Lords Sitting of 10 March 1893

Preamble
The Lord Lovelace—Took the Oath.
INFECTIOUS HOSPITALS BILL. [H.L.]

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD THRINGsaid, he brought this Bill forward at the instance of the County Councils Association, a Body representing 51 out of the 61 counties of England, a population of 16,000,000, and a rateable value of £88,000,000. It must necessarily interest the House as the best means, he believed, for preventing some of the most virulent and destructive diseases afflicting mankind. Though doctors differed in many things, they were agreed that isolation was the only effective protection against infectious diseases. Even in their Lordships' own houses isolation was no easy thing—one or two cases they might be able to isolate, but in poor men's dwellings—even of two or three rooms in the case of the better class of artisans in the larger towns—that was impossible, and it was a miracle if the disease did not spread through the house. Nay, the very charity of the poor increased the dauger by their going to assist neighbours, and carrying back with them the seeds of disease, so that a disorder which might have been easily checked at first would spread and destroy a whole town. Isolation hospitals were essential, for by no other means could isolation be produced. At whose expense were they to be built? Modern legislation had replied, in the case of London, in no doubtful voice, that isolation was a public and not a private benefit. If a man broke his leg, he was carried to the hospital for his own benefit; but if he had scarlet fever, or, still worse, small-pox, his removal to the hospital was not so much for his own benefit as for that of the community, and his isolation was, therefore, to the public advantage. The expense ought, therefore, to
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  be borne by the community, for the necessity of isolation hospitals was as great as that of the supply of water, gas, or any other requisite. By the present law sanitary or urban sanitary districts might establish isolation hospitals, but only 400 out of 1,500 such authorities had made adequate provision for them. To some extent, that might be due to the apathy of the Local Authorities, who were slow to move and very much afraid of increasing the rates. But the fact was, that the division of the country into sanitary and urban sanitary districts, though apparently a systematic arrangement, was perhaps the most perplexing that had ever puzzled an inquirer. Urban Sanitary Authorities contained towns from the size of Manchester to places of 500, and sometimes fewer, inhabitants. Sanitary Authorities, again, were the residue of Unions after taking out of them the Urban Sanitary Authorities. They even consisted of scattered parishes having little communication with each other, and being little able to combine. That being the case, the first object of this Bill was to further the protective system of combination; to enable County Councils to combine parishes or Rural Sanitary Authorities, or indeed any rating authorities, and to remove the difficulty of their unequal aptitude for combination. Another difficulty lay in the selection of sites. Learned persons had stated that some 40 ft. of space was sufficient to prevent the spread of contagion in all diseases except small-pox; but however that might be, people had a terror of having isolation hospitals near them. The two great factors in the question were the combination of appropriate districts and the selection of sites, and they had been found almost insuperable. Dr. Seton, the medical officer of Surrey, had informed him that one bed to 1,000 people was the requisite number, and that the ideal hospital would contain some 30 beds to a population of 30,000. Such an arrangement was unfitted for sparsely-populated places, and medical men were of opinion that village hospitals might be sometimes substituted, the arrangements being made in every case in reference to the local peculiarities of the place. That this Bill would effect, through the medium of the County Councils, giving the necessary flexibility for the combination of the small areas, either

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  sanitary districts or parishes. The safeguard against unjust combination would be an appeal to the Local Government Board, which might take out of the combination any place possessing a proper hospital or giving a just reason for objecting. A Governing Body would be formed for the hospital district; and there, again, the Local Government Board might be appealed to if any of the constituent areas thought they had been unjustly treated. County Councils might exercise this power of forming a hospital district on the application of 25 ratepayers, and they might even, if they thought fit, direct their medical officers to make inquiries as to the necessity for a public hospital in a particular locality, and might thereupon form a hospital district -subject always to an appeal to the Local Government Board, so as to entirely prevent any injustice. When the hospital district was formed and the Governing Body constituted, either from members of the Local Authorities or by the County Council and the Local Authorities with it, the system would begin to work. They would then have every power, including that of buying land. But that, again, was fettered, for they bad only the same power of buying land as they had under the Public Health Acts—they might buy it by agreement; but if they wanted to purchase it compulsorily, they must have a Provisional Order. Then they must be provided with ambulances, and put in communication with the system of telegraphs. This, also, was on the recommendation of the medical men, who said that patients could be easily removed five or six miles by ambulance, and in many cases even a much greater distance. Being a public benefit, the expense of the hospitals was to be borne, as in the case of London, entirely by the public. As a patient was removed for the benefit of the community and not for his own, be he rich or poor, he was entitled to relief gratuitously in the infectious hospitals; but of course it was expected, as in all hospitals now, that rich patients would contribute to the funds, and the hospitals might, if they chose, provide separate rooms for those who could afford to pay for them. In small areas in the hospital district the hospitals would be built at the public expense according to the rateable value of the constituent areas, but the establishment expenses
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  would be paid according to the population of the various areas. The patients' expenses would be paid out of the sanitary district. A subsidiary power was given to provide nurses. Trained nurses were essential, and, as their Lordships were aware, many hospitals not only trained nurses themselves, but obtained funds by sending them out to private persons, and power was given for that purpose. This was not an ambitious Bill; and while it did not pretend to make any great change, it would be productive of great good. The counties had been zealous in carrying into effect the medical education provisions, and would, he believed, if power were given them, show equal alacrity in undertaking this difficult and important subject of the establishment of isolation hospitals. There could not be a graver object for the counties to undertake than to prevent, if possible, an invasion of infectious diseases; and even if they were unsuccessful in attaining that result, at all events they would palliate those evils.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a." —(The Lord Thring.)
  LORD MONKSWELLsaid that the provisions of the Bill had received from the Local Government Board the attention due to the importance of the subject dealt with, to the high authority of the noble and learned Lord who had introduced it, and to the vast body of representative opinion at the back of it. The Local Government Board was thoroughly in accord with the object sought to be attained by this Bill—namely, the provision of increased accommodation for the isolation of infectious disease. There could be no doubt that there were many sanitary districts, both urban and rural, which were without the hospitals with which they ought to be provided, and at times it happened that persons, not paupers, who were suffering from infectious diseases, were taken to the workhouse infirmaries as being the only places in which they could be treated. That was an illegal and thoroughly objectionable arrangement. The view, therefore, of the Local Government Board was that the present law, under which it was optional for Sanitary Authorities to provide hospital accommodation for infections cases, was defective, and that further provision should be made for

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  such accommodation, and the Board was of opinion that some powers with this object should he conferred on County Councils. Consequently, the Board welcomed this Bill as an endeavour to deal with a pressing evil on sound principles, and invited the House to give it a Second Reading. The Local Government Board was not, however, satisfied that the provisions of the Bill were in all respects the best that could be adopted to secure the end in view. So far as the Bill proposed that petitions should be made to the County Councils by Sanitary Authorities for the establishment of hospitals for their districts, no provision would seem to be needed, for there would appear to be no reason why a Sanitary Authority which had already, under the Public Health Act, 1875, full power to provide hospital accommodation for its district, should apply to the County Councils to provide it for that district, and at the same time—for that was the proposal in the Bill — to set up a separate Body to have control of the hospital and to charge the expenses to the Sanitary Authority. In such cases the Sanitary Authorities, if they wished to move in the matter at all, would probably prefer to act under the powers they now possessed rather than to place themselves under the control of the County Councils. With regard to the proposals in the Bill for the formation of hospital districts, as the law now stood, united districts could be formed by Provisional Order for hospital purposes; but, practically, such districts could only be formed when the Sanitary Authorities of all the districts concerned were willing to contribute. Several united districts had, however, been formed. The powers given to County Councils by this Bill would no doubt facilitate the formation of hospital districts. As to those cases where the Sanitary Authorities, being desirous of having a hospital district carved out, would be obliged to approach the County Council instead of proceeding under the powers they now possessed, the Local Government Board entertained some doubt whether it would be well to let Sanitary Authorities throw upon the County Council the task—often a difficult one—of providing a hospital merely by asking that a hospital district might be formed. The Board suggested that it might be better to follow the lines of
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  other legislation on subjects in which both County Councils and Sanitary Authorities were concerned, and to empower the County Council to provide a hospital where the Sanitary Authority made default in doing its duty in this matter. It might be provided that where the County Council dealt with a complaint that a Sanitary Authority had made such default, the Council might take into account the circumstances of the neighbouring districts as regarded hospital accommodation, and, if necessary, form a district to contain two or more sanitary districts or contributory places. He hoped the Bill, with such amendments as might be considered desirable, would pass into law, and he was sure the country and the House were much indebted to his noble and learned Friend for introducing and drafting it.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

CONDITION OF THE NAVY.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD BRASSEYcalled attention to the state of the Navy in relation to ships building and the resources for manning the Fleet. He said that those who had had the privilege of serving at the Admiralty must always watch with interest the work of that important Department; and, as their Lordships had the advantage of the presence of the First Lord in that House, he hoped that, in raising a discussion with reference to the Navy, he might command their Lordships' approval. The two points with which he desired to deal were shipbuilding and manning. The Navy Estimates for 1893–94 provided for shipbuilding a total of £4,621,774. From the close approximation of those figures to the figures for 1892–93, it was evident that Earl Spencer adhered, in the main, to the policy of his predecessors. In protecting the great Department over which he presided from a premature reduction of Estimates the noble Earl had done a public service. The late Board had thought it desirable to submit to Parliament a programme of construction extending over a period of five years. That course had not been followed by the present Board. It was most

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  desirable that a continuous policy should be pursued in relation to the Navy. There were, no doubt, objections —he did not say insuperable objections— to fixing a programme by embodying in an Act of Parliament proposals which fettered the discretion of future Administrations. The necessity for sustained efforts in the direction of large expenditure on shipbuilding on our part had been created by the action taken by other Powers, not dependent in an equal degree with ourselves upon a Navy for protection from invasion and for the security of their trade and food supplies. The expenditure of France in the construction of new ships had averaged for the last three years £2,800,000. It was officially stated that an increased expenditure must be looked for in the future. The expenditure of Russia on shipbuilding had been rapidly increasing, and was only a fraction less than that of France. For the present year it stood at £2,674,000. It was laid down by Lord George Hamilton, with the approval of Parliament, that the standard of strength at which the Navy of England ought to he maintained was that of equality to a combination of any two other Powers. The combined expenditure of France and Russia being some £5,500,000, the Board of Admiralty would not have been warranted in proposing a less sum for shipbuilding than that proposed in the Estimates now before Parliament. Certainly our naval preparations were not in that state of advancement which could alone have justified us in resting on our oars, while other Powers were making great efforts to push forward the reinforcement of their Fleets. Comparing our strength in ships, built and building, with the combined strength of France and Russia, our relative position might be briefly summarised. In first-class battle-ships we had an advantage over those two Powers combined, though not more than was sufficient to give protection to our enormous maritime interests. In second-class battle-ships we had a sensible inferiority both in number and tonnage. In the French list, however, were included seven ships built of wood, of which the oldest was launched in 1865. In cast defence we were weak; but the ships of that class under the flags of foreign Powers were for the most part
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  not of a type capable of keeping the sea, or to engage in offensive operations against an enemy's coasts. In the most important and powerful type—namely, cruisers of the new armoured class, we greatly needed reinforcement. In the protected classes the efforts lately put forth had placed us in a good position. Having dealt with expenditure, they had now to consider the several types of ships in the new programme. The list included two first-class battle-ships, to be named the Magnificent and the Majestic, one somewhat smaller first-class ship, the Renown, two first-class cruisers, three second-class cruisers, two sloops, and 14 torpedo-boat destroyers. The Renown, the only battle-ship already laid down by the present Admiralty, was designed as an improvement on the two smaller first- class battle-ships Centurion and Barfleur, laid down by the late Board. In the new vessel the displacement was in creased from 10,500 to 12,250 tons. The guns were more fully protected. To obtain this protection it might have been better to reduce the number of guns rather than increase the size and cost of the ship. The two battle-ships which the Admiralty proposed to commence in the Dockyards were of the Royal Sovereign type—of which eight were laid down under the late Board. The Royal Sovereign type was highly approved in the Navy. There were cogent arguments against throwing all our resources into the construction of ships, displacing more than 14,000 tons, and which, with their armament, would cost in round figures £1,000,000 sterling. The two new ships were to be still larger and more costly than their predecessors. Increase of dimensions enabled the naval architect to give more armour, more armament, more speed, *more coal capacity. With every addition to tonnage, we suffered increasingly the disadvantage of having too many eggs in one basket. The gun, the ram, and the torpedo were the weapons of naval warfare. Hugeness of size did not secure invulnerability even from projectiles, and certainly it gave no advantage, but rather the contray, whether for dealing or avoiding a blow with the ram or the torpedo. It increased rather than lessened the risk of a disaster such as that which had befallen the Howe. If we looked to the ship-

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  building policy of other Powers, we found that the French had with great reluctance followed us in adding to dimensions. Their ships of the Hoche type, the contemporaries of our own Admiral class, did not exceed that class in tonnage. When we advanced from the 10,600 tons of the Admirals to the 14,150 tons of our latest first-class ships, France laid down three ships of 11,800 tons. These three ships had since been followed by two ships of approximately similar tonnage, the Bouvet and Massena. Russia had one ship building of over 12,000 tons; with that exception, all the battle-ships building for Russia and Germany were, as regarded their largest ironclads, below 11,000 tons. In Italy, where for a long period the largest class of ships were in favour, it had now been decided to build no more monster ships, but to lay down in lieu of them such vessels as the Admiral San Bon, of 9,800 tons, of great speed, specially adapted to the Mediterranean. No less than eight vessels of the Royal Sovereign type having recently been built by us, it would have been preferable on many grounds that they should have been followed up by vessels of more moderate dimensions. Passing from shipbuilding to reconstruction and repair, the programme included nine ships which it was well worth while to take in hand. The hulls being in perfect condition, it was much to be regretted that the opportunity should not have been used for supplying to all these vessels powerful engines of modern pattern when they were taken in hand for a thorough re-fit. Although our older ships might no longer be fit for the line of battle, they were not obsolete as cruisers, especially for the defence of the trade east of the Cape, leading to India, to China, to the farthest East, and Australasia. It was not likely that the newest ships of a hostile Power would be found in those distant waters. With improved machinery, long vessels such as the Agincourt, Achilles, and the Northumberland would steam 16 knots. For service as cruisers, their heavy muzzle-loaders should be removed and replaced with light breech-loading guns. The change would give more disposable weight for coal supply, and allow of a reduction in the complements. The latter was a most important
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  consideration, having in view the nature of the duties for which the ships would be most available, not as battle-ships, but as cruisers. Turning to the cruiser-class, special attention was now being given in foreign Navies to an armoured type which it was difficult to differentiate from the battle-ships. For many years Russia had been leading the way in building this new and powerful class of armoured cruisers. The Rurik, now approaching completion, had a displacement of 11,000 tons, a speed of 18 knots, and was well protected by armour. Three ships of the Rurik type were in progress for the Russian Navy. The French had already built one similar cruiser. They were completing another, and were laying down two more ships, considerably smaller in tonnage than the Rurik, but similarly protected. Two ships of the Rurik class and five smaller ships of 7,000 tons were in course of construction for Spain, and the type was represented in the United States Navy by the New York and the Brooklyn. With these remarkable developments abroad in the power of cutting up commerce, the Admiralty was well-advised in building vessels capable of meeting the cruisers built and in hand for foreign Navies, and for which at present the British Navy had no match. It was promised that the two new first-class cruisers were to surpass in speed, coal supply, armament, and armour any cruisers built or building; but ships of this class were so extremely valuable and so urgently necessary, that it was a question whether two more vessels of the same powerful type might not with advantage have been substituted for one of the new first-class battle-ships. The laying-down programme included, in addition to the first-class cruisers, three second-class ships of 5,500 tons, which were to be improvements on the Astræa class. These new vessels would be nearly 2,000 tons larger than the first batch of second-class cruisers laid down by the late Board. All the ships lately built for the Navy as cruisers were valuable additions; but it was certain that for the duties of ocean cruisers the larger protected ships of the Hamilton programme were relatively the most efficient, whether they looked to speed, to protection, or to coal endurance, or ability to keep the sea. One feature in the new second-class cruisers he must criticise.

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  In the improved Astræa the coal capacity was increased from 400 to 500 tons. On a displacement of 5,500 tons, it was most desirable, and it should be possible, to carry a more ample supply. In this connection it seemed to be appropriate to refer to the policy of subsidising merchant cruisers. At a time when foreign Powers were giving encouragement with a lavish hand to the construction of fast steamers, the support of the State could not safely be withdrawn from those British shipowners who were prepared to build vessels of a type suitable for conversion into cruisers. No merchant steamer could be a match for a regularly-built vessel of war; but if the contingency of war were more carefully considered in the original designs, much might be done to improve the means of protection. If deficient in protection, the merchant cruisers had a great superiority in speed over the majority of war-vessels. He need not trouble their Lordships with detailed observations on the torpedo flotilla. The Admiralty had wisely decided to meet torpedo-boat attacks with torpedo-boat destroyers. They had been well-advised in not yielding to the demand for a great increase in torpedo-boats. Having dealt with the shipbuilding programme, it became necessary to examine our resources for manning the Fleet. The energy recently directed to the construction of vessels involved a large addition to the seamen and Marines. The effective ships now on the Navy List would probably require not less than 100,000 men. He should be glad to know the exact figures from the First Lord of the Admiralty—how many men were actually available. Provision was made in the Navy Estimates for 70,493 available for sea service. Behind them were 3,010 in the Seamen and Marine Pensioners' Reserve. The Royal Navy Reserve had a strength of 1,100 officers and 20,900 men, nearly equally divided between the first- and second-class. In addition to the seamen, they had 1,200 firemen. It would be seen that we were barely able to man all the ships on the effective list, and there were no reserves to make good the loss by wastage which in time of war was sure to be constant and large. On the other hand, the numbers of the men were in excess of our peace requirements, ard our facilities for
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  their training at sea. In the last 10 years they had added more than 15,000 men to the permanent force and had increased the Votes for wages and victualling by £ 1,266,000 a year. If the present policy in relation to the manning of the Navy was pursued, it was evident that a burden would be laid on the taxpayers only to be justified by imperative necessity. He could not recognise that there was any such necessity. They might safely place more confidence than hitherto in the Mercantile Marine as a second line of defence standing behind the Navy. There was no reason to doubt a Reserve could be brought to any necessary standard of efficiency by sufficient training and drill. As to the loyalty of the men to their engagements if called upon to serve, Sir George Tryon's Committee had expressed the fullest confidence. These considerations pointed clearly to a reinforcement of the Royal Naval Reserve. Under the Act of 1859 the Admiralty were empowered to raise 30,000 men, A Reserve of 1,000 officers, 12,500 seamen in the first-class,. 12,500 in the second-class, and 5,000 firemen was the smallest force with which they should be satisfied. There would be no difficulty in raising the strength of the Naval Reserve. As estimated by Sir George Tryon's Committee, they had in the Merchant Service approximately 40,000 men eligible for the First-Class Reserve, and 70,000 men regularly, and 40,000 others occasionally, engaged in the fishing industry. No fewer than 24,000 men were employed as firemen and trimmers. In dealing with the manning of our own Navy, their Lordships might with advantage take into view the systems long established and successfully worked in other countries, and especially in France. The British was the only Navy whose ships were completely manned with seamen trained for the Service from boyhood and engaged for a long term of years. In France, out of a total force actually embarked in the ships in commission, 25,000 were entered as full-grown men from the Inscription Maritime. The seamen gunners, torpedo-men, engine-room artificers, and firemen were obtained for the French Navy by voluntary enlistment. The special ratings formed, perhaps, a quarter of the total ships' complements. For the general duties of a man-of-war's man, French

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  naval officers were well satisfied with the efficiency of the men obtained from the Inscription Maritime, and it was estimated that 100,000 able-bodied seafaring men could be supplied as a reserve to the Fleet from that source. In England, where naval and military service was' voluntary, pay and retainers must necessarily be fixed on a liberal scale. In all other respects the organisation of the French Inscription Maritime might be studied in this country with good effect. If he had trespassed upon the patience of the House at some length upon this part of the subject, he might urge that the manning of the Navy more largely from the Reserve was just one of those questions in which a civilian might interpose with advantage. Among the officers of the Navy there was a natural preference for the well-drilled and disciplined force, which the continuous service system placed in their hands. It was the part of the statesman to appreciate how serious was the waste of public money and how yet more grievous the waste of valuable human energy which was inevitable in attempting to maintain our men in peace at the full numbers required in time of war. They should look more confidently to the Reserves which the Mercantile Marine could supply for the Navy in the emergency of war.
  LORD SUDELEYsaid, the question brought before the House was of the greatest interest and importance to the country. The noble Lord who had just spoken had dwelt very fully upon the question of the larger battle-ships, and on that subject had gone so much into detail and was so great an authority that he would not weary their Lordships by going further into the matter. He could not, however, agree with him that it was desirable to build a smaller class of battleships unless we had individual ships amongst our our battle-ships equal to individual ships of foreign nations. Our ships must be of equal size to those they had to fight against, and it would not do in any case for England to have battleships which would have to run away from an enemy's ship. If they took the unwritten law which Cobden once laid down, and now agreed to by all the principal authorities, that our Navy should be equal in efficiency to cope with the Navy of any two countries, especially with the Navies of France and Russia combined, he thought that, on the whole,
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  the last few years had enabled them to get into a satisfactory state, as far as our great fighting ships were concerned. He found that the money spent in shipbuilding from the year 1885 to 1892 was about £27,000,000, whereas in the previous 14 years it was only £22,000,000. Thus they had built vessels during the last seven years at the rate of £3,500,000, and in the previous 14 years only at the rate of £1,500,000. This was really very satisfactory, and showed that, of late years we had awakened to the fact that our Navy had gone down, and that steps had been taken in earnest to maintain it in a state of efficiency as regarded other nations. That large expenditure was a true measure of what had been done. What they had to do, however, was to keep up the shipbuilding programme to what was being expended in foreign countries. His noble Friend had alluded to the amount France and Russia were spending this year—France nearly £3,000,000 and Russia over £2,500,000, together the enormous amount of £5,500,000. Now, this great increase in shipbuilding which Russia had made during the last few years was a very serious matter and could not be overlooked. Notwithstanding England was spending so much larger an amount than she used to do, in the face of what Russia and France were doing England must at once take steps to still further increase the Navy. It was all very well to say that the amount they were expending was very large, but if France and Russia were doing more, however much they disliked it, it was quite evident they must follow their footsteps. They must keep a steady eye on; that policy, and not on any consideration whatever allow France and Russia to go ahead of them and possess larger Fleets He was very glad to see that in the Estimates steps were being taken to maintain their superiority, though he wished very much indeed that he could see that some special steps had been taken to replace the Howe, as that ship must either be lost or, at any rate, would have to be practically rebuilt. His noble Friend had paid a right and proper compliment to his noble Friend at the head. of the Admiralty for not having been induced in any way to recede or make-any reduction from the Estimates. He fully concurred with what he had said on this subject. He thought it would have

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  been a disastrous thing in every way if the Navy had once again become a question of Party warfare or Party politics, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have been allowed to improve his Budget at the expense of that great Service, on which the power of this country so much depended. Sir John Colomb, in the House of Commons, defined the position of this country in a very graphic remark, which seemed to him admirably to state the case. He said—
  "We were an unvictualled ocean citadel, of whose inhabitants 30,000,000 are dependent for their livelihood on manufactures, the raw materials of which are brought to 'us from abroad."
  That very aptly described our position When they considered this, and when they remembered what might happen to Great Britain if her ports were closed only for a few days, there could be no question that anything which would tend to diminish the efficiency of the Navy would be one of the most false economy and one which would redound to the discredit of those who carried it out. The subject that he wished specially to bring before their Lordships' notice was the question whether they had anything like a proper number of modern protected and belted cruisers for the protection of our maritime interests, which were far greater than those of any other Power. He thought it was right that he should explain that the numbers and statistics of ships which he was about to refer to he had taken from Lord Brassey's Naval Annual; but he had somewhat altered the way in which they were there place ', as he had taken in two categories cruisers above 4,000 tons and cruisers below 4,000 tons. In the first list he had added to Lord Brassey's first-class protected cruisers the Astræas, Merseys (belted cruisers), the Imperieuse, Warspite, and the Talbots, and he had excluded the older ironclads which he hardly thought ought to be classed as cruisers below 4,000 tons, including the Latona, Pallas, the Australian ships, and the Medeas. There were so many other different ways of classifying these modern cruisers that he trusted there might be no confusion if he looked upon those ships over 4,000 tons as cruisers of the first-class belonging to the home and European waters, rather than those under 4,000, which
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  might be looked upon as ships necessary to protect our maritime interests abroad. In all the cruisers he had referred to he alluded to the modern protected cruisers with considerable speed, and not, of course, to the old smaller cruisers, which were more for peace time than for war. Now, in considering this question they had two subjects to look at—first, had we sufficient of the larger cruisers to enable us to hold our proper position of being able to cope with both France and Russia at the same time in the ordinary European battle-ground of naval warfare? secondly, whether, over and above this, we had sufficient of the smaller class to protect our great maritime interests throughout the world? Under both these heads they must consider, also, whether they had amongst these cruisers vessels of equal size to meet any which might be built by foreign countries, or whether they had allowed other countries to build vessels larger and more competent than ours. Now, in regard to the first question, he found that, taking the protected and belted cruisers about and above 4,000 tons, broadly speaking —and in these matters it was necessary to speak in a broad and large way— England was at present very fairly placed, and, so far as numbers were concerned, and general efficiency, great credit was due to the past Administration, and to what was being done by the present Board of Admiralty, to maintain the superiority. This country of plated and belted cruisers, taking the classification he had stated, had 37. Against this France had 15 and Russia 10, total 25. As to the power of individual ships to compete with each other, there was one point, however, which deserved special attention. This was the fact that we had allowed ourselves to be somewhat outwitted, and Russia had now got a cruiser afloat, the Rurik, which was superior in every way to any cruiser England could bring against her; and she had two more such ships actually building. Spain was also building three such vessels, and the United States were building two. This was a subject of the utmost importance, which deserved to be pressed home on the Admiralty, and they should be asked to give their implicit promise that they would do their utmost to overtake this increase in efficiency in this one indi-

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  vidual class. Now for one moment to glance at what the Rurik was. He found that the Rurik carried no less than 2,000 tons of coal, against the Blake, a similar vessel in the English Navy, carrying only 1,500 tons; that she had a speed at sea, at natural draught, of 19 to 20 knots, as against about 17½ to 18½of the Blake. As to the armament, the Rurik carried four 8-inch guns, 16 6-iuch, six 4·7-inch; the Blake carried two 9-inch guns, 10 6-inch. It was true the Rurik had cost no less than £800,000, whereas the largest English cruisers, the Blake had cost £400,000, which pretty well explained the position. He hoped his noble Friend the First Lord, when he spoke on this subject, would be able to say that the three vessels which the Admiralty were to lay down would compare favourably with those ships, or at any rate that special steps were to be taken in order to enable England to maintain her superiority. In our present position if one of those Ruriks were to meet one of our Blakes, the unfortunate Blakes would be unable to get away if they wished, going from one and a half to two knots slower and with a smaller armament. No doubt they would make a very hard fight of it, but it would not be a very equal contest. We could not afford to allow either Russia or France to build vessels of this type and have such terribly powerful cruisers afloat in time of war with nothing whatever to cope with them. If the Blake class were to meet such vessels, it was clear the fight would be very unequal. In the number of smaller cruisers to protect our maritime interests we were very far below what we ought to be. We had, about and below 4,000 tons, some 39 vessels. Against this we had to meet in French ships 18, Russian two—together 20. This number was altogether inadequate for the protection of our maritime interests. It had been clearly laid down by Sir Geoffrey Hornby and many other authorities that as coal is the limit of our power, so we must have in all calculations one-third more than our requirements to make up for vessels that are coaling or which have gone to fill up. In the present day blockades would be far more difficult under steam than in the old days of sail. A blockade could not be maintained without a very large amount of coal, and it would be far more difficult
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  to prevent an enemy putting to sea. The danger of steamers preying on our commerce was brought in recent years very prominently forward by the Alabama. There was also no doubt that, owing to the directness of the routes which steamers now take, it would be most easy to cut them off on their route. No definite opinion had been given as to how many cruisers would be necessary in time of war to protect our commerce, but at least 100 would certainly be required. A few years ago a statement was made by Sir Geoffrey Hornby that whereas in 1794 we had 185 cruisers, though that included all sorts of vessels, irrespective of fireships and bombs, we ought to have at least 200 now. He pointed out that for the requirements alone of what may be called the home districts and fleet at least 42 would be wanted; but looking at our enormous trade throughout the world and all our distant stations, in time of war at least another 100 would be required. When 42 was spoken of as being the number of smaller cruisers which we now have for this class of work below 4,000 tons, it included all such vessels, with no reserve for loss and accidents in time of war. We could not make armed merchant vessels of use in this respect. They were not meant for fighting vessels, and his noble Friend's remark that they might take the place of armed cruisers was an entirely misleading statement. They were intended for carrying information at great speed, and no ironclad squadrons—no fleet—could exist unless they were attended by ships of this class; but they would never be fighting ships. They would be the Intelligence Department; they would also be wanted for military and naval transport, both of troops and stores; and possibly for carrying food. We wanted genuine war cruisers, constructed to minimise the effect of projectiles, to look after our commerce. He had received a letter from Lord Armstrong, who was unable to be present, but took the greatest interest in the subject; and his Lordship wrote—
  "I am still distinctly in favour of swift vessels, and plenty of them. We have such a large expanse of ocean to cover that largeness of number is indispensable. To have ironclads in large number is impossible; therefore we must be contented with unarmoured cruisers. We cannot have invulnerable ships of any kind in even line-of-battle ships; they can only

  1567
  carry armour over the most critical parts, leaving all the rest to be smashed. Swifness of movement is the best and cheapest protection against being hit. A ship which carries guns instead of armour will have an immense preponderance of fire over unarmoured adversaries of equal tonnage. As an armament quick-firing guns are the thing. Each such gun is equivalent to half a dozen of the old ones, and with the new smokeless powder their penetration is enormous. England should have an innumerable Fleet both of large and small cruisers."
  There had been a wonderful development of war vessels, European and extra-European. Of late years many foreign countries had obtained vessels of a class of smaller cruiser which he wished he had more of—vessels of great speed with large coal endurance and limited protection. Many of our large Shipbuilding Companies notably the Elswick Company, had turned out many of these vessels for the Navies of Italy, Chili, Argentina, Japan, &c. Some of these vessels, amongst them the Italian cruiser the Piemonte, which was built by Lord Armstrong's firm, and in which he him-self had cruised, had a coal capacity of 600 tons, and was able to steam the considerable distance of 1,900 knots at full speed with natural draught, and could maintain a speed of 10 to 12 knots for 55 days, during which she could run a distance of 13,500 knots. Such cruisers were now in the hands of foreign countries, and it was of the utmost importance we should not allow ourselves to have vessels unable to cope with them. If the First Lord of the Admiralty would turn his attention to this subject, and would institute an inquiry as to the number of smaller cruisers which we ought to have, he would be astonished at the result. He had suggested, from the best information he could obtain, that we ought to have at least 100 protected cruisers under 4,000 tons for the protection of our mercantile interests, but many high authorities thought the number ought to be a great deal higher, having regard to the stupendous interests which had to be cared for. If the Navy of France were destroyed she would be a first-class Power still; but with us it was a case of actual life and death. It would be well if the Admiralty saw their way to build a large number of cruisers of about 4,000 tons and 22 knots at natural draught. Twenty or 30 of these vessels, with a considerable amount of protection and a very powerful armament, with
  1568
  great coal endurance, would place our position as regards the protection of our maritime interests in a very different condition from what they are now. In regard to speed the French had gone ahead of us in the manufacture of our boilers, and by instituting a system of tubular boilers they were able to get much greater speed than ourselves with natural draught. At the Admiralty we were perhaps stronger in our building power than we have ever been before.We had as Constructor of the Navy a gentleman in the person of Mr. White who was celebrated throughout Europe for his great skill as a naval architect, and for having been eminently successful in the vessels he had built. We had as Controller of the Navy Admiral Fisher, who combined in himself considerable technical knowledge with great know ledge of the requirements of the Service, which was most indispensable. We might be quite certain that ships which were built with which he and Mr. White were connected would be ships that officers and sailors would consider right, and which they would fight cheerfully and well, and that was a matter of great consequence. This question of cruisers was perhaps the gravest of naval questions, and deserved most earnest consideration when we considered our enormous Merchant Navy. The total tonnage of steam and sailing vessels of the world amounted to 23,000,000 tons, of which ll,000,000 belonged to the United Kingdom and her Colonies. He felt quite confident that the noble Earl at present at the head of the Admiralty would never allow the Navy to go below its present state of efficiency, and sincerely trusted he would see the necessity of increasing the number of our cruisers. All foreign Navies were doing their very utmost in the building of protected modern cruisers. The United States had devoted nearly the whole of their expenditure to supplying their Navy with these protected cruisers. The increase of the Naval Reserve might very well become a subject of discussion on another occasion. As it was found necessary 20 years ago to place our Naval Reserve at 20,000, the time had now arrived when we ought to try and double it with our increased Navy and the certainty that in time of war seamen would be so largely required. He sincerely hoped that the

  1569
  suggestion thrown out that a certain number of men should be obtained from outside sources might not be agreed to, but that we might continue to rear all our seamen from the boy class, even if they were more expensive, as nothing had been more satisfactory than the class of men we had raised up of late years, and any alteration from that system would be a very great mistake. That plan of obtaining men from outside sources was tried many years ago, and no man in the Navy of any authority who had gone largely into the question will say otherwise than "Do not for one moment alter your present plan; you have the most splendid seamen in the world; it may cost a little more; but for Heaven's sake continue that most admirable system which has given us the best man-o'-war's men in the world!"
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Earl SPENCER): Your Lordships will rejoice that two noble Lords of such special knowledge of this important subject should have addressed you to-night and should have made such interesting and valuable speeches. One of my noble Friends has acted as an executive officer in Her Majesty's Navy, and the other has had a long experience at the Board of Admiralty, and, besides that, has shown an amount of interest in the Navy which has earned for him the gratitude and approval of all who have the interest of the Navy at heart. I feel some diffidence in rising to reply to my two noble Friends, for I must frankly own I have had only a small experience compared with theirs in the affairs of the Navy. I must thank my noble Friends for the way in which they have referred to the other members of the Board of Admiralty and myself as the head of it. I cordially endorse the high commendations of my noble Friend, for I believe the Navy never had two more admirable officers than the Chief Constructor and the Controller. I do not complain of what my noble Friend behind me said on the subject of the policy of the present Board. We have thought it very important to have continuity of policy at the Board of Admiralty. I quite admit there have been objections taken by Members of the Party to which we belong to the mode in which additions to the Navy were made in recent years. I do not want to enter into the question
  1570
  of the Naval Defence Act and the way in which the late Government carried out the policy of increasing the strength of the Navy. The present Board feels it of the highest importance to maintain the strength of the Navy and to maintain our position as the greatest Naval Power in the world; and we shall use our utmost endeavours to do that without spending unnecessarily one penny of the taxpayers' money. My noble Friend quoted some figures on the cost of the new construction under the present Board. He stated that in 1893–4 our Estimate for new construction was £4,623,000, whereas last year the cost of new construction was £4,864,000. Well, I am not able to follow my noble Friend exactly in his figures, but I will shortly state what I believe is the true position; I rather think he has included armaments in his calculation, but, excluding armaments, I should like to state the exact position. In the proposed new construction for this year, excluding armaments, under the Naval Defence Act in the Dockyards, £1,381,572 will be expended; in the Dockyard and under contract outside the Act £1,062, 159, or, together, £2,443,731. Last year the corresponding amounts were £2,126,368 and £166,569, or a total of £2,292,937. That may be considered the normal expenditure upon the Navy. In recent discussions allusion was made to what the annual waste of the Navy might be, and that was put by my predecessor in another place at £2,300,000. Of course, that calculation may vary in accordance with the views of those who are putting the figures together, but I have no reason to differ materially from that. And it will be observed that these figures for construction may be considered outside the contract ships, which are paid for by money advanced under the Naval Defence Act. Outside that, the sum we have estimated this year for new construction slightly exceeds the cost of what is considered the annual and normal waste of the Navy. Probably there is very little material difference between what my noble Friend has stated and what I have stated, but I thought it better to put shortly the view which the Admiralty take of what our new construction will be, and the figures I have given-will, I think, be found to be entirely correct.

  1571
  My noble Friend went on to compare the Navy of this country with the Navies of France and of Russia combined. I think my noble Friend who spoke last was correct in attributing to Mr. Cobden the saying that we ought in this country to have our Navy equal in strength to any two Navies in the world. I always regret when it is necessary to name particular countries with our own in regard to ships. It may sometimes be supposed that we fear we shall be in collision with those countries or that we fear rivalry or hostility. I do not look upon the matter at all in that light. I trust no such disaster will happen. The rivalry and comparison is entirely a friendly one. It was, and is, a test of what other countries are doing, and by a comparison of what other nations are doing we can judge what we ought to do ourselves. No doubt they are influenced by us, but we also are influenced by them, and that must be the case. In the comparison which my noble Friend gave I am not quite sure that I altogether follow him, for it is so easy to arrange your figures in a different way, though probably when analysed the difference would be exceedingly small. I will give your Lordships what I consider to be the proper comparison between our Navy and those other Navies to which my noble Friend referred. I may premise that we ought to look beyond vessels complete and afloat, and take into account the number of ships we find are laid down on the stocks. Unless we do that we may find ourselves some day in a position of great inferiority. But when I say I take into account ships on the stocks that will lead us to consider the position in which we should be about 1896–7. Though we may not be guided by an Act of Parliament with regard to the number and type of ships we should build, I consider it absolutely necessary we should look forward. We have looked forward in our programme, but we have not laid down any absolute lines beyond this year and the next. It would not be right to do so. This year and the next will be years of considerable transition, because the effect of the Naval Defence Act comes to an end and a new programme will have to be commenced. Therefore, we thought it desirable, as a matter of policy, not to lay down a long programme, though
  1572
  every prudent Board of Admiralty must look forward beyond the immediate present with regard to shipbuilding. Making, then, a comparison between the English and French and Russian Navies, I may state that taking first-class battleships, at the present moment we are in a position of considerable superiority. When ships like the Hood and the Empress of India, and one or two other ships are completed, this will be more markedly the ease; but if we take the ships on the stocks abroad, which will bring us down to 1896–7, the superiority is not maintained. At the present moment we have 11 first-class battleships completed, as against 12 French and Russian; nine completing afloat, against three French and Russian; but only one on the stocks as compared with five and four in the case of France and Russia respectively. Those are first-class battle-ships; therefore, in the immediate present or immediate future we stand well. But if we look forward it is necessary not to neglect the building of battle-ships, and that is an argument in favour of the policy we have pursued this year of having battle-ships rather than an increased number of cruisers. Adopting the same classification in regard to battle-ships of the second-class, we have 14 completed vessels to nine French and four Russian; we have none of the second-class either completing or on the stocks; but, taking them all together, we have 14 of this class to their 19; while of vessels of the third-class, we have 23 to their 21. If, therefore, we look forward to 1896–7 we ought to stand in respect of battle-ships much in this position: 58 to 64 French and Russian combined. Passing to cruisers and taking the same classification, I find that again we are in a position of considerable superiority. I quite admit that we cannot, as with regard to battle-ships, rest on a comparison of the number of our cruisers with the number of foreign cruisers. We have a' very much larger commerce to protect and very much wider interests to look after than other nations; and, therefore, as regards cruisers, we must have a very much larger proportion than other nations who are great naval Powers. Classifying them rather differently to my noble Friend, I find that of cruisers of 5,000 tons and upwards we have completed 10 to two French and two Russian; com-

  1573
  pleting afloat, six to one French and one Russian; and on the stocks five to three and two respectively. In other words, in cruisers of this class we have 21 to their 11. Of cruisers from 3,400 to 5,000 tons, we have completed 22, to three French and no Russian; completing afloat, five to one; and on the stocks seven to eight—total, 34 to their 12. That is a very marked superiority. With regard to smaller cruisers, the French and Russian Navies together are perhaps stronger than we are; but, on the whole, if we look forward to the same date— 1896–7—we have of all three classes 62 cruisers to 40 of those two Powers. It is difficult to lay down a maximum number; but I quite admit the desirability of having a great number of those fleet vessels to protect our commerce. I do not know that it can be laid down positively that we ought to have this number or that; but the policy of recent years has been materially to increase the number of those cruisers. That is a policy which it is quite right to adopt, and certainly the Board have no wish to depart from the principle thus laid down. The question of the merits of different types of battle-ships is one that has been discussed for a very long time among those who are interested in naval architecture—the question whether you are to have battle-ships of the size of the Royal Sovereign or of the Centurion or Barfleur type. I have the greatest possible deference for the opinion of my noble Friend, and I feel conscious that my own opinion, if it were mine alone, would be worth nothing as against his; but I have taken a great deal of pains to consult experts in relation to this matter, and I confess I am absolutely of opinion that the larger type of battle-ship is the proper one for us to build and not the smaller. Now, what do we want in battle-ships? We want speed, coal endurance, and as great an amount of offensive and defensive power as we can get. If we compare vessels like the Royal Sovereign and the Centurion, we may say that in some respects they are almost identical. They are almost identical as to speed and coal endurance; they have a high freeboard and about the same power in manœuvring—all important qualifications—although the greater length and power of the Royal Sovereign enables her to maintain a higher speed
  1574
  in rough seas than smaller vessels. But when we come to other points your Lordships will agree that the larger ships have immense superiority over the smaller type. Take the question of armour. The Royal Sovereign has hull armour of 18 inches, as compared with the 12 inches of the Centurion. Her barbette armour is 17 inches thick, as compared with 9 inches thick of the Centurion—a most important consideration when you think of what vessels and what armaments you may be opposed to in actual war—while her guns are 13½ inches and 67-ton guns as compared with the 10-inch and 29-ton guns of the latter ship. If one of these smaller vessels had to encounter an enormous ship like the Royal Sovereign, she would find that, although she might be equal to the other in coal endurance and in speed, she would be exceedingly inferior in armament and defensive power. The Royal Sovereign could perforate the armour of one of these smaller vessels, while the guns of the latter could not penetrate the armour of the former. These are very important considerations. It is of immense importance when we are building these large ships that they should be of such a character as would enable them in all cases to deal with the ships of the enemy. My noble Friend admits that in many respects these ships are inferior, but he says that in point of vulnerability they are the same in reference to ram and torpedo. However, if he admits that, I do not think I have much to quarrel with him about. I do not admit that the larger vessel is as vulnerable as the smaller, because in defensive power to beat off the attack of an enemy's vessel she is infinitely superior to the smaller one. My advisers inform me that it is very much better to spend somewhat more upon ships of a larger size than to have a greater number of ships of a smaller type We could have, I believe, five Renowns to four Royal Sovereigns; and I much prefer, if we are to incur heavy expenditure for a ship, to have one which is equal to any vessel she can meet, and not to be perhaps at the mercy of a ship of the Royal Sovereign type. That, I believe, is entirely consistent with past naval history. There is hardly an instance in the old wars where a smaller frigate defeated a larger frigate, or where

  1575
  a smaller three-decker defeated a larger line-of-battle ship of the same class. Therefore, I have great confidence in asserting that the larger type of battleship is the one we ought to adopt. There is one other consideration which we should not lose sight of—namely, that we can build ships more cheaply and more rapidly than our neighbours. For instance, the Royal Sovereign was built in 2¾years, exceedingly rapidly, and she would have cost £200,000 more to build in France than she cost to build in England. As to displacement, we calculate it upon a different principle to that which is adopted abroad; and if the same principle were adopted in estimating the tonnage of French and English ships, the disparity in tonnage between their larger ships and ours would not be so great. That was so in the case of the Astræas, of which the noble Lord had complained that 550 tons of coal were not sufficient for them to carry; but the fact is, if all their bunkers were filled, they could carry as much as 1,000 tons. My noble Friend alluded to the armoured cruisers, and expressed his regret that the Admiralty had not built more of them. In answer to his observations, I may say that it has been the fixed policy of the Admiralty not to build too many of this class of vessels, because if the ships have heavy plates on their sides they will lose in speed and in weight of armament. The Admiralty believe that it is far better to give them a curved protecting deck, such as has been adopted in the case of all our cruisers, instead of heavy side armour. By adopting this course we are able more efficiently to protect certain parts of the ships, while they are able to steam at greater speed and to carry a heavier armament. That has been the policy that has been adopted for some time at the Admiralty, and I cannot but think that it is the right one. The noble Lord also referred to the question of re-construction of old ships, upon which I cordially sympathise with his views. I believe the subject to be one of great importance. In my opinion, it would be of great advantage to re-refit our older battle-ships whose hulls are sound, so as to render them available as part of the naval force. They would be of enormous value to the fighting power of the country. That policy has been
  1576
  adopted. It was marked out very distinctly in the Report of the Committee on the Naval Manœuvres of 1888, in which occurs the following passage:—
  "As a measure most ready to hand for increasing our reserve of battle-ships, without prejudice to the completion of the new vessels not yet ready, we strongly advocate the desirability of bringing forward such ships as the Achilles, Warrior, Hector, Superb, Defence, Valiant, and Minotaur into such a condition of efficiency as will at all events render them available as a Reserve Channel Squadron in case of sudden emergency. They are all iron ships well subdivided into compartments, fairly protected against shell fire, and are more than a match for many battle-ships which could be brought against them. Until such time, therefore, as the places of these vessels can be fully supplied by better, we deprecate their being allowed to go into disrepair. They are, in our opinion, for the most part capable of doing good service for many years to come; and when it is taken into consideration, supposing their hulls to be in good order, that all the ships we have named could be re-engined and re-boilered for about the cost of one new vessel, it appears to us to be most desirable that they should be made available to meet emergencies, and that so inexpensive a means of rapidly increasing our ironclad fleets should be made use of; but we distinctly desire to guard ourselves against giving an opinion that the building of new ironclads should not be proceeded with irrespective of such vessels."
  That is a well-defined policy which the Admiralty have had to consider and have continued, but I do not agree with the proposal that we should attempt to change the character of these old ships. My noble Friend is desirous that we should give these vessels a new armament and such engines as would enable them to be driven at an increased rate of speed, but we do not think that that policy ought to be adopted. That question has been considered over and over again at the Admiralty by successive Boards, but that has been the conclusion come to. We think that it will be of advantage to re-fit these vessels upon the old lines; but in order to make modern battle-ships out of these old hulls and give them engines that would drive them at a high rate of speed, we must take them to pieces and re-construct them at a cost of something like £200,000 to £250,000 each. The same reasoning applies, to a moderate extent, to changing the character of the armaments of these vessels. If properly re-fitted, however, these ships would make sound and useful vessels. Now I come to the subject of large cruisers. In my opinion, we ought to

  1577
  have a number of fast and nimble cruisers on the ocean in order to meet the large cruisers of an enemy, which, if they were of high speed and heavy armament, might do an enormous amount of harm to our Mercantile Marine. These might belong to a small Power whose Navy could not compare with the strength of our own. My noble Friend alluded to the Russian ship the Rurik, and I will only repeat what we have stated over and over again, that we intend to build a ship that shall be superior to everything afloat in speed, coal endurance, and armament. I do not think that it would be right at the present moment to make known the actual lines on which the ships will be built—their length, beam, speed, or horse-power. Turning to another point, I quite admit the importance of increasing the number of our torpedo-boats, because in any future war we must be prepared for swarms of them issuing from the enemy's harbours and attacking our fleets both at sea and lying in harbour. The best way, however, of meeting the attacks of these boats will be to have vessels of very great speed which can run them down, and that is the policy which we have adopted. I cannot but think it is a sound one. The noble Lord alluded to the question of the merchant cruisers; and with regard to them we certainly do not at the present moment propose to depart from the policy of the late Government, although I admit that the whole subject is open to consideration, not as to the merits of the proposal itself, but as to the changes brought about by the increased number of our own fast cruisers which we intend to lay down. There are a considerable number of contracts running with companies; and notwithstanding the recent lamentable occurrence with regard to the Inman line, we hope that with the ships we are now engaged with we shall not have a repetition of that disastrous affair. Then the only other point to which I need refer is the manning. That is one of the most important points about the Navy; but I do not know that I follow the figures of my noble Friend. This year in the Estimates we have put down a larger number than he gives us credit for. The number is 76,700.
  LORD BRASSEY: I referred to those available for sea service.
  EARL SPENCER: At all events, we have proposed an increase of 2,600 over last year. I agree almost wholly with the view which my noble Friend has taken as to the desirability of having a large Naval Reserve in time of war; but we must bear in mind that the requirements of a modern fleet of ironclads are quite different from those of a fleet of the old wooden ships. You will have an enormous number of cases where highly-trained men will be required, and those men must go through the admirable training which is given in our training ships of the Navy. That must, to a certain extent, modify the desire to increase largely the Reserve. The whole subject, however, has been gone into lately by an able Committee appointed by my predecessor. All the arrangements to be made in time of war have been considered and the complements of ships have been determined, those complements consisting partly of trained seamen and artificers and partly of less highly-trained seamen of the Royal Naval Reserve, both first and second-class. I do not think that in regard to the number of the Royal Naval Reserve we shall be, next year or the year after, very far short of the number suggested by my noble Friend. But the present Admiralty administration have cordially taken up the recommendations for the improvement of the Royal Naval Reserve, and have adopted nearly all the recommendations of Sir G. Tryon's Committee. We are training men of the Second-Class Reserve longer in the training ships, and are offering them several other advantages in the way of pay and naval uniform. We have also increased the reserve of the engine-room complements by 500 men. I hope my noble Friend will see by this that we value extremely these Royal Naval Reserve men. We wish to encourage them, and to have as many as possible in reserve for working our ships in case of war. I think I have now dealt with all the chief points of this question, and I must apologise to your Lordships for the length at which I have troubled you, but it is not easy to compress within a few minutes an explanation upon so important a subject.
  THE EARL OF RAVENSWORTHsaid, the explanation given by the First Lord of the policy of his Board would be highly satisfactory to the House and to

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  the country. Though the programme of the Admiralty for the year might be described as modest, he was glad to know that they were looking forward and were watching closely what was being done by foreign countries. Further, he was glad that both the noble Lord and the Representative of the Admiralty in another place had declined to give explicit information about the ships to be built. Hitherto, the Admiralty had been much too lavish with such information, of which foreign countries might avail themselves. It was very necessary for this country to keep ahead of other nations in her Navy, and especially in the matter of speed; for the power of a modern vessel depended largely on its speed. The noble Lord had pointed out the enormous preponderance of English commerce over that of other nations. It appeared by Lloyd's Register that while the steam tonnage of the rest of the world was very little over 5,000,000, the total steam tonnage of England and her Colonies was over 9,000,000. For the protection of that commerce it was absolutely necessary for us to maintain fleets in every sea. That alone was an adequate reason for a gradual increase of our Fleet, without reference to what might be done by foreign statesmen or foreign Powers. An Admiralty authority bad wisely pointed out recently that a single powerful cruiser belonging to a weak Power might inflict irreparable damage upon our commerce at some distant part of the world. Upon that point reference might be made to what was being done by two very small Powers. The other day the Japanese Government had built for them a most powerful cruiser, remarkably armed with an exclusive armament of quick-firing guns, and she achieved on her trial very nearly 23 knots under forced draught, and her engines developed about 15,000 horse-power, her tonnage being 4,150. He was probably correct in saving she was the fastest cruiser in the world. Since that time, the same establishment, Elswick, had turned out the Nuova de Giulio for the Argentine Republic. That vessel on her trial achieved nearly the same rate of speed, 22·74 knots. We had not at present afloat a cruiser of anything like that speed. That, again, showed the neces-
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  sity for our keeping ahead, for in these days the power of warships depended upon their speed; and when it was remembered that these vessels could deliver a heavy concentrated fire, we must look out for the possibility of meeting serious adversaries in parts of the world where they would hardly be expected to exist. He congratulated the Admiralty for pursuing a continuity of policy as successors of the late Government, and were carrying on work in the Dockyards, and the result had been the creation of a Fleet unparalleled in power and numbers. He was glad that the fatal policy of leaving ships for six, seven, or eight years on the stocks had been abandoned. Taking two vessels—the Royal Sovereign and the Hood—an actual saving of upwards of £30,000 had been effected in each case by pushing forward the work, and he thought the Dockyard authorities were to be congratulated upon their performances in that respect during the last two years. The mischief of leaving to the caprice of Parliament interference with a naval programme had been illustrated the other day in the German Reichstag, where a programme approved by the Emperor, by the Secretary for the Navy, and cordially supported by the Chancellor himself, had been defeated, and the Vote for six powerful ships to replace worn-out, obsolete vessels had been struck off the Estimates. He would like to know what steps the Admiralty were taking with regard to the reserves of engineers and stokers? In order to get full value out of the triple expansion engines, it was necessary to secure the services of highly-trained and skilled engineers and stokers, and he thought sufficient steps had not yet been taken to form Reserves of such men. It was also satisfactory to hear that a serviceable force of torpedo-catchers was contemplated. It was not wise to place too much reliance upon our Naval Reserve, for our trade should not be stopped in the event of war, and it would be very awkward to deprive our merchant vessels of their best men in that case. We should, if possible, attract Reserve men from less important ships than the magnificent steamers on which they were now employed, and which we should require in time of war for the supply of the Fleet, and for keeping up our communications.
  THE EARL OF DUNDONALDcalled attention upon the point of the efficiency for warfare of our armed merchant ships and the nationality of the crews to the fact that there were a large number of Chinamen among the crews of our armed merchantmen running between Japan and Vancouver. When travelling on one of those vessels he had discussed the matter with the officers of the ship; and although they thought it would be very possible that the Chinamen might be replaced by English lads at much the same cost, they were unanimous in thinking that the question of discipline was a difficulty in the way, for they considered their present powers were not sufficient to enable them to maintain proper order over the boys, and, moreover, they found the Chinamen worked very well on the whole. He thought it would be worth the consideration of the Admiralty whether some regulations could not be made by which every man on board our armed merchantmen, and, if possible, also every boy, should be required to be of British nationality. In the event of those merchantmen having to fight with those Chinamen on board, the Chinamen should also be regularly drilled, so as to he able to fight in the event of war breaking out before British seamen could possibly be sent out to take their places.
  [The subject then dropped.]

  LAND TRANSFER BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Land Transfer Act, 1875 —Was presented by the Lord Chancellor; read 1a; and to be printed. (No. 30.)

  STATUTE LAW REVISION BILLS.
  Moved, That a Committee of Six Lords be appointed to join with a Committee of the House of Commons to consider all Statute Law Revision Bills of the present Session."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  Motion agreed to.
  The Lords following were named of the Committee:

  L. Chancellor.

  L. Watson.

  E. Kimberley (L. President.)

  L. Halsbury.

  L. Thring.

  E. Morley.

  Ordered, That the Committee have power to agree with the Committee of the House of Commons in the appointment of a Chairman:
  Then a Message was ordered to be sent to the House of Commons to acquaint them therewith, and to request them to appoint Six Members of that House to be joined with the said Com-
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  mittee pursuant to the Resolution of this House of the 27th of February last and to the Message of the House of Commons of yesterday signifying their concurrence in the said Resolution.

  ARCHDEACONRY OF CORNWALL BILL [H.L.]—(No. 10.)
  House in Committee (according to order): Bill reported without Amendment; Standing Committee negatived; and Bill to be read 3a on Monday next.
  COINAGE (No. 2) BILL.—(No. 28.)
  House in Committee (according to order): Bill reported without amendment: Standing Committee negatived; and Bill to be read 3a on Monday next.

  SALE OF GOODS BILL [H.L.]—(No. 8.)
  Read 3a (according to order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock. to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock.