§ *LORD STANMORE moved for Papers with respect to the Protectorate of Uganda. Disclaiming any desire or intention to ask for the production of Papers the Contents of which it might, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be injudicious or inconvenient to disclose, he stated that his sole object in giving the notice in that form was to enable any noble Lords wishing to address the House on the subject to do so more fully, and in a more regular manner than they would have been able to do had he adhered to the form of question of which he had originally given notice. When he gave this notice he was under the impression—an impression fully justified by the statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on the re-assembling of that House after the Whitsuntide Recess—that a Debate on this subject would take place also in their Lordships' House on the same date. The Debate had been postponed in the other House of Parliament simply on account of the exigencies of business there, their whole time being required for the consideration of measures of a more urgent nature, and in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government of more pressing importance, than the affairs of Central Africa. Even if the Debate in the other House were not to take place, he might 134 perhaps be doing a service to Her Majesty's Government, and earning unawares the gratitude of the noble Earl the Lord President of the Council by giving him an opportunity in this House of declaring to the country what its intentions were with regard to the declaration previously made to their Lordships. On the 12th of April the noble Earl stated in that House that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to establish a regular administration in Uganda, and declare it under a British Protectorate. That announcement was received with satisfaction by noble Lords, and had met throughout the country an approval so general that, in spite of some dissentient voices, it might fairly be said to have obtained a national ratification. But, satisfactory as the declaration was, so far as it went, it must be confessed that the noble Earl's utterances were very concise, and were studiously guarded and general in their expression. It was no reflection upon him to say that for he had himself so described them. No impatience was expressed, nor, he believed, was any felt at that time at the reticence of Her Majesty's Government, because it was understood that, having agreed upon that general policy which was announced, it might well be that they might require time to consider the details of the manner in which that general declaration was to be carried out. But more than seven weeks had elapsed since that date, and he thought the House had a right to ask, and not only a right to ask but a right to obtain, some further information with regard to the decisions which must undoubtedly have been taken by Her Majesty's Government on the subject, and the instructions which must have been as undoubtedly conveyed to our agents in Africa with regard to it. A Protectorate might be of more than one character; it might involve very grave responsibilities, amounting almost to actual possession and direction; or it might be so slight and colourable as to be little more than a name. Some of our latest Protectorates had been of that character. We had not very long ago established a Protectorate over the Solomon Islands, and in the name of that Protectorate, and exercising a protective power, we had called upon the inhabitants of those Islands to help the Government in the 135 prosecution of certain objects it had in view. That help was freely given, and those people had in consequence put themselves in a position of great danger of being massacred by their neighbours. But when they asked for protection they were told that those who had undertaken to protect them could not do so. Now, that kind of Protectorate was not of much value. He did not suppose for a moment that Her Majesty's Government intended that only a Protectorate of that description should be extended to Uganda; but it would be quite compatible with the declaration of the noble Earl. How British authority and influence was to be exercised in Uganda was still an entirely doubtful matter. Our rights over Uganda might even be exercised by delegating their performance to someone else by leasing out the execution of them, as we had done with regard to another portion of the territory subject to our influence in Africa under a Convention. Not that he was prepared to blame that Convention. On the contrary, it seemed to set at rest many points of importance, although undoubtedly it raised other questions which would require further discussion in the future. With regard to the subject of the Motion, it would be remembered that in the Report of Sir Gerald Portal several methods were discussed by which effect might be given to the British influence in Uganda. One suggestion was that the British Government might take over the actual government of the country. That he took to be disposed of by the noble Earl's declaration. Another was that our influence should be exercised through the Sultan of Zanzibar, whether directly or as representing the British Government. It would be difficult for anyone to press the adoption of that mode of solving the question after the destructive criticism poured upon it by Sir Gerald Portal. There remained, then, the question either of the Protectorate as suggested by Sir Gerald Portal—the existence of a native Government acting under the direction and guidance of a British Commissioner, or some other mode which might be devised by Her Majesty's Government, and which might appear to them superior to all others suggested. It could, not be considered premature or a display of impertinent 136 curiosity for their Lordships to ask to be informed in some further detail in what mode that influence was to be exercised. The practical question was whether this Protectorate was to be a shadowy one, sufficient to keep out any other Foreign Powers which might appear on the scene, or was it to be a practical one which would discharge the responsibilities of protection which we had incurred, and further the interests of the British Empire generally? There could be no doubt of the answer which their Lordships would return to that question; he wished he could feel equally certain as to the answer which would be returned to it. In saying that, he desired to cast no reproach on the present Government. The best part of his life had been spent in colonial administration, and he knew only too well how great was the pressure upon the Government of the day—no matter what political Party might be in power—to abstain from decisive acts in matters abroad. That was a very natural indisposition, but it was sometimes a very unfortunate one. It was forgotten that to take no action at all, or to defer action unduly, was often the most important action which could at the time possibly be taken, and that the saving of a few thousand pounds expense at the time often led to a very much larger expenditure, to be made perhaps in vain, at a later period. The satisfaction with which the public had received the announcement made by the Lord President of the Council would, he thought, have been enhanced had he been able to state that the distinguished officer who must certainly be credited with having first formally established a regular Government in Uganda was to take some part in its further development and extension. He had not the honour of any personal acquaintance with Captain Lugard, even of the very slightest description, but it was impossible to read what Captain Lugard had written, and to know what he had done, without perceiving that he possessed that quality which was the first, the best—and he should not very greatly exaggerate if he even said the only—essential to the successful government of native races, the power to make them act in their own way under their own leaders and of their own free will in the direction in which he wished them to go. A man possessing that power, even if in other 137 respects a man of but ordinary average ability, might do almost what he pleased with such a people; he could mould the course of events like wax, while a man far abler in other respects and of more varied talents but without that necessary power would be as unable to deal with natives as he would be to shape with his bare fingers a block of granite. Possibly there might be reasons against the further employment of Captain Lugard. All he would say was that they ought to be very strong ones indeed, for in a great national enterprise the Government could not afford to throw away or disregard the services of instruments whose fitness had been already proved. Certainly he could scarcely class as sufficiently strong objections either the displeasure of a small knot of Members of the other House of Parliament or the dissatisfaction of either British or foreign ecclesiastics, and still less that incurable though very natural love of docile mediocrity which so often formed the characteristic of bureaucratic departmental administration.
§
Moved—
That Papers be laid before this House with respect to the Protectorate of Uganda."—(The Lord Stanmore.)
§ LORD HERRIESdesired to put a further question on this matter. Though he agreed with much that had fallen from his noble Friend, he could hardly agree with him in the appreciative comments in the last sentences of his speech on the conduct of Captain Lugard, who he recognised had been placed in a very difficult position. But there had been a great difference of opinion throughout Europe as to the conduct of Captain Lugard in the unfortunate affairs which took place in Uganda in the beginning of 1892. He asked a question in June, 1892, of the noble Marquess opposite, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, whether he would, without expressing any opinion as to the rights or wrongs of the difficulties which had arisen in Uganda, be prepared to send out to Uganda some person who was qualified to make a report as to what had happened, and who would be able to give the public in this country some satisfactory account of what had really happened in January and February of 1892 in Uganda. A week or two after that discussion a telegram was sent to Sir Gerald Portal 138 stating that Captain Macdonald was to be sent to Uganda for the purpose of making an independent inquiry as to the circumstances which had occurred in the Spring of that year. Nearly two years had elapsed since that question was put, and since the authority was given to make inquiry, but they were still in the dark as to the result of the inquiry. Would the noble Earl be prepared to give their Lordships Captain Macdonald's account of what took place in Uganda in the Spring of 1892? He desired to call their Lordships' attention to three subjects especially, which had never been fully explained. Captain Lugard's account of what took place in January, 1892, stated that the immediate cause of the troubles that arose then was what he described as the cold-blooded murder of a Protestant by a Roman Catholic in the streets of Mengo. This incident had been described by the opposite party as an act of self-defence. The Catholic chief, it was said, was in his house, that the opponent made his way into the "compound" which surrounded the house, and was in the act of attacking when the defender, in his own self-defence, shot the intruder. The question was brought before the King, and he acquitted the chief, who was acting in self-defence. He did not wish to say which was the true story, but it was evident that the two stories were contradictory, and he thought that the Report of Captain Macdonald might possibly contain some information which would clear up this difference of opinion. Immediately after this incident Captain Lugard distributed 450 rifles to those natives who were friendly. In his opinion that act was very much to be reprobated, because he did not think that Captain Lugard was in any personal danger. To give 450 rifles to men in a most excited state at the time was most likely to produce the very trouble which it was his duty to prevent. Captain Lugard stated in a Report that only one man of his own force was killed during the year and a-half he was in Uganda. He could hardly, therefore, have been in any very imminent danger. The third point which required clearing up was as to what efforts had been made to secure religious liberty in Uganda. An Agreement was stated to have been made between the two parties that if an 139 individual changed his religion he was at once to forfeit his land and property. Their Lordships would concur with him that such an Agreement smacked rather of the 16th than of the 19th century. That Agreement had never been produced; but if it existed, and had been really acted upon, some evidence of it should be given. He asked the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if information could be given on those subjects, and particularly whether if this country were to come within our Protectorate those who became subject to it would enjoy the greatest of all rights possessed by every British subject—liberty of conscience.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Earl of KIMBERLEY)My Lords, I am much obliged to my noble Friend who introduced this discussion for the opportunity it gives me of making some statement to the House with regard to the very important question connected with Uganda. I am sorry that it has been necessary for the discussion to be delayed until the present occasion; but I do not think that the matter will suffer from the postponement. Her Majesty's Government are quite ready, as they always have been, to give any information in their power that Parliament has a right to require. The noble Lord commenced by asking a very pertinent question indeed—namely, what was the nature of this Protectorate which we propose to establish in Uganda? I think it would be most conveniently answered if, in the first place, I explain what we propose the limits of that Protectorate should be. Uganda is a country which formerly exercised much more authority over various States which were more or less tributary to its King. Our intention is that our Protectorate now to be proclaimed shall extend only to the territory known as Uganda proper. That territory can be accurately defined—of course, as far as a country of that nature can possibly be accurately defined, by stating that it is a country bounded by the territories known as Usoga, Unyoro, Toru, and a small territory called Koki. That is the definition of the territory over which we propose to establish our Protectorate. Then, as regards the territories I have mentioned which are the territories immediately adjoining Uganda, with which it is of 140 course necessary that we should have relations, we intend that those relations should be confined as far as possible to Agreements with the different chiefs for the maintenance of peace with Uganda, for that very important object the suppression of the Slave Trade, and also for the encouragement and protection of British trade and commerce. Captain Lugard concluded certain Treaties with regard to the territories I have mentioned, and also with certain minor chiefs in the neighbourhood of the Albert Nyanza. Those Treaties have never been approved in the ordinary manner as in the case of Treaties concluded by the Company in order to enable the Company to exercise the powers those Treaties might confer. They have not been dealt with on account of the Company having retired from Uganda. It will be necessary, therefore, to reconsider these Treaties and to put them into such a shape as will be conformable with the general policy which her Majesty's Government intend to pursue in those regions. With regard to the protectorate, speaking generally, because precise details can scarcely be formulated, it is our intention to establish such a Protectorate as is described by Sir Gerald Portal on page 36 of the Report presented to Parliament. From that it will be seen that the Protectorate will be exercised by a Commissioner appointed by the Government, but that it will not be the duty of that Commissioner to interfere at all with the details of government. The actual administration will be left in the hands of the native chiefs, the Commissioner having all the powers to perserve peace and tranquility in the country, and it will be his duty to see that equal justice is meted out to all. In his powers will be included in the fullest manner the enforcement of the principle that there should be perfect impartiality maintained between all religions in the territory. That is shortly the nature of the Protectorate we propose to establish. This brings us at once to a very important question. When we have established the Protectorate, what is to be the fate of East Africa Company? That is a question by no means without difficulty. Our view is that, inasmuch as the Company has retired from and abandoned the territory of Uganda and the other far-reaching territories which it had pre- 141 viously occupied, the Company is not now advancing the interests of the country, which it was the intention of the Charter that it should advance. For these reasons we think that a very serious question has arisen as to the exercise of the power reserved in the Charter to Her Majesty to revoke that Charter, but, in the first instance, we desire, if possible, that some arrangement should be made by which what is known as the concession—that is a different matter from the Charter—granted by the Sultan of Zanzibar of a strip of territory 20 miles wide, reaching for a long distance on the coast, should be reacquired by the Sultan of Zanzibar. We are in communication with the Sultan on the subject, and until the negotiations are further advanced and some more definite results have been attained with regard to them, we do not propose to raise the question of the revocation of the Charter, as we desire that both the concession and the Charter should he dealt with together, because as those who are acquainted with the affairs of Uganda and that part of Africa are aware, the interests under the concession and those arising under the Charter are intimately connected. There is also the wide question of the territories which separate Uganda from that part of the coast to which the concession relates. I need scarcely say that it is absolutely necessary that the Government should continue to exercise control over these territories in order to ensure free and easy access to Uganda and the Protectorate. A suggestion has been made—I think by Sir Gerald Portal—that a Sub-Commissioner should be appointed under our Zanzibar Commissioner, not as regards Uganda but as regards this portion of the territory. I think that arrangement may probably be found to be convenient, but it will be necessary to have a much more careful examination of the matter on the spot than has hitherto taken place. At present I am unable to say whether it would be expedient to adopt that arrangement or whether it would be possible to establish some sort of Protectorate for that purpose. But I do not anticipate there will be any difficulty on that part of the matter. It is, of course, obvious that we must exercise some control over these territories. It is simply a question in what way the 142 control can be most conveniently exercised. At present the Company occupy two stations and have a variety of Treaties with the different chiefs in the territories in question. That naturally brings me to some reference to a very important matter—namely, the connection of Uganda with the coast by means of a railway, referred to by the noble Marquess opposite on a former occasion in this House. Sir Gerald Portal stated the advantages which a railway would confer upon Uganda, but suggested that it might be desirable it should not be constructed further than the Kikuyu district. The position we take is that the whole matter is not sufficiently advanced, the establishment of the Protectorate not having actually taken place for Her Majesty's Government to make any proposal for the expenditure of public money upon that undertaking. Those are the principal points which arise immediately in connection with the Protectorate; but I think I should not be acting fairly by the House if I did not refer also to the war that has been going on, as your Lordships know from notices appearing in the newspapers, in the adjoining territory of Unyoro. Unyoro, I may say, is a powerful native State immediately to the North and North West of Uganda, and its Chief, Kabarega, has never been friendly to us, or indeed to Europeans at all. From intelligence we have received it appears that Colonel Colville, the present Acting Commissioner in Uganda, found the actions of that Chief so aggressive that decisive steps should be taken against him. A serious war resulted, in which Colonel Colville and the troops under his command obtained conspicuous successes. We did not know until very recently what had taken place, but no instructions have been given authorising the establishment of a Protectorate over Unyoro. It will be necessary to have the whole matter fully before us in detail before we can form any final judgment as to the course to be taken with regard to it. There is one other matter connected with the proceeding which Colonel Colville has been engaged in—I will not call it an expedition, but rather a visit which has been paid to Wadelai at the North of Lake Albert, where it appears that some Treaty has been made, and some arrangements entered into with the Chief of that place. If anything further has been done, it 143 would be in excess of the instructions issued—I mean the establishment of a British post or a British Protectorate in that region. It will, of course, be apparent to the House that inasmuch as we have concluded an Agreement with the King of the Belgians, which has been laid upon the Table, allowing to him that sphere of influence, we have not it in contemplation to establish ourselves at Wadelai. Although the arrangement concluded with the King of the Belgians is not immediately connected with the matter before us, I think I ought to say a word upon that very important subject. A Despatch which I addressed to Mr. Harding, the new Commissioner who has just gone out to Zanzibar, has been laid on the Table of the House giving shortly an account of the circumstances which led to this matter. I do not think I can add anything to what is stated in that Despatch, but it will be obvious to the House that this is no new idea which entered into our heads, but was the result of communications which have been going on for some time, and it appeared to us that after the advances which have been made by the Belgians into that district, and, in the existing circumstances, now that we are about to establish a Protectorate in Uganda, it was urgently necessary that we should come to some distinct arrangement with the King of the Belgians, and, if I may use the expression, put upon a regular footing an occupation which had not hitherto been recognised by us. We do not think that in making that agreement we have in any way violated the rights of any other Power; and as far as we ourselves are concerned, whilst it secures to us a friendly neighbour it certainly does not tend to increase in any way the activity of our own movements in that part of Africa. It rather tends for the time to restrict our responsibilities and enables us to devote ourselves to the immediate duty before us—namely, the consolidation of our Protectorate of Uganda and the administration of the vast region which is implied in that term. My Lords, I have touched upon some of these matters very briefly, but I hope sufficiently to have given the House a general view of the situation. If there be any other points on which information is desired, I have not the least wish to avoid giving the 144 House all the information I can; but I am not sure I need add anything except to refer to a point raised by the noble Lord who spoke second—namely, the unfortunate question which arose as to the manner in which the Roman Catholics in Uganda had been treated in some occurrences which happened when Captain Lugard was there some little time ago. The noble Lord asked me if I could present to Parliament a Report of Captain Macdonald. I regret to say I can give only one answer—namely, that the Report was of a confidential nature, and I do not think it would be to the interest of the Public Service that it should be presented to Parliament. As regards the questions which have arisen in connection with the Roman Catholics, we have been, and still are, in communication with the French Government, and, that being the case, I think it better to say nothing further on the subject except that, as regards Catholic priests and missionaries in Uganda, and those connected with them, it is our intention and determination that they shall be treated with fairness and justice in every respect. I may add this one remark—that the intelligence we have received from Colonel Colville shows that, as far as he is concerned, his relations with Monseigneur Hirsch, who is at the head of the Catholic missionaries, are of a cordial and friendly character. That is all I think it necessary to say to the House. I hope I shall be excused for not entering into more precise details; but the House will understand that a matter of this kind, in which it is not possible in less than three months to have communication with our agents in Central Africa, is one of extreme difficulty and one in which every step requires to be most fully and carefully considered; and, although you may lay down general principles as to your course of action, it is both unwise and premature to pledge yourselves to particular and intricate details which ought to be settled only after full communication with the Commissioner on the spot enjoying, under the altered circumstances of the Protectorate, the entire confidence of Her Majesty's Government. In saying this, I do not mean to reflect in the least on Colonel Colville, but we should be careful not to take any steps we might afterwards have to retrace, for however wise may be our 145 measures, we cannot be expected at once to establish a thoroughly stable and satisfactory administration in a region so distant and where there are so many conflicting elements and many difficulties arising out of past occurrences and out of rival factions in the country, whose animosities, difficult to appease, make the administration of the country singularly arduous and difficult under any circumstances. I have no Papers at present to lay before the House; but, indeed, there is very little that has not been already produced; and when we have anything further, especially in regard to the Belgian Agreement, I shall be perfectly ready to communicate it to the House.
*THE DUKE OF NORFOLKexpressed astonishment at the statement of the noble Earl that the Report of Captain Macdonald was of a confidential character. On a former occasion when he asked a question in the House with regard to the religious troubles in Uganda, the noble Earl (who was then Foreign Secretary, Lord Rosebery) said that, inasmuch as a Report from Captain Macdonald was expected, it was inopportune to go into the question, and in the absence of that Report he deprecated discussion. Now their Lordships were told the Report was confidential, and they were not allowed to know what it contained. He had no wish to press for any Papers which, in the view of the Government, ought not to be produced; but he must point out that the Catholic missionaries might justly look to their co-religionists in this country to protect their honour, especially as they had been compromised by questions connected with British administration. Therefore, he trusted the Government would be able to give complete assurance and guarantees that in the future absolute religious freedom would be the rule in Uganda, and not only so, but that in the future Catholic missionaries would not be allowed to suffer in any way from any reflection upon their conduct imputed to them in the past when their friends at home were not allowed to have the official Report showing what their conduct had been. They had every right to insist that in common fairness the events dealt with in the Report should not be allowed to prejudice the position of the Catholic missionaries. Complete reli- 146 gious freedom should be ensured for both Catholics and Protestants in the future. He could not undertake not to press further for Captain Macdonald's Report if its non-production prejudiced the future of the missionaries, but he trusted that if Her Majesty's Government intended to bottle up this Report to which their Lordships had been told they might look for information, some guarantee would be given that in no sense would that withholding of information be made a cloak to hamper the Catholic missionaries in the future. He thought it right to make that protest.
*THE EARL OF MAYOsaid, there seemed no doubt that Great Britain had annexed Uganda. The difficulty lay in getting there. Their Lordships had just heard that communications took three months. One-fourth of the distance was through a country so unhealthy and deadly that Europeans could not travel through it without great danger, and, difficult as it was to get there, it was just as hard to get away. The only reason for annexing it seemed to be that the Government were afraid of some other country taking it. He was sorry that a more definite statement had not been made with regard to a railway from the coast in respect of which a great deal of money had been already expended in surveying. What was the use of Uganda if you could not get there, or if you had to spend three months in getting there? If a railway were made, there was no doubt that it would be of use, though at present the trade of Uganda with the coast was almost nil—about £1,000 worth of ivory was brought down, and through the Custom House at Mombasa a few articles of rubber and things of no great importance passed. Some day, no doubt, there would be a line right up from the Cape to the Soudan, but he did not suppose that any who were living would see it. If there was a prospect of this piece of railway being made, there might be some use in our retaining Uganda; but without a railway there could be no trade to make it worth retaining, and it would be simply left to swelter in the furnace of Africa with nothing to support it.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, we have heard from the noble Earl an interesting, I cannot say a satisfactory speech, but it would be premature to enter fully into the subjects he 147 has touched upon, because the necessities of his official position have compelled him to observe so much reticence as to details that it is difficult to appreciate exactly what has taken place. I do not complain in the least of that reticence on his part; I can well understand that it may be required; but, nevertheless, the items of information which he had to give us are not of a cheering character. In the first place, I understand that the Company has been condemned, and is only awaiting the coup de grace. I cannot deny that the Company is in a financial condition which does not render it an efficient auxiliary of the British Government in the performance of its duties in those regions; but still the Company is deserving of some consideration. Through it large sums of money have been risked and lost, and great energies and much devotion have been expended in carrying British dominion, civilisation, and Christianity into those countries. I think the Company is worthy of all the consideration we can show it, whether in the shape of prolonging its existence or in the shape of some recognition of the services it has rendered. It is not only that we should be animated by gratitude to the Company, but there is also the reflection that if adventures and efforts of this kind are treated with jealousy and harshness we are not likely to find men so ready in future to do what they can to push forward the influence and greatness of this country in distant lands. I rather share the feeling of noble Lords who have spoken with respect to the on production of Captain Macdonald's Report. I do not deny that the Report may be, as the Foreign Secretary said, of a confidential character, but I am sorry that he did not say that it was within his power to give us some indication of the conclusions to which it tends, and relieve the minds of my noble Friends from the feeling that undue reflection had been cast on the conduct of their co-religionists. I should, of course, be very sorry to rake up old fires and renew old conflicts; but if any calumny is resting, or is felt to be resting, on the heads of either of the great Religious Organisations, I fear a bitterness will be left behind, more likely to break out again in future struggles than if some effort were made by the Government to remove any sus- 148 picion that has been entertained. But I mention this rather also because, while I entirely agree with my noble Friends that Catholics have a right to look to their friends in this country to defend them, I am not sure that I am so ready to appeal to other champions whom the noble Earl indicated in his speech. He said he had been corresponding with the Government of France with respect to the missionaries. As far as that applies to the missionaries who are French subjects, of course nothing would be more natural or more legitimate.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am very glad to have elicited that explanation, because I often see in public discussions a kind of assumption that France has a right to protect Catholics all over the world. Now, France has undoubtedly the right to protect them in Turkey by Treaty with the Ottoman Government, and I believe, though I am not sure, that some arrangement of the kind has been entered into with China; but, even recognising to the utmost the zeal of France for the Roman Catholic Church, I cannot admit that France has a natural right to protect the Roman Catholics, and I should be sorry if any countenance to that claim were given in any speech or document issued by the British Government. But the noble Earl has entirely relieved my apprehensions on the point, and I see I misunderstood him. Another point on which I listened with great care to the words of the noble Lord refers to the fate of those other countries that are not included in this new Uganda Protectorate. In what would be philosophically called the diplomatic evolution of recent years sundry new ideas of modified and limited possession have come into general use. We talk now not only of "protectorates," but also of "spheres of influence." It is a very odd metaphor. I do not know exactly how you get into the sphere of influence.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYAt all events, it expresses an idea which we understand very well. It is a right over countries which does not involve for the present the duty of undertaking the 149 regular government, but which establishes that the quasi-independence of those countries must, at all events, be recognised by other civilised Powers. Now to the north and north-west of Uganda there is a large stretch of territory which is under British influence. It was declared to be under British influence in formal and definite terms by the Anglo-German Convention. That Convention was known to all the world, and I think was communicated formally to many Governments, and I must take it—the noble Lord did not drop a word inconsistent with the assumption—that that sphere of influence remains absolutely intact, and that we do not recognise any pretensions from any quarter to interfere with it. I do not mean by these words to cast any reflection or express any blame for the Treaty with the King of the Belgians which has recently been effected. On the contrary, so far as I know, it seems to be a sensible arrangement, and I do not think it differs very largely from one which was under discussion at the time I left Office. The King of the Belgians is a neighbour we may be very glad to have, and whom we can perfectly trust to undertake for us, and in the interest of all the things which we have most at heart, the care of territories which for the time he can reach more readily than we can. That does not affect in any degree the ultimate title which we have to those territories, and must not be looked upon as affecting anybody except ourselves and the Belgians. But I am bound to say that the part of the noble Earl's speech which will attract most notice in this country, and which also very largely affects the condition of these distant territories, is that in which he told us he is not going to do anything in favour of the railway. I regret that announcement exceedingly. I should not ask for a large expenditure. We have all cause to know that the British Government is not very affluent at this moment.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYBut I should ask for an expenditure of something in the way of a beginning, something showing that a railway was part of our policy, and that we intended to communicate with this new Protectorate of ours by some mode more rapid than a three months' post. That, I think, would 150 have been desirable, both in the interest of those countries themselves and in the interest of our relations with other Powers. The result of leaving this territory at three months' distance without any effort to make the communication more rapid and more secure will be, not that you will pursue your policy with that care and circumspection which the noble Earl spoke of, but an exactly opposite result. The result will be that your government will be conducted entirely by your subordinates out there, and that your voice in the matter will be absolutely none. You will be in the presence of a fait accompli by every post that comes from Uganda. It is useless, of course, to censure the officer. You know that in most cases an officer acts on his best judgment in great difficulty and danger; you cannot consult him beforehand, and you will have to assent to whatever he may do. We have had plenty of experience of that—100 or 120 years ago in the government of India, and we had a more modified experience of it only about 15 years ago in our dealings with the King of the Zulus. If we could have had some more rapid communication in those days such as we have now, the Zulu War, with all the discredit that attached to it, with all the terrible embarrassments of which it was the undoubted cause, would never have taken place. I regret, therefore, exceedingly that the policy of more rapid communication has not been kept in view by Her Majesty's Government. And there is yet one other suggestion in reference to it which I hope the Government will well consider. It is not safe in these days to establish your title to large territory three months from home, and then to leave it there without any effort to assert your title in a more practical and more effective fashion. The whole doctrine of paper annexation is in a very fluid and uncertain condition. We do not admit that mere claim without any attempt to assert our position will confer permanent Sovereignty; in fact, we have denied that very doctrine in the case of Portugal and denied it practically. On the other hand, it would be most absurd to say that, because a Power cannot immediately make good, in a practical measure, the claims it has laid down and establish the emblems and the methods of its government in all regions where its 151 title has been proclaimed, therefore that title is ineffective or loses its validity. But there is something between those two extremes, and I believe that, in order to make your claim over these vast regions a genuine one, and one that the public opinion of Europe will respect, you ought, I do not say to take possession of it at once, I do not say to take it immediately under your effective Government, but you ought to show that you are gradually assimilating it, gradually making good your possession of it, and your claim, your control, and your title to be considered persons who are introducing into it the benefits of civilisation and Christianity. I fear greatly that if this railway be abandoned and allowed to float back into the past as a forgotten scheme, that if you are content to maintain as best you can a sort of very modified hold over this Protectorate of Uganda and no hold at all over the vast regions that surround it—I fear that, as time goes on, we shall find difficulties arising around us, and that the maintenance of our power over this region will not be as easy as it would be now if we made only a slight effort. And, in conclusion, I earnestly urge that, in pressing our right over those countries, we are not actuated by any merely ambitious view of extending the boundaries of the British Empire, or the grandeur of the claims which that Empire can put forward. There is a much more solid reason: to keep our trade, our industries alive we must open new sources of consumption in the more untrodden portions of the earth, and we are the only nation that can occupy those countries without shutting them to all the world besides. If we occupy a distant, large, and uncivilised country and attempt to make it subservient to the purposes of commerce, we injure no others, because all others are as free to use it for commercial purposes as ourselves. But there are other countries which, if they occupy any of these regions, entirely shut it out from British commerce, as though the access to it was physically impossible. In the interests of our industry and our trade, which never more needed such care and such support as the British Government can, according to our principles, accord—in the interests of our trade and industry, I earnestly hope we shall do all we can to maintain, push forward, and strengthen our power in these rich and 152 extensive regions, and that we shall not by any weakness, or feebleness, or undue economy now forfeit the brilliant hopes which a stronger policy might give us in the future.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY AND LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Earl of ROSEBERY)My Lords, I am quite sure that as far as the Government are concerned we have no reason to complain of the tone which this discussion has assumed. I think there has been a sense of responsibility on the part of every speaker who has addressed your Lordships which is eminently creditable to them as individuals and is not unsatisfactory to the character of the House as a whole. With the speech of the noble Marquess I find myself largely and substantially in agreement. I think that in his closing sentences he set forth with an eloquence all his own and with that justice of perception which has marked his statesmanship in relation to foreign affairs the true object of our intervention in East Africa. But with regard to points of details upon which he touched I must, perhaps, say something more particularly. I agree on the whole with what he said about the services of the Company. The Company has endeavoured to do a considerable work, and the only part of his speech with which I should be inclined to differ would be that in which the idea was suggested that it was intended to treat the Company with harshness and ingratitude. Of course, in these great enterprises it is not considered necessary for a Government to bear the whole risk which is in the beginning borne by the Company. No one, I think—not even the noble Marquess himself, with his large and liberal views towards the Company—would say that Her Majesty's Government were bound to re-imburse the Company in respect of an expenditure because the object of that expenditure has not happened to succeed. What my noble Friend said with regard to our relations with the Company is perfectly accurate. We think that the Power that should, in the first place, at any rate, deal with the Company is not Her Majesty's Government, but the Government of Zanzibar, which is immediately interested in the most valuable, if I may so call it, of the Company's assets, and it is with the very 153 object of arriving at a friendly arrangement with that Government that we postponed, until these negotiations have arrived at some result or another, the reconsideration of their position and their Charter. I do not think my noble Friend used any words which would justify the assumption that we were anxious roughly and rudely to snatch away the Charter from the Company; but I think no one can read the Charter in its very explicit terms without feeling that the Company has failed to implement the conditions of the Charter, not altogether by its own fault, and that therefore the question of the revocation of the Charter is one that it is perfectly open to Her Majesty's Government to consider. Then we come to the question of Captain Macdonald's Report. I have no reason to complain of what was said on that head by either the noble Duke or the noble Marquess. The noble Duke, I think, carried my answer of last July a little further than I should have carried it; but as I have not the text by me, and as the feeling of delivery is different from the feeling of reception, I will not quarrel with the noble Duke's interpretation. Nor will I quarrel with the thirst for information displayed by the noble Marquess. The facts as narrated in Captain Macdonald's Report are simple, though not such as I can lay before the House at this juncture. We chose Captain Macdonald to conduct this inquiry not because we considered him a judicial Commissioner sent on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to conduct what we might almost consider as an International operation, but because he happened to be an engineer officer on the spot, and we thought that he might furnish to the Government in confidence a primâ facie relation of the impression produced on his mind by such inquiry as he could conduct in Uganda. The Report in itself was, I will not say satisfactory, but at any rate by no means conclusive, and the noble Marquess who has had so vast an experience in relation to these matters will be the first to feel that that Report is not a document that should be laid before your Lordships' House as a definite Report on this subject. In relation to the equality of treatment of Catholics and Protestants in Uganda, as to which the noble Duke inquired, I have to say that we are prepared if necessary to give him any pledge, 154 if he asks it, that may be satisfactory in that matter. But it is not by the British Government at the end of the 19th century that such a pledge can be considered necessary. As to the question of our sphere of influence, and of our relations to the various nations within that sphere of influence, not Uganda, the noble Marquess said that it is necessary when a sphere of influence is undertaken it ought not to be abandoned to chance. I should have thought that, the noble Marquess having had two years after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement in which to carry out any occupation that he thought necessary for that sphere of influence, and we having had only 20 months, our 20 months' work will compare favourably with the noble Marquess's two years' work. As regards the sphere which was established by agreement with Germany on July 1, 1890, we consider it in full force, and we intend to maintain it as a substantive arrangement. Subsequently we received the recognition of Italy of our sphere of influence, because up to that time it was only an arrangement between the two Powers, and now we have received the recognition of it by the Congo States, which may fairly be described as one of the great African Powers. Therefore, three out of the four great African Powers—Germany, Italy, and the Congo States—have recognised our status in Uganda as a part of the African system. That is a considerable stride in the direction which the noble Marquess has pointed out as necessary for us to take. But a great deal more has been done. We have concluded, or there has been concluded for us—I admit partly in the time when the noble Marquess was in Office—some 80 Treaties of friendship and protection with the neighbouring tribes and nations that inhabit our sphere of influence. Considering that this sphere has existed for only three and a-half years, I think that result is satisfactory. With respect to the Uganda railway, I think I have approached the question of Uganda and the Imperial questions connected with it in a spirit of quite as much ardour as any of the noble Lords who have taken part in this Debate; but I combine with that ardour discretion. I think the railroad is a matter which cannot be dissociated from the arrangements in contemplation for Uganda; but it is not one which 155 requires us to take any immediate steps in connection with its construction. And I take that view from more points than one. There is the further material consideration which has occurred to the noble Marquess himself, that this country is not at this moment particulary affluent. We are called upon to make a great sacrifice in order to maintain our naval position, which we believe to be more important to the interests of the Empire than Uganda, or even 100 Ugandas. I think, under the circumstances, we were justified in postponing the consideration of the construction of the railway. But I will go a step further. The noble Marquess has said that the Empire of India would have been more closely connected with us than it was if we had had better communication with that country.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am not sure that I went quite so far as to say that.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI should not myself consider it an unmixed advantage, and I do not know that if the noble Marquess filled the office of Viceroy of India at present he would not look back to the times when communication between India and this country were somewhat more tardy than now.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI was referring to Zululand.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYNo, a telegraph.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYWe are jumping from communication to communication. I thought the noble Marquess said that a railroad would have prevented the troubles in Zululand, now he says a telegraph. But if he will allow me to say so, that seems rather in the nature of a platitude. Of course, if we were connected everywhere we should be in a much better position than if we were not.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWhat I did say was that if communications had existed with Zululand there would have been no war.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYThat is the same remark in a different form, but I think whether railroad or telegraph no sane person would have thought of constructing either. The proposition 156 has apparently two legs. I do not know whether the noble Marquess rests on the leg of the railroad or on the leg of the telegraph for Uganda.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe reference was to Zululand.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI am now referring to Uganda. But I am bound to say in considering this great question that in my opinion it is open to question whether it would not have been wiser, for the purpose merely of government, to consider whether it would not have been preferable to construct a line of telegraph than a railway to Uganda when the first expenditure had to be made. And let me remind the House that that by no means exhausts the question. There is the question where the railroad is to go to and its breadth. Some think that a railroad which goes in 100 miles from the coast and which gets over the possible region of the tsetze fly, would be sufficient for all practical purposes; some would take it on, no doubt, to Timbuctoo. I venture to think that all these are matters which Her Majesty's Government would have to carefully consider. In the face of the penury of the Imperial Exchequer, and in the face of this problem, perhaps unmatched in history, of attempting to govern a province in Central Africa without communications, I think we should put out our foot very warily lest we should have to draw it back before disaster befall us. That is all I have to say about the railroad. I do not think that it is a proved fact that it should be constructed at once on the principle of the survey which has taken place. As regards the railway "floating back into the past," that metaphor of the Marquess rather took my breath away. That idea, I confess, is not one which is present to Her Majesty's Government. I have never had experience of a railway floating either into the past or into the future. It is a question for consideration and mature judgment, and I have no doubt that in that way we shall arrive at a more satisfactory solution than we could by hastily planting a railroad under conditions which we have not thoroughly determined. I do not know that I have anything to add to what I have said on these various points. I concur with the words with which the noble Marquess concluded his speech. We, on our side, have no desire 157 either in the maintenance of our sphere of influence, or in the conclusion of agreements with Powers like the Congo State with respect to that sphere of influence, to interfere with the susceptibilities of any State whatever. But we do think it is a necessity—and it is for that reason that we have concluded that agreement—to develop and maintain our hold of our sphere of influence, and within those limits we cannot recognise the right of any State to make any suggestion or intervention on whatever ground it may be taken.
§ *LORD STANMOREsaid, he did not mean to press for the adoption of the Motion he had brought forward, but be fore he withdrew it he wished to say one word. He deeply regretted what had fallen from the noble Lord with regard to the railway. He (Lord Stanmore) was not accustomed to address their Lordships' House, and the diffidence which one felt in addressing so august an assembly rather disturbed one, and the consequence was that in addressing their Lordships, in the first instance, he quite omitted to say what he intended with regard to that railway. But this he must say, that he had heard that decision with great regret, because if they turned to the Report of Sir Gerald Portal—
§ LORD STANMOREThe decision not to take even into consideration at this moment the question of the railway.
§ LORD STANMOREsaid, that Sir Gerald Portal in his Report pointed out in very forcible terms what would be the consequence of not making that railway, and if those words were translated out of the decorum of diplomatic language into plain Saxon-English they would be stronger still. They amounted to a declaration that, unless the first portion of the railway was made, all the rest of their labour was in vain. Sir Gerald told them, almost in plain words, that it would be better if they abandoned the country altogether, notwithstanding the meanness and the shame of doing so, rather than not to do that which was necessary to enable them to carry on the machinery of government 158 in Uganda with success, and secure the course of trade through the territory under English influence. Sir Gerald pointed out that, unless that portion of the railway was made—which would make that which was the shortest route also the speediest—the trade route was certain to be diverted from the sphere of English influence to the south of it; that the whole profit of the trade route would go to the German colonists; that most of it would pass into German hands, and that our revenue by which Uganda was to be administered would be consequently so seriously depleted that we should not be able to carry on the work. The noble Lord the President of the Council had said he was in substantial agreement with the noble Marquess opposite. Those were words, they had heard before in this House, and he trusted the agreement was more entire on this occasion than on that. It seemed to him that the noble Lord entirely differed from the noble Marquess on those important points to which he believed the attention of the country was really most directed. The two points which the country really looked to was that they should not throw away the great influence which had been given them in the head waters of the Nile, which chiefly depended on those outlying dependencies of Uganda which they were apparently to cast off, and of the trade of the country—which they were apparently pre-prepared to sacrifice. Where he would venture to differ, with great respect, from his noble Friend the Lord President of the Council, was in this point. He said that there was no necessity for immediately taking into consideration the question of the railway. What he should be prepared fully to admit to the noble Earl was that it might be perfectly right to leave to the future the consideration of the various details as to the construction of the railway, but the principle of whether they were to have railway communication with Uganda or not, as a part of its machinery of government, was a principle which might be at once either taken up or rejected, and in his humble opinion—and, he believed, in the opinion of many of their Lordships—it ought to be decided, whether they at once proceeded with the construction and prosecution of the object or not. He begged to withdraw the Motion.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.