COMMITTEE. (Hansard, 25 June 1892)

§ * LORD MORRIS
My Lords, before this Bill goes into Committee I should like to make a few observations upon it. I was not present when it passed the Second Reading; but it appears to me to be a Bill of dangerous import, and liable to be used in a very mischievous direction. It has arisen, I understand, in consequence of circumstances which occurred in another place in which, for argument's sake, I will assume that the employer very harshly dismissed his employee. I say I will assume it—for I do not be- 1896 lieve it; but hard cases we all know make very bad law for asserting general principles. Now what is the principle asserted in this Bill? In the first place, the Bill does what I have a very strong objection to personally; and my noble and learned Friend opposite I am sure also has the same; it constitutes a new crime. This country has in many places had the constitution of new crimes very much commented on, particularly in a case in which it was not the constitution of a new crime, but only a new mode of dealing with an old crime. Now Clause 2 of this Bill says— Every person who commits any of the following acts, that is to say, who threatens, or in any way punishes, damnifies, or injures, or attempts to punish, damnify, or injure, any person for having given evidence upon any such inquiry, unless such evidence is shown to have been given in bad faith, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and be liable upon conviction thereof to a maximum penalty of one hundred pounds, or to a maximum imprisonment of three months. My Lords, what the distinction is between "damnifies or injures" and "attempting to damnify or injure" I really cannot follow. The Bill goes to such an extent that a person who used the first syllable of the word "damnify" might very possibly be brought before the Court on the charge of having committed this new crime. Then, my Lords, what is an employer to do supposing he has an untrustworthy servant who has repeatedly been guilty of breaches of trust for which he ought to have been dismissed; but because this untrustworthy servant has given evidence before one of these inquiries the employer is simply precluded from dismissing him unless he finds that he has given false evidence. The Bill proposes that it shall be a mis-deameanour punishable by a penalty of £100 or imprisonment for three months; and it does so unless—the onus of proof is thrown upon him—he can show that such evidence is given in bad faith. Why is the onus not thrown upon the party, who wants to make his employer guilty of a new crime, to show that it was given in good faith? And, my Lords, those who are acquainted with Common Law practice know that it is difficult to decide what the law holds to be malice, 1897 which is only another name for things done in bad faith. But, my Lords, it does not stop there. This prosecution is to be instituted before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, that is to say, before a Magistrate. It is true that either party is to have the option of having the case sent to Quarter Sessions or Assizes, where it would be tried before a jury—an option which, in the country that I am familiar with, I think parties would not very often be anxious to take. But it does not stop there; because it provides further that it may be lawful for this Magistrate, having sent the employer to gaol for three months, or fined him £100, then to award, under the name of compensation, any sum of money to the complainer—£10,000—I mention that as a round figure; and that amount, so ascertained, is, ipso facto, to become a judgment debt on his property. My Lords, I heard my noble and learned Friend a few minutes ago speak very strongly indeed, and I agree with very much that he said, about rushing Bills through this House on the last day of sitting of the House; but here is a Bill for which there is no urgent demand that I am aware of, considering that things in this country have gone on from time immemorial without the necessity for this Bill. My Lords, I have only called attention to these very striking portions of the Bill for the purpose of saying that it is a Bill, at all events, that should not be rushed through on the last day of the sittings of this House, but one which should either have been referred to the Standing Committee, as was so very ably put by my noble and learned Friend in the case of another Bill, or to the Law Committee, who would be able to deal with it. At present it stands thus: that for dismissing an untrustworthy servant you may be liable to be imprisoned or to be lined, to pay him any compensation, such as a jury might award, and, this being constituted a misdemeanour, the employer is statutorily disqualified from holding certain appointments. My Lords, I object to this Bill going into Committee without its being sent before the Standing Committee who could deal with it, or before a Law Committee, and because, at all events, 1898 there is no particular hurry for it now, when there is no opportunity of considering or amending it. I suggest that this is a case where the Bill should not go into Committee at all, but should be brought in again at a time when it can go before the Standing Committee.

§ * LORD WATSON
My Lords, I wish to ask the noble and learned Lord for an explanation on one or two points. In the first place, what is meant by giving evidence in bad faith? Does it mean perjury? And, if it does not mean perjury, I should like to be informed what it does mean? In the second place, I assume that the evidence is given in good faith, and that the employer believes it; but that it brings to his knowledge for the first time acts committed by the servant which in ordinary circumstances would warrant his dismissal. If I understand the Bill, if the master's suspicions are corroborated by the evidence of the servant, the result is that the doing of that by the master which any other master in the country would do, and which a Court of Law would consider proper, is by the Bill to become a misdemeanour warranting three months' imprisonment.

§ LORD HERSCHELL
My noble and learned Friend suggests that this is a Bill which needs looking into by the Standing Committee, and says that he had great sympathy with the observations that I made on the previous Bill. He did not exhibit that sympathy in any practical fashion. If he had got up and supported me on that occasion, which was a much grosser case than he can suggest this to be, I might have had more disposition to regard favourably any observations that he has made on that point on the present occasion. But, my Lords, my noble and learned Friend has said that this Bill creates a new offence, and that that is a bad thing. I do not agree with him at all. We are constantly creating new offences. What does the Legislature exist for but to create new punishments for acts, if those acts are proved to be pre- 1899 judicial to the community, and such as ought to be visited with punishment? Therefore the mere fact that you have created a now offence seems to me to amount to nothing. The question is whether there is an occasion for doing so. Then my noble and learned Friend said that hard cases make bad law. My Lords, I think that is a maxim which is frequently very much abused. Hard cases make bad law, no doubt, when you are dealing with a matter judicially, and you are tempted by a hard case to decide contrary to the law; but hard cases constantly make very good law, when you are dealing with a matter of legislation, because those hard cases call attention to an evil that needs to be met, and needs the Legislature to set it right. Now my noble and learned Friend says there is no demand for this Bill. I do not blame him for that; his time is no doubt much occupied, but obviously he does not read the proceedings that take place in the other House of Parliament; because he makes that statement in absolute disregard of all that has taken place there. This matter was considered so urgent and important that two Members of the other House, one on one side of the House and one on the other, introduced Bills on the subject, each of them backed by a number of Members. These two Bills, at the suggestion of the Government, and with their full assent, were referred to a Select Committee, who dealt with the two Bills, and the Bill now before your Lordships is the result, and was passed with the unanimous assent of the House of Commons, supported by the Government, because it was believed to be a measure that was desirable and necessary. And now your Lordships are asked to treat it in the summary fashion that my noble and learned Friend suggests when it comes before this House. My Lords, of course I should not be unwilling to consider any Amendments that may be proposed. And with regard to my noble and learned Friend's criticism, is it reasonable to make it an offence where on public grounds a person is summoned to give evidence because it is thought desirable in the public interest that the facts should be elicited? I would say is it not right that a man should have protection 1900 when he comes forward in obedience to that summons; is it not monstrously unfair that, having come forward in the public interest to give that evidence so summoned, he should be subjected to disabilities and injuries and pecuniary loss by reason of so doing? There can be but one answer to that question, and it is to meet that that this Bill was introduced and passed with common assent. With regard to the question put by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Watson), I cannot think that Clause 2 could be construed to apply to such a case as he has referred to. It is in respect of the nature, character, and quality of the evidence that is given, and not because of some act that a man has done. That does not prevent your dismissing him if he has committed such an act; you do not dismiss him because of the evidence, or the nature, character, and quality of the evidence; you dismiss him because he embezzles, or commits some other breach of trust. That does not seem to me to come within the words of Clause 2; but, if it is suggested that the clause should be put in better form, I shall be ready to meet the suggestion. But the Bill, in the form in which it comes before your Lordships for consideration, is the work of some of the ablest lawyers in the other House, and I think myself it would really not be possible reasonably to construe it to do any injustice.

§ * LORD WATSON
I should like to ask my noble and learned Friend if he will refer to the words he has specially mentioned? I do not object to the Bill, or to its scope as explained by him; but I have difficulty in regard to the expression: "in respect of the nature, quality, or character of the evidence." I take it that, if a man made a disclosure, any punishment inflicted by his master would follow from the nature of the evidence that he gave, unless my noble and learned Friend can satisfy me that it is not so.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
I am bound to say that I myself entirely concur with what my noble and learned Friend (Lord Watson) has just said. I do not know either what is the meaning of giving evidence in bad faith. If it means false evidence, it is intelligible; but what is the meaning of giving 1901 evidence in bad faith? It seems to me rather to point to not being absolutely false, but to evidence given with the desire to injure the master. Would that be giving evidence in bad faith? Surely, if new offences are to be created without very minute examination of the language in which they are created, it may give rise to very considerable inconvenience.

§ * LORD MORRIS
My noble and learned Friend must have misunderstood what I said about there being no demand for the Bill—I said it was going to be passed in a hurry. I did not say there was no demand for it. And a good deal of what my noble and learned Friend has said is applicable to a contention which I did not raise. I do not say that a Bill of this nature might not be a very proper Bill to go before a Committee, and eventually to pass into law; but I do object if at this stage we are to pass it without consideration, merely because it was submitted to a Committee in another place consisting of very distinguished lawyers. My Lords, this House, after all, is the Court of Appeal in all matters connected with the law of the country, and, if any prerogative of your Lordships' House is to remain, I should say, at all events, that it should be the privilege to consider all matters regarding legal positions.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
said: My Lords, it is my duty under the Standing Order to declare that the question is not decided.

§ LORD HERSCHELL
My Lords, I beg to give notice that on Monday I shall again endeavour to proceed with the Bill.