried into effect; and that the contemplated removal of this strong and able Judge, from a position which he was filling to the entire satisfaction of the mercantile community and the legal profession, was resolved upon—partly in consequence of his conduct in the matter I have mentioned, and partly owing to the apprehension that he would act in the same way in other matters which are now pending in his Court. Now this involves two charges. The first is, that I acted from resentment of what the learned Judge had done; and the second, that I desired to screen some one. Both of these charges are absolutely and utterly untrue. I will deal with them separately. I have told your Lordships what led me to consider the question whether it would be well to make a change. Is there any one that cannot see that there may be motives—perfectly creditable motives and inspired by a desire for the public interest—sufficient to induce me to consider such a matter? I certainly had no such motive as resentment on account of what the learned Judge had done. No such mean or ridiculous thought ever crossed my mind for a moment. There was no friction between me and the learned Judge in regard to the New Zealand case. The only communications I have ever had with the learned Judge in respect to the winding up of companies have been on points of general application. I believe in most of the cases it was on the learned Judges request that I sought a conference with him. The conferences we had on those points were throughout of a friendly character, and I believe, that our views on the points which we discussed did not substantially differ. My Lords, the opinion which was delivered by Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams on the New Zealand case was delivered on May 8. It was some time after that that I asked him if he could not arrange to get some one to go circuit for him in order that he might remain in town and continue his duties in regard to the winding up of Companies. That was after the time it is said that this resentment was in my mind because of the action of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams in certain cases. I never entertained the question until it was brought to my notice, under the circumstances I have stated, on August 25, on which day I consulted with the learned Judge on the subject. It was never in my mind to remove these cases from the learned Judge or to transfer them to any one else against his will. If I had the power to do it—a question I will not now enter into—nothing would have been further from my thoughts than that if the learned Judge, after due consideration, differed from me, and if he did not see as I saw that it was for the public good—even if I had the power to do it, I would hesitate long indeed as to disputing his desires and wishes and removing the business from him. But no such contingency ever arose. So much for the first point. The next is that it was partly owing to the apprehension that the learned Judge would act in the same way in other matters now pending in the Court. My Lords, I knew nothing; I know nothing of other matters pending in the Court. I have not the slightest idea what matters are pending there at this day. I had no idea either when the change was spoken about. All I can say is that the suggestion that that was one of my motives in considering this matter is absolutely and utterly without foundation. What more can I say on such a point? But this I can say further. If the change had been made it would certainly have been made so as to leave any pending matters the Judge thought desirable to deal with himself in his own hands. I would not dream of making the change in any other fashion, and I am quite sure the learned Judge would have desired that it should be so made. So much for those matters that I was supposed to desire to transfer from one Judge to another. But, my Lords, what is involved in this statement? As grave an imputation, I venture to say, upon the Judges as it is upon myself. I could only desire to transfer cases from one Judge to another as suggested in order to screen somebody, because I thought the Judge to whom I was transferring them would not act in the same capacity and with the same impartiality in bringing wrongdoers to justice as the Judge from whom the cases were transferred. I venture to say that the independence and fearlessness of the Judges is no novelty. It is not a monopoly of this Judge or that Judge. I do not detract, and I am sure the learned Judge to whom I am going to refer—Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams—would not deem that I detract from his high qualities as a Judge when I say that there are other Judges upon the Bench who are as fearless, and as determined to do their duty, and as little influenced by considerations personal, as that learned Judge himself. But, my Lords, if I had sought for a Judge pliant to my will, and willing to screen persons, I should search for him in vain. Then as to the learned Judge to whom reference has been made, there is no one that knows him who does not know that he would be as incapable of doing anything but meting out the most rigorous justice to wrongdoers as any Judge that ever sat on the Bench. My Lords, I say that the article which contains that charge carries its own refutation. It says that it does not attack the competence and integrity of Mr. Justice Romer, as he is admitted to be a Judge of great ability, and of unquestioned impartiality. Then does anybody think that, if I wished to screen any person, I should transfer the business to a Judge of the highest ability, the highest character, and the most unquestionable impartiality? That I should be so foolish and so ignorant of facts that everybody knew with regard to the qualities of this Judge as to transfer cases to him in order to screen some unknown persons, of whom I have no conception, when such persons could not possibly benefit from the change? My Lords, against what I have put before you there is nothing but the assertion of an anonymous writer as to what my motives were. It was felt, I suppose, that further evidence was needed, and in a campaign of scandal there are many ready to forge weapons, and join in the fray. Accordingly, a paragraph taken from the South Wales Daily Post went the round of the papers. It is in these terms— The Press Association states that the South Wales Daily Post last night states—'Important information has reached us from a perfectly reliable quarter bearing on the question whether the proposed replacing of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams by Mr. Justice Romer in the Chancery Division of the High Court was connected with the recent action of the former Judge in the mutter of the New Zealand Company, of which Mr. Mundella was a director. It is to the effect that the Lord Chancellor wrote to Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams asking if he would not withdraw some of the observations made by him in the course of the winding-up action; that Mr. Justice Williams replied that he could not with-draw the observations; and that, upon the request being repeated, the Judge intimated to Lord Herschell that if the matter were pressed further, he would consider it his duty to publish the correspondence. Now, my Lords, all that is absolutely and utterly untrue. I never wrote to Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams asking him to withdraw some observations he had made in the New Zealand Company case. I neither wrote nor spoke, directly or indirectly, to Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams asking him to withdraw some of the observations he had made in the New Zealand Company case. It follows, of course, that the learned Judge did not reply; that I did not repeat the request; and that the Judge never intimated to me that, if the matter were pressed, he would consider it his duty to publish correspondence which never existed. But, my Lords, that weapon was cleverly forged. The South, Wales Post does not have its observations generally accorded such wide circulation as they have had on this occasion. Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams happened to be on the South Wales Circuit, and the fact of a paragraph of this kind appearing in a South Wales Newspaper led many people to jump to the conclusion that there must be some thing in it, that the newspaper must have got the information from the learned Judge, especially when it said that it had got the information from a perfectly reliable quarter. I do not know what is the reliable quarter; but I know it is a quarter in which lies are forged and that this is one of them. I venture, my Lords, to say that it is intolerable that those who have to discharge public duties should be subjected to such attacks as these. And more than that, that they should be told that unless they rush into print and write to the newspapers and challenge and contradict these attacks that everybody is to believe them and write articles on the assumption that they are founded on fact. We sometimes see attacks upon the foreign Press for their campaigns of scandal. May it not be well to look once in a while at home, and to see whether if there be a mote in their eye there may not be a beam in our own. I have given my word on this matter; I have given cogent evidence in support of my word; but there is something more I am inclined to appeal to. I have now spent 20 years in Parliamentary life—eight of those in office—in that fierce light which is thrown on the action of every man who takes part in Parliamentary life. I ask those who have accused me and those who have been ready to believe the accusation, to what act of mine can they point, or to what word I have uttered that would indicate that I am capable of this contemptible conduct with which I have been charged? My lords, I believe no one could be more alive than I am to the importance of the Judges being independent and being no respecters of persons, for I have myself taken, part in the administration of justice. But there is another danger equally to be guarded against, and it is lest one should trim his sails to catch the passing gust of passion or allow ones judgment to be overborne by popular clamour. My Lords, I do not resent criticism. I welcome it. I hope I never shall be proud enough, or obstinate enough, or stupid enough to fail to profit by it. But the imputation of baseless motives and foul motives is not criticism; it is slander. I have spoken warmly. I hope your Lordships will pardon me, for I have felt deeply. From the first moment that I became Lord Chancellor it has been my dearest ambition that no act of mine should lead to the office being held in less esteem, or should diminish its dignity. For that I care more than for life itself. If I cannot be trusted to discharge the duties which the law has cast upon me, even with common honesty, I ought not to hold the Great Seal for another moment. I am conscious no one more so—that it may, that it will, pass into abler hands than mine. I hope it will not be thought unbecoming of me if I add that it will never be held by any one who will discharge the duties attached to it with a more sincere regard for its great responsibilities.