Lords Sitting of 20 July 1894

COMMISSION.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:—

Public Libraries (Scotland).

Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892, Amendment.

Merchandise Marks (Prosecutions).

Bishopric of Bristol Act (1884) Amendment.

Injured Animals.

Commissioners of Works.

Outdoor Relief (Friendly Societies).

Wild Birds Protection Act (1880) Amendment.

Sea Fisheries (Shell Fish).

Prevention of Cruelty to Children.

Notice of Accidents.

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Order (No. 1.)

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Order (No. 5.)

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Order (No. 13.)

Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Order (No. 14.)

Pier and Harbour Provisional Orders (No. 2.)

Pier and Harbour Provisional Orders (No. 3.)

Pier and Harbour Provisional Order (No. 4.)

Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 3.)

Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 4.)

Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 5.)

Gas Orders Confirmation (No. 1.)

Gas Orders Confirmation (No. 2.)

Water Orders Confirmation.

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 7.)

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 9.)

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Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 10.)

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 11.)

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 12.)

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 13.)

Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 16.)

Local Government Provisional Order (No. 19.)

Local Government Provisional Order (Poor Law).

INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEinquired whether it was still the intention of Her Majesty's Government to prohibit the Government of India from extending the Import Duties, levied under the Tariff Act of 1894, to cotton goods; and called attention to the discussions upon this subject in the Legislative Council of the Governor General. He said: My Lords, before placing this Notice on your Lordships' Paper I asked myself, not without some anxiety, whether the discussion which I proposed to bring on could in any way embarrass the Government of India or be detrimental to public interests, and I came to the conclusion that upon the whole it was clearly desirable that the end of the Session should not pass by without some further reference in Parliament to a subject which has so deeply moved public opinion in India. I felt sure that the Debate which might take place this evening would be one which upon the whole could not fail to do good rather than harm. The subject has been so long before the public attention that I do not feel called upon to detain your Lordships with any lengthened reference to its history. It will be sufficient if I remind your Lordships that until a comparatively recent time—about 12 years ago—the Government of India used to derive a considerable part of its Revenue from Import Duties. It was the custom of the East India Company to impose such duties. I may say, in passing, that I believe there is no form of taxation which is more acceptable, or less repugnant, to an Eastern people than

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  taxation of this kind. In 1859 Mr. James Wilson, a well-known English financier, was sent out to take charge of the finances of India, and I believe he then re-arranged the Import Duties, and fixed an all-round rate of about 10 per cent. Those rates were subsequently, at different times, modified. A very important controversy took place in 1875 between the India Office and the Government of India upon the subject of the Import Duties. At that time the Marquess of Salisbury was in charge of the India Office, and my noble Friend at the head of the Government of India proposed a very considerable alteration of the tariff. He gave some relief to the exports; he reduced the general rate from 7½ per cent. to 5 per cent.; he altered the system under which cotton goods were valued—altered it, I may say, in a manner which gave a very considerable advantage to British importers. He did all those things; but he did not see his way to do away with the Import Duty upon cotton goods and yarns, which he left at the then existing rates of 5 per cent. and 3½ per cent. respectively. A discussion arose between the India Office and the Government of India as to the propriety of the action taken by my noble Friend. The noble Marquess opposite was of opinion that the Cotton Duties had a preferential claim. My noble Friend did not see his way then to give the desired relief to cotton goods; but the noble Marquess and the noble Earl were entirely at one as to this: that there could be no question of imposing additional taxation in order to give relief to the cotton goods. That point was clearly established at the close of the correspondence, and it is a point of some importance, because, as I think I shall be able to show the House presently, the Government of India is likely to be driven to impose fresh taxation if the prohibition against taxing imported goods remains much longer in force. The difference of opinion which declared itself in 1875 led to the Mission of Sir Lewis Malet, who was sent to India for the purpose of discovering a modus vivendi between Calcutta and Downing Street; so far as I have been able to make out, that Mission did not produce any immediate results.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: He fell ill.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: However, in the following Session of Parliament a very remarkable Resolution, to which reference has constantly been made during the present controversy, was passed by the House of Commons. That Resolution was to the effect that the duties then levied upon British manufactures imported into India were protective in their nature, were contrary to sound commercial policy, and ought to be repealed without delay so soon as the financial condition of India would permit. This Resolution was transmitted to the Government of India as an Instruction, and it was followed by a partial remission of the obnoxious duties. But, my Lords, the opponents of the duties, having once tasted blood, were not going to be satisfied by any mere modification of the tariff, and in 1879 a second Resolution, more strongly worded than the first, was carried in the House of Commons. It ran as follows:—
  "That the Indian Import Duties on cotton goods, being unjust alike to the Indian consumer and the English producer, ought to be abolished, and this House accepts the recent reduction of these duties as a step towards their total abolition, to which Her Majesty's Government are pledged."
  The House will observe that this Resolution was more strongly worded than the first, and it differs from its predecessor inasmuch as no reference is made to the financial condition of India, and also inasmuch as the duties are attacked upon the ground of their injustice not only to the English producer but to the Indian consumer, about whose interest in the matter I shall have a word to say presently. My Lords, the result of this action on the part of the British Parliament was that in 1882, during the Viceroyalty of the noble Marquess, now Secretary of State for the Colonies, the duties were entirely swept away, and although there have since that time been many lean years, in which the Government of India has been in sore straits, no attempt has until now been made to re-open the question. That, my Lords, is all that I need to say by way of introduction. We have now to turn to the situation as it stood when the Government of India had to consider its position at the commencement of the present financial year. The rupee had fallen from 1s. 9d. in 1890 to a little over 1s. 2d., and, taking the rate of exchange at that figure,

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  which, as your Lordships know, has not been maintained, the Finance Member of Council found himself on March 1st face to face with a deficit of three and a-half crores—a deficit which was subsequently reduced to about three crores by changes to which I shall refer by-and-bye. The outlook was indeed serious, and it is impossible not to feel the greatest sympathy for the unfortunate Minister who was called upon to make both ends meet under such unpromising circumstances. The Finance Member of Council is never much to be envied, and I doubt whether his difficulties are perfectly understood in this country. A well-known English Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lowe) once compared the Revenue of this country to a table, and reminded his hearers that, just as you could not expect a table to stand unless it had a sufficient number of legs, so you could not expect the Revenue of a nation to maintain its stability if you cut away too many of the sources of income by which it is supported. That homely illustration is especially applicable to the case of India. In India the Revenue table has a very small number of legs, one or two of them are somewhat rickety, and the Financial Member comes very soon indeed to the end of his resources. The Salt Tax, from which he draws a very considerable portion of them, affects a necessary of life, and no statesman would, I am convinced, regard with satisfaction an attempt to increase it. The Opium Revenue is dwindling and uncertain. The Income Tax is unpopular and unproductive, and a very strong case has been made out in favour of exempting the smaller incomes. The Government of India can come down on the provincial balances; and it has, on more than one recent occasion, been compelled to adopt this course, but it is one which is deeply and not unnaturally resented by the victims of these appropriations, for it deprives the Local Governments of resources which they are able to use with excellent results in the development of the districts committed to their charge. Then there is the suspension of the Famine Grant. There is, I believe, a great deal to be said in favour of suspending it under circumstances such as those which have lately arisen; but the step is undoubtedly one which occasions a serious shock to public confidence, and
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  it is certainly not a step which any Government can take with a light heart. It involves a departure from a financial policy which has found general acceptance, and to which successive Governments have solemnly undertaken to adhere. But, my Lords, when we have arrived at this point, we have virtually exhausted the sources to which the Financial Member of Council can look for additional revenue. He cannot, like the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, extricate himself from his difficulties by imposing an extra penny or two in the Income Tax; still less can he, in spite of the fact that the finances for which he is responsible are those of an Eastern country, make a descent upon its accumulated wealth by transferring to his own pockets a slice of all property passing by death from one owner to another. There remains the question of reducing expenditure. That is a subject of immense difficulty; all that I feel called upon to say with regard to it at the present is, that although reduction may here and there be possible, and although rigid economy is, no doubt, desirable, I entirely disbelieve that it would be safe or statesmanlike to effect sudden and wholesale reductions, either in the civil or military expenditure of the Indian Empire. You may starve your public works, but the limits within which you can do so are far from wide. Of all dangerous and wasteful economies none is more dangerous and wasteful than that of suddenly interrupting the progress of a railway, or of some great irrigation scheme. In such cases stoppage means not only the arrestation of a useful work, but that large establishments are to be broken up or kept in idleness; and materials, accumulated or already ordered, wasted or left to perish by the roadside. The case of the military expenditure does not present fewer difficulties. A few economies may be made here and there, but no substantial diminution of expenditure can be arrived at unless you are prepared either to reduce the pay of the soldier or to diminish the number of troops now employed in India, or to deplete those reserves of stores which we have been endeavouring to accumulate during recent years. I do not envy the statesman who attempts to retrench in any of these three directions. This question of the reduction of our military expenditure was

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  very anxiously considered by the Government of India last year. I remember that it produced a deep impression upon me when I found that out of a total expenditure of between 15 and 16 crores no less than 12 crores were absorbed by the pay of the Army, by the expenses of feeding it, and by the pensions to which it was entitled, which could, of course, not be touched. It is easy to point to the fact that the military expenditure of India is large and has been increasing, but I think the critics are apt to forget how much of the increase has been due to the increase of the Army by 30,000 soldiers after the annexation of Upper Burma, to the measures which have been taken to promote the comfort and well-being of our troops, British and Native—measures with which the name of my noble and gallant Friend on the Cross Benches will always be honourably connected; to the vast expense which has been imposed upon us by the introduction of new armaments, to the fall in exchange, which has added nearly 40 lakhs to our Military Estimates in a single year, and last, but not least, to those measures of precaution which have been rendered necessary by the military activity of powerful neighbours both on the eastern and western frontiers of the Empire. This, then, was the position with which Lord Elgin's Government was confronted, and it was in all conscience serious enough. The Financial Member of Council found himself obliged to scrape together from the different sources available—and I have shown how few they were—the necessary Revenue with which to make up this large deficit. It was clear from the first that the Famine Grant had to go, and I do not think there can be any doubt that the Government of India was fully justified in suspending it. The Famine Grant, which your Lordships know, amounts to 150 lakhs per annum, was intended to provide out of the superfluity of prosperous years for the exigencies of years of adversity. Some of your Lordships have probably read the extremely instructive speech delivered in the Viceroy's Council on the 27th of March by Sir Charles Elliott, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. Sir C. Elliott was Secretary to the Famine Commission, to whose recommendation the institution of the so-called Famine Insurance Fund was due; and it
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  is noteworthy that Sir Charles, speaking with the authority due to his connection with the Famine Commission, as well as with that belonging to the head of the Province which has more than any other in India suffered from famines in the past, expressed his opinion that the time had come for inquiring whether the grounds on which this figure of lakhs was arrived at, still remain unchanged. He shows in the course of his speech that owing to the construction of many of the lines considered necessary by the Famine Commission, the districts most liable to scarcity have become much less vulnerable than they were, and he expresses his opinion that there is good reason for thinking that it is no longer necessary to set apart so large a surplus as 1½ crores, for the definite purpose of meeting the recurring expenditure which the occurrence of famine entails. I am not sorry to have this opportunity of adding to Sir Charles Elliott's testimony the expression of my own belief that the danger to the people of India from famine has become greatly less than it was; not only have the means of communication improved, and with them the facilities for bringing timely supplies of food into the threatened districts, but we have now a system of perfectly organised Returns carefully collated by the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, showing from time to time the condition of the population and the movement of the prices of food supplies—returns which render it almost impossible for the Government to be, as they were before these precautionary measures had been taken, surprised by sudden and unexpected calamities of this kind. It is, therefore, I think, clear that Lord Elgin's Government are amply justified in suspending the Famine Grant so far as it was possible to do so. A part of it was already pledged, but 107 lakhs out of 150 lakhs were available and were very properly hypothecated. The deficit was thus reduced to 250 lakhs, if Mr. Westland's first figure be accepted as the point of departure, and there was one source only from which the bulk of it could be made good. An all round tariff of Import Duties at the rate of 5 per cent. ad valorem would have given a sum which may be estimated at from 225 to 250 lakhs, and with this addition to their income the Government would have had an equili-

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  brium, or at all events a small deficit only, without further trouble. Now, my Lords, there is no question whatever that if the Government of India had been left to itself it would have taken this step. But it had to reckon with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State had to reckon with Manchester. On the very day on which Mr. Westland introduced his Tariff Bill, an influential deputation waited upon the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was then Secretary of State for India, and urged upon him the inexpediency of allowing the Government of India to tax imported cottons. The noble Earl announced that it had been decided by Her Majesty's Government that there was not to be a re-imposition of duties upon cotton goods—a statement which is reported to have been received with loud cheers by the deputation. The noble Earl was, however, perfectly frank, and he went on as follows:—
  "I should be uncandid if I did not tell you that there is in India an extremely strong feeling the other way."
  But he went on to say—
  "The matter is perfectly at rest so far as the present time is concerned, and it is highly satisfactory to me to be able to make this announcement to you to-day."
  A statement to the same effect was made by Mr. Westland in the Viceroy's Council when he introduced the Tariff Bill, and was repeated by him a few days later when that measure came up for discussion. Then, my Lords, took place those remarkable discussions in the Viceroy's Council, the Reports of which are before the House. All I need say with regard to them is that upon the merits not one single Member, official or unofficial, approved of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, or accepted it, save under a more or less emphatically worded protest, and with an expression of hope that the last word had not been spoken by the India Office. Let me point out to the House what were the results of this decision of Her Majesty's Government. The import duties, without the inclusion of cotton goods, yielded only 114 lakhs, instead of the 225 or 250 lakhs which would have been obtained if the cottons had not been exempted. Instead of an equilibrium or an approach to it, Mr. Westland found
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  himself, taking the original deficit of 350 lakhs as the point of departure, with a deficit of about 130 lakhs, for which provision had somehow or other to be made. Well, my Lords, what has happened? To begin with, part of the balance to the credit of the Provincial Governments was appropriated; in other words, the financial contracts recently entered into between the Government of India and the Local Governments were broken for the purpose of making good the deficit of the Imperial Exchequer. Let me read your Lordships the words in which Mr. Westland refers to this measure. In Paragraph 27 of the Financial Statement your Lordships will find the following passage:—
  "The Government of India were most unwilling to have recourse to a measure which practically means the stoppage for the time of all administrative improvements; a measure which they feel must take the heart out of Provincial Governments by making them surrender all the fruits of careful administration to fill the yawning gulf of our sterling payments."
  My Lords, I remember that on one occasion, while I was connected with the Government of India, we found ourselves obliged to ask the Local Governments for a benevolence of this kind. I always regretted it, and I feel very strongly that Mr. Westland was using no exaggerated language when he said that such action must have the effect both of stopping all administrative improvement, and taking the heart out of the Provincial Governments. From this source 40 lakhs out of 130 were obtained. In providing the sum which remained the Financial Department had literally to make bricks without straw. Twenty lakhs or thereabouts were obtained by reducing the grant for military works, and 17 or 18 lakhs more "by cutting out," to use Mr. Westland's language—
  "Practically every new work upon the civil side to which the Government of India was not absolutely committed."
  If your Lordships wish to know what these reductions mean, I would beg you to read the eloquent speech delivered in the Viceroy's Council by Sir Griffith Evans on the 27th of March, in which this part of the case is dealt with. You will find the passage at p. 99 of the Blue Book. Sir Griffith Evans says—
  "It is not suggested that these works are not necessary or that this expenditure can be permanently avoided. … It means totally to

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  arrest all development. … The barracks required in Upper Burma will not be built. … The sanitary measures required for the Army in India will not be carried; and worst of all, the proposed improved arrangements for water supply for the troops all over India must stand over. This means preventable sickness and preventable deaths among our troops. The dreadful scourge of enteric fever is to run its course unchecked."
  These, my Lords, are not the words of an agitator, or of a disloyal newspaper, but of the leader of the Calcutta Bar, a gentleman who has for many years been a member of the Viceroy's Council, and whose loyalty to the British Government is altogether beyond suspicion. No wonder, my Lords, that at the conclusion of his financial statement Mr. Westland made the observation that the means which he had adopted for nearly balancing his revenue and expenditure were means which would hardly be available a second time. And after all, my Lords, after the absorption of the Famine Grant, the appropriation of the provincial balances, and the abandonment of necessary works, the magnificent result was to leave the Government of India with a prospective deficit of 30 lakhs, and this, although the exchange value of the rupee had been estimated at 1s. 2d., a rate which, as your Lordships are aware, has not since been maintained. The financial results were, however, nothing as compared with the political effect which has been produced by the exemption. It is no exaggeration to say that it has evoked a feeling of universal disappointment—I should not be wrong if I said a feeling of universal indignation throughout India. What are the grounds upon which this special favour denied to all other imports has been shown to the imports of cotton goods? It has been said that the resolutions passed by the House of Commons in 1875 and 1879 are obligatory. I do not suppose that it will be seriously contended that, if a sufficient case can be shown, a Parliamentary Resolution carried under one particular set of circumstances must remain for all time and under wholly different circumstances, as a kind of law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not. I have told the House what those Resolutions were: one of them has reference to the interests of the Indian consumer, and I noticed that when the deputation, to which I have already referred, called upon the noble
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  Earl, the principal spokesman stated his case upon the assertion that—
  "the imposition of these duties would involve a great hardship upon the poor Indian consumer."
  The present Secretary of State also, I observe, spoke very strongly of the injustice of making the consumer pay for the benefit of the Indian manufacturer. I confess that while I am the first to admit that the case presents very considerable difficulties, I am a little incredulous as to the grievance of the Indian consumer. What is the argument? We are told that if the price of imported cottons is enhanced by the addition of the duty, the price of all other cottons will be raised, and it is urged that the additional cost will in all cases fall upon the consumer, that the amount by which the price is raised would, in the case of imported cotton, go into the pocket of the Government, and in the case of cottons produced in India, into the pocket of the manufacturer. It is obvious that if the Indian manufacturer puts up his prices by an amount equal to the duty payable by imported cottons, the Indian-made goods will gain no advantage in respect of cheapness, and to this extent the grievance of the British competitor would disappear. But, of course, the Indian manufacturer may add to his prices something less than the whole of the duty; in that case he will get his protection, and the consumers may have to submit to a more or less increased price. But let us see what is the extent of the consumer's grievance. A 5 per cent. duty is equal to about ½d. in the 1s., or less than one anna in the rupee. Now, I doubt extremely whether, as far as the Indian consumer is concerned, this addition to the price of those cotton goods which might be affected would be very seriously felt. At any rate, it is our duty to remember that the Indian consumer, so far as he has an articulate voice, is asking you to put an end to this exemption. You may say that he knows nothing about these questions. That may be true, but your Lordships may take it as beyond doubt that if you could get at the consumer's opinion you would find that he greatly preferred an infinitesimally small increase in the price of cotton cloths to an addition to the Salt Tax, and certainly to any kind of direct taxation,

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  and it is to some taxation of this kind that the Government of India will have to turn if it is deprived of the revenue which the Cotton Duties would yield. It is stated confidently by those best qualified to offer an opinion that while the duties upon imported cotton goods were still in force the consumer did not feel them, or know that he was being taxed. A well-known member of the Legislative Council, the President of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, estimated the incidence of these duties as equivalent to something like ¾d. per head of the population. It is interesting to note how this point was regarded when the question was discussed nearly 20 years ago between the Government of India and the Secretary of State. I quote the following from a Despatch addressed by the noble Marquess opposite to the Government of India on the 15th of April, 1875, when this question was under discussion. The noble Marquess wrote that—
  "In the presence of influences so powerful"
  (the noble Marquess was referring to the rapid development of the Indian industry)
  "the effect of the 5 per cent. duty was probably insignificant."
  He went on to say—
  "An importance, however, which I think exaggerated, has been attached to it by the cotton manufacturers both in England and Bombay."
  In the same Despatch the noble Marquess proceeded—
  "If it were true that this duty is the means of excluding English competition, and thereby raising the price of a necessary of life to the vast masses of Indian consumers, it is unnecessary for me to remark that it would be open to economical objections of the gravest kind. I do not attribute to it any such effect, but I cannot be insensible to the political evils which arise from the prevalent belief upon this matter."
  I shall have a few words to say presently as to the political aspect of the question, but I trust that I have said enough to show that the alleged consumer's grievance is not one to which your Lordships would be justified in attaching too much weight. Then, my Lords, we are told that the duties are protective and inconsistent with our Free Trade principles. My Lords, I hope we shall not allow our affection for Free Trade principles to degenerate into mere
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  bigotry. So far as the question of principle is concerned, I object altogether to the doctrine that, because we are believers in Free Trade, India is to be absolutely precluded from raising revenue by any taxation which, although imposed for revenue purposes, incidentally protects one industry or another. A more dangerous doctrine I cannot conceive. I have already pointed out that in the case of India a general tariff must necessarily be, to some extent, protective in its results. My Lords, I am aware of the dangers which surround the colonial analogy, and I should be the last to claim for India the kind of fiscal independence which is enjoyed by Canada or the Australian Colonies, but we cannot, when we are discussing this question, altogether exclude from consideration the fact that we allow our colonies to raise revenue by duties which are designedly protective, and which have undoubtedly had the effect of considerably hampering our own trade. So long as the colonies do not discriminate against the mother country we do not raise a finger, and they have at times been perilously near arriving at this point. You cannot, therefore, prevent people from asking why we swallow the colonial camel and strain at the Indian gnat. It is most desirable that we should know exactly to what extent protection would be given if these duties were imposed. Would it be so great that our trade would be crippled or destroyed? If this was the case it is clear that the duty would yield no revenue and would, therefore, fail to effect the purpose for which it was imposed. We know, however, that Indian cottons do not compete, or compete to a slight extent only, with our finer cotton goods; it is only in the case of coarser goods that there is any competition to speak of.
  "Manchester and Bombay,"
  to use the words of Mr. Westland,
  "overlap to a certain extent, but the area which Manchester occupies, and must continue to occupy without competition, is very wide and comprehensive."
  That is the statement of the expert adviser of Lord Elgin's Government. Do Her Majesty's Government accept it? By the last mail I received the report of an interesting discussion which took place last month of the Bombay Millowners' Association. A very re-

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  markable statement was then made by Mr. G. Cotton, the president of the association. I quote the following from his speech:—
  "We do not enter into competition with Lancashire, nor can she compete with us, and I may mention that this week I have declined to quote even for 24s., because our machinery can be more profitably employed on 6s., 8s., 10s., 16s., and 20s. Lancashire does not, I venture to say, export to this country any goods or yarns which average under 24s."
  He proceeds to give, in a tabular form, figures showing, as to yarns, the production of all the mills in India except one for 1893, and he says (and apparently the figures bear out the statement) that—
  "They show that 20 per cent. of our production is under 10s., that 79 per cent. is under 20s., and only 19½ per cent. is between 20s. and 30s., 1½ per cent. between 30s. and 40s., and 1.8 per cent. over 40s. I regret that we could not get the figures between 20s. and 24s., as I am sure that we would find that fully 10 per cent. are 20½s. and 21s., and a good 5 per cent. 22s. to 24s., so that fully 94 per cent. of our spinnings are counts that Lancashire does not send, and has not sent us for years."
  Are these figures, which I must say seem to me a little surprising, accepted by Her Majesty's Government, or can they be explained away, and, if so, to what extent? We must, however, I think, concede that to some extent these duties, unless accompanied by a countervailing Excise Duty, would be protective. Well, my Lords, as to that, let me say that even if it be true that to some slight extent Indian mills will get an advantage from the taxation of British goods, I, for one, deprecate the contention that this objection is fatal. The Indian millowners have had a good many trials of late. Our currency legislation has for the time disturbed their business. We have imposed upon them factory legislation conceived upon European rather than Indian lines; and, in this very tariff which we are discussing, their dye stuffs and chemicals, which enter very largely into the cost of production, are taxed. It is stated that the duty on these is equal to more than 1 per cent. on the cost of production. I confess that unless you are able to show that by taxing these imports you would give to the Indian mills an amount of protection which would seriously cripple British competition, and thereby lose you the revenue of which you are in need, I should not
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  regret to see these millowners get a little of the smooth as well as the rough. My Lords, if it comes to the question of protection, let us, at any rate, be consistent. If protection be indeed the unclean thing, and we are to rule out every duty which is protective in its effect, the tariff which the Secretary of State has already sanctioned is altogether inadmissible. At some points it is protective in the interests of the English manufacturer. The Government of India is, as I have just pointed out, about to take toll of the dye stuffs and metals used by the Indian millers, who will, to that extent, be subject to a penalty from which their British competitors are free. But that is by no means all. The new tariff includes Import Duties upon papers and woollens, both of which commodities are to a considerable extent manufactured in India. The manufacture of paper, in particular, is making great strides in that country. Every one of these newly-built paper mills will receive a certain amount of protection by the tariff. I could mention other cases, but the fact is, that the tariff, as a whole, hangs together, and it is impossible to make exceptions without creating anomalies and producing injustice. As for the Cotton Duties, I do not believe that Sir Evelyn Baring was guilty of any exaggeration when in 1872 he told the Viceroy's Legislative Council that, if the case were argued upon the ground of Free Trade or Protection,
  "The arguments in favour of abolishing the general Import Duties were even stronger than those which could be adduced in respect of the abolition of the Cotton Duties. The maintenance of the former, if the latter be abolished, would from every point of view be open to objection."
  We have reversed the process, we are imposing general duties, and giving exemption to the commodity which, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, had the least claim of all to such indulgence. My Lords, the question is really a question of revenue, and these arguments founded upon the sanctity of Free Trade principles are, if I may be allowed to say so, beside the mark. Even if they had more weight, they would weigh as nothing compared with the political considerations which are involved, and which require a much fuller explanation than we have yet received of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. It is impossible

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  to exaggerate the intensity of feeling which this piece of fiscal favouritism has produced in India. Those who have had the longest experience in that country say unhesitatingly that public opinion never was so unanimous; from the Members of the Viceroy's Council to the humblest classes, the people of India are solid upon the subject. The case has been stated during the discussions in Council, at public meetings, and in the newspapers with merciless logic. Judgment has gone by default; there is no reply. Those from whom an official apology for the measure might have been expected have refused to make it. All that they are able to say is that they are acting under orders from Home, and that there is reason to hope that those orders may be reconsidered. In the meanwhile the public sees the Government of India cutting down expenditure, starving useful public works, and appropriating the economies of the Local Governments, merely because, as they are told, political exigencies render it impossible for the Secretary of State to give way. The time has, I think, come when we may reasonably ask Her Majesty's Government to take us more fully into their confidence. There never was a moment when it was more necessary to avoid creating an impression that our financial policy in India was dictated by selfish considerations. I am not one of those who regard with exaggerated alarm every bazaar rumour which may be telegraphed over to this country from India, but it is idle to conceal from ourselves that many causes are at work which should make us pause before we do anything to shake the confidence of the people in the absolute disinterestedness of our rule. Western ideas are spreading with rapidity in the minds of an Eastern population, not yet by any means fitted to receive them. The Press takes advantage of the wide measure of liberty which it enjoys to speak its mind with a licence that would not be tolerated by the rulers of any other Eastern country. The Government must make up its mind to be misrepresented, and may in ordinary cases console itself by the hope that the truth will prevail, and the reflection that a good deal of the vituperation is not very sincere, but it should think twice before it supplies the party of
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  agitation with a real grievance and with the materials for an indictment to which no reply has been made, because no reply has been possible. We have lately, I think most wisely, extended the functions of the Indian Legislative Councils; we have added to them a certain number of members owing their appointment, not to nomination from above, but to the recommendation of their fellow-countrymen, and we have given to the Councils thus reformed and reconstituted the right of discussing the financial proposals, both of the local and of the Imperial Governments. We have also given them the right, of which they are already availing themselves freely, of questioning the Government upon matters of public importance. It is at such a moment as this that we are adopting a course which has had the effect of supplying every ill-wisher of the British Government with a whole arsenal of arguments. At the moment when we are increasing the constitutional privileges of our Indian fellow-subjects, and giving them new opportunities of scrutinising our management of their finances, we are denying to the Government of the Indian Empire even a few shreds of the financial independence which every one of our self-governing colonies enjoys to the fullest extent. There is only one satisfactory feature about this painful subject, and that is that it has been made abundantly clear to us that Her Majesty's Government have not said their last word upon the matter. I trust that we shall be able to elicit from them this evening some announcement which will come as a relief to public feeling, official and unofficial, in India. What has been done is either right or wrong. If it is right, let us have the whole of the argument and let us say boldly that nothing will induce us to depart from our decision; but if it is wrong, as I for one believe that it is, if no sound arguments are forthcoming in support of the position taken up at first by the Secretary of State, then let us, at whatever cost, make a clean breast of it, and show the people of India that it is a gross libel to say that either of the great political Parties in this country will, for the sake of a passing advantage, deny to them the fair play which they expect at their hands.
  THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord REAY): My Lords, I have listened with the greatest attention to the very dispassionate speech in which the noble Marquess has brought before us a subject of very grave importance. I will mention at the outset that with regard to any observations on the past action of the Government I shall leave the reply to the noble Earl (Lord Kimberley), as he ordered that these duties should not be imposed. Instructions to that effect were given before I joined the India Office. What the noble Marquess has asked with regard to the present state of affairs I am prepared to answer. I am not prepared to answer his question as to the figure at which the Government estimates the deficit that may arise in the Budget of the present year. I should have thought that the noble Marquess himself must feel that, with exchange fluctuating as it does, it would be impossible to make any estimate of what the deficit may ultimately amount to. I am, however, glad to be able to mention that the last accounts received from India as to the financial situation are not of a nature to cause alarm at this moment. As to what the noble Marquess has said about starving the Services, I certainly shall not deny that the various Services are subject at this moment to a régime of very rigid economy. It is, however, a result of the temporary nature of the financial situation, and economy is not identical with starvation. The financial situation has been correctly described in the Viceroy's Council in the following words by the Financial Member:—
  "It is a serious confession to make, but nevertheless, it is true, that our financial position in the immediate future depends on circumstances absolutely outside our control, and that we can do little more than watch in which direction the forces are working, which will, in the end, either bring us security from these perpetual variations, or still more serious trouble than any we have had as yet to provide against."
  This situation is provisional and temporary, and consequently it is impossible to make any definite forecast. I do not suppose that the noble Marquess urges that Supplementary Estimates should be introduced into the Budget without absolute necessity for such a course. He must be well aware of its inconvenience.
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  If, however, Supplementary Estimates become imperative, they will have to be considered. With regard to Public Works, the situation does not justify the criticism that they are starved. On March 31, 1894, the total length of railway, of all gauges, open in India was 18,500 miles, showing an increase of 458 miles over the open mileage at the corresponding period of the previous year. On the same date there were 1,922½ miles which had been sanctioned but were not yet opened; so that the total sanctioned mileage, including lines already opened, amounted to 20,422½ miles. During the year 1893–94 sanction was given to the construction of additional mileage to the extent of 154½ miles; but after allowing for deductions on account of lines abandoned or in abeyance and minor corrections of mileage the sanctioned mileage on March 31, 1894, exceeded the sanctioned mileage on March 31, 1893, by only 27¼ miles. Although no large schemes have been actually sanctioned during the past financial year, several large works are at present in hand or in contemplation, among them the East Coast Railway, of which it is expected that 200 miles more will be opened during the present year. Progress is being made with the Assam-Bengal Railway, which is in the hands of a company. The length of line included in this scheme is 742 miles. The construction of the Mu Valley Railway beyond Wuntho, in Burma, 156 miles, is being steadily pushed on. On the north-west frontier work is proceeding on the Muskaf-Bolan Railway, 86 miles, and to some extent on the Mari Attock line, 85 miles. The railway from Bareilly, viâ Rampur to Moradabad, 56 miles, and the Godra-Rutlam Railway, 115 miles, may also be mentioned. The latter is very near completion. Of the schemes in immediate contemplation the most important is the Delhi-Bhathinda Samasata project. This railway will be about 400 miles in length and is estimated to cost about 277 lakhs of rupees. It may be mentioned that in September last the Government of India issued a circular offering terms on which the Government would be prepared to consider offers for the construction, by the agency of private companies, of branch lines or extensions of existing railways. In the Budget the total outlay for construction of railways including

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  protective railways—although the Famine Insurance Fund has been suspended—is only reduced from Rx.4,027,000 in 1893–94 to Rx.3,450,000 in this year. I was very glad to hear the noble Marquess say that he had no objection to a temporary suspension of the Famine grant, and that he concurred in the views which Sir Charles Elliott laid before the Viceroy's Council. The noble Marquess has said that this is a practical Revenue question. In that I agree. If these duties have to be imposed, it is simply for raising Revenue; and, in so far as they would operate as protective duties, they would be inoperative as Revenue duties. The problem, therefore, which may ultimately have to be solved is, what kind of duties the Government can impose which will be paid into their own Treasury, and recovered from the purchasers of the goods. Now, my Lords, in these figures which the noble Marquess has quoted, and which I also have read with the greatest interest as given at the annual meeting of the Bombay Millowners' Association, there is one very important feature, that, whereas in 1879, no yarns above 30's were manufactured in India, yarns above 30's are now manufactured if only to a limited extent. It is quite true that these form only a small part of the yarns manufactured in India, but it is obvious that the moment you introduce a duty, the manufacture of yarns above 30's would increase. A well-known authority on these matters—Mr. O'Conor—has gone so far as to say that it would be necessary to exempt all yarns and all piece-goods under 60's, leaving only a very small quantity on which the duty could be raised. You will, therefore, for practical Revenue purposes, have to contemplate the prospect of countervailing duties—a matter which is very complex, and which will require very mature examination. This it will receive at the hands of the Government. The present position is stated as follows, in the words of the Viceroy to his Council:—
  "I am able to state that if, after an interval sufficient to judge of the position as affected by the Tariff Act, the course of exchange, and other circumstances, there is no improvement, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to receive a further representation on the subject."
  That representation has not yet been received, because the latest accounts of
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  the financial position in India are not alarming. The balances, which stood last year at this time at 15 crores stand now at 25 crores, and the present situation, indeed, is so little alarming that it has been found possible to invite tenders for the reduction of the interest on part of the debt. No blame can, therefore, be imputed to the Government of India for not having urged on the Home Government the necessity of immediate action on this subject. I claim for the Government of India absolute freedom to act in this matter as they may think opportune; but I also claim for ourselves entire freedom to consider any proposals when they are submitted to us, as it would be highly prejudicial to the interests of India in any way to bind the hands either of the Government of India or of the Government at home by any premature declaration on this occasion. But before I sit down I wish to give the noble Marquess this assurance: that Her Majesty's Government are well aware that the finances of India require close watching, and that the interests of India ought not to be, and should not be, sacrificed to any extraneous consideration. The House may feel satisfied that the Government do not consider this to be in any sense a Party question, but that they will have regard to the interests of India, and to those interests alone, in any future action which may be taken in connection with this most important subject, relying upon the support which your Lordships have always given to measures calculated to benefit Her Majesty's subjects in India.
  LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHARsaid, the noble Marquess, whose five years' recent experience at the head of the Government of India enabled him to speak on the question before the House with an authority which no one else could claim, had so fully explained the object of the Motion brought forward for consideration that he would not venture to take up their Lordships' time with any words of his, did he not feel that he was bound by all he owed to India, and by his regard for, and intimate acquaintance with, its people, to tell what they thought of the question. He would, therefore, offer no apology for asking the House to listen to him for a few moments. The people of India thought that, by

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  prohibiting the extension of the Import Duties, levied under the Tariff Act of 1894, to cotton goods, the interests of their country were being sacrificed to the interests of this country. This was a feeling which ought not, which he thought must not, be allowed to continue. While, as a soldier, he believed that the prosperity of India depended on the maintenance of our naval and military supremacy; as an Englishman, who had lived for more than 40 years in that country, he knew that it depended to even a greater extent upon the contentment of the population, and their belief in the advantages of British rule. The extraordinary position we occupied in India was mainly due to the natives' firm reliance on our integrity and honesty of purpose, and on our determination to do what was right and best for them. If this feeling were once destroyed, the consequences would be disastrous. It was, indeed, this implicit trust in the uprightness of the British character which enabled a single English magistrate to keep peace and order in a district far larger than the largest county in the United Kingdom, amongst divers races, differing in religion, and often bitterly hostile to each other—a unique kind of influence which, he ventured to think, was unknown in any other part of the world, of which this nation might justly be proud, and without which we could not continue to hold India. The noble Marquess had shown how difficult it would be to make any material military retrenchment; but he would remind their Lordships that the Army in India was out of all proportion small to the extent of frontier, more than 5,000 miles of which it had to guard; the enormous area, upwards of 100,000,000 of square miles, over which it was scattered; and the population, numbering nearly 300,000,000, it was supposed to control. If, when the hour of trial came, we had only our few troops, our guns, and our forts to rely upon; if we had lost the confidence of the people; and if our feudatories were not loyal to us, it would go hard with us. The faith of the natives of India in our fair dealing must never be shaken. To show how strong that faith still was, he would read an extract from a letter he received a short time ago from a nobleman in Calcutta, the Maharajah Sir Jotendro Mohun Tagore, than whom
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  there was no more loyal subject or enlightened gentleman in Her Majesty's dominions. In referring to a remark made by himself in a letter to which this was a reply, the Maharajah says—
  "You tell me there is every desire in England to deal fairly by India as regards the cotton duties matter, and I may say that it is precisely because we are so sure of England's fair dealing that we appeal to her whenever there is any matter for complaint. If we had no faith in England and Englishmen all agitation would have ceased and there would have been a deathlike calmness—not perhaps a very desirable thing in the political world of India."
  VISCOUNT CROSS: My Lords, I should like to say one or two words in this matter—they shall be very few. I cannot help knowing what a deep feeling there is all over India in regard to this question. I must press upon your Lordships the importance of one point alluded to by the noble Marquess, and that is the change which has been brought about in the position of the people of India by the reconstitution of the Indian Councils, by means of which the feeling of the people of India will be made much more known both here and in India than hitherto has been the case. Members of the Councils will now be appointed from among the people themselves, and Parliament must not forget that the power given to those Councils will probably become very great. I do not think the noble Marquess has in the least exaggerated the difficulties of the Finance Minister in India, who cannot tell whether he is to budget for a deficiency or not. No one can possibly exaggerate the lamentable and damaging fact that all the public works in India are practically stopped. I think the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State said that during the last 12 months 27 miles of railway were all that had been completed.
  LORD REAY: I said sanctioned in addition—
  VISCOUNT CROSS: I mean that only 27 miles had been added. I have had a good deal to do with the increase of the railways in India, and I believe that no greater benefit can be conferred on the country than by a vast increase in the mileage of Indian railways. Wherever a railway is opened civilisation and prosperity follows. If 27 miles is the only addition that has been made in the course of 12 months to the existing railways I

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  think it is one of the most lamentable facts that could be laid before us.
  LORD REAY: I have stated the sanctioned mileage in contemplation, which is 1,922 miles; 27 miles merely represents the additional net mileage sanctioned.
  VISCOUNT CROSS: I have not the smallest doubt that there are other railways in contemplation; but they cannot be carried out. In the present financial condition of India it is impossible that can be done. I endeavoured when I was at the India Office to multiply the number of miles that were made; I believe we made them at one time at the rate of 1,000 miles a year. But that is practically stopped. You might go on making railways at the rate of 1,000 miles a year with the greatest possible benefit to the people of India, and yet it appears that only 27 miles have this year been made. This is one of the greatest calamities that could happen. But it is not only the railways. The irrigation works also are being stopped. If one thing is wanted more than another in India it is irrigation, because if works for that purpose were carried out they would turn what is practically desert into fruitful and fertile places, where the inhabitants of the country could live and prosper. It is not simply a question for the future; it is of the highest importance in the present. Again, it is not only the railways and irrigation works that are stopped, but works which are absolutely necessary for the health of the Army from one end of the country to the other. All those works are stopped on account of the want of funds. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Reay) said that this is only a temporary matter. I wish we knew that it was really so, and that we had got to the bottom of the hill; but I am sure the noble Lord knows no better than I do whether we have or not, and this is a case which is really deserving of the most serious attention of the Government. I am disappointed in looking through the Blue Book to find no correspondence published between the Indian Government and the Government at home. The noble Marquess wanted to know the reasons why the Government took this course, and one would naturally look for a reply in that correspond-
  514
  ence. What is the use of giving us a number of Blue Books when the one thing we want is not contained in them? The one thing the noble Marquess asks for is not to be found. The noble Lord who has just spoken on behalf of the India Office has given no answer to that question. Probably the noble Earl opposite (Lord Kimberley) will answer it before this Debate concludes. All I desire to add is, and I have always said so with regard to the affairs of India—this is no Party question whatever. I hope it will be a long time before that should prove to be the case, and it has been greatly to the advantage of India that it has not been the case hitherto. I must say, in conclusion, this is a matter which must be decided by the Government of the day. It is for them to say whether the course which has hitherto been adopted should be persisted in or not. They have the information which we could not get for the purpose of judging what is right and what is wrong. I observe that in the Debates in the Indian Council one member, who is also a millowner, said he would be very glad if the Import Duties were re-enacted—that there should be an Excise Duty imposed on cotton manufactured in India, though he points out how difficult it would be to collect, especially if you went beyond the cotton manufactures. It is, however, something for a millowner himself to say that if you do re-impose these Cotton Duties you should also be at liberty to impose an Excise Duty upon the manufacture of goods in India itself. All these are matters for the Government to consider. Do they believe that without the reimposition of these duties the Indian finances can be properly balanced? If they do, there is an end of the question; if not, are the duties not to be imposed simply on account of some fad about Free Trade which ought not to enter into the discussion of any question between great countries like England and India? At the same time, the Resolution of the House of Commons still stands, and is no doubt not lightly to be upset. It is, as I said before, a question for the Government of the day. I am sure if they saw their way to balance the finances of India without re-imposing these duties they would be happy to do so; but if they cannot find any other way of doing it, what is to be

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  done? It is entirely for them. If they can avoid doing this, well and good; but if they cannot balance the finances of India without re-imposing this particular tax, of course they will, at the proper time, reconsider the question, and probably re-impose it.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The EARL OF KIMBERLEY): Before I make any other remark, I must thank the noble Marquess for the fair, temperate, and admirably clear manner in which he has brought this subject before the House. In regard to what the noble Viscount has just said as to the number of miles of railway my noble Friend has been somewhat misunderstood. What he stated was that during the year 1893–4 sanction was given to the construction of additional mileage to the extent of 154 miles, and that the sanctioned mileage in March, 1894, exceeded the sanctioned mileage on the 31st of March, 1893, by only 27 miles. That, of course, is a very different statement. I may also add, as illustrating the exact position, that the total outlay on the construction of railways, including protective railways, was, on the whole, only reduced from Rx. 4,027,000 in 1893–4 to Rx.3,450,000 in the present financial year. My Lords, though making that correction, I am not in the slightest degree disposed to question what the noble Viscount said with regard to the lamentable results of the great diminution which has occurred in Indian available revenues owing to the fall in the exchange. That fact has caused the whole of the embarrassment we have now to consider. It cannot be questioned for a moment that large reductions in expenditure suddenly made bring with them considerable inconvenience by the dislocation of works, and so forth, and I thoroughly share the noble Viscount's opinion, that it is greatly to be regretted that, even if there be no considerable reduction in the expenditure on railways, at all events the progressive increase in that expenditure which we desire to see is stopped, and I agree with the noble Viscount that it may be stopped possibly for some considerable time. The noble Marquess made one remark with which I cannot entirely agree. He spoke of the suspension of the Famine Fund as a reversal of the famine policy. It cannot be termed a reversal of the famine policy.
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  It has on previous occasions been found necessary, and, I think, during the time the noble Viscount was in Office, owing to temporary financial difficulties, to suspend the famine grant, and I wish to point out to the House that it is by no means so serious a step now as it would have been a few years ago. When the grant was instituted you had first to provide a fund to meet the possible occurrence of the same great famine, and, secondly, you desired to construct as rapidly as possible the railways, which were called famine railways, which would enable you to convey supplies into territories affected by famine, and so prevent the lamentable results which might otherwise ensue. The result of that policy, which has been going on ever since the institution of the famine grant, is that you have constructed most of the railways which were regarded by the Famine Commission as urgently necessary—I believe not very far from the whole of them. The construction of these railways has diminished the necessity for laying by the fund for this reason; that there is every reason to hope that it is scarcely possible for a famine with such results as former famines had to occur, because by timely measures and by all the advantages of better communication you would be able to prevent such disastrous results to a very considerable extent as you had formerly to meet. For that reason the famine grant has been one which may be taken advantage of by the Government of India upon emergency; and upon the present emergency it is perfectly justifiable, in my opinion, to make that suspension. It must not be supposed that the mere reimposition of the Cotton Duties would given you all the relief you want, supposing it were done. The condition of the finances of India is so uncertain, the future is so obscure, and the difficulty of making any trustworthy forecast is so great that you cannot by any means be certain that you will meet the difficulty by any one particular expedient, and, in any event, I think it would be sanguine to suppose that you must not look forward to a period—possibly for some time—when you will not be able to make such expenditures upon public works as were fortunately quite possible during a portion of the time when the noble Marquess was Viceroy of India, and when he had the good fortune

  517
  to have an overflowing Exchequer. Having made these few general remarks, I will now come to what is the real and more immediate matter for us to consider—namely, this question of the re-imposition of the Cotton Duties and the reasons why Her Majesty's Government did not when the Budget of the present year was framed, give their consent to that re-imposition. It is necessary to understand the precise history of this question. The first important document was a despatch from the noble Marquess opposite (Lord Salisbury), dated July 15, 1875, in which the noble Marquess drew attention to the effect of the duty on the coarser class of cotton goods and the necessity of removing a subject of dangerous contention as soon as the state of the finances would permit. That is a mere summary of the despatch. Again, in a Despatch on the 11th of November, 1875, the noble Marquess referred to the Import Duty in these words—
  "as impeding the importation of an article of first necessity, and as tending to operate as a protective duty in favour of a native manufacture. It is thus inconsistent with the policy which Parliament, after very mature deliberation, has sanctioned, and which, on that account, it is not open to Her Majesty's Government to allow to be set aside, without special cause, in any part of the Empire under its direct control."
  That seems to me to be a perfectly fair statement of the policy in the matter. I will not pursue all that was done before the Cotton Duties were ultimately repealed, because I do not think that is necessary for understanding the matter as it now stands. The noble Marquess referred to the Resolutions of the House of Commons. The second Resolution was certainly most unqualified in its terms. The noble Viscount spoke of a mere fad about Free Trade: but a Resolution of this kind by the House of Commons declaring that the duties operate as protective duties, and the Despatch from the Secretary of State at that time, then the noble Marquess opposite giving his opinion to the same effect shows that in the opinion at least of very high authorities this was not a mere fad of Free Trade, but involved questions of principle of a very serious kind. That then was the position of the question, and I would further wish the House to remember, what is often not sufficiently borne in mind in these discussions, that the objections entertained
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  in India to the removal of the duty upon cotton goods have always been entertained, and very strongly pressed ever since the Cotton Duties were repealed. The noble Marquess alluded to the answer I gave to the deputation from the Lancashire manufacturers, in which I reminded them that there had never been a moment, I believe, in India since the time when the Cotton Duties were repealed when there had not been more or less of an agitation, or, at all events, a continued very strong expression of opinion that an injustice had been done to India by the repeal of the Cotton Duties. I say it is extremely important to bear that in mind because you must not suppose that this agitation and strong feeling is merely the result of what has been done, or what has not been done, during the present year. The fact is, that as there had existed in India for years past an extremely strong feeling against the repeal of the duties upon cotton manufactures, a strong feeling not confined to the natives, but also very largely expressed by the Anglo-Indian community, the occasion which presented itself for pressing the matter still more strongly home owing to the difficulties in which the Government of India is placed by the deficit in its finances was naturally seized upon by all those who desire the re-imposition of the Cotton Duties, not merely because it might be necessary to meet the present emergency, but because they have invariably and continually insisted, in opposition to the policy of Parliament which has been adopted by both Parties in this country, that the duty upon cotton goods ought never to have been repealed. I do not by any means wish either to neglect or under-estimate the importance of that feeling. I think it is a very grave feature indeed in the consideration of the whole of this question. The only remark I would make upon it is this: That I do not believe that it is sound policy to consider these questions simply with reference to each member of the Empire without any consideration for the other members of it, and above all, strong as is my feeling in regard to allowing the Colonies the independence they enjoy, and fully as I share the opinions expressed to-night that you ought to have, in every respect, full regard for the interests of India, on the other hand, I say that we

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  have a right, as the head of a great Empire, to see that the interests of this country are also fully considered and that they are not neglected. The real difficulty we have to confront is how to conciliate all these interests, and an extremely difficult task it always must be. I come now to the actual position of affairs when I had the honour of holding the Seals as the Secretary of State for India and we had to deal with this difficult question. The matter presented itself to us practically in this form. I may say, without wearisome details, that the Estimates were put before us, and what appeared the best estimate that could be formed showed that in round numbers—and it is almost the exact figure—the deficit which would remain if the Import Duties, as they have been laid on, were imposed, without imposing duties upon cotton manufactures, would be Rx.300,000. We had then to consider whether it was desirable we should at once, then and there, consent to the re-imposition of these Cotton Duties, after the deliberate opinion of Parliament and the deliberate manner in which the policy of not imposing such duties had been accepted in this country before we had further experience of the condition of the finances of India, and, above all, before we knew what would be the result of our measures with regard to currency. I am not going to deal with that most abstruse question of currency, but everyone who has paid the slightest attention to it, more especially since the measure we adopted, must see how extraordinarily obscure is the whole matter, and how excessively difficult it is to form an estimate of its result. It seemed to us that to reverse under these circumstances the policy which had been adopted with regard to these Cotton Duties, without having further experience of what was likely to be—not merely for the moment, but was likely to be for some time the financial position of India—would be to pursue a most precipitate and unwise course. We thought, in all the circumstances of the case, although I admit the extreme difficulty of the matter, that on the whole it was better to accept a deficit of Rx.300,000, as estimated, and to wait until we had further experience of the effect of the currency measure and the general financial condition of India before pledging ourselves to any further step.
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  That is the statement—and there is nothing to add to it—of the grounds upon which the Cabinet came to that conclusion. Now, my Lords, I am aware I may be very fairly told that in announcing that decision of the Government of India I had to do so contrary to the expressed opinion of the whole of my Council, or of those who were present. I think there were 11 present. That, again, was a step which, I must say, I had to take with extreme regret. I always had felt the greatest advantage from the advice I received from my Council, with whom, I am happy to say, although we differed, I was always on most harmonious terms. But in this particular matter, where the interests of this country as well as those of India were involved, and where we had to deal with a Resolution passed by Parliament, it was quite evident that it must be decided upon the responsibility of the Cabinet itself. At the same time, I admit that my Council were perfectly justified in placing before me in plain terms their opinion from an Indian point of view, and I do not think they were called upon or that I could require them to take a view of a larger kind, and they were—if I may venture to say so of men of so much ability—from the very nature of the case, not so well qualified to offer me a really authoritative opinion as to the considerable part of the question which was not merely Indian. There was another point which weighed very much with me. I may have over-estimated, but I do not think I did, the opposition which would be met with in this country. The noble Marquess alluded to the deputation which waited upon me. He said that that deputation received my announcement with loud cheering. It was a deputation, I believe, of the most influential kind that Lancashire could send up, and they did receive it with loud cheering. But there was something more. They told me in explicit terms—and, although I am not a Lancashire man, like the noble Viscount, I have always believed that the words of Lancashire men meant deeds—they told me that, without distinction of Party, there was not a man among them, or, they believed, in Lancashire, who was interested in these manufactures who would not use every possible means at his disposal to agitate against and destroy any such measure on

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  the part of the Government. It was not merely the effect that might have upon the Government of the day, but we had to consider what was of much more consequence, the effect it might have on the relations between this country and India. It seemed to me that if there could be one thing which would be more disastrous than another, it would be that the Government of this country should have announced that these Cotton Duties might be reimposed, and that then there should be violent agitation which might lead to some resolution of Parliament or expression of opinion contrary to that decision which I think would have embittered opinion in India far more than the course we took. We can defend the course we took upon the solid ground that it would have been unwise to take any premature step. But if we had once committed ourselves and there had been a reversal of our policy in consequence of agitation against it, then I think there would have been far more harm to our relations with India than by the course we adopted. I do not believe there was anything we could have done which was not open on one side or the other to grave objections. We took the course, after very careful and full deliberation, which we thought to be best, and I also authorised the Viceroy to make the statement to his Council in those words which the noble Marquess has read as to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the future:—
  "I am, therefore, able to state that if, after an interval sufficient to judge of the position as affected by the Act, the course of exchange, and other circumstances, there is no improvement, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to receive a further representation on the subject."
  That is how the matter stands. It rests with the Government of India, if they think it necessary, to make a representation to Her Majesty's Government at the time and in the manner they think best. The responsibility will then fall on the Government here to decide upon the course which they may take, but, as regards any indication of what may be the policy of the Government, I entirely agree with my noble Friend behind me that the very nature of the case precludes us from making any announcement. I will tell you why. Suppose I were to say the Government had con-
  522
  sidered the matter, and that if they should receive a representation they will be prepared to consent to this or that measure which may impose a duty, your Lordships will see at once what might be the result. It is obvious that whenever a duty is likely to be imposed the natural course is for the importers to take advantage of any interval which may exist to pour into the country where the duty is to be imposed as much of their manufactures as they can send over before the duty comes into effect, therefore it is quite clear that at the present time it would be highly improper that I or my noble Friend should give any indication beyond that I have already given—namely, that if the Government were to receive any resentation from India upon the subject, it would be fully and carefully considered here. My Lords, I am not at the present time so well acquainted with the precise condition of the finances in India as to be able to give your Lordships any very accurate details, but I believe that although there has been a greater fall in the exchange even than was anticipated, still there has been such an improvement in some branches of the Revenue as practically leaves the matter at present much as it was when the Budget Estimate was made. What the future may bring forth it is extremely difficult to say. It is undoubtedly true that in the position in which India now stands it may be necessary to have recourse to measures which otherwise we should not adopt, and the noble Marquess opposite, in the passage I read, indicated very clearly that that was his opinion, when he said "except for special reasons," a reservation that I think was perfectly right. The only other thing I will say is this: I entirely agree with what my noble Friend behind said in conclusion, and although it is, in my opinion, our duty not to confine our view merely to India in the consideration of such questions as this, yet when an emergency arises in India we must have regard—it is our duty to have regard—in the first and principal place, to the interests and needs of India itself. More than that I do not think, my Lords, I can say. If there is any other explanation I can give I shall be happy to give it in reply to any questions.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKtrusted in the few remarks he was about to make he should follow the excellent example set to him by his noble Friend the noble Marquess who had lately returned from India, and by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that they should discuss this question with the greatest calmness and deliberation. At the same time, he must express his entire concurrence with what fell from the noble Viscount opposite, who regretted that in a matter of such importance as this they had before them no Despatches from the Secretary of State for India in Council and no Despatches from the Government of India. Lord Kimberley had felt it to be his duty to overrule the unanimous opinion of the Government of India, of every member, he believed, of the Legislative Council of India, and of the whole of the Council of the Secretary of State—the Council established by Parliament to advise the Secretary of State upon Indian matters, and who certainly ought not to be lightly overruled. In circumstances so grave, when a responsibility so tremendous had been undertaken by one individual as the mouthpiece of the Cabinet, he thought it was due to this country and to India that the reasons of the Government of India in proposing to impose this duty, the reasons for Her Majesty's Government declining to assent to that proposal, and the personal reasons of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for overruling his Council should be deliberately expressed and laid before Parliament, and thus given to this country and to India. The great powers which the Constitution undoubtedly gave to the Secretary of State for India ought not to be exercised in an important matter of this kind without publicity, and he thought of all the manners in which publicity could be given to those reasons the worst was probably that which was adopted by his noble Friend in his answer to the deputation from Lancashire, who were, no doubt, interested against the imposition of cotton duties. That fact of itself had created the very worst feeling in India, and would have been avoided if there had been a deliberate expression of opinion in well-weighed language in public Despatches. So far as to the manner in which this measure had been
  524
  taken by the Government, there could be no reason why, as far as he understood it, the whole correspondence should not be presented to Parliament. The Secretary of State for India the other day, in another place, was asked whether there was any proposal now before the Secretary of State for India in Council dealing with this question. He answered that there was no proposal. The correspondence, then, must be final and complete. The Viceroy, moreover, in his speech the other day in the Legislative Council of India, said publicly that the opinion of the Government of India would be seen in the papers that would be laid before Parliament. He should like to know where those Papers were? They, doubtless, were in the correspondence, but that correspondence appeared to be in the archives of the India Office. This, he thought, became of greater importance because, so far as he understood his noble Friend's explanation, he gave it to be understood in some way or other that the proposal to impose these duties was a revival of the opposition that was being made for many years for these duties having been taken off. If his noble Friend meant that the Government of India were influenced by any such considerations as that in making the proposal, it was surely only fair that the statement of the Government of India themselves should be presented to the world so that they could see whether there was any foundation for the supposition.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I never intended for a moment to convey or suggest anything that could imply that the Government of India had taken that view. I said that was the view taken generally, but not by the Government.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKaccepted his noble Friend's explanation, and, passing from that particular topic, expressed very great regret that his noble Friend did not feel himself in a position to indicate more clearly what the policy of the Government really was. He appeared to be ready, on the one hand, to assume the responsibility of overruling the Government of India, whilst on the other hand he did not seem to be ready to give the Government of India any help as to what the solution was to be of this question. His noble Friend said with some

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  plausibility that, of course, it was quite impossible for him to give any indication of his views in this matter, because the effect might be to derange the cotton trade and influence the exchanges, and might have some injurious effect on the Indian finances. His noble Friend might be reticent, but other people were not. Unfortunately, the trade was quite ready to see which way the wind was likely to blow, and to act in regard to their own interests upon their view. There was no secret in India about it as far as he understood. Only yesterday he got a recent copy of The Bombay Gazette, which stated that the fact that Mr. Westland, the Finance Minister of the Viceroy, was to go to Poonah and Bombay next month for the purpose of making himself familiar with matters affecting the cotton industry would be generally taken to mean that the re-imposition of the Cotton Duties had been decided upon. Then followed words which would show his noble Friend he need not be so apprehensive that he would do any harm by giving his opinions to the House. The writer stated that the anticipation of some such step had undoubtedly led to large speculative imports of Lancashire cottons, far beyond the actual requirements of the Indian market, with the result that stocks were unsaleable. This state of things would, no doubt, lead to a fall in prices and discourage imports for some time to come. In face of that how could his noble Friend suppose that any statement on his part could do any harm to the cotton trade in India? He thought some more explanation would not do any harm, but would tend to steady public feeling. The evil of all this had been that great excitement had arisen in India. He did not know whether the Government knew, but the people in India did not know what was going to happen in respect to this matter. The trade must be influenced by that, and he believed the sooner the Government of India and of this country could make up their mind on this important question the better it would be for trade, the better it would be for the honour and interest of the English Government, and the better it would be for all the parties concerned, both in India and in England. He was quite free to admit that the remarks made by his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as regarded
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  the disadvantage to the public interest of so important an interest as the cotton manufacture of Lancashire being in collision with the whole of the feeling, native and European, official and non-official in India, was a matter of very serious concern. He greatly regretted to hear what his noble Friend said, that any man in that deputation from Lancashire should have said if this duty were imposed, for whatever reason, there would not be a man in Lancashire who would not oppose that measure, because he had a better opinion of his fellow-countrymen in Lancashire than to believe for a moment that if the necessity should really arise, and if it could be proved that the measures taken dealt fairly with the Lancashire manufacturers, the feeling in Lancashire would be against the re-imposition of the Cotton Duties. He welcomed the words in which the leader of that deputation expressed himself—namely, that all that Lancashire wanted was fair-play and no favour. He greatly regretted that his noble Friend did not think it his duty, after full consideration of this question with the Government of India, to decide it before the Budget of this year. It appeared from the discussion in the Legislative Council that much correspondence had taken place upon the matter between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council. There could, therefore, have been no reason why the whole facts of this case should not have been before his noble Friend, and knowing, as he did, his great industry and ability, and the fairness of his mind, he felt satisfied that having these matters all before him he could have been of the greatest value to both Governments in bringing about a settlement of this question. His noble Friend appeared to him to attach too much weight to the Resolution passed by the other House of Parliament in 1879. He thought his noble Friend should have remembered that that Resolution was passed no less than 15 years ago, and, as the late Viceroy said in his speech, in different circumstances to those of the present time. It was passed after a controversy which lasted some time, and which ended, to his great satisfaction, in the repeal of almost all the Indian Import Duties by his distinguished relative Lord Cromer, then Sir Evelyn Baring, who was at that time Finance

  527
  Minister. No one who cared for India or this country could have failed to rejoice in getting rid of the subject of dispute between the two countries, and moreover no one with any knowledge of finance or commerce could fail to rejoice that the Government of India were then in such circumstances as that they were able to remove almost all the Import and Export Duties, and give to the world an example of almost perfect free trade, such as he believed no country in the world except theirs could give. The advantage of the trade of India was very great, and he regretted that the Government of India had been obliged to re-impose those duties. The reason he alluded to this Customs Tariff Reform in 1882 was because it had not been alluded to by previous speakers and it had a great bearing upon this question. The difference of opinion among those who had studied the question of Cotton Duties before that time was whether the Government of India were right in supposing that the protective effect of the duty of 3½ per cent. upon yarn and of 5 per cent. upon cotton goods was great or small. The Government of India thought that the advantage that the Indian manufacturer had in having cotton supplied at his door, with cheap labour and perhaps some other advantages, would enable him to hold his own as against the Lancashire manufacturers in respect of all the coarser description of cotton goods. On the other hand, those who took the view of the Lancashire manufacturers in those days were strongly of opinion that the 5 per cent. Import Duty had a great prejudicial effect on the importation of Manchester manufactures into India. It was impossible at the time to prove whether the Government of India was right or the Manchester manufacturers were right. But now that they had had 12 years of Free Trade—of free competition, he should say, between the Indian manufacturers and the Lancashire manufacturers—they could judge what the real condition of the trade was much better than they could in the year 1879, and he thought that should have been in the mind of Lord Kimberley when he attached so much weight to the Resolution of the House of Commons of 1879. The result had been to show that the Government of India was correct in their supposition that in reality the effect of free competi-
  528
  tion was to give the whole of the trade in low class manufactures and low-class yarn to the Indian manufactures mainly from Bombay, and to give to the manufacturers of Lancashire the whole of the trade in the finer goods manufactured from the long staple cottons of the United States of America and manufactured by processes of manufacture, and in circumstances of climate with which India could not compete. That had been the result of twelve years of free competition between Lancashire and Bombay in respect to the cotton manufacture. He thought his noble Friend should have borne in mind that obvious circumstance to any one who had paid any attention to the manufactures of the two countries, and that he would see that the contention of the Government of India, as expressed by the Finance Minister, Mr. Westland, was the contention alluded to by the late Viceroy—namely, that although the duty now imposed might to a certain small extent be protective, it would make no serious difference in the amount of the trade of the two countries. The coarser goods would still be made almost entirely in India, and the finer goods would come almost entirely from Lancashire. Mr. Westland said that the finer goods which Manchester mainly sent out to India were beyond the power, at present at least, of the Indian manufacturer.
  "India, in fact, cannot produce the cotton requisite for their manufacture. The climate, too, I understand, is in some cases unsuitable to the processes involved. … Manchester and Bombay overlap to a certain extent, but the area which Manchester occupies, and must continue to occupy without competition, is very wide and comprehensive."
  He knew very well that the very able gentleman, Mr. O'Conor, who made annual Reports upon the Customs trade of India, had shown there was a development of the finer manufactures of yarn especially in the Bombay mills, that cotton from the United States of America and from Egypt, of a long staple had been imported into Bombay to be spun into yarn at the Bombay mills, and it must be admitted, as was admitted by the noble Marquess who opened this discussion, that in respect to a certain amount of the trade there might be a protective effect in imposing duties upon cotton imports into India. That being admitted, let them see, supposing these manufactures came from Germany and not from

  529
  England, what the revenue necessities of India were in the matter, because he held that it was the duty of the Secretary of State to be guided in the end by the interests of India, even if he had to do something which was unpopular in this country. But looking at it as a question merely of revenue, he thought it would be disadvantageous to the Indian Revenue, and therefore to the Indian taxpayer and to India generally that by the imposition of a duty upon cotton goods into India, the Bombay mills should be induced to produce goods of the same quality as those which came from abroad into India, because thereby the Indian Revenue would lose the duty upon those goods, and so far there would be a loss of revenue. Moreover, he was not one of those who considered that any artificial stimulus to any industry was ultimately advantageous to that industry. Something might be said in favour of imposing protective duties in countries where a manufacture was just beginning; but in India the Bombay cotton manufacture did not require any artificial stimulus. He said, therefore, that the duty of the Government was to see how far such a duty imposed upon the imports of cotton would really be protective. His impression, which was strengthened by the experience of free competition between the two industries in the last 12 years, was that as respected most of the lower grades of goods there would be no necessity whatever to put on any countervailing duty of any kind, and it would be only necessary in respect of some particular classes of goods in which the two industries might, and probably would overlap. Having said that he would make one further remark rather of a technical nature, in consequence of something which fell from Lord Reay in his answer to the noble Marquess. The noble Lord alluded to the finer class of yarn which was now being spun or likely to be spun in the Bombay cotton mills. For his part, he thought the policy of imposing a duty upon imported yarns was open to very considerable doubt, as yarns represented no more than one-tenth part of the value of the total imports. The yarn imported into India was a semi-manufactured article and would form part of the cotton manufactures there, being worked up either in the mills or by means of hand looms; and he thought it was excessively
  530
  doubtful whether, in respect to yarn, it was desirable that any duty should be imposed upon imports. He thought if that view should commend itself to the Government of India it would relieve them of very great difficulty in regard to arranging and finding out what remedy should be applied and to the possible protective effect to a very small extent of the duty upon the imports of cotton into India. He thought, then, that his noble Friend Lord Kimberley need not have attached such importance to the Resolution of the House of Commons of the year 1879 as he had. At any rate, it was in the noble Lord's power previous to the Budget to have brought the matter before either House of Parliament, to have explained his views and have got a decision of either House of Parliament upon it. Surely so important a subject as this, involving the present and future of Indian finance, ought to be postponed to no other question, however important, and even the Budget of this year might have been introduced a day or two later in order to have given an opportunity for the discussion of this question. He did not know whether his noble Friend the late Viceroy claimed to be gifted with prophetic qualities, but in a speech he made just before he left India he made use of quite prophetic language. At a dinner at the Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta his noble Friend made a speech in which he referred to the dangers which there were in India; but he said he was not sure that the greatest of all did not lie in the tendency to transfer power from the Government of India to the British Parliament. Whilst he admitted that the Imperial Parliament must be the ultimate source and depository of power in an extreme case, he said it did not follow that because these powers were inherent in Parliament they should be perpetually exercised by it and
  "it is the modern tendency to exercise those powers continually and at the instance of irresponsible persons which, in my belief, constitutes a grave menace to the safety of the empire. The policy of a body, which is admittedly a body of experts (the Indian Government), is liable at any moment to be thwarted and set aside by another body which must, in the nature of things, be deficient in expert knowledge, and which in recent years has shown constantly increasing tendencies to be swayed by emotion and enthusiasm. In the House of Commons an erratic Member, in a thin House, may carry a Resolution vitally affecting the

  531
  welfare of this country as summarily and as light-heartedly as if the proceedings were those of the debating club of a college rather than the Senate of a great empire, and so it may come to pass that while we are slowly and laboriously striving to obtain an equilibium between income and expenditure some haphazard decision of our masters on the other side threatens our financies with bankruptcy. The whole thing is done, and it is done in a manner which cannot fail to impair the authority of the Government which can carry on its work only if its authority is upheld."
  Those weighty words appeared to him to be in the nature of a prophecy of what had taken place now when they heard the Secretary of State for India had, in dealing with a question of this magnitude, without attempting to argue the matter out or bring it again before the House of Commons, founded the whole of his policy on the Resolution of the House of Commons of the year 1879. He would not trouble their Lordships any further except to say that in general he agreed entirely with the views taken by his noble Friend the late Viceroy, who had not, in his opinion, exaggerated the great importance of the question in India. Distinguished military officers, travelling about the country and becoming acquainted with all classes of people in India, had perhaps better opportunity than any others to acquire an accurate knowledge on the subject. He was therefore glad to hear his noble and gallant Friend Lord Roberts, with all his military reputation and knowledge, declare, in almost the same words previously employed by Lord Lawrence and Lord Napier of Magdala, that, although the foundation of the British power in India was, in one sense, the strength of her military power, yet, in another and wider and nobler sense, the real power of England in India lay in this, that the natives of that country should feel that she was being governed, not in the interests of England, but of India; and that, in the conduct of the Government in this country towards our great dependency, the Government should be guided only by the interests of India and by sentiments of justice. He hoped that the Government would carefully consider the questions which had been raised and would arrive at a decision upon the lines which had been indicated to them; and he trusted that when next they heard of the subject of this controversy it would be presented to Parliament as a matter which had been finally settled.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HERSCHELL): There are only two or three points in the speech of the noble Lord who has just sat down to which I think it necessary to allude. I think he scarcely did justice to the statement of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in saying he based his action wholly upon the Resolution of the House of Commons of 1879. My noble Friend stated that that was one of the factors which had to be taken into account, but I think he was far from stating it was upon that alone that he rested the conclusion at which he arrived. My Lords, it appears to me that my noble Friend a little overlooks the difficulty in which the Secretary of State was necessarily placed in arriving at a determination by this time. It is not until near the end of the financial year that the financial position is known to be estimated by the Government of India. There is, therefore, but necessarily a very short interval for any decision to be arrived at. The question is not what might have been done if there had been time for mature deliberation and inquiry, but rather whether the course which my noble Friend pursued was not the right one under the inevitable circumstances which then existed? My noble Friend who has just sat down has himself pointed out that to impose a duty which is, in fact, protective, is in itself necessarily mischievous to the country where that duty is imposed. Of course, one result of it is that part of the increased price which the consumer pays goes not for the good of the country and to increase its Revenue, but into the pocket of the particular manufacturing or trading class. Everybody must admit that that in itself is a disadvantage, and if the effect of imposing the duty be to stimulate a particular trade unnaturally to the extent to which you do that you increase the disadvantage by diminishing the Revenue advantage and increasing the advantage to the individual producer. And unless protection of that sort is to be permanent there is no more cruel kindness you can bestow upon the manufacturers themselves than to give them such protection, because if you have, by means of the protective duty, stimulated trade, and that duty be removed, it is obvious that you have done that which is very far from, on the whole,

  533
  being beneficial to the industry. Now, my noble Friend has pointed out that so far as it is a protection, or would be calculated to become protective by leading to the manufacture in India of goods of a fine character not now manufactured, but which might then be manufactured and become competitive, that this apprehended evil might be met by some countervailing duty. No doubt that is a very grave and important question. My noble Friend will see at once that the questions how far it would be practicable, how far it should extend, and how it should be imposed, are questions of very great difficulty. It would be utterly impossible for any such questions to be inquired into. If the duty was to be imposed, it must have been imposed absolutely with all the evils to which my noble Friend alluded, and with the impossibility of removing these evils by any of the expedients he has suggested. My noble Friend suggested that there should be certain exemptions, and he indicated yarn as one of these on account of its being used in India in manufacturing processes. But is he certain that no other cotton goods imported into India are used in manufacturing processes, and, which, for the same reason, ought to be exempted? That, again, would be a matter on which it would be obviously necessary to make inquiry, and the truth is that if I wanted reasons for showing how impossible it was to take any other course than that which my noble Friend took under the same existing circumstances I should have appealed to the speech of my noble Friend who has just sat down, because it shows the difficulty with which the question is surrounded and the number of problems which have to be solved, and the various considerations which have to be discussed and canvassed before you come to any conclusion on the subject. All that is absolutely impossible between the time the proposals are made and the revenue received, and when it becomes necessary to make a decision. That is the explanation of the necessity of arriving, as I say, at a decision such as the Government have arrived at at the time, but not, as then stated, a final decision applicable to all circumstances, and never open to review and reconsideration. The very contrary was stated publicly at the very time the decision was announced. The
  534
  noble Earl has said that he regretted that allusion should have been made to the statement by the gentlemen from Lancashire who attended the deputation which waited on my noble Friend, to the effect that they would fight as one man in opposition to the re-imposition of any such duties, and he said he had confidence in the good feeling and good sense of the Lancashire men, that if they saw it was necessary and right in the interest of India they would not let their own interests stand in the way of India's true interest. I entirely agree with my noble Friend in thinking that would be the view of Lancashire, and I would remind him that what my noble Friend alluded to was the statement made with reference to the then expected deficiency or apprehended deficiency, and the hope then expressed that some way or other would be found to meet that deficiency. My Lords, I should be very sorry to believe, with my noble Friend, that if there was an emergency in India which could not well be met in the interest of India in any other way than by dealing in some manner or other with the duties, that Lancashire would put its business inconvenience before the real interests of India and the necessity of meeting any great emergency arising there. When I say that, I lay emphasis upon the interest of India, because that is what has to be regarded, not the interest of any section of India, and not the interest of any manufacturers of India. If Lancashire believed that was what was being considered I think they would most naturally set their faces against the being imposed for the benefit of the manufacturers of India protective duties which would prejudically affect the manufacturers of Lancashire. But, my Lords, if once they are satisfied that the interests of India at large require some reconsideration and re-arrangement of these duties of a fair and reasonable character, I agree with my noble Friend that Lancashire, no more than any other class of Englishmen, would not set their faces against a change which, though it might chance to be in some respects prejudicial to themselves, would be fair and just to the interests of India, and was demanded by the righteous consideration of their interests. I agree with what has been said, that in circumstances such as those to which I have alluded it would not be right to sacrifice the interests of

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  India to the interests of any class or section of this community. There is entrusted to us a high mission in our Government of India, and we should, it seems to me, fall short of the demands upon us in respect to that mission if we were to do anything which was against the interest of that country. I trust that in our dealings in India we shall show that this country desires to pursue no selfish policy, to serve no selfish ends, but to govern India in the highest interests of the people of India themselves, particularly, if I may say so, bearing in mind the interests of the great inarticulate masses of India, and to lay before itself the determination that so far as this country can it will fulfil the mission entrusted to it, and seek to make the people of India see that this country is endeavouring to secure their contentment by exhibiting to them its determination to do them justice.

WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE BILL.—(No. 61.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD DENMANmoved the Second Reading of this Bill. He observed that it seemed almost a formality to make the Motion, but some women had taken the trouble to urge him to proceed with it. He did not see any great advantage in pressing the Bill, but, nevertheless, he pleaded with their Lordships to accord a Second Reading to the Bill, for which many women would be grateful. He did not wish it to be supposed that the House of Lords was against the Second Reading of the Bill. He had been for 10 years trying to obtain that stage, and had had many instances of agreement with him on many points, whilst there were no points of difference which could not be very easily adjusted in Committee. He did not think anyone could say he had been hasty in this matter. He had tried for many Sessions to get this Bill through the Second Reading; he had on many occasions been up till as late as 12 o'clock with a view to secure that object, and he trusted their Lordships would now reward his perseverance by agreeing to his present Motion. He begged to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Denman.)
  On Question? resolved in the negative.

VALUATION OF LANDS (SCOTLAND) ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 163.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord TWEEDMOUTH)moved that the Bill be read a second time. The Bill, he explained, was a very simple one designed to remove an inconvenience felt by the County Councils of Scotland by the late date at which the assessors made up the Roll and the County Valuation Roll. It was proposed by the Bill to make the date the 15th of March instead of the 15th of August, and by the alteration proposed the County Councils would be able to have the Roll before them at a convenient time to settle their assessments for the October meetings.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Tweedmouth.)
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 15) BILL.—(No. 126.)
Reported, without Amendment, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.
STATUTE LAW REVISION BILLS AND CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
Leave given to the Joint Committee to report from time to time: First Report made; and to be printed. (No. 170.)
COPYHOLD (CONSOLIDATION) BILL [H.L.]—(No. 2.)
Reported from the Joint Committee on Statute Law Revision Bills and Consolidation Bills, with Amendments, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Thursday next; and to be printed as amended. (No. 171.)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 17) BILL.—(No 123.)
Amendments reported (according to Order); and Bill to be read 3a on Monday next.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 14) BILL.—(No. 150.)
Amendment reported (according to Order); and Bill to be read 3a on Monday next.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 18) BILL.—(No. 151.)
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
PAROCHIAL ELECTORS (REGISTRATION ACCELERATION) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without Amendment; and re-committed to the Standing Committee.
ZANZIBAR INDEMNITY BILL.—(No. 308.)
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment: Standing Committee negatived; and Bill to be read 3a on Monday next.

PEEBLES FOOT PAVEMENTS PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Read 1a; to be printed; and referred to the Examiners. (No. 172.)
House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock.