§ LORD HOOD OF AVALONasked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it was intended to take a Supplementary Estimate in order to provide, with the least possible delay, for the commencement of a first-class battle-ship to replace the Victoria, and also for the entry of the necessary number of men to replace those lost by the sinking of that ship? He said, the grievous loss the country had sustained must be deplored most deeply by all as a great national disaster. In Sir George Tryon the country had lost an Admiral of the very 1299 highest distinction and ability, who had won the admiration and respect of the whole Naval Service and the entire confidence of every officer and man who had served under his command. We had also to deplore the loss of some 400 of our officers and trained men. But whilst deeply mourning their loss, one bright spot stood out conspicuously in this great disaster, which must command the admiration and sympathy of all, and that was the cool courage displayed and the high state of discipline maintained by officers and men to the very last. No panic was shown, but each man remained steady at his station until the order was given them to endeavour to save themselves. The country might well be proud of such men. All honour to them! It was of vital importance that this great national loss should be repaired as soon as possible. First, as to replacing our trained men. Heretofore, when it had been necessary to do so through any sudden loss in the personnel of the Navy, an additional number of boys had been entered for the Service; but the adoption of that course was not to be recommended in this case, and the trained men lost must be replaced by trained men. Boys after 18 months' service in the training ships only became ordinary seamen at 18, and, therefore, if the necessary number of boys to replace the men lost in the Victoria were at once entered, nearly three years must elapse before they became ordinary seamen. On the other hand, a Marine recruit joined as a man in 14 months after passing through the whole of his training, and was ready to embark as a trained gunner, his cost to the country during training being £48, as compared with £102 for a boy, from his entry on the training ship to his becoming an ordinary seaman. He would, therefore, strongly recommend that an addition of 400 men should be made to that most valuable corps, the Royal Marines, to replace the loss of trained men in the Victoria, in the shortest possible time. Then as to replacing the vessel herself. The loss of a first-class battle-ship was a matter of the greatest importance at present when large increases were being made in the number of battle-ships in both the French and Russian Navies, and that loss should be replaced with as little delay as possible. Three years were required to complete a first-class battle-ship, and six or seven 1300 months' time would be saved if a new one were commenced now instead of waiting for the Naval Estimates for next year. There would be no necessity to wait for a design to be prepared, for that of the two first-class battle-ships in this year's Programme could easily be adopted for a third, and but a moderate sum, comparatively speaking, would be required for the material and so much of the construction as could be carried out in the present financial year. He trusted the noble Earl the First Lord would be able to assure the House that it was intended to take a Supplementary Estimate for the purpose of replacing the grievous loss the country had sustained by this great national disaster.
§ * THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Earl SPENCER)My Lords, I do not wonder at the noble and gallant Lord referring in appropriate and feeling terms to the serious loss of the Victoria, or at the tribute he has paid to the high discipline shown by the crew in the foundering of that vessel. But I do not intend to-night, in the few words in which I shall answer the noble and gallant Lord, to enlarge upon that painful subject. I will go at once to the answer I propose to make to him. I would first ask the noble and gallant Lord whether he considers that in the estimate of the strength of the Navy made by the Board to which he belonged they did not intend to have a margin of strength in the ships building and in commission, and whether, in a minor degree, they did not intend to have a margin with regard to the men? As to the ships, I think we should be in an exceedingly bad position if we calculated so narrowly the strength of our Navy and the number of ships we possess that we should be put into serious difficulties by the loss of one of them. I do not under-rate the serious nature of this loss; but, at the same time, I deny that the loss is so pressing that immediate action is imperative in order to keep up the strength of the Navy. Having said that, I at once make the qualifying admission that the loss of a great ship like this is, as the noble and gallant Lord says, a very serious and grave loss, and that in the Estimates and Programme we are making, and have made, the loss of the Victoria has been considered, and will be 1301 considered in any plan of construction we have to lay down. That I say most deliberately. It would be impossible for any Board having a sense of responsibility to exclude from their view the loss the country has suffered by this grave disaster. Now I come to the other question of the seamen. I have very little to criticise in the remarks of the noble and gallant Lord, but I do not think any immediate stops are pressed upon us owing to what has taken place. The losses in the Victoria, which were so serious and which we all so much deplore, are divided among different ratings. There were 124 seamen lost. That includes 15 boys. I will not go through every one, but will take some of the principal ratings. There were 81 stokers and 68 Marines. Altogether, exclusive of the officers, there were 320 lost. Now, there will be no difficulty whatever, with the ships now in commission, in replacing the 124 seamen lost. If there were a difficulty, we could resort to two courses: We might resort to the course suggested by the noble and gallant Lord—namely, increasing the Marines, who can be made efficient much more rapidly and at a smaller cost than seamen. As the noble and gallant Lord has reminded your Lordships, the seamen now are educated and trained in special training ships as boys for a period of from one and a-half to two years. It may be necessary on account of this loss to keep up the rather large number of boys now entering the training ships for a longer period than would otherwise have been necessary. We may have to continue the number voted each year at the somewhat high figure at which they were put for 1892–3. That was not intended to be continued as a permanent figure, and it was supposed that by 1894–5, if those numbers were entered, we should have got up the strength of our seamen to what it should be for the number of our ships. That full number may have to be kept up, as I have said, rather longer in consequence of this serious loss. Then, coming to the question of stokers, I have to say that we are trying to increase the number of stokers; and the recruiting for them, under the new conditions we have imposed, has been so far satisfactory. If it continues as satisfactory as it has begun, we hope that by the end of the year we shall have brought up the 1302 stokers to the number we have asked for in this year's Estimate. That, I think, is satisfactory. With regard to the Marines, I also hear that the recruiting is satisfactory, and alike in this respect and in respect of the stokers we have sufficient numbers without reducing the standard. I need hardly say that if we reduced the standard for men joining the Navy, especially for the Marines, we could immediately increase the numbers very materially. There is another source to which we could turn in case of real necessity. We could turn to the Royal Naval Reserve men, and we believe we should be able to get at once a very considerable number of Royal Naval Reserve men to join the Navy as seamen if there were necessity for doing so. At present we do not think there is that necessity, as we believe we shall have sufficient men to man the ships we put into commission. But in regard to this we are now considering very seriously—it has not been absolutely settled—whether we cannot put through training on board Her Majesty's ships for a certain time Royal Naval Reserve men who are seamen just in the same way as we put officers of the Royal Naval Reserve into a great many ships that are commissioned. That is the answer I have to give to the noble and gallant Lord. I am not prepared to pledge Her Majesty's Government to introduce a Supplementary Estimate, we do not consider that is necessary, and, while keeping in view our responsibility to maintain the strength of the Navy, we do not consider it is absolutely necessary to take fresh steps at present, considering especially that the ships under the Naval Defence Act are rapidly going forward. We may press forward to completion rather earlier some of those ships, but we do not consider the needs of the moment are so urgent that we must at once lay down a now ship or in any way increase the number of recruits in the Navy.