§
*LORD HOOD OF AVALON moved to resolve—
That taking into consideration the extreme importance of the vast interests in connection with the British Empire, which in time of war must be protected by the Navy, also the rapidly-approaching completion of the vessels building under the Naval Defence Act, and the very large increase which has been undertaken in the strength of foreign navies since the passing of that Act, it has become absolutely necessary that a further well-considered progressive scheme, extending over a term of years, for making such an increase to the strength of the Navy as will insure adequate protection being given to the vast interests of the Empire, should be prepared and provided for.
He said that the extreme importance of the subject set forth in his proposed Resolution would, no doubt, be considered a sufficient reason for bringing it before the attention of their Lordships. What were those vast interests which could only be protected by the Navy? They were, first, the protection of our own coasts; secondly, our valuable Possessions abroad; thirdly, our commerce on the high seas, the average value of which afloat at any moment was esti-
1019
mated at £150,000,000 sterling; and, lastly, but by no means least, the protection of our coaling stations and seaborne food supplies. It was by no means over-stating the case to say that, in the event of this country being engaged in war with a powerful enemy or combination of enemies strong on the sea, its very existence as a first-class Power must depend upon having a powerful Navy thoroughly ready for war. In time of peace our sea-borne food supply was an important question for us; but if, through false economy, the Navy was again allowed to fall into a weak condition—which God forbid!— and this country was suddenly involved in war with a first-class Naval Power, or possibly with more than one Naval Power, our food supplies would be materially interfered with—nay, possibly cut off—in which case but very few months would elapse before we should have a famine throughout the country, and we should be simply starved into signing an inglorious peace with the enemy on their own terms. The strength of the Navy should never be made a controversial Party question. It was the bounden duty of all legislators, whatever their political views on other subjects, to unite in insisting that the Navy should be maintained at such a standard of strength as would insure adequate protection being given to the vast interests of this Empire. Then, and then only, should we be free from those panics which had hitherto occurred whenever a scare of war arose. He well remembered the anxiety which arose throughout the country in the early part of 1885, when the relations between Russia and this country were in a very strained condition, from fear that the Navy was not prepared for war, and how money was spent broadcast in the endeavour to provide hurriedly, and therefore inefficiently, for the deficiency. When at that time, having been appointed by Lord George Hamilton First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, it became his duty to look closely into the real state of the Navy, he formed a very decided opinion that we were not prepared to engage in war with a single first-class Naval Power with a well-assured certainty of success. The real state of the Navy at that time was this. We were decidedly deficient in
1020
battle-ships; our cruisers were far too few in number, and far too deficient in speed, to enable them to protect our commerce on the high seas; we had no first-class gunboats suitable for foreign service, not a single fast torpedo vessel, and very few torpedo boats. When the Conservative Government came into Office in 1885, steps were at once taken to remedy that state of things. Fifteen new vessels were commenced, including two first-class battle-ships, the Nile and the Trafalgar. Their successors in Office very wisely did not attempt to interfere with their building programme; but no additional vessels were commenced. From that time up to 1889, every endeavour had been made by the late Government to increase the strength of the Navy, so far as it could be done without largely increasing the Naval Estimates. At the end of that time, looking at the very large increase in the strength of Foreign Navies, the late Government most wisely decided to increase the strength of the Navy as rapidly as possible, and to raise it to a standard that should be equal, if not superior, to that of any two Foreign Navies in combination. With the building of the 70 vessels resolved upon under the Naval Defence Act great progress had been made, a large proportion having been completed; and they had passed their trials in a most satisfactory manner. As regarded rapidity of construction, he might give the instance of the Royal Sovereign of over 14,000 tons displacement, which within two years and eight months of its being commenced was commissioned as flagship of the Channel Squadron, a rapid feat of shipbuilding, which had never been approached cither in this or any other country, and for which the highest credit was due to her designers and the whole of the officials connected with her construction. But since the passing of that Act a large increase had been commenced and was being rapidly proceeded with in the strength of Foreign Navies, especially in the case of France and Russia. In Franco five first-class battle-ships and four so-called coast defence vessels, which, for size, speed, and armour protection, might fairly be classed as battle-ships, were building; also five powerful armoured cruisers, 15 other protected cruisers, and five exceedingly
1021
fast torpedo gun vessels—a total increase of 34 vessels. In Russia, six first-class and one second-class battle-ships wore building; also four armoured coast defence vessels and three of by far the most powerful armoured cruisers in the world, and six exceedingly fast torpedo gunboats—a total increase of 20 vessels; and both France and Russia combined an increase of 54 vessels, of which no less than 16 were battle-ships, four very powerful armoured coast defence vessels, and eight exceedingly powerful armoured cruisers. In order that our vast interests might be duly protected in time of war in future, he held it to be absolutely necessary that there should be a further well-considered progressive scheme extending over a term of years for increasing the strength of the Navy. In the Navy Estimates for 1892–3 Lord George Hamilton stated that provision was only made for com-moncing three battle-ships and building 10 torpedo boats in that year, and he added that in 1893–4 he should be prepared to bring forward a very largely-extended programme. Unfortunately, however, events had since occurred to interfere with that intention of the noble Lord; but he had sincerely hoped the noble Earl, his successor, would follow the same wise policy, and that they would have found that provision had been made for increasing the strength of the Navy in battle-ships, cruisers, and torpedo gunboats, to the extent necessary for the protection of the vast interests of this great Empire, looking at the large increase of the naval strength of foreign nations. Of these three classes of vessels he thought an increase of battle-ships was the first and most important point to consider, for there could belittle doubt that the fate of future wars would be decided by that class of vessel. Fast cruisers were of great value in the protection of commerce; but they could not perform the fighting duties of battle-ships. They could be built in half the time, and could be largely supplemented when necessary by our large and fast mercantile steamers, and he was glad to say that a number of the best of these vessels had been subsidised by the late Government to act as cruisers in time of war. Armaments had been provided for them and fighting crews arranged. Torpedo boats would be of extreme value in any future war for protecting our ports and for
1022
protecting our commerce in the Channel from the swarms of torpedo boats which had been organised and arranged in groups all along the opposite Coasts. He had carefully examined the Estimates for the present year, but could find in them no trace of any such progressive scheme for increasing the Navy as he advocated. A certain programme had been laid down; but it was a very meagre one, though he had no fault to find with the class of vessels decided upon. They had wisely resolved to build two very large first-class cruisers, and this step had been rendered necessary in consequence of Russia building three of the most powerful armoured cruisers in the world—vessels which would be far superior in size, speed, armament, and coal-supply to any cruisers ever before built by any other country, and in time of war it was certain they must prove most formidable commerce-destroyers; and in this country, with our enormous commerce on the high seas, it was therefore absolutely necessary that we should build a certain number of still more powerful cruisers to protect our commerce from the attacks of such vessels. He trusted that when the Estimates for 1894–5 came to be considered—by which time the whole of the vessels building under the Naval Defence Act would be completed—they would find, whatever Party was then in power, that a comprehensive and progressive scheme for increasing the Navy to the necessary extent for providing adequate protection for our vast interests had been decided upon. If this was not done, through any consideration of false economy, then the British Navy, looking to the increase of Foreign Navies, would fall back into a state of comparative weakness, with regard to the vast interests which must be entrusted to its protection in time of war, such as it was in when the late Government took Office in 1885. During the time the late Government was in Office they increased the strength of the Navy by 130 vessels, including 13 of the most powerful battle-ships in the world, 69 fast and powerful cruisers, 17 gunboats of over 700 tons each for foreign service, and 31 fast torpedo gunboats. A remarkable advance was made in the same period in the speed of the vessels of the Navy. In 1885, when the late Government came into Office, the number of
1023
ships built and building, torpedo-boats excluded, having a speed of 15 knots and over was 49; in August, 1892, when the late Government left Office, the number had been increased to 148. In 1885 the number of vessels built and building, excluding torpedo-boats, with a speed of 18 knots, was five; in 1892 there were 86. He had no hesitation in saying that the wise policy pursued by the late Government in making this large increase to the strength of the Navy, in fortifying our coaling stations abroad, and, in conjunction with our Australasian Colonies, providing a squadron of powerful cruisers for the protection of trade in those waters, had, in so far as the Navy was concerned, placed this country in a far better state of preparation for war than it had been in at any former period during his recollection, and therefore merited the confidence and gratitude of all classes of the country, irrespective of Party. He hoped the strength of the Navy would never in future be made a controversial Party question, but that statesmen of all Parties would unite in insisting that the Navy should be maintained at the strength that was necessary to protect the vast interests of an Empire on which the sun never sets. He begged to move the Resolution of which he had given notice.
§
Moved to resolve,
That taking into consideration the extreme importance of the vast interests in connection with the British Empire, which in time of war must be protected by the Navy, also the rapidly approaching completion of the vessels building; under the Naval Defence Act, and the very large increase which has been undertaken in the strength of foreign navies since the passing of that Act, it has become absolutely necessary that a further well-considered progressive scheme, extending over a term of years, for making such an increase to the strength of the Navy as will insure adequate protection being given to the vast interests of the Empire, should be prepared and provided for."—(The Lord Hood of Avalon.)
§ *LORD SUDELEYsaid, he had also a Notice on the Paper on the subject of the condition of the Navy—namely, to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether his attention has been called to the important evidence given before the Select Committee, presided over by the present Secretary of State for War, on Naval Estimates in 1888, by the then First Naval Lord, to the effect that no 1024 complete scheme had ever been laid before the Admiralty, showing (apart from the financial question) what, in the opinion of responsible Naval experts, the strength of the Fleet ought to be for the duties it may fairly be expected to perform. He said, there could be no doubt that a Naval programme which would carry us forward from our present condition was necessary. The Naval, Defence Act, which was passed in 1889 had had a most beneficial effect in bringing up the Navy to a condition fairly adequate to what the requirements of the country demanded, though the position was still very far short in the way of cruisers to what it ought to be if the true interests of the country were to be considered. The enormous duty that the Navy would have to perform in time of war in guarding our commerce on our lines of communication of over 92,000 miles, over which 22,000 ships were continually passing, necessitated a very large number of cruisers. They were now informed by the French Minister in the Senate that it was proposed that in France their shipbuilding programme should in the next year be no less than £4,000,000. This, with the amount of £2,500,000 of Russia, brought the Naval Expenditure of those two countries up to the enormous total of £6,500,000 a year. It had been laid down for some years as an undisputed point that we must have our Navy, so far as home service was concerned, equal to any two nations such as Russia and France. If this was the case, it was clear that our shipbuilding programme must in the future be considerably increased. He had no doubt that so long as his noble Friend at the head of the Admiralty remained in that Office, after the declaration of policy which he had recently announced, there was no fear but that he would do his utmost to keep the Navy thoroughly efficient; but they heard on all sides such different opinions from skilled experts of what the number of our ships ought to be, that he thought it was most important to know whether the Admiralty had any definite programme drawn up by their skilled Naval experts apart altogether from the question of finance. What the public wanted to know was not whether the Admiralty had got as many ships as the Estimates would allow, but how many ships were really 1025 required to meet the Necessities of the country in time of war. The Committee on Naval Estimates in 1888 declared in their Report—
That the responsibility of the Board of Admiralty and Government, respectively, for the efficiency of the Navy would be more clearly defined and accentuated if the wants of the country were carefully considered, and a programme drawn up and submitted by the First Lord, on behalf of the Board, to the Cabinet before any decision is taken as to the amount of money to be spent during the year.He wished to know whether any such programme had been drawn up; and, if so, whether there would be any objection to laying it on the Table of the House? He did not believe that there would be any difficulty in obtaining as much money as was really required to render the Navy as efficient as it ought to be; and he held that it was a fatal policy to keep the nation in the dark. Whilst he was delighted that the noble Lord opposite had brought forward this Motion, with all his great authority and experience, he was bound to say that he was not a little surprised to see the Notice standing on the Paper in the noble Lord's name. It was impossible not to carry one's memory back to the year 1888, when the noble Lord (Lord Hood of Avalon) was the First Naval Lord at the Admiralty, and when he gave evidence before the Committee on Naval Estimates, presided over by Mr. Camp-bell-Bannerman. At that time it was a grave question whether the Navy was thoroughly efficient for the demands which in war-time it would be called upon to meet. Lord Hood was naturally one of the principal witnesses called before the Committee, and in his evidence he distinctly stated before that Committee that he was quite satisfied with the state of the Navy, that it was ample to fight any one Power, and that all was required would be six more cruisers to be finished in the year 1890. He was asked after speaking about battle-ships—Do you think we are building them sufficiently fast, or procuring them sufficiently fast?—As I said before, I should like to have a few more fast cruisers.You said, did you not, that you were only fairly well satisfied with the adequacy of the Estimates?—I was speaking of the fast cruisers. As I said half-a-dozen times before. I should have preferred by the end of 1890 to have had six more fast cruisers. I do not consider it a point of vital importance.But you are satisfied with everything else?— Yes, I am.1026 It was possible, of course, that when the noble Lord gave that evidence, he felt himself tied and bound by official restraint, and that he did not utter his own untrammelled opinion and unfettered judgment. The Navy was astonished at the evidence that he gave, because it was so totally at variance with the feelings and exigencies of the whole Service. The country, also, which at that time had been roused to the necessity of having a large increase of our Fleet, was at first inclined to think it had been wrongly advised, and that further additions were not necessary. Fortunately, soon after that evidence was given, a Committee was appointed by the Admiralty to consider the results of the Naval Manœuvres of 1888. The gentlemen selected were Naval experts of the highest authority — namely, Admirals Sir W. Dowell, Sir Vesey Hamilton, and Sir F. W. Richards. Their Report was of a very different character from the evidence the noble Lord had given. They spoke in the strongest terms of what the Navy wanted. That Report was so remarkable that he would like to quote from it to their Lordships, not because it was necessary to prove his point, but because it was the strongest programme which had ever been drawn up in this country, and, fearlessly issued as it was, was undoubtedly in antagonism to the opinion and evidence of their First Naval Lord of the Admiralty. He would, with their Lordships' permission, read a few extracts from the Report of the Committee on Naval Manœuvres, 1888—For all these services in July last the total number of battle-ships and cruisers. &c, available in home waters was a force altogether inadequate in our judgment to meet the requirements we have indicated, and to take the offensive in a war with only one Great Power; and supposing a combination of even two Powers to be allied as her enemies the balance of maritime strength would be seriously against England. The Mediterranean Squadron alone would have required to be more than doubled. We are decidedly of opinion that no time should be lost in placing the Navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers. No other nation has any such interest in the maintenance of an undoubted superiority at sea as has England, whose seaboard is her frontier. England ranks among the Great Powers of the world by virtue of the Naval position she has acquired in the past, and which has never been seriously challenged since the close of the last great war. The defeat of her Navy means to her the loss of India and her Colonies and of her place among 1027 the nations. Without any desire to question the sums annually granted by Parliament for the maintenance of the Services, we cannot but note the disproportion in the appropriation when the magnitude of the issues involved is taken into consideration. It would, in our opinion, be far more in consonance with the requirements of the nation by the provision of an adequate Fleet to render invasion an impossibility than to enter into costly arrangements to meet an enemy on our shores (instead of destroying his 'Armadas' off our shores), for under the condition in which it would be possible for a Great Power to successfully invade England nothing could avail her, as, the command of the sea once being lost, it would not require the landing of a single man upon her shores to bring her to an ignominious capitulation, for by her Navy she must stand or fall.The Report was signed by Sir W. M. Dowell, Admiral, Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, Admiral, and Sir Frederick W. Richards, Vice Admiral.
§ LORD HOOD OF AVALONasked the noble Lord to read his comments upon that Report. Having read the statements on one side, he might as well read the statements on the other.
§ *LORD SUDELEYwas sorry that he had not the noble Lord's comments ready to hand. The noble Lord at the time certainly did his best to get out of what was a very difficult position, and in his reply he, no doubt, wrote strongly with reference to other matters; but, apparently, he did not say much in regard to that actual point.
§ *LORD HOOD OF AVALONsaid, he took up every point in the Report of the Committee and dealt with it. Having read the statements on one side, the noble Lord ought to read the statements on the other.
§ *LORD SUDELEYsaid, that the noble Lord undoubtedly gave that evidence before the Committee, and by those statements from such a high authority he did more than any other man to retard the passing of the Naval Defence Act.
§ *LORD HOOD OF AVALONWhy, I drew the Naval Defence Act. How can you make such a statement?
§ *LORD SUDELEYsaid, that he had no wish to irritate the noble Lord, for whom he had great respect, as certainly one of the greatest authorities in the Navy; but that it was impossible to let his statement remain unchallenged that he had done so much in favour of passing the Naval Defence Act of 1889, when it was known to everyone that he had given 1028 the strongest possible evidence before the Committee on Naval Estimates in that year that nothing beyond six cruisers was required in 1888 to increase the Navy. He would conclude by expressing the hope that the noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty would tell the House that the Government contemplated bringing forward a strong Naval Programme.
*THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Earl SPENCER)My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will have listened with pleasure to the clear and able speech of the noble and gallant Lord, whose contributions to Debates on the Navy will, I have no doubt, always be welcome and valuable to your Lordships and the country. In thinking over the course likely to be taken by these Debates, I did not anticipate a long historical review of the Navy, and I was not prepared to go back to the year 1885 and what was done by the Government of that day. I was not a Member of the Board of Admiralty of those days, but I was a Member of the Cabinet; and, therefore, I shared with other Members of the Cabinet the responsibility for what was done at the Admiralty. Now, my Lords, the noble and gallant Lord attacked the policy of the Admiralty of which Lord Northbrook was the head; but when the Government, of which that noble Lord was a Member, went out and that of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) succeeded, I failed to find any evidence of a new policy or programme adopted by the new Board of Admiralty. What they did do was to carry out and develop the programme of Lord Northbrook. I do not wish to dwell upon that, nor to go into the controversy between Lord Sudeley and the noble and gallant Lord opposite (Lord Hood of Avalon) as to the evidence given before the Committee of the House of Commons. At the same time, I am aware that some evidence of the noble and gallant Lord was quoted to show that very little was wanting in the Navy of 1888. I am also well aware that the noble and gallant Lord was First Sea Lord when the Naval Defence Act was introduced. Perhaps the noble and gallant Lord was more responsible for advice given and the programme adopted in the Act than any other person except the First Lord himself; and it is due to 1029 him to say so much. Now, the Motion contains three propositions. As to the first, nearly everybody agrees with the doctrine it lays down. I, for one, have more than once declared my opinion in this House that it is necessary the Navy should be in a thoroughly efficient state in order to protect the vast and varied interests of this great Empire. I would even go further, and say that not only is it necessary for the interests of the State in time of war that the Navy should be efficient, but that even in time of peace the interests of the country require the support of the Navy in various parts of the world. Then it has been stated that the programme of the Naval Defence Act will shortly be completed. The Admiralty believe that all the ships will be completed, with the exception of about nine, by the end of the financial year 1893–4. The Act requires that they should be completed, as far as practicable, by the end of that financial year. As regards certain ships, there has been some delay which it was impossible to avoid, arising out of the conditions of the shipbuilding trade; but, on the whole, the position we are in as regards the fulfilment of the conditions of the Act is eminently satisfactory. We believe that only £283,000 would be wanted to complete the programme after the beginning of the next financial year. The next proposition which the noble and gallant Lord makes is, that since the passing of the Act the increase in the strength of Foreign Navies renders necessary an increase in the strength of ours. It was always contemplated that there would be increase in the strength of other Navies, but it is possible that increase may have gone beyond our expectations. At all events, I cannot plead ignorance of it. We admit that there has been a considerable development of shipbuilding, in France and Russia particularly; and all that was taken into account by us in considering the position of these nations with regard to our own Navy. Now, my Lords, I come to the Resolution which the noble and gallant Lord asks your Lordships to agree to; and that Resolution, founded upon these propositions, that a further well-considered, progressive, and large scheme should be adopted on the completion of the work created by the Naval Defence Act. That is as I understand it. Now, I am 1030 not quite certain what the noble and gallant Lord moans with regard to that. If it is meant that he does not consider the programme with which he was so much connected in 1889 adequate, and which is known as the Naval Defence Act Programme, then I do not find myself able to agree with the noble and gallant Lord. I cannot help thinking that the standard of strength on which the programme was based still holds good, and that it is adequate and sufficient to meet all the just demands of the nation. Having regard to the necessity for considering the strength of Foreign Navies, as well as the defence of the great interests of this country, my belief is that the fulfilment of the programme of the Naval Defence Act attains the necessary standard of strength for our Navy, and I am not prepared to say that that standard should now be increased. A point which has a material bearing upon this question is the great rapidity with which we are now able to construct our ships. The noble and gallant Lord has referred to what was done in the building of the Royal Sovereign, and has justly stated that the greatest credit was due to the Dockyard officials for the rapidity with which that vessel was built. I fully endorse that view. That ship was ready for service within three years of the time she was commenced. In other countries five years have been found necessary to build a ship of that kind. That illustrates one of the sources of the strength of this country—that we are able to build ships much more rapidly than other countries. We are thus enabled to watch carefully what oilier countries do, and, if necessary, we can overtake them on an emergency by laying down ships enough to make up for any possible deficiency, as we can build so much more rapidly. Now, my Lords, I am not quite clear as to what the noble Lord desires. Does he desire that we should have at once a now Naval Defence Act? I do not gather that entirely from his remarks, and I will not, therefore, discuss that question. I will only repeat what I said before, which is well known to the noble and gallant Lord, that there has been a considerable difference of opinion as to the policy of having a scheme of construction laid down in an Act of Parliament. There 1031 are strong financial reasons often urged against that policy, although I am ready to admit that there are also great advantages to be got from it. I did not wish in any way to support the policy of the necessity of having a Naval Defence Act to carry out the programme for the Navy. But, my Lords, when I say I do not consider an Act is necessary, I thoroughly admit that it is necessary to look forward and take a comprehensive view of what is wanted for the Navy. Besides what is absolutely wanted to maintain the strength of the Navy, it is exceedingly desirable that ships should be built and should be at different stages of construction in the Dockyards of the country. This is important, in order to avoid spasmodic increases in the Navy, such as often took place in former years, which mean spasmodic increases in the men employed in the Dockyards, with rapid diminutions in their number when the pressure is past. That I do not think at all a desirable policy. If the noble Lord means that we must keep up the strength of the Navy by substituting new ships of the most modern types for old ships which are becoming obsolete, then I entirely agree with that view of the case. In my belief the duty of the Admiralty at the present time and for the next few years is to maintain the standard of strength which has been laid down of late years, to introduce those ships which are necessary to take the place of vessels which are becoming worn out, and to give the newest types of ships in place of the old ones. I do not want to go again over the ground which I covered in the Debate some time ago. I regretted at the time that the noble and gallant Lord was not present to take part in the Debate; but I will refer shortly to the programme which I stated that the present Board of Admiralty were ready to adopt—a programme which, in my opinion, is sufficient for the present wants of the Navy. I am not aware that what we now propose comes very far short of what, at all events, was first intended by the preceding Board in regard to the programme for this year. There may be modifications on certain points from that programme; but certainly the present Government has decided on those large cruisers to which the noble Lord referred—and I was glad to find approvingly—in his speech. We propose in new construc- 1032 tion this year to spend £2,493,731. That exceeds, to a certain extent, the generally estimated cost of filling up the normal waste of the Navy. My Predecessor, in another place, spoke of it as roughly £2,300,000. There may be some difference of opinion upon that point. It may be put lower to some extent; but on the whole, I do not, from what I have heard, think it necessary to differ materially from that figure. At all events, for new construction, we exceed this year the sum estimated to represent the normal waste of the Navy. Therefore, I do not think we can be justly accused of having such a very programme as the noble and gallant Lord has stated. We propose to build three battle-ships—one, the Renown, laid down by my Predecessor, and we propose to lay down two more battle-ships of the Royal Sovereign type in the Royal Dockyards. We propose to build three second-class cruisers and two sloops. We propose, moreover, to increase very considerably the number of torpedo-catchers, and we also propose at the end of the year to build two large cruisers, those large vessels all being built out at contract. My Lords, I have not much more to say. I am not prepared to promise a further programme. I adhere to what I stated on the last occasion when I spoke in your Lordships' House. I consider it absolutely necessary to look forward to the future; and that, you may he quite sure, the present Board will do—that they will frame their policy not simply with a view to the present, but to the future. I think there are many reasons why it was not desirable to have too long a programme. First of all, we were new to Office, and it would have been exceedingly wrong on our part to take any new line. We wore content to carry on the programme which we found; and, no doubt, if we continue in Office it will be our duty to consider whether any larger programme would be needed. The proper time, it seems to me, for considering the question of a programme is when the Estimates are produced, and when a discussion is raised on the programme that is then put forward, with regard to the policy of construction which it is necessary for the country to know. No doubt other countries have longer programmes than for one year. France has such a programme, but France does not publish before hand the exact pro- 1033 gramme which she intends to carry out for the next few years. I have very little doubt that the late Board had, as we have, a programme; but they did not publish what that programme should be for a series of years. I am quite aware that the Naval Defence Act was carried for a very special occasion when it was considered necessary to largely increase the strength of the Navy. An opportunity was then given of consulting Parliament for a considerable number of years ahead, and I think that was a different position of affairs to when you are merely keeping up the strength of the Navy to a given standard. I am unable, therefore, to say more than that I adhere to what I. stated in the Paper which was circulated to the two Houses of Parliament, and what I explained on the previous occasion in this House. My noble Friend, Lord Sudeley, has put down a Motion which, no doubt, he expected me to answer; but I do not suppose he wishes to make; a separate Motion of that question. With regard to what he says, I think it is very probable that before the late Government laid down the principles of the Naval Defence Act a proposal was made in accordance with what he suggests—that a statement was probably laid before the Government of the views of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty and of what they considered necessary to maintain the strength of the Navy. But it is manifestly impossible, even if I bad the means, to lay such a Paper on the Table of your Lordships' House; and with regard to doing this in future, I think it is quite impossible for mo to lay before he public any programme which may be made with regard to the future construction of ships for Her Majesty's Navy. I do not think it would be in the interests of the Navy or the country to do this, and therefore I am afraid I cannot agree to the doctrines which my noble Friend has laid down in the question he has placed on your Lordships' Paper. I thank your Lordships for listening to these remarks. I regret that I cannot, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, agree to the Motion of the noble and gallant Lord. There is much that he has said which meets with my sympathy and support; but I cannot go so far as to promise a further programme certainly at the present moment.
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKdesired to add his congratulations to those of the First Lord that the House had so able an authority as the noble and gallant Lord for the discussion of naval affairs. He did not intend to go back to the history of Admiralty, over which he had formerly had the honour to preside. He would only mention that the Board of his successor, Lord George Hamilton, continued to work on their programme for three or four years, and the only criticism to be made on that policy was a failure, rather, in laying down battle-ships. Therefore, he did not think that the policy of the Board to which the noble and gallant Lord be-longed justified the criticisms he had made, after the lapse of eight years, on the policy of the previous Board. However, that was now an old story, and he quite agreed there should be no jealousy between different Boards of Admiralty— no question of Party or politics on one side or the other. What they all wished to do was to maintain the Navy in a state of efficiency, and ready for any service that might be required for it. He had always heartily supported the policy of Lord George Hamilton as First Lord, and was prepared now to support the spirit of the Motion of the noble and gallant Lord opposite in regard to the Naval Defence Act, though he presumed it would not be pressed to a Division. He understood that what his noble Friend (Earl Spencer) wished to do was to keep up the Navy in accordance with the policy of the late Government, and that he had distinctly given his opinion against opposing the Naval Defence Act. For his part, he regarded the Naval Defence Act as marking an economical and valuable change in the manner in which Naval construction had hitherto been carried on; and he trusted his noble Friend, if in his present Office next year, would reconsider his views, and would bring before his Colleagues arguments in support of that valuable policy. As regarded programmes, be agreed that it was not particularly advisable to advertise any grand scheme of Naval construction lasting over a great number of years. Opinions might change about the type of ships that were most desirable and necessary; and, besides, to advertise a great programme only tended to excite other nations to go and do like- 1035 wise. He had of late years had so little opportunity of getting any practical knowledge of the present condition of the Navy and of the present programmes, that he would only be occupying their Lordships' time to no purpose by adding anything upon a subject which had been brought before the House so ably by the noble and gallant Lord opposite.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, as it fell to my lot—somewhat anomalously—to bring forward the Naval Defence Act, I merely wish to make one or two observations in reference to what we have heard. I think we all agree that the noble and gallant Lord has contributed a very valuable element to discussions in this House, and has performed a great public service in drawing attention to this question. I am inclined to agree with the noble Lord that programmes in themselves, considered abstractly, are not desirable. Programmes are remedies when there has been neglect; but a healthy Admiralty ought not to require them. On the other hand, I think such a speech as that of my noble Friend Lord Hood and the Motion which he has brought forward, backed as they are by solid professional knowledge, are exceedingly valuable; because unless the Admiralty is kept up by Parliamentary pressure to its duties, however virtuous, however angelic, Boards of Admiralty may be, I am sure they will fall short of the duty imposed upon them. One thing I should wish to say with regard to history. I think it is only fair to say that the first person who awoke Parliament and the country from the torpor into which we had fallen in respect to Naval construction was the noble Lord who has just sat down. It was Lord Northbrook's Administration undoubtedly, I perfectly well remember, which first called attention to the necessity of a new and better state of things. I earnestly hope that the initiative which the noble Lord commenced will not be dropped, and that the First Lord of the Admiralty will not allow himself to be deterred by any absurd Constitutional scruples from following the example which we set in the Naval Defence Act—I refer to the special point of avoiding paying back the balances which have once been voted. The advantage of the Naval Defence Act has been 1036 that a plan as a whole, when laid down, has been kept to, and not altered backwards and forwards according to the requirements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in each succeeding year. Whatever Party is in power there is always a danger of that pressure which everybody must feel; and the practice of putting the design of a ship, if I might use the phrase, into an Act of Parliament, avoids one of the greatest dangers which our Constitutional system inflicts upon the Navy. I only wish to make this general observation, because I feel how out of place it would be for me to attempt to speak on professional matters. Perhaps my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will allow me to make the remark as one who has been Foreign Secretary. In the course of his speech the First Lord stated that the Navy was necessary, not only for meeting other Navies, but for conducting a great deal of the business of the country in time of peace, for representing the country on many occasions in various parts of the world whore the sense and sight of the power of this country were necessary. I believe that is a most important branch of the duties of the Navy, and it is not always sufficiently considered by our critics. They always seem to imagine that the one duty of the Navy is to fight battles of Trafalgar. It has a great deal to do besides fighting battles of Trafalgar; it is valuable in times of peace; it is a valuable aid to the diplomacy of the Foreign Office, especially when we are dealing with less civilised Powers. But what I want to press upon the First Lord is how that bears upon the question between big ships and smaller ones. I have no doubt that for fighting battles of Trafalgar the big ships are necessary; but they are not so valuable for conducting the ordinary business of the country. They cannot get into small harbours, and that is a very practical evil. We have got battle-ships of such size now that we cannot send them through the Suez Canal, and there are many harbours into which it would be exceedingly difficult for a sufficient English force to go; and on that ground I earnestly hope the noble Earl will not decide too resolutely against multiplying the smaller class of cruisers.
§ EARL SPENCERBattle-ships I was speaking of, not cruisers.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYBut in forming your Navy you must have a sufficient number of powerful cruisers which can be used on a coast and in small ports. I would also urge on the noble Earl to consider the old proverb about "putting all your eggs into one basket." I confess, when I see the extreme complication of a modern man-of-war, my feeling is that, when we do go to war, after the first naval action the ships of both Navies will return into dock and will remain there. Of course, it will add very much to the nervousness or caution of your Admirals in conducting their operations if they know that every ship they are commanding represents something more than £1,000,000. I have not been able by reading or listening to ascertain whether it is absolutely impossible to have small ships with very heavy armament and of speed equal to the larger ships. If it is not possible, if speed is solely and entirely the characteristic of large ships, there is an end of the question, because the quickest ship will win; but if you can have a small class of ship with a powerful armament and very high speed, I believe that that class of ship would do more for carrying on the business of the Empire, and be more valuable when the day of struggle comes, than the leviathans which will be only too likely to frighten with the sense of responsibility those to whose charge they are committed.
§ *LORD SUDELEYsaid, there was one remark which had been made by the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Hood) upon which, with the permission of their Lordships, he would like to offer a few words of explanation. The noble Lord took exception to his reply to the Report on the Manœuvres not having been quoted. He had not the paper by him at the time, but had since obtained a copy from the Library, and found that he was quite correct in stating that whilst the noble Lord went very fully into details in his Memorandum he said very little as to the question of the efficiency of the Service generally, but what he did write was practically to confirm his evidence before the Committee of 1888—namely, that he was satisfied with the then present condition of things. These were the words of his own Report— 1038
And whilst at once admitting that our Naval Force is not of sufficient strength to perform efficiently the various services sketched out by the Committee, in the case of war with one maritime nation, I believe it is of sufficient strength to engage the forces of any single Maritime Power with success; to protect our coasts from the possibility of invasion, and to afford fair protection to our commerce abroad and good protection to our commerce in the Channel and its vicinity, and I am certain that by the end of next year the strength of our Navy will be very largely increased as compared with the advance which can be made by any other Maritime Power in the same time.
§ *EARL SPENCERI have already said it is impossible for me to agree to the Motion the noble and gallant Lord has made, and I trust he will not press it to a Division.
§ LORD HOOD OF AVALONsaid, he had no wish to press it.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.