§ *LORD STANMORErose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—I. Whether, in consequence of the decision of Her Majesty's Government not to take into consideration the question of the construction of a railroad from the East Coast of Africa to Kikuyu, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to place upon the Victoria Nyanza and Lake Albert the steamers recommended by Sir G. Portal to be in that event placed there; and 2. Whether the decision announced with regard to Unyoro involves the abandonment of the forts erected, and the withdrawal of the force stationed, in that country? He said, their Lordships would recollect that when about 10 days ago the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the administration of Uganda the noble Earl dealt largely with negatives. He told the House, amongst other things, that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to extend an active protectorate over the States immediately surrounding Uganda; that it was not intended that the stations on the road from Mombasa to Uganda should be under the control of the Commissioner in Uganda; and, above all, that it was not intended to commence the railway from the coast or even to take into immediate consideration Whether such a railway was or was not desirable. It was needless to repeat with what earnestness and reiteration the necessity for making that railroad had been pressed at different times on Her Majesty's Government. That railway was the keynote of the Report of Sir Gerald Portal, who went so far as to assert that he 780
had no hesitation in saying that any organised system of administration or plan for the improvement of this country which may be devised must be in the nature of a makeshift.But Sir Gerald Portal either foresaw, or discovered after his return home, that the reluctance of the Government to embark on this enterprise was likely to throw in its way obstacles which might prove fatal to it. He therefore, in view of the possibility that the railway scheme might fail to be carried out notwithstanding all he had said in its favour, suggested in the last few paragraphs of his Report another possible plan, not as an equivalent to the railway scheme, but as a substitute for it if it were found altogether impracticable. That recommendation consisted in increasing the force on the Great Lakes and placing there steamers of a larger size than had been originally contemplated. It was not very safe to trust too much to internal evidence; but, if we might trust to it, one would be inclined to say that those paragraphs of the Report were an addition and an afterthought, and a somewhat hasty afterthought; because when they came to examine it they would perceive that while the scheme for putting larger steamers upon the Lakes as a substitute for the railway would not meet more than a few of the objects that the railway would carry into effect, its initial cost in the first year would be greater than the initial cost of commencing the work of the railway, though no doubt the plan of placing the steamers upon the Lakes would be cheaper in subsequent years than the construction of the railway. Yet the loss on the annual expenditure on the steamers would be one that would go on permanently, year after year without diminution, while the loss on the railway might every year be expected to diminish as the freight upon it and its receipts increased. In these circumstances he did not think that the alternative scheme was one which it was desirable to adopt; nor, after what the noble Lord had told them about the inability of this country to bear the expense, did he think that it was at all likely to be adopted when it was found that the initial cost would be greater than that of commencing a railway. But, still, it would afford a real reason for the rejection of the one scheme by Her Majesty's Government if they 781 had accepted the other. It might be a bad reason, but still it would be an assignable reason. Her Majesty's Government, if they adopted it, would be in a position to say, "Our Representative—that is to say, our Commissioner—in Uganda has put before us two schemes; we reject the one and take the other." He did not think it likely that Her Majesty's Government would say that; but if they did, it would afford an explanation of the rejection of the railway scheme. But, if the Government declared that they rejected both schemes the position was very different and rather curious. Everyone who had been connected with the administration of Uganda, or who had had anything to do with it, had urged in the strongest language, backed by the most forcible reasons, the construction of the railway, but Her Majesty's Government said, "No; we will not take either of these schemes. We think that we know a great deal better than any of these people who have been concerned in the administration of Uganda, and we firmly believe that the Protectorate will get on capitally without either railroad or ships." But they had not given for that belief one single reason, nor had they supported it by argument. It was simply the ipse dixit of Her Majesty's Government that Uganda could get on very well without these things. On many points connected with Uganda those who had had to do with it differed, and differed widely, from each other. Experts, so far as his experience went, were rather apt to do so; but on this point they all agreed. There was an unanimous concert of opinion amongst all those who had been engaged in the matter that the construction of this railway was absolutely necessary if the Protectorate was to be of any value whatever. Therefore, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must forgive him if he preferred the opinion of all those who had been practically concerned in the matter, backed by clear and convincing reasoning, rather than the dictum of Her Majesty's Government, backed by no argument at all. He said "backed by no argument at all," for the one argument which had been used as a reason why the railway should not be constructed—the argument of expense—though a very important argument no doubt in itself, was alto- 782 gether irrelevant to the question of whether the railway was or was not essential to the administration of the Protectorate of Uganda. It would really almost seem as though Her Majesty's Government were not alive to the vast importance which had been attached to the question of transport. They had been told by everyone who had a right to speak on the subject, that whether they regarded this question of Uganda as an administrative question or as a financial question, or as a commercial question, the question of transport always came to the front. As Sir Gerald Portal had expressed it—All these questions resolve themselves into the all-important and overshadowing question of transport and communication.He was the more afraid that Her Majesty's Government had hardly realised the importance of that point from something which fell from the noble Lord the President of the Council the other night. The noble Lord, to his (Lord Stanmore's) astonishment and alarm, said it would be a question for consideration on some future occasion whether it would not be a greater advantage to have a telegraph line to Uganda than a railway. The object in view was not the more rapid transmission of intelligence, but the more rapid transport of men and stores. The construction of an electric telegraph would not facilitate the passage of one ounce of goods from the coast to Uganda nor shorten by a single hour the length of the march, nor diminish the fatigues of that march which had already proved fatal to so many valuable lives. It could not be too often repeated that, although the route through the British sphere of influence to Uganda was shorter, that through the German sphere was easier and cheaper. He had been informed that a large part, if not the greater part, of the last Government stores that were sent to Uganda were sent by the German route, and that we had to pay an ad valorem Customs Duty of 11½ per cent, in consequence. Things were bad enough as they were at present, for even as things were the advantages of the German route would cause it to be preferred; but would they remain as they were? Certainly not. The reason which Her Majesty's Government had put forward for not making the railway was the great expenditure that would have to be 783 incurred this year on account of the Navy; but, as the expenditure upon the Navy was to be spread over five years in, he presumed, nearly equal amounts, the same argument would be put forward every year against the construction of the railway. Well, did their Lordships think that all this time, our neighbours in Uganda would remain inactive? Up to the present time the prospect that if Great Britain determined to retain Uganda she would also naturally set about ensuring her communication with the coast had prevented any other enterprise on a great scale being commenced. But that prospect had been removed by the declaration of the Secretary of State, and they would unquestionably see before the five years were over, a railway commenced, and very probably completed, through the German sphere of influence. The consequence would be that by the time we thought about constructing a British line it would be too late. There would not be traffic for two railways, and the one which was begun first would be the one which would probably win the day. The subject was not one which could be put off now and taken up again at pleasure. It was not a matter as to which we might consider at some future time whether it might or might not be desirable. Now was the time. If failure were courted he did not know that Her Majesty's Government could have invented a better method of bringing it about than by establishing this nominal Protectorate without the means of communication with the coast, and by allowing it to be borne down by enormous transport expenses, while losing all the advantages that might be derived from Customs Dues. The Custom Duties would all go to the German authorities, and the trade would all go into the hands of the German traders. This country would find its Protectorate so poor and worthless that probably in the end it would withdraw from it as being no longer able to maintain it. When it was a question as to whether we should go to Uganda at all or not, there were many who might have hesitated to return an affirmative answer, but the late Government had decided that question. At a later period it might still have been possible to withdraw—though he doubted whether it could have been done so without some dis- 784 honour or disgrace—but that possibility had been disposed of by the present Government. What could not be done with any credit was to establish a Protectorate and invite another Power, a friendly Power if you will, but still a rival Power, to undertake the enterprise which we had not the courage to undertake ourselves, and to supply those means of communication which would practically make a present to that Power of the revenues and of the advantages which we might derive from the Protectorate. As to his second question, about two years ago a line of forts was erected by Captain Lugard across Unyoro, with the object of preventing raids to the south of the line. Those forts were afterwards abandoned and the garrisons withdrawn. Later, another line of forts not identical with that of Captain Lugard, and to the north of it, but essentially for the same purpose, had been established. Since he had given notice of his questions the subject had been discussed in the other House of Parliament, and if he rightly understood the answer given by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs the forts were held to have been put up for the protection of Uganda. It was considered as a defensive measure for the defence of Uganda. That was very natural, and if it were so he presumed they would be maintained, and had consequently nothing more to say. But it was well that the matter should be made clear. It was difficult to make those who had had no personal experience of dealing with savage races to appreciate the dangers of vacillation. But to those who had had that experience, and there were several noble Lords in the House who had, he would confidently appeal to say whether anything was more likely to excite suspicion and distrust in the native mind than the policy of establishing, withdrawing, re-establishing and withdrawing a second time. There was another matter he desired to refer to, though he had not put a question on the Paper with regard to it, because he had nothing to ask, as the statement of the noble Lord had been perfectly explicit. He would merely express his regret that the stations between Uganda and the coast were not to be placed under the authority of the Commissioner in Uganda. On those stations, and the supplies obtained from them, the very existence of 785 the settlement in Uganda might depend. According to the scheme now proposed, the only way in which the Uganda Commissioner could remedy any mistake of the Commissioners on the road was by appealing to the Foreign Office, and then eight months must elapse before he received his reply. Finally, he would urge, above all things, the vast importance of the appointment of the Commissioner for Uganda. Even if a man possessing the exceptional qualities which were necessary was appointed, there would always be danger that the ineradicable suspicions of savages might upset the arrangements the Government had made; but if there were not such a man, only the ordinary commonplace official who looked to his appointment merely as a stepping-stone to something better, and who looked to Members of the House of Commons and the London evening papers for guidance, then trouble was absolutely certain. Find your man with care, but, having found him, trust him. Under a man who was not fully trusted, and whom they would try to keep in check from home, there were quite certain to be unpleasant occurrences, possibly disaster of a grave and serious character, such as this country would be happy to escape from without the loss of honour also.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy noble Friend has spoken at great length with respect to the railway, to which his Notice does not refer, and he has said extremely little about the steamers, to which his Notice does refer. I shall not be drawn into a discussion of the railway; but with regard to the steamers all I can say is this—that all the recommendations of Sir Gerald Portal, which are very numerous, are under consideration, but I cannot at present say how far the recommendation about the steamers may be adopted. I am afraid—from the opportunities I have had of judging—that if I were to express an opinion, being only the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would have very little weight with the noble Lord. With regard to his second question, referring to Unyoro, Colonel Colville, the acting Commissioner in Uganda, is authorised to take whatever measures are indispensable for the safety and defence of Uganda; and if Unyoro continues hostile it will be for Colonel Colville to 786 judge of the military measures which are necessary for that purpose.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWhat force has Colonel Colville with him?
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI do not think I could tell the noble Marquess off-hand. But it comprises a really useful and valuable force of Soudanese, who are the remnants of one of the regiments of Emin Pasha, and there are also a very large number of armed natives of the country, who have been, as I gather, largely employed in Unyoro. But the most valuable portion of the force is undoubtedly the Soudanese. As to the arrangements for the management of the country between Uganda and the coast, it is simply a question of convenience and administration. If the noble Lord looks into the matter he will see—though the question is not yet absolutely decided—that the management of the transport to the coast can be better done by the Commisssioner at Zanzibar with a Sub-Commisioner under him than by the Commissioner at Uganda. Of course, the former would be in constant communication with the latter and would be aware of what his wishes were.
§ [The subject then dropped.]