Lords Sitting of 19 December 1893

EAST INDIA LOAN (£10,000,000) BILL
Brought from the Commons; and read 1a.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND SECRETARY or STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of KIMBERLEY)THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND SECRETARY or STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of KIMBERLEY) moved—
"That Standing Order No. XXXIX. be considered in order to its being dispensed with for this day's sitting."
Motion agreed to.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I beg leave now to move that this Bill be read a second time. In doing so, your Lordships will expect me, as the matter to which it relates is one of very serious importance indeed, to say a few words in explanation of the circumstances which have made this measure necessary. The Bill itself requires very little explanation. It is a Bill for enabling the Secretary of State for India in Council to raise any sums, not exceeding £10,000,000, in this country for the public service in India. It has been the practice on former occasions to grant powers of this kind to the Secretary of State for various purposes. I believe that the last occasion on which borrowing powers were granted was in 1885, when, in view of the prosecution of public works, which had been recommended, the Secretary of State was authorised to borrow a sum not exceeding £10,000,000. The course of events which has compelled the Government of India to come to Parliament for further borrowing powers is very easily explained. Your Lordships are well aware of the measure taken a few months ago— namely, the closing of the Mints in India to the free coinage of silver. That step was taken on June 26, and the reasons for it were very simple. The Government of India found themselves in great financial difficulties in consequence of the continuous fall in the exchange between
1726
this country and India. It is well known that a very considerable sum has to be provided by the Government of India every year to meet the sterling liabilities — I mean the liabilities in sterling gold in this country, which it has to discharge, in respect of the payment of interest on the debt, in respect of matters connected with the railways, and speaking generally in respect of the Home Charges for the Army. These payments have amounted in times past on an average to£15,000,000 in the year, but now, for various reasons, they have reached £16,000,000 or £17,000,000. The increase is in connection with railways. That large sum has to be provided, but if the exchange is low the result is that a much larger burden falls upon the Indian Revenue, the Indian Revenues being received in silver. In order to pay in gold, putting the thing in its barest form, they have to pay a larger sum. Not only was the Government of India in difficulty, but it was threatened with a still more serious matter, because it was foreseen that the Act of the United States Congress, by which a large purchase of silver every year was made obligatory on the United States Treasury, would be repealed—that has been the case—and that the result of that would be to throw a very much larger amount of silver upon the market. If no measures had been taken in India, there can be no doubt that a larger quantity of silver would have been exported to that country, and there was every prospect that the exchange would be very seriously affected. The subject having been considered by the Committee presided over by the Lord Chancellor, assisted by four other extremely able persons fully competent to advise in the matter, Her Majesty's Government determined to comply with the advice of the Government of India to close the Mints to the free coinage of silver. I will not enter now, because it will take too long, into all the arguments in favour of that course. It is sufficient for me to say that that course was determined upon at that time. Of course, when taking that exceedingly serious step, the Government hoped that the result would be two-fold, that the exchange would be made more steady, and that a further fall would be averted. It must always be remembered that one of the great evils arising from violent fluctuations of ex-

1727
change is a great disorganisa tion of trade, and that they make it difficult for the importers (in mercantile language) to forward. I deliberately put those two reasons as being the reasons which actuated us, because it has been very commonly said that we expected or hoped that we should raise the exchange to a much higher amount. Of course, if the exchange had been raised there would so far have been some relief from the embarrassment in which the Government of India was involved, but our principal object was to prevent a further fall in the value of the rupee. One of the recommendations of the Committee, which I must mention because it has been so much misunderstood, was that in order to prevent a sudden very large rise in the exchange, which might have the result of dislocating the trade of India and prolong the existing embarrassments, that a limit of 1s. 4d. the rupee should be laid down, or, in other words, that gold should be given in exchange for rupees at that rate whenever the rate was sufficiently high to attract people to ask for gold in return for rupees at that rate; the result of which, of course, would be to prevent the exchange of the rupee above the limit of 1s. 4d. That step has been represented as showing a determination on the part of the Government to raise the exchange to 1s. 4d., which is a very different thing. The reason why the Government adopted the recommendation of the Committee, and the reason why that recommendation was made, was to prevent any large sudden rise in the exchange, but, unfortunately, a different impression has prevailed, and has been the cause of complication. What took place after the closing of the Mints—and it is rather important to be precise—was this:—The Mints were closed to private coinage on June 26, and on June 26 and 27 bills for 66 lakhs of rupees were sold in London at prices rising from 1s. 37–32d. to 1s. 4 l–32d.—a very considerable rise. In the following week the exchange fell to 1s. 3⅞d., at which 66½ lakhs were sold. The general impression which appears to have produced this result was that the exchange having risen to above 1s. 4d., and afterwards being at nearly the same amount, might be regarded as a kind of fixed minimum at that amount. A very general impression of that kind prevailed in India. But after that week the ex-
1728
change rapidly fell. It is not necessary for me to trouble the House with the figures because they are unimportant; but from that time for a very considerable number of weeks the Government sold no bills in India. Small numbers were sold, but practically I may say bills were not sold from June 26 to August 16; but on the latter date tenders were received for 10 lakhs of bills at 1s. 37–32d. and 12 lakhs of telegraph transfers at 1s. 3¼d. The tender for the bills was not accepted, but the tender for the 12 lakhs of transfers was. We thought that as we had not sold any bills for so long a period of time it was sound policy to accept the tenders made to us at 1s. 3¼d., but when we had taken that step there arose a most extraordinary outcry against the Government in India. It was alleged that the Secretary of State, the unfortunate person who is always mentioned on these occasions, through weakness, folly, and ignorance, had prevented a rise in the exchange. The Government of India expressed to us their opinion that it would be desirable not to sell our bills below a rate which should be determined, and we accordingly deemed it to be wise to adhere to the rate of 1s. 3¼d., being the amount at which we had accepted this tender for telegraphic transfers, and at that point we have stood ever since. We have, as a rule, not been successful in selling our bills. In the last fortnight in November our sales amounted to 97 lakhs, but since then we have had no tenders at all, and the exchange has again fallen considerably. In those circumstances, it was perfectly clear that we could only meet our liabilities by borrowing from the Mother Country. The total amount borrowed is as follows:— We first of all issued in India debentures for £ 1,386,000, and we subsequently issued short bills at six mouths to the amount of £3,500,000, which together with an over-draft of £750,000 make altogether £5,636,000. That is the amount we have already borrowed for the purpose of meeting our liabilities, which we could not meet in the ordinary manner by the sale of bills. Well, the result of these operations is that we have now a small balance left of the original £10,000,000 we had power to borrow, and if Parliament is not willing to grant us further powers to borrow we should be in the position of being unable to meet our liabilities. We

1729
have asked for £10,000,000, but we do not expect we shall want to borrow the whole of that amount. I hope circumstances will prove favourable, and that we may not have reason to come up to that amount. It is quite obvious that it is not safe that the Executive should not have power to borrow to a certain extent at all times, because emergencies arise when it is desirable to borrow, and it might not be able to get consent from Parliament, which might not be sitting. Now, my Lords, I shall naturally be asked why we have adopted this policy of a minimum, and what our expectations are with regard to it. The policy of not selling bills below a certain amount was adopted because we felt and had reason to know that if we persevered in selling our bills at such an amount as they would fetch in the market we should be told that we had never given a fair trial to the measure recommended by the Government of India of closing the Mints. Now, it will be obvious at once that the position we have taken up is one which cannot be maintained for any great length of time. It would not be safe—it would be most unwise—to pile up a large additional loan of sterling from this country in order to try and carry through the measure we have adopted. But we do think it is our duty and a reasonable thing to persevere in our policy and give it a fair and complete trial. If it should so happen that this policy of closing the Mints should entirely fail, we shall be thrown back into our original situation, which is a very grave one, because at the present price of silver (I do not know the quotation to-day, but I know it was about 32⅛d.) the exchange, if measured as it is usually measured, stands at no more than one shilling and one-eighth; and, speaking in round numbers, at that rate of exchange the Government of India would be landed in a deficit of no less than Rx.6,000,000. Your Lordships will see that that would be a deficit of a most serious and alarming character. More than that, we do not know at present what the ultimate effect of the repeal of the Sherman Act by the United States Congress may be. The effect has been considerable, but it is quite possible its effect may be far greater in the future. To prophecy on this subject would be the most foolish thing possible. The whole matter is one of such great magnitude and obscurity
1730
that no one, however well versed in commercial affairs, can state with confidence what the course of things with regard to the price and supply of silver may be in the future. There are those who say there will be an extensive closing of mines so as greatly to limit the output of silver. Others say that the mines are so rich and the production so large that there will remain a considerable margin upon which a sufficient profit may be obtained at a reduced price. But these matters are all dark and obscure. All we know is that, with the closing of the Mints in India and the cessation of large purchases of silver by the United States Government, the outlet for silver in large quantities is practically now confined to Eastern countries, especially China. If the policy now adopted should fail entirely, the Government of India will have to meet their difficulties by strict economy on the one side, which I am sure I desire as much as any man can to see, or on the other by fresh taxation, which I desire as much as any man can to avoid. At the same time, it is easy for anyone to conjecture how difficult it would be to meet such a deficit as I have mentioned without considerable hardship and political dangers. We have certainly tried a very novel experiment, an experiment the results of which it is impossible for us to forecast; but we have followed the recommendation of a very able Committee, seeing the extreme magnitude of the interests involved and the certainty of being unable to avoid the dangers which would otherwise supervene. Even if we were entirely to fail—and I do not think we necessarily shall fail—I think that would be a very sufficient justification for the policy we have pursued. We have reason to hope that we shall not fail, and the reason is, that in a short time we shall be entering upon that season of the year when there is a large demand for bills in this country, arising from its being the chief season for exports from India; and I desire to call attention to what has happened with regard to exports and imports during the last six months, for in that will be found a sufficient explanation of the failure of the demand for bills. The course of trade has been very remarkable. Usually there is a considerable balance of exports over imports as regards the trade of India. In August

1731
of last year the net amount of exports over imports was Rx. 1,306,000. In August of the present year it was only Rx.688,000. In September last year it was Rx.1,964,000. In September this year, Rx. 846,000. In October last year the net amount of exports over imports was Rx.1,846,000. In October this year it was a minus amount of Rx.225,000—that is to say, the imports exceeded the exports by that amount. That is merchandise. Turning now to the exports and imports of bullion. In August last year the net imports of treasure amounted to Rx.906,000. In August of the present year it was Rx.986,000. In September last year there was a balance in favour of exports of Rx.33,000. In September this year the amount of bullion imported was Rx.965,000. In October last year the net imports were Rx.334,000; and in October of the present year Rx.1,450,000. In November of last year they fell again, for they were Rx.302,000; and in the same month of this year Rx.700,000, still more than double those of last year. The total result is that, whereas in August last year there was a net balance in favour of India of Rx.400,000, in the month of July of the present year there was a net balance in favour of imports of Rx.599,000; in August, Rx.298,000; in September, Rx.119,000; and in October no less than Rx.1,675,000. Your Lordships will, therefore, see that the usual balance of exports over imports has been entirely reversed, and that during the last four months in this year there has been a large balance of imports over exports. The result has been that there is not the usual demand for remittances to India and consequently no great demand for bills. That is a matter which gives rise to very serious reflection. In the first place, one asks oneself what is the reason for this great change in the balance of trade. Take, first, merchandise. There, I think, the explanation is tolerably clear. There is no doubt that this measure of closing the Mints has affected, as it was foreseen it would affect, the trade with China and other Eastern countries having a silver currency. The trade of India with countries having a gold currency is two-thirds of the whole trade, and the trade of India with countries using a silver currency is about one-third of the whole
1732
trade. Consequently, I think it is quite obvious we might anticipate some loss as regards our trade with silver countries; but, on the other hand, if our measure of closing the Mints succeeded, we might anticipate a gain with the gold countries, and therefore our gain might be expected to counterbalance any loss. The trade with China consists principally of opium and cotton yarns, and both of these items of export from India have been considerably affected. But I am told that those who have studied the question believe that after a certain time has elapsed this dislocation of trade between India and China is likely to very largely settle itself. Upon this point I may say I am merely repeating what I am told. With regard to the trade in silver, of course before we closed the Mints silver went to a large extent to India for the purpose of being coined into rupees. Anyone might present silver at the Mints, and that silver was coined and he received the rupees. Naturally, at all times there was a good deal of silver that did not find its way to the Mints, but now all the silver sent must be for other purposes. The question naturally arises, what are these other purposes; what is the reason for this very large continuous demand? I have had an opportunity of consulting many people upon it, and quite recently I have been able to ask the opinion of Sir David Barbour, who was Financial Member of the Council of the Government of India, and who has just returned to this country after the expiration of his term of office. He tells me his opinion is that there exists in India always a very large demand for silver for ornaments, because ornaments of silver are most extensively used by the population of India; and that that demand has been stimulated, in the ordinary way in which a demand is stimulated for a commodity, by the large fall in the price of silver. The natives generally consider that this is a most favourable opportunity to purchase silver for the purpose of ornaments, and Sir David Barbour thinks that probably accounts for the larger part of the demand. When we remember that the population of India numbers 287,000,000, we see that any increased demand in so vast a population may easily produce a very considerable result. The other cause may be connected with speculation. At all events, there is the

1733
fact that this very large amount of silver is now going into India. I may mention, in passing, that, as your Lordships have no doubt seen, there have been references in the other House to a measure, which some authorities have recommended and other high authorities have strongly condemned, of putting a duty upon silver. I merely mention it in order to show that it has not escaped my notice; and certainly it is not a matter upon which I shall express any opinion. It is quite obvious that on the question of placing a duty on a commodity—and silver now is a commodity—no person who has any sense of responsibility whatever will give any intimation one way or the other, any more than he would in reference to a duty to be imposed in this country before the Budget is declared. I do not know that I can add anything to what I have said. I have endeavoured to show your Lordships what has been the reason why we have pursued the policy which we have adopted. I have carefully avoided expressing too sanguine expectations: but, on the other hand, I will not for a moment leave the House to suppose that I consider that it is in any way proved that the measures which we have taken have failed. It is quite clear, as a distinguished member of the Committee presided over by the Lord Chancellor (a man as capable of expressing an opinion upon the subject as any one in this country), Mr. Courtney, said most truly, that a measure of this kind must require a considerable time before you can see what its effects are. Any of your Lordships who may have looked into and studied this question will see that there is such a complication of causes which act upon currency, and that there are such a variety of interests involved, that it is quite clear that any very sudden and decisive effect is seldom to be expected from any measure which any Government may adopt. I believe that we are justified in the course which we have taken. We are actuated by a desire to save India from what we could not fail to see was possibly a most serious disaster, and I feel quite certain that most of your Lordships who take any interest in the question will look at it in the fairest and most dispassionate manner, and will be anxious to assist the Government in dealing with a question the magnitude and gravity of which can scarcely be ex-
1734
aggerated. I beg leave to move that this Bill be read a second time.
Moved," That the Bill be now read 2a." —(The Earl of Kimberley.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the very interesting exposition of his policy and motives which has been made by the noble Lord will be certainly in itself sufficient, I think, to prevail upon this House to agree to this measure; and even in the absence of such an exposition we should have very little choice as to the course which we must pursue. Our position is one which, on a much smaller scale, is often repeated in private families when a less pecunious member of the family comes to the head of it and represents that unless he is assisted by a loan inevitable bankruptcy must follow. I regret to say that is the position of the Indian Government at this moment, and, even if we take a gloomier view than the noble Lord has expressed, we should have no choice but to assent to the Bill he has proposed. But the noble Lord has not committed the error of speaking peace when there is no peace. I do not think even the severest critic can say that there was an exaggerated sanguineness in his tone; and, though that attitude might meet with censure, I am bound to say I think it much better to speak as he has done, intimating to us. the real gravity of the situation in which we stand, and not misleading us to the belief that our difficulties are much smaller than they really are. We have no course but to vote this Bill, but at the same time I should think that we may take the satisfaction of moralising on it a little. Everybody is aware of the extreme complexity and obscurity of the subject with which the Indian Government had to deal. The noble Lord has enlarged upon that, and has pointed out how impossible it was for any Government to know anything about the results of the experiment on which they were about to launch. I am afraid he has been misled by that terrible inclination, on which Lord Melbourne used to comment with such severity, that when men were in utter despair and wholly ignorant of the course they ought to purr sue they always ended by saying "Some-

1735
thing must be done." And it was with the view that something must be done that the Indian Government resolved to take the advice of the Committee over which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack presided. I regret that such very able and distinguished persons should have given such advice, for my impression is that without the assistance and authority of such able and distinguished persons the course actually taken would never have been ventured upon. It was an audacious course. Their recommendation was, " The rupee is losing in value: you must make the rupee rarer, and therefore make it dearer." In the language of natural science, they wanted to make a rupee vacuum in India. But it is well known that there is no manipulation in physical science which presents such formidable difficulties as that of making a vacuum chamber which shall be absolutely proof against any irruption of outside gases. That is exactly the difficulty which the Government of India have experienced. They have tried to make their rupee vacuum. But the rupee has crept in by clunks and by joints, by some very obvious channels, and by some channels most obscure. The device of making the rupee rarer, and therefore dearer, has failed, and the rupee is still losing in price as before. What the channels are of course we can only guess. The noble Lord has explained one most important one—namely, that a very much larger importation of treasure has taken place than has taken place before. I suspect that is not the only channel, and that if the noble Lord could only get at the private accounts of some of the native Mints in India he would find they have been very much more active than before. That is mere conjecture. Anyhow, the experiment for the time has failed, and the noble Lord rather claims our sympathy for that as a thing which must necessarily happen, and that we should look upon it with contentment. This is not the first time I have noticed that tendency in the mind of the noble Lord. His intellect is of a subtle, ingenious, and exploring character. He likes that proverb which I have quoted before, "Fiat experimentum incorpore vili" and he has delighted in making an experiment and an exploration in one of the darkest and obscurist fields of financial and political science. It shows
1736
great boldness of the mind and great acuteness and activity of intellect. I earnestly hope that he may obtain ultimately that information which he seeks. At present all he has satisfactorily ascertained is that it is not possible by artificial means to make the rupee rarer in India than it was. But I will venture to submit to him that all the inconveniences which he has expounded at great length are due to this experimental practice. It has a terrible effect upon the minds of merchants, financiers, and all persons, native or English, who are interested in Indian commerce. They were entirely misled—I do not for a moment say the Government intended to mislead, and I know that is not the case—but the noble Lord has explained how they understood what the Government intended to do; and when the Government did not ultimately do that which they had conceived they would do, they raised such an uproar that the Government of India were forced to implore the Government at home to alter their course, and to take the measures which have lauded us in the unfortunate position of to-day. Of course, it is very lamentable that people, especially people who are deeply interested in a matter, will constantly misconceive the intentions and actions of the Government, but still that is part of the danger of experimental legislation, of wandering into unknown thickets and wilds of financial desert, that at the end of your journey your actions and intentions are misconceived, the objects you have in view are misconstrued, and complaints of delusion and bad faith are showered on you when it is found your intentions have been entirely misunderstood by those who comment upon them. I earnestly regret that we have deferred so far to what I may call the experimental method in the government of India. The formidable fact is that whereas formerly we were suffering from having to provide out of a silver revenue 17,000,000 of gold in India, we shall now have to provide 17,500,000 of gold out of the Revenue of India; and if this crisis should unhappily occur again another £500,000 will be required, and so on. The difficulty grows greater and greater at every step. I hope that we have not thus given a permanent or lasting jolt or shock to the commercial and political relations between this country

1737
and India. It is a very dangerous thing to drive commercial relations violently out of the course which they have pursued, because it is to be feared that they may go to other countries, and form new connections, so that for many years our commercial relations may feel the result of the action now taken by Her Majesty's Government. Perhaps the noble Lord may say, "What remedies have you to offer? " I am happy to take refuge in the privileges and irresponsibility of Opposition, and to say that I should be sorry to offer any remedies. But there are remedies, and one of them is to resume the negotiations which the noble Lord so rashly put aside, of trying to find out whether the other nations of Europe cannot agree with us from time to time on some stable relation between the value of the two metals. I do not know whether it is possible so to agree, but I am told that all the other nations say that the only obstacle to such an agreement is the obstinacy of England, and if that is so it is very much to be regretted. I think it would be a great pity that those negotiations should be rashly thrown aside. The other suggestion is of a simpler character, and that is whether it would not be better, instead of the Indian Government borrowing £10,000,000 here, that the English Government should borrow £10,000,000, the interest to be paid in silver. It is the fault of the English Government that this difficulty has arisen here at this great distance in the Metropolis of India, so to speak, where the people reside, who make its railways and who take its pensions. I do not say that any right is established, but there is some claim to consideration on the part of a country whose opinion, and greatness, and convenience, and whose interests, to a certain extent, depend on this very extraordinary state of things. If we take the risk of an increase in the silver debt, instead of throwing it upon the already overburdened shoulders of the Indian Government, we should be performing an act of generosity, almost deserving the name of an act of justice, and should earn much gratitude and recognition from the Indian people for whom we are legislating.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HERSCHELL): My Lords, I shall only
1738
detain you for a very few minutes, but I am induced to make some observations by reason of the remarks which have fallen from the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess has suggested that the course adopted by the Government was adopted only from a sense that a position of difficulty existed, and that something must be done. Something would have had to be done in any event, and what the Government had to consider, and what the Committee of which I was a member had to consider, was what would be the consequences to the Indian Government of taking any of the possible alternatives to the course which we suggested; and certainly it appears, as far as it is possible to forecast for past events, the consequences to the Government of India would have been most serious. The noble Lord has pointed out that if the exchange had gone on, regulated as it had been substantially by the price of silver, the result would have been to leave the Government of India to deal with a deficit of something like £6,000,000 or £7,000,000. That anticipation has to a certain extent been realised. Silver had fallen to an extent sufficient to bring down the rupee to 1s., and then arose the question, how such a deficit could be met? Every possible mode of meeting it was fully canvassed and considered, and it appeared to be impossible to meet it in any way without most serious possible consequences to the Government of India except by stopping the free coinage of silver. The fears of the Government of India have proved not to have been exaggerated, and the fall which they anticipated, if the rupee was still to be governed by the price of silver, has taken place. Suppose the Government had not made that experiment, that silver had fallen, and the exchange had fallen with it to 1s. the rupee, and the Indian Government had then to face its position, what would have been said? I do not know what the noble Marquess would have said, but I fancy many of his friends and followers would have said that the Indian Government had been landed in a most disastrous and dangerous position, owing to the fact that the Home Government had not had the courage to authorise them to do that which they thought was best under the circumstances. The noble

1739
Marquess says the experiment has failed, but I am not prepared to admit that experience has shown down to the present time it has failed. It is a remarkable circumstance that the commercial exchange between India and England has been extraordinarily steady, and steady at a point very greatly above the exchange as regulated merely by the price of silver. The exchange has varied very little for many months between 1s. 3d. and 1s. 3¼d., and that is a matter of very great importance to the trade of India with gold-using countries. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, and there were differences of opinion as to the extent of prejudice, all who gave evidence before our Committee were agreed that it was extremely prejudicial to commerce that there should be considerable variations in the exchange, that it hampered trade and made it speculation instead of legitimate business, while it seriously interfered with the commercial relations between the two countries. Had the rupee fallen rapidly to 1s., as it would have done as far as we could see but for the step taken by the Government of India, what would have been the dislocation of trade between India and this country? Apart from the fact that the imports have been greater, the exports from this country of Lancashire goods have been in excess of the usual amount. No doubt circumstances have been interposed which have prevented the Government from enjoying the success which they anticipated in disposing of their bills. Whether these causes are permanent or irremediable to any extent is a question which only time can solve. It is too early to express an opinion upon them. If it should turn out that this scheme is after all successful, that the contrary has not been proved, surely it was far better to have tried and carried through this experiment than to have lelt matters, doing nothing, with the worst results that would have followed. The noble Marquess suggested that something else might have been done—that we might have resumed negotiations with other European nations: but there were difficulties in the way. I am regarded, I know, as somewhat of a heretic both by the bimetallists and the monometallists. The monometallists think I make too great concessions to the bimetallists, while the latter consider
1740
that I favour the monometallists. Perhaps therefore, I am to be regarded as. speaking somewhat impartially in the matter. I know that great difficulties lie in the way of a bimetallic arrangement, and the real difficulties of such art arrangement have never been fully faced One great difficulty which would have faced you if you went upon a bimetallic arrangement is what would be the ratio which you are to fix in the relations between gold and silver. I am certain that as soon as you come to discuss the matter practically, you would find the most vehement differences of opinion upon subjects that are vital to your coming to any bimetallic arrangement at all. The experiment would, moreover, be open to all the objections urged by the noble Marquess against other experiments. No bimetallic arrangement between the various nations concerned is really practicable, or could, in my opinion, be carried into effect. For these reasons I think that if an experiment was to be attempted, the one now being tried is the more practicable one until you can arrive at some bimetallic arrangement: and it was more ready to hand than would be the attempt, especially in face of the very strong opposition to it in this country, to wait until you could arrive at a bimetallic arrangement. Even if you admit a bimetallic arrangement to be practicable, the possibility of the success of such an arrangement must, in my opinion, depend on the various nations being convinced of its practicability, and upon its being approached with a real belief in it. That belief, I know, prevails among certain sections in this country, but it certainly does not yet prevail, to any large extent, in the City or in the other great commercial centres, and I do not believe that you can arrive at any bimetallic arrangement till you can get them to believe in it and convince them that bimetallism is a sound and wise policy, and therefore, even if one were to accept the bimetallic theory, it seems to me to be a condition precedent to such an arrangement to get those who are largely concerned to believe in it. I need hardly say that that, in any case, would be a work of time. No Government in this country could possibly enter on a bimetallic arrangement with other nations while the City and many great commercial centres are strongly against such a policy. For

1741
these reasons, even if we were disposed to' accept the theories of bimetallists I think it would be impracticable to have waited for the chance of some such arrangement as the noble Marquess has foreshadowed.
Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly; Committee negatived; Bill read 3a, and passed.

PROPOSED DOCK AT GIBRALTAR.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government, in framing the Navy Estimates for 1894, to ask for a Vote for the construction of a dock at Gibraltar? He desired to call the serious attention of the House to the present position of this matter, which had been brought before Parliament in both Houses from time to time during the last five or six years. Successive Governments had, when addressed on the subject, invariably approved of the project. He had the support of distinguished officers in the Navy, including the present and four ex-Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, who all agreed that the construction of the dock was of the greatest importance. One of those officers, having visited the Rock, had withdrawn his former opinion that the dock would not be defensible, and believed that it would be perfectly capable of defence from the sea. He could not understand the reason of this long delay. In answer to a similar question in the early part of the Session, he was told it was impossible to enter upon so large an outlay at that period of the Session when the Estimates were already framed. For that reason he now asked in ample time whether the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty intended to place upon the Estimates a Vote for the construction of a dock at Gibraltar, the need for which increased with every year. No less than five years would be required for its completion, and the necessity for it had been greatly increased by recent events. If the result of what was passing in the other House should be to lead Her Majesty's Government to make considerable additions to the Navy, that necessity would be still greater. France was constructing important naval works at Tunis, and was making efforts in other directions; and every moment of delay was a matter of importance. The French Government
  1742
  were connecting the docks at Brest with the Mediterranean, so that in the event of hostile operations France would not only have the advantage of the magnificent docks she possessed in the Mediterranean, Marseilles, Toulon, Caserta, and Ajaccio, but would, in the event of a reverse there, be able to convey her fleet up to Brest entirely beyond the reach of hostile forces. As to expense, the cost of a dock at Gibraltar would not be more than about one-third of the price of a large ironclad. He hoped the noble Earl would assure the House that some step would be taken in the matter, and that the construction of a dock, which all who had the interests of the Navy at heart, would be no longer delayed.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Earl SPENCER): My Lords, I fully share the views of the noble and gallant Viscount as to the importance of the subject he has brought before your Lordships. On a former occasion I made some remarks in answer to a somewhat similar question addressed to me last Session. I certainly did not speak unfavourably as to the necessity of having a dock at Gibraltar, and I have not altered my opinion since that time. I am afraid, however, that I cannot give a positive answer to the question put to me. This is the time of year when the various Government Departments are considering their Estimates, and the Admiralty is no exception to this rule. The question of the dock at Gibraltar is now being considered, but, until the Estimates are finally settled, it would be improper for me to declare what the intentions of the Government are on the subject. It is manifestly extremely inconvenient to describe piecemeal what the Estimates will contain, and my only answer, therefore, is that the question of the dock at Gibraltar is being considered as the Estimates are now being placed before the Government.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I cannot let this occasion pass without a word in support of the views of the noble Viscount. The importance of Gibraltar is enormous to the naval interests of Great Britain, and has been rapidly growing in consequence of the events of the past few years. The full and safe possession of Gibraltar, a possession which shall be free alike from any danger which may threaten it by land,

  1743
  and any danger which may threaten it by torpedoes from the opposite coasts—the possession of Gibraltar in the true and full sense is absolutely necessary for the junction and co-operation of the Channel and Mediterranean Fleets, and especially when, as I hope, the Channel Fleet will assume larger proportions than at present. If that be the case, if it be necessary to make the fleets act together when you wish, and that Gibraltar should be in our full and safe possession in ordinary times, it is still more necessary now, because we must remember that a moral junction has taken place between the Cronstadt and the Toulon Fleets. With these circumstances in our view, which naturally we do not dilate much upon, but the importance of which is not the less present to the minds of all who take an interest in the present position of the maritime affairs of this country, I feel that the restoration of Gibraltar to that position which it occupied in past times is one of the most important subjects which could occupy our attention.
  [The subject then dropped.]

  FRANCE (ANARCHIST CRIME IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES).
  The LORD CHANCELLORacquainted the House that he had received the following letter from the President of the Chamber of Deputies of France:
  Chambre des Députés,
  Secrétariat Général de la Présidence,
  Paris, le 15 Décembre, 1893.
  MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,
  J'ai en l'honneur de lire hier, au milieu des chaleureux applaudissements de la Chambre FranÇaise, la lettre par laquelle Votre Excellence m'a transmis l'expression de la sympathie de la Chambre des Lords d'Angleterre. La Chambre m'a chargé d'être auprès de Votre Excellence l'interprète des sentiments de vive reconnaissance qu'elle éprouve.
  Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.
  Le Président de la
  Chambre des Députés,
  CH. DUPUY.
  Son Excellence
  Le Lord Grand Chancelier
  et Président de la Chambre
  des Lords du Royaume-Uni.
  Ordered, that the said letter be entered on the Journal of the House.
  WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE BILL [H.L.].
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read, and discharged.

  THE ADJOURNMENT OVER CHRISTMAS.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to move that the House do now adjourn until Thursday, at a quarter to 3 o'clock, for the purpose of a Royal Commission, no other Business whatever to be taken on that day. It may be convenient that I should now state to what time we propose that the House should adjourn over Christmas. I intend to propose that the House shall adjourn until Friday, January 12, but at the same time I will undertake that no contested business whatever shall be taken in this House before Tuesday, the 16th. Therefore, practically, except for formal business, or receipt of any Bill from the other House, no real business will be taken before that date.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I will only say that in view of the delay which must necessarily take place with respect to the Business now being considered in the other House I think the proposal of the noble Earl will sufficiently meet the convenience of your Lordships, and I shall offer no opposition to it.
  House adjourned at ten minutes before Six o'clock, to Thursday next, a quarter before Three o'clock.