MANIPUR.

HL Deb 22 June 1891 vol 354 cc985-1053

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

, in rising to call attention to the Papers relating to the affairs of Manipur lately laid before the House, and to move for further Papers, said: My Lords, in accordance with the notice which I have placed upon your Lordships' Table, I rise to call attention to the Papers which have lately been laid before us in relation to the affairs of Manipur. I believe your Lordships will not think that I am wrong in taking this course in a case in which such said occurrences have taken place as those which have happened in the State of which I am about to speak. Several valuable lives of civil and military servants of the Government have been sacrificed, and a force of our Indian troops has received a repulse. Under these circumstances, it is, I think, only right that in this, as in the other House of Parliament, the questions connected with these affairs should be discussed and considered. And, indeed, my Lords, in this House, apart from the fact that we have here many noble Lords especially qualified to speak upon Indian questions, we have an advantage which is not possessed by the other House of Parliament at the present moment, for we have amongst us the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, who can give with an authority, to which none else can pretend, an explanation of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this question. And, my Lords, if this was the view which I took of the matter when I first placed this notice upon the Paper, I am more convinced than ever now, after some strange declarations that have been made in another place, of the necessity of entering upon the consideration of these questions in the House of Lords. I am perfectly aware how very easy it is to be wise after the event, and it is with a constant recollection of that fact that I hope to address myself to the consideration of these proceedings; and, of course, having filled the office that I have filled in India, I know well the many difficulties which beset questions of this kind and the complications in which they are involved. The State, the affairs of which we have to discuss to-night, is one of those which are called in the common Indian parlance, though the term is not perhaps historically accurate, Feudatory States. It is a small State, probably until these events took place very little known to your Lordships, unless, indeed, some of you may have heard of it as the birthplace of the game of Polo; but it is a protected State, which has been under our protection for a considerable time, and where we have had for long a Political Agent to represent us. In the year 1851 the Government of India took a step, in guaranteeing the then Maharajah—or the Rajah, as I think he was called—in the possession of his State, which made somewhat closer our connection with that State than it had been before. There is little remarkable in the condition of Manipur except in one respect, that succession to the Gaddi, as it is called in India, or the Throne, is based upon a peculiar system. When there are a series of brothers they succeed one after the other—not the son of the Maharajah, but his brother succeeds him, and so the succession goes on until the last of the brothers is exhausted, and then it is his son and not the son of the elder brother who succeeds to the Throne. I need not point out to your Lordships what a complicated succession this is, and how very likely it is to raise difficulties and troubles; and so it has done on many occasions in Manipur. Disputes have sprung up, domestic quarrels have taken place, Palace revolutions have occurred, and it is out of one of these Palace revolutions that the present difficulty has arisen. As those who have read the Papers are well aware, on the night of the 22nd September last an attack was made upon the then Maharajah by some of his brothers; shots were fired in the Palace; the Maharajah was seized with great alarm, and fled to the protection of the British Political Agent, Mr. Grimwood. His alarm was such that it appears that his first thought was to quit the country. Mr. Grimwood supposed that he intended to abdicate, and that he had actually abdicated. The Maharajah now contests that matter, but there seems, at all events, to be no doubt that he did intend to retire from Manipur, and he immediately took steps to do so; and, with the consent of those who had overthrown his authority and rebelled against him, he upon the following day left the city of Manipur and proceeded to British territory. This occurrence was at once reported by telegraph to the Chief Commissioner of Assam. Your Lordships will understand that the Political Agent of Manipur is under the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Assam. He is generally one of the officers of the Assam Commission, and he serves under that Chief Commissioner, whose authority is to a certain extent, as it were, interposed between him and the Government of India. Mr. Grimwood immediately reported these occurrences to his Chief, who forwarded information of them by telegraph to the Government of India. Upon the 25th of September—that is to say, three days after the events of which I have been speaking—Mr. Grimwood sent a full account of what had taken place, together with his views upon the subject, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, who did not, however, transmit that Paper in full, so far as we officially know, to the Government of India until after the lapse of a long period. There is nothing in the Papers to show what was the cause of that delay. Mr. Quinton's letter is dated the 31st December, and the delay, of course, was considerable. There is nothing to show whether the Government of India communicated, by telegraph or otherwise, with Mr. Quinton during that period, except one single telegram at the commencement. We have, therefore, to conjecture as best we can what may have been the cause of this delay. But Mr. Quinton did take one step during that period, as I understand, which was a step of very considerable importance as bearing upon the ultimate decision to be arrived at. Mr. Quinton reports to the Government of India (and the words are important)— The Jubraj —that is, the Regent, as he became afterwards, the elder brother of the Maharajah— whose nomination by the Maharajah as his successor on his demise had been sanctioned by the Government of India, has since carried on the Government of the country, having been recognised as Regent by the Political Agent under the orders of the Chief Commissioner. Now, my Lords, there is clear proof that the person whom we have since been in the habit of calling the Regent was acknowledged as Regent by order of the Chief Commissioner shortly after the Palace revolution took place. There is nothing in Mr. Quinton's words about a preliminary acknowledgment pending the decision of the Government of India. That is stated in a subsequent letter, but it appears to me to be a gloss which was put upon Mr. Quinton's statement. That statement is broad and unmistakeable. The Regent was recognised as Regent by the Political Agent under the orders of the Chief Commissioner.' These matters came under the consideration of the Government of India, and they took, no doubt, a considerable time—a, long time, I think—to come to a decision about them. I am not at all inclined to say that matters of this kind should be decided hastily. No doubt the Government of India were quite right to seek the views of their local officers, and not to come to a hasty decision upon a question of importance. But, on the other hand, a delay of four months is a very considerable delay, and it had in this case, as I think I shall be able to show your Lordships, one effect of importance, namely, that it rendered it extremely difficult to adopt one of the alternatives which might have been adopted by the Government of India if they had determined to act upon it immediately or shortly after the receipt of the intelligence of the revolution. They wrote upon the 24th January, and then proposed an inquiry by Mr. Quinton upon the spot, and appeared to point towards the restoration of the old Maharajah. Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood had both Previously expressed their opinion against the restoration of the old Maharajah. They held him to be a weak man, incompetent to rule the country, and they had also said that he could not be put back except by force. Their conclusion was distinctly and clearly that the true course to take was to recognise the Palace revolution, to acknowledge the status quo, and to leave things in the condition in which they were after that revolution was carried out. In accordance with that view, the Government of India hesitated to restore the old Maharajah, and they ultimately determined to take a course, upon which I shall have more to say in a few moments. Mr. Quinton, in the meantime, had got to Calcutta. He entered, no doubt, into communications, of which there is, naturally, no record, with the Government of India and the Foreign Office, and although he acquiesced in the course which the Government ultimately determined to take, there is nothing in these Papers to show that either Mr. Grimwood or Mr. Quinton did change their opinions, or did really give their approval (and I venture to say that I distinctly believe neither of them did give his approval) to a portion, at all events, of the policy which the Government of India ultimately adopted. Now, my Lords, with respect to one question I think there can be no doubt. I have no doubt whatever that the Government of India had a right to interfere in this matter. The State of Manipur was, as I have said, a protected State. We had been in the habit for a considerable time of acknowledging the successors, the heirs to the Government of the country, and the right of the Government to deal with a question of this kind is, to my mind, complete. I go beyond that; I say it was their duty to deal with this question, because they were appealed to by both parties. They were appealed to by the old Maharajah and by the Regent who had taken his place, and they were, therefore, bound to give a decision upon the matter. But, my Lords, it seems to me that they might have taken one of two courses; they might either have determined to restore the old Maharajah, or they might have determined to acknowledge the Regent and acquiesce in the Palace revolution. There is a good deal to be said for both these courses. For the restoration of the old Maharajah there is the strong and powerful argument that it would have been a step tending to maintain the authority of a Native Chief, whom we had ourselves acknowledged as ruler of the country. But it was objected to, and strongly objected to, by the local officers—both by Mr. Quinton and by Mr. Grimwood—and it would, as it appears, undoubtedly have involved a resort to force in order to carry it out. For the other step, in a case of this kind, in which the interests of the British Government were very little directly concerned, there were all the arguments which may be adduced for an acknowledgment of the accomplished facts; and there was the great advantage that, according to the view of the local officers, that policy could have been pursued quietly, and would have involved no use of force at all. Therefore, my Lords, although strong arguments might have been adduced in favour of restoring the old Maharajah, nevertheless, I am not at all inclined to blame, or even to criticise, the Government of India for having, upon the recommendation of their local officers, determined against that course. But I do think it is much to be regretted that they did not take one or other of these two courses—that instead of that they adopted a third course, which was neither one nor the other. I quite admit that after a delay of five months it would have been very difficult to restore the old Maharajah, and to upset the state of things which had grown up with the acquiescence and acknowledgment of Mr. Grimwood, who remained our political agent there. But if that is true, then the proper course was to acknowledge that state of things. Instead of doing that, the Government of India, as it seems to me, tried to adopt a compromise between these two policies. They acknowledged the revolution, and they endeavoured to punish its authors. Well, I cannot say that that course seems to me to have been a very logical one; and I certainly think, though, as I said before, it is easy enough to judge after the event no doubt, still I certainly think it has proved not to have been a wise course. It involved really all the objections to both the courses. It involved the refusal to maintain the right of the old Maharajah, and it also involved the necessity for employing force. It had the objections to both courses, and I think it had the advantages of neither. Therefore, I cannot but express regret that that course should have been adopted. But this also I will say. If it was going to be adopted, if the intention was only partially to accept the change which had taken place in Manipur, to proceed against the Senapatti as a person who had been guilty of offences that deserved punishment in regard to that revolution, then the action ought to have been speedy. There ought not to have been this delay of five months during which the Government was being carried on at Manipur by the Regent and the Senapatti, but steps ought to have been taken without delay. However, my Lords, assuming that this was the course to be taken, I cannot but think that it is to be regretted that the policy thus adopted was carried out in the manner which was pursued. It seems to me that it would have been far better—I think it is always better in dealing with Indian questions, with Native Chiefs, and rulers in India—for the Government to state at once distinctly and plainly what was the policy intended to pursue. As soon as they had made up their minds, they should have authorised our representative at Manipur to declare to the Regent what was the policy of the Government, and to call upon him to conform to it. If that had been done, the Regent would have been informed that the Government were prepared to acknowledge him as Maharajah upon certain conditions; that they did not think it necessary to restore the old Maharajah; but that they would acknowledge the new one if he conformed to the conditions which they thought fit to lay down. Then those conditions might have been communicated to him, and he would have been told: "It is for you to remove the Senapatti. It is for you to call upon him to retire; and, if he refuses to retire, to take steps to remove him. If you are not strong enough to carry out our wishes in that respect, we will help you." But the first responsibility of acting upon that policy ought to have been cast, in my opinion, upon the new Maharajah, openly and clearly, by a declaration from Mr. Grimwood. That might have avoided—I am not sure that it would not have avoided—the necessity for employing force at all; but, if force had been necessary ultimately, you would then have employed it in defence of a policy that had been fairly declared to the parties, and about which they would have had their option whether to accede to it or to resist it. Whereas it is quite evident from these purposes that the main purpose—at all events the main purpose as Mr. Quinton understood it—was the purpose of deporting or getting rid of the Senapatti. If you look at these Papers, your Lordships will see at once that Mr. Quinton set out evidently understanding that that was his main business, and that accounts for the secrecy of his proceedings, of which we have heard a good deal. That accounts for his not having communicated the orders of the Government of India earlier than he did to our representative at Manipur. That accounts for the mode in which he conducted himself up to the last day or two of those proceedings. His main object evidently, as he understood it, was to lay his hand upon the Senapatti, and I myself, I confess, trace to that mistake, as I regard it, a good many of the difficulties and the evils that have arisen since. Mr. Quinton arrived at Manipur on the 22nd of March last, and then occurred that series of acts which culminated, as we all know, in the unhappy massacre by which Mr. Quinton's life, as well as the lives of Mr. Grimwood, Colonel Skene, and others were sacrificed. I do not propose to review this part of the proceedings in detail, for this very good reason, that we have no accurate information about it. The men who were concerned in them are dead; their lives have been sacrificed; they have fallen in the service of their country, and it would be unjust and ungenerous to criticise upon imperfect information the acts in which they have been engaged. But there is one point connected with this matter which I cannot help alluding to, because it has been so much brought before the public, and that is the question which has been raised in regard to Mr. Quinton's intention, as it is supposed, of arresting the Senapatti at a durbar. Now, I quite admit, as I think everybody connected with India will admit, that there are durbars of different kinds. There are ceremonial durbars, and there are durbars at which the policy of the Government, or intentions of the Government, are declared to those who are present at them, and I see it has been stated that my friend Sir Robert Sandeman says that he has often arrested Native Chiefs at durbars. I have not the least doubt that that is so. Sir Robert Sandeman had to deal with a turbulent set of Chiefs in Beloochistan, and I have no doubt, as he says so particularly, that he has often taken that step in the manner described. There is a great difference of opinion upon this point. I have Sought counsel about it of many of those whom I knew in India, and who are now in England; and I have found great differences of opinion exist about it. But on the whole, I am bound to say that I think the attempt to arrest any person at a durbar, except under some very exceptional circumstances, is an attempt to be regretted, and a thing to be avoided, and I hope that the noble Viscount opposite will be able to tell us to-day what are his views upon that subject; and whether he will give any general directions in respect of it when he communicates those views to the Government of India. Of one thing, my Lords, I am perfectly convinced, and that is that Mr. Quinton was absolutely incapable of treacherous or unworthy conduct. I knew Mr. Quinton very well. I have a very great respect for him. He was a most upright and high-minded man, and I am quite sure that any idea unworthy of a servant of the British Government never once crossed his mind. But he had got hold, as I say, of that idea, so unfortunate as I think in the conduct of this business, that his main object was to secure the Senapatti, and it was because of that that he took the course which he did, practising secrecy with regard to his intentions, and bringing himself into a position so liable to be misrepresented as that in which he appears to have stood. Your Lordships know very well what were the results of this attempt. The Senapatti did not come to the durbar. The durbar did not take place, and then an attempt was made on the 24th of March to arrest the Senapatti by force in his palace. You know what happened; you know the fatal results; you know how our officers were seized, and how they died. As I have said, I will not enter into any discussion of the details in this matter, either in their civil aspect, or still less in their military aspect, because, perhaps, I am not the best person to speak upon those matters from a military point of view. But I must say this, all that I have over heard of the late Colonel Skene leads me to believe that he was an able officer, that he was a man whom the Government of India were right to trust, and who deserved their confidence. I will not touch upon the question of ammunition, because the facts about it appear to be very obscure. We were distinctly told that the force which went out with Mr. Quinton had only 40 rounds per man. If that was so, and if they had nothing else to rely upon, sending them out with such a small amount of ammunition was a great mistake. I think there can be no doubt about that matter. Forty rounds a man is about what is carried, I believe, by the troops who go out to guard and protect the Viceroy's camp in a quiet district, and it would be quite inadequate for a purpose of that kind; but there seems to be doubt as to whether there was a larger supply at Manipur or supposed to be there, and I will not press that matter further. I hope the noble Viscount will give us any further information that he may possess on that point. But, my Lords, I cannot help saying, if it is not wrong in a civilian to say it, that I greatly regret that the force was not accompanied by any guns. There are mountain guns in Assam. I believe at present each of the Ghoorka regiments has two mountain guns; a mountain gun can go wherever a mule can go. It was known that the Manipuris had at least four guns; some of the accounts represent them as having had more. I do think it is to be regretted that with the force that accompanied Mr. Quinton a few of these very useful mountain guns were not sent. I believe if they had been sent the evils might have been avoided. My Lords, put very briefly, and compressed as much as it has been in my power to compress it, that is the view which a perusal of these Papers has led me to take of the course pursued in regard to these transactions. Your Lordships will see that the points upon which I have made some criticism are, undoubtedly, points upon which opinions may differ, and I shall wait with very great interest, as I am sure all your Lordships will, to hear from the noble Viscount opposite an explanation of his views upon the matter, and anything that he may have to say on behalf of the Government of India. But, my Lords, I am quite sure that whatever else the noble Viscount may say, there is one line of defence, if defence it can be called, which he will not adopt and against which I feel bound to enter my strongest protest. We have been told that the true explanation of the conduct of the Government of India, the real reason why they made it the principal point of their policy, as they seem to have done, to remove the Senapatti from Manipur, was because the Senapatti was a man of great ability and force of character; he was considered by them dangerous because he was able. It has been said also that when the Government of India spoke of the offences which the Senapatti had committed and of criminal acts which they attributed to him, they did not mean anything by those charges; they were only said in the sort of way in which politicians in this country are perhaps too often apt to bring charges against their political opponents. It is said that they meant nothing serious, but that what they really did mean was that the Senapatti was able, therefore he was dangerous, and that view resulted from the fact that Governments have always discouraged independent and original talent, and have always promoted mediocrity. It is said that that is the true construction of the course pursued towards the Senapatti. Now, with respect to that very extraordinary statement, I have some observations to make. In the first place I must say that I think it is a great exaggeration to describe the Senapatti as a man of great ability and force of character. He was a man of more force of character than some of his brothers, who seem to have been singularly weak, but there is nothing in these Papers that I can see to show that he was a man of extraordinary ability. He had a certain amount of vigour, and he had a certain amount of popularity, the result apparently of lavish expenditure, but that he was a man of whom the Government of India would ever dream of being afraid appears to me to be an exaggeration of the grossest kind. Then, my Lords, to say that the Government of India, in their official communications, brought forward charges against a native of India, a member of a native princely family, in which there was no reality, which were, in fact, sham charges, is to my mind, I confess, an insult to my noble Friend, Lord Lansdowne, and to his colleagues; and I should think they would resent it and repudiate it as strongly as possible. And lastly, my Lords, I assert that the notion that the Government of India informer days, or now, have systematically discouraged talent, and countenanced only mediocrity, is a libel upon the Governments of India, and is altogether unsupported by facts. Events have occurred in the course of our Indian rule of which we cannot approve. Acts have been done which we are bound to condemn; but to my mind it is untrue, and it is unfounded, to say that the great fabric of our Indian Empire, the most wonderful, perhaps, in some respects, of any of which we read in the history of the world, has been founded upon, and has been built up by the adoption of a mean and trivial policy like this. Against this, my Lords, I protest. It is easy enough to produce proofs of the injustice of this accusation. I will not trouble your Lordships with more than two, and two of a somewhat recent date. When my noble Friend, the Earl of Northbrook, was Viceroy of India, and at the time when a Gaekwar of Baroda had been removed from his Government for misrule, my noble Friend had to seek out for a now native administrator of the State of Baroda. What did he do? Did he try to find out some wretched mediocrity who would be nothing but a tool in the hands of the British Resident? Not at all. He sought for the ablest statesman to be found in India itself; be se- lected the late Sir Madhava Rao, and selected him to be Dewan of Baroda. Again, take the case of the late Sir Salar Jung. The Government of India had differences of opinion with Sir Salar Jung, and they expressed their opinions very frankly, but when Sir Salar Jung died (I was in India at the time myself), what was the feeling of the Government of India? Was it a feeling that an able man had been taken away who was dangerous to us, and that it was a very good thing that we had got rid of him? Exactly the reverse. We felt, and we knew, that Sir Salar Jung had rendered great services to the people and to the State of Hyderabad, and to the Nizam, and we felt that we had lost in him a man of whom India might be proud, and that we should find it exceedingly difficult, as we did find it exceedingly difficult—nay, my Lords, we found it impossible—to get anybody who was really fit to take his place. And then, my Lords, we are to be told forsooth that this policy, this love of mediocrity, this attempt to cast down everything in the nature of intelligence or talent, is the policy of the Government of India. But, my Lords, there are some persons who have been giving a very startling explanation of the utterances to which I am alluding. They have said that the speaker was not thinking at all of Governments in India, either past or present, but was thinking of Governments nearer home. There have even been men who have had the audacity to say that the true Tarquinius Superbus sits on the Bench before me. My Lords, I will not attempt to pronounce upon these delicate questions, but of this I am sure, that the Princes and the people of India will not give credence to that explanation. They do not understand the ways of public life in this country, and the queer things that are sometimes done in it. They will never be persuaded to look for the Roman tyrant on the Treasury Bench. They will be sure to expect to find him enthroned on the heights of Simla. That is the mischief of these rash and cynical declarations, and a very grievous mischief it is. They will be repeated in every native newspaper in India; the will be discussed in every bazaar; they will be commented upon with pain and anxiety by our friends, and with secret triumph by our enemies; they will alarm every Native Prince in India, and will fill with disgust, aye, and indignation, the minds of many able men fired with a just and natural ambition who are to be found now largely in that country. I am afraid, my Lords, that it will be impossible altogether to get rid of the mischief effected in India of declarations of this kind made, if not with the authority, at least on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, but there is only one way in which the mischief can be stopped, that is by a clear and distinct declaration from the noble Viscount opposite, which I am sure, I hope and trust, he will give us to-night in repudiation of these doctrines. It will not be a very pleesant thing for my noble Friend to have to do, and I am very sorry to invite him to do it, but in the interests of our rule in India, aye, and I will go further, I will say for the vindication of our fair fame it is essential that the noble Lord should repudiate these doctrines, and that they should be repudiated by him to-night in clear, decisive, and unmistakeable terms. Now, my Lords, before I pass on to some questions connected with the future administration of Manipur, I wish to say one word upon a matter which does not arise directly out of these Papers, but which has been alluded to in another place, and upon which I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to express my opinion. It has been suggested that it would be an improvement in our system of Indian administration if a new Member were added to the Council of the Governor General, who should be specially charged with the management of foreign affairs. I deprecate any such change in the present system. The Viceroy is now, and has been for a very long time, at all events, in direct and personal charge' of the Foreign Department, and according to my view of the matter it is right that he should continue to be so, because I hold it to be very necessary indeed that the head of the Government should have a distinct hold and a clear knowledge of all the details of our dealings with Native States. In a question of this kind (and this Manipur story seems almost to show it) it is very easy for mistakes to arise from small beginnings. What is done in one State is closely watched by all the other States, and you may give a great deal of offence to the Native Chiefs generally, without perhaps even thinking of it, unless you have it constantly before your minds. The Viceroy is a man sent out from England, trained in English public life, and acquainted with English feelings. He is, or at all events he ought to be, in the closest and most confidential communication with Her Majesty's Government. He knows their views not only upon Indian foreign matters, but upon other foreign matters which are connected with Indian questions. He is in possession of information of a most secret and confidential character, and I venture to say that he, and he alone, is really fit to deal with the management of Native States. If he is only to deal with questions when they have been got into a difficulty, or when matters of particular importance arise, he will not have, he cannot have, that close and daily knowledge and interest in those questions which he ought to have, and I am quite certain that the arrangement will not work better, bat rather that it will work considerably worse than the present arrangement. And, again, I am very certain that this change, if it were made, would be highly distasteful to the Native Princes of India. They set great store by dealing directly with the Viceroy. They are very sensitive, and would be highly offended if anybody was to be interposed between them and the head of the Indian Government. I should not, my Lords, have perhaps touched upon this matter if it had not been that seme words fell from the Secretary of State for War in another place which seemed to give some encouragement to this idea. They did not, however, pledge the Government at all, and I hope we shall hear from my noble Friend opposite that having had some few days to consider it he is not inclined to make this change. If there was anything wrong, any mismanagement in the Foreign Office in regard to these affairs at Manipur, I venture to say that it arose from this single fact, that the Foreign Secretary, a very able Foreign Secretary he is, my friend, Sir Mortimer Durand, was absent from India on sick leave during the whole of this time. But that may happen under any system, and it is no reason for changing your system that it may have led in this particular case (I do not say it was so) to results which were lamentable. Now, I hope your Lordships will allow me to say a few words about the future course to be-pursued in regard to the State of Manipur. In the first place, I would say one word about the trials that have been going on in that country. It is light, nay, it is necessary, that condign punishment should be awarded to those who have had any hand in the massacre of our officers. Upon that point I entertain no doubt whatever, but I see it to-day stated in the newspapers—and the only information available to us upon the point is from the newspapers—that the Regent has been acquitted of any complicity in the murder of Mr. Quinton and his companions, but that he has been found guilty of what is in reality the crime of high treason, and that he has been condemned to death. Well, my Lords, I fully hope and believe that the noble Viscount will tell us to-night, or, if he cannot do that, that he will come speedily to the conclusion that it will not be right to carry out that death sentence in this case. The circumstances are very different from those of the men who were engaged in any way in the massacre. I think to carry out that death sentence in this case would weaken the effect of the example of the punishment of the men who were concerned in the murders, and I venture to express the hope that the noble Viscount will be able to draw a distinction between this case and the others, and to admit the plea of mercy to a certain extent in regard to those who were not, in fact, engaged in the massacre. My Lords, the point that I am most particularly anxious about in respect to the whole of this question is to obtain, if possible, from the noble Viscount opposite a declaration as to the principle upon which he proposes to deal with Manipur in the future. I do not ask him—of course it would be quite unreasonable—to give us any details. I do not ask him to say what member of the family he is going to put upon the Gaddi. There is the old Maharajah, who never sinned against us at all events, and who never was accused of cruelty or oppression towards his people. There is his son; there may be others for aught I know, who may be available for the purpose. I ask for no information, and I express no opinion as to the detailed manner in which the principle is to be carried out. But I do most earnestly hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to say that they do not favour the idea of annexation. There is a party in India who are always anxious for annexation, who are ready to cry out for annexation whenever opportunity offers, and they are following their usual course upon this occasion. There is nothing whatever, I am happy to say, to show that that policy is favoured either by the Government in India or by the Government at home. I do, therefore, very earnestly hope that we shall have it disavowed to-night. The Native Princes of India watch with the most singular closeness—perhaps it is not singular, but with the most minute closeness—every step which is taken with regard to every Native State in India whatsoever. I could give you, if I had the time, many curious instances of that kind. They are always on the watch. They study what is said in Parliament; they get our Blue Books read and described to them, and they know exactly the principles which we have professed and the acts which we have done; and I can assure you that the annexation of Manipur would give a great shake to the confidence of the Native Princes of India. They rely upon the Proclamation of the Queen, in which Her Majesty was advised, most wisely and justly, distinctly to disavow any desire for an increase of territory. They rely upon that, and any deviation from that policy would shake their confidence and would be very mischievous. Therefore, I do earnestly beg the noble Viscount opposite to give us a statement upon that matter to-day, and I hope that he will be able to tell us that in spite of all the complications and difficulties with which this question of Manipur is surrounded—and I do not at all desire to underrate them—Her Majesty's Government will do nothing to impair the confidence or excite the fears of the Native Princes and Chiefs of India, who believe that their rights now rest firmly on the gracious pledges of the Royal Proclamation, and that they may dwell in peace and in security under the protection of the British Crown. I beg, my Lords, to move that further Papers be laid before the House. Moved, "That a humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for further correspondence relating to Manipur."—(The Marquess of Ripon.)

*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount CROSS)

My Lords, I am quite sure I have nothing whatever to complain of in the way in which the noble Marquess has brought forward his case upon this matter. It was undoubtedly quite right that the question should be submitted to your Lordships for inquiry, and no one is more glad than myself to be able to state from my place in this House to your Lordships my views of the conduct of the Government of India in this question. I think it is only right for the Government of India itself that those views should be stated, and I am one of those who regret very much that I have not had an earlier opportunity of making a statement on behalf of the Viceroy than I have to-night. Probably, before I enter into the whole question of Manipur, I might be allowed to deal with those one or two points which the noble Marquess raised just before he sat down. First of all, as to the question of annexation, I think your Lordships will agree with me when I state that before I could make any definite statement to your Lordships upon that point I must wait till I hear the opinion of the Government of India and the views which they may have to present to me for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but I have no hesitation in stating, as a broad principle, that I individually have not, and I am sure the Viceroy has not, the smallest wish to add to those territories in British India which we already possess, and it would only be under the most absolute necessity of annexation that we would adopt that course. For think, my Lords, what it really means. It would mean, in the first place, probably the punishment of a great number of people who had committed no offences against us at all. It would probably throw upon us the direct responsibility for the behaviour of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of that country. It would involve the application of the cumbrous machinery of our British law to that State at, I think, considerable expense and considerable trouble. It would involve a very large expenditure in any case, and it would probably give rise to discontent amongst the inhabitants of that country where the collections of revenue have been very carelessly carried out, and where, if they were properly carried out, discontent would be quite certain to arise. And it might give rise among the other Native Chiefs to a mistaken idea of the policy we want to adopt towards them. But supposing that the state of facts were such as to make it an absolute necessity that we should annex Manipur, I think that even those Native Princes would see that the circumstances of the case were very peculiar, and could not be of general application. All I can say at the present moment, as at present advised, is that I am decidedly against annexation—against any annexation—but I can give no opinion at all upon the annexation of this particular Province until I hear the opinion of the Viceroy and the reasons he may have to give. And I will say the same with regard to the trials. I quite admit that there is a great distinction between those persons who are found guilty of murder, or even of abetting murder, and those who are found guilty of waging war, although the latter, by the Indian Code, as the noble Marquess knows perfectly well, are liable to be punished by death. I am quite certain that your Lordships may trust to the mercy as well as to the justice of Lord Lansdowne in any recommendations that he makes in matters of this kind. His views are not likely to reach me for some little time. I understand that the Senapatti, who has been condemned to death, has made an appeal to the Viceroy to be allowed to petition in his favour, and that some three weeks have been granted to him to draw up his Petition. I presume the same course will be adopted in the case of Jubraj. Therefore, some time must necessarily elapse before we know the result of his deliberations. There is only one other point that the noble Marquess has mentioned which I should like to mention before treating with the general subject, and that is the suggestion that was made in the other House the other night about a Foreign Member of the Council. That suggestion, I think, was made by someone who sat on the Opposition side of the House—Mr. Bryce. There is no doubt that the Secretary of State for War—very naturally—said that the suggestion was one that required consideration. I have considered that question in the short time that has elapsed since that Debate, and the more I look upon it I must say the more I dislike it. I think that what the noble Marquess has said is perfectly true, and that great evils might arise. At the same time, I am very happy to state that we have taken steps already to strengthen the Foreign Department by the appointment of an Assistant Secretary at an increased salary, so that that Department may practically be stronger for the future than it hitherto has been. Now, my Lords, I have answered the main points of the noble Marquess outside the case itself. With regard to the case of Manipur itself, I should like to put my views as shortly as I can before your Lordships, and also the views of the Viceroy himself. I would make this first proposition to your Lordships, which I do not think anyone will dispute, namely, that it is the right and the duty of the British Government to settle the successions in all the dependent States, that every succession may be recognised by the British Government, and that no succession is valid until it has been so recognised. I believe that is a principle thoroughly understood throughout the whole of India, and one of universal application. It is a principle which is of very vital importance when we come to discuss the case a little later on. But if the principle is true in general, it is more especially applicable to the State of Manipur. The State of Manipur is one practically of our own creation. Your Lordships are perfectly aware of the quarrels that took place between them. In 1826 we first recognised as a ruling Sovereign the Rajah of Manipur. We have always interfered with the internal affairs of Manipur from that day to this. In 1833 we made a Treaty with them, and by that Treaty we were to have very great advantages, and to be enabled to call upon them for support and assistance in many ways; not only for making roads, but also in case of war, and in cases of disturbance and other matters. In 1834 we went so far in interfering with the State of Manipur that we ordered them to give up one of the valleys which they had taken and hand it back to the Burmese on receiving from them a payment of something like 500 rupees a month. In 1835, when that Rajah died, we recognised the infant son, and we said that he should be the Rajah under his uncle, who was the Regent. Some little time afterwards the Queen-mother attempted to murder this uncle, and fled away with the infant Prince. We then stepped in, and we recognised the uncle as Rajah. We set aside the succession altogether and recognised the uncle. He lived and ruled till the year 1850. We then brought back the infant who had grown up and who had been guilty of no offence in former times, and we placed him upon the Throne, so that we have interfered continually. In 1888, when the Rajah was ill, we recognised his nest successor as the next in order, and during the lifetime of the last Rajah, who has just run away, we again recognised the Jubaraj as his successor. Nothing can be clearer than the letters themselves, both of the Maharajah, who has gone, and of the man who is sitting there temporarily, whom we have just acknowledged, In the letters of both of them they acknowledge as absolutely as men can the actual supremacy of our power, and request its assistance and public recognition by it. That, my Lords, is the second point which I wanted to place before you—I wanted to show that when the Rajah had been recognised by us, especially in Manipur, we had always found it our duty to support him against all comers. We did that especially in 1847, when the refugee Prince, after the Queen-mother and he had run away, attempted to invade that country. We told them that if they stirred towards the borders of Manipur and made any disturbance in that territory they must be immediately removed to Bengal. We interfered again in 1850, in 1851, and 1852; and then it was that took place that occurrence to which the noble Marquess has already alluded. We formally undertook to support the Rajah against all comers, and not to allow him to be attacked in his seat, or to allow any attempt to disturb him from his Throne. We did so again in 1862, in 1864, and in 1866. So that, historically speaking, from the very first, in Manipur, we have felt that it was thrown upon us to interfere whenever it was necessary with the internal affairs of that State, and the State has always acknowledged our suzerainty and our sovereignty, and the Government have interfered always to protect the Ruler of that State against those who rose up against him, and against the paramount Power. I feel that those three propositions which I have just placed before your Lordships are of great importance, when we come to consider the rest of this case. Now, my Lords, I come to the rising which took place in September of last year. That rising against the Maharajah in September, I venture to say, was an unlawful revolt, if ever there was one. It was an unlawful revolt against the man who was reigning there, who was recognised by us, and it was a revolt which the paramount Power could not allow to succeed. We should have been perfectly justified then in marching straight into Manipur to the assistance of the Maharajah if there had been time and opportunity to do so. What was the first thing that Mr. Quinton did? Mr. Grimwood telegraphed to Mr. Quinton the moment this disturbance had taken place. That was on the 22nd September. He telegraphed to him on the 22nd September, and told him what had taken place, and the answer of Mr. Quinton at once was— You can apply for troops at Kohima. You can have your troops in support of the Maharajah,"— (that is the policy we have always pursued in this State of Manipur) and if the Maharajah of Manipur is threatened by his subjects and this revolt, there are the troops for you to support him, just as we supported the former Maharajah. And there can be little doubt that if the Maharajah had remained where he was those troops would have gone, and he would have been replaced on the Throne, and there can be no doubt, at the same time, if that had taken place the Senapatti would have been banished as a man who was dangerous to the peace of the State. I do not think your Lordships can imagine for a moment that there would be the smallest doubt that that would have been the result if it had not been for one particular circumstance, and that was that the Maharajah was so frightened with what had gone on in the Palace, he was so much in fear of the Senapatti, his brother, that he ran away. What was the origin of this revolt? As Mr. Grim wood tells us, it was the quarrel between two of these brothers—Pucca Sena and the Senapatti. They seem to have been the most powerful of the family. It was, no doubt, a great misfortune in a State like Manipur that there should have been seven brothers living together in such a small country. Quarrels naturally occurred, and of the seven brothers some took one side and some the other; Pucca Sena had a certain following, and the Senapatti had another, and the Maharajah was not strong enough to keep the peace between them. That was the primary cause of the outrage that took place. The immediate cause was a very trifling matter. It arose from a slight which had been supposed to be given to two of the younger brothers. They were the people who first started the firing in the Palace, but the moment it began the Senapatti came to the front, and there was no doubt whatever that he was the leader of the revolt. That is admitted on all sides, and as I have told your Lordships, if the old Maharajah had remained in Manipur, undoubtedly our troops would have gone from Kohima and replaced him, and undoubtedly at that time the Senapatti would have been removed from the State, not because he was an able man, not because he was an independent man, but because, whether he was or was not able or independent, he used such powers as he had to the mischief of the State and to the disturbance of the happiness and peace of the country. The notion that a man is to be removed from the State simply because he is an able man or an independent man is a notion, to my mind, so utterly repugnant to all common-sense, to all our practice either in India or elsewhere, that I really cannot imagine that such a statement could have been made. I am quite sure, if any words of mine have any weight with the Princes of India, they need have no fear whatever, so far as the Viceroy and the British Government are concerned, as to their removing any man because he is able or independent. They would thankfully welcome him and wish there were more such men. The difficulty is not to remove them; the difficulty is to find them. We can find work for all the able men and all the independent men from one end of India to the other. My Lords, the Maharajah runs away, and then what is to be done? The Jubraj had taken no part whatever in the revolt. The moment it had begun he went some eight miles away from Manipur; not wishing to take part either of one side or the other. But when the old Maharajah left, then the Jubraj came back and took possession of the Gaddi. He wrote to the Viceroy and told him that he had done so, and asked specially that he might be recognised. Mr. Grim wood knew at all events, and Mr. Grimwood also knew, that the Jubraj was perfectly aware of the fact, that until his being there had been recognised by the British Government his reign practically was illegal. When the Maharajah had got away and had once got across the borders, and felt that he was safe, he changed his mind and denied, in fact, that he had ever tendered his abdication. I think if your Lordships will look at the Papers, you will see that Mr. Grimwood's account is quite substantial. That this man was so frightened that undoubtedly he did tender his abdication. I think there cannot be a doubt about that. However, his own story is that when he got to the border and opened his passport, or whatever it was, and found he was stated in that to have abdicated, he immediately denied that any such abdication had taken place. What he did was at once to telegraph to Mr. Quinton to say that he was going to submit a representation to the Government of India, in order to be restored, and he hoped that that would receive a favourable consideration at the hands of the Government. Mr. Quinton very properly said that any representa-that he made should have the proper attention of the Government of India. So it would have had—so it had. Then there is a matter which has a very important bearing upon one point which the noble Marquess raised, and which Mr. Quinton distinctly stated to Mr. Grimwood in the first instance in his first telegram, which I think the noble Marquess had overlooked. It seems to me one of the most important questions in the whole matter. It appears quite in the early part of the book, and I think the noble Marquess must have turned over the page without seeing it. What are Mr. Quinton's instructions to Mr. Grimwood? On the 23rd September he says, "Yours of yesterday. The Jubraj may be acknowledged as Regent"—now, mark the words that come afterwards—"till sanction of Government has been obtained." That is the whole starting-point of the thing. To say that that man has been reigning there for six months, believing that he was acknowledged by the Government of India, in face of these words which were used by Mr. Grimwood on the 23rd September, is, it seems to me, an impossible suggestion. When Mr. Quinton writes to the Government of India on the 9th October, almost immediately after the telegram that he has received from the Maharajah, what does he say? The officiating Secretary says— It will be observed that the Chief Commissioner has expressed his readiness to give his best consideration to any representation which the Maharajah may submit and pending its receipt (the hon. Marquess seems to have missed this too)— Mr. Quinton would suggest that it might be well to defer passing any orders in regard to the succession of the Jubraj, So that Mr. Quinton tells the Government of India at once that this representation is coming, and he says, "Please hold your hands till you have got it, and do not pass any orders about the succession of the Jubraj until you have received this representation which the Maharajah is going to send." Surely nothing can be clearer than that this man could not for a moment fancy that he was there with the sanction of the Government after the communication I have just read from Mr. Quinton and the letter which was telegraphed to Mr. Grimwood. Now, the noble Marquess refers to the delay, and there is no doubt that a considerable time was taken up before the final orders of the Government of India were made. Bat a great part of that delay is due to the consideration that had to be given, I do not like to trouble your Lordships with dates, but the matter is so important that, with your Lordships' permission, I will just mention a few of them. It is necessary that you should follow what happened. On the 9th October Mr. Quinton informed the Government of India that a representation might be expected from the Maharajah. The representation was sent by the Maharajah on the 14th November. It reached Mr. Quinton on the 19th. On the 22nd November Mr. Quinton very properly forwarded that representation to Mr. Grimwood for his observations. It takes some 10 or 11 days to get from Assam to Manipur, and that letter from Mr. Quinton only reached Mr. Grimwood about 11 days after it was sent. On the 4th December Mr. Grim wood writes to Mr. Quinton and makes a report on the case. That Report is received by Mr. Quinton on the 15th December. On the 31st December Mr. Quinton writes to the Viceroy a letter which the Viceroy receives on the 8th of January. Therefore, if there has been any delay up to that time it has not been any delay on the part of the Government of India. It has been because the Maharajah took some little time in drawing up his Report: then that had first of all to go to Mr. Quinton, and then to Mr. Grimwood, and then back again to the Government of India afterwards. On the 24th the Government of India replied that they wished to restore the Maharajah. There is no wonder that they should do so. The Maharajah, as the noble Marquess has said, had never offended the Government of India in any way. He may not have been a very strong ruler, he may not have been able to keep his brothers in order, but still, so far as we are concerned, we had no cause of complaint against him. Quite the contrary. He had on more than one occasion rendered us very valuable assistance. He had offered to send troops to Kohima. He had also rendered considerable assistance in the Burma expedition, and also in the Mahratta war, and had shown that he was our sincere friend. Therefere, there was every reason why the Viceroy should wish not to let this man go. And it is clear that the Viceroy was so strongly impressed with that, that, although he had got Mr. Quinton's and Mr. Grimwood's views to the contrary, he thought it wise to write a strong remonstrance to Mr. Quinton about it, which he did on the 24th January. On the 9th February comes a direct appeal from the Maharajah to the Viceroy and Mr. Quinton's answers to the Viceroy's objections to his former letter arrives on the same day. Now, Mr. Quinton was going to Calcutta on the 11th or 12th. Therefore the Viceroy thought it was quite necessary to stay till he came and had communications with him personally. After that, Mr. Quinton had evidently been asked to consider the effect of all those conversations and to put down in writing his final views. This he does on returning to Assam on the 19th February, and on the 21st February the Viceroy gives his final orders. Now, your Lordships will see, I think, that the whole desire and wish of the Viceroy has been, up to that moment to support the old Maharajah, if it had been possible for him to do so. I am quite sure that that is a desire which would commend itself to all the Native Chiefs from one end of India to the other. Here had been a terrible revolt, and in consequence of the revolt the Maharajah had had to run away from his throne. It must be a matter of satisfaction to all the other Indian Chiefs to know that under these circumstances if there is a revolt of this kind the Government of India will stand by the Ruler, and will go against those who revolt against him; but I should like to read to your Lordships one sentence—I will not trouble you with many of these quotations—one sentence in which the Viceroy communicates his reasons for, at all events, yielding. It will be found on the 26th page of the Blue Book, paragraphs 5 and 6— It was not, however, so clear whether the Jubraj should be placed in the Gaddi, or whether the Maharajah should be restored. You do not hesitate to recommend the former. The Maharajah is described as a miserably weak man, and you recall his vacillation in 1888, when he disregarded the advice which was given to him, and failed to punish the Sanapatti, thereby, as his Highness acknowledges in his letter of 9th February, bringing upon himself his present misfortunes. You anticipate that the Maharajah's restoration would involve the necessity of strengthening the garrison at Manipur, and give rise to frequent occasions for interference in support of the Ruler, as well as in the internal affairs of the State. It has already been intimated to you that in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, whatever arrangement is come to in the affairs of the Manipur State, must be brought about with the full sanction of the British Government, His Excellency in Council accepts your opinion that it will be to the advantage of Manipur, and to the furtherance of British interests, to recognise the Jubraj rather than restore the Maharajah. That is the close of the chapter so far as that part of the case is concerned. But now let us go on. The noble Marquess says there were two courses open. There was the course either to support the old Maharajah, and there was the course to support the person who was in authority at the moment. Those were the only two practicable courses. But the noble Marquess goes on to say that the Viceroy had a compromise. I think anything further from a compromise that he made could not possibly be imagined. What compromise was there? What remained really for the Viceroy to consider was this. There had been a revolt by which the Maharajah had been dismissed from his throne. There had been a revolt against his Chief. There had been a revolt against the wishes of the paramount Power. That revolt was not to go unpunished. What would have been thought of the case of Manipur by the other Indian Native Princes, if it had been said that we put this man on the throne, and that the man who has caused the revolt, and who is driving away the old Maharajah is to remain in power unpunished and no notice is to be taken of it? I think there was no other course for the Viceroy to take than to say that this man had to go. He had to go, not because he was able, not because he was independent; but he had to go for the reasons which the Viceroy himself urged, and which your Lordships will find on the 20th page of the Blue Book, and for those reasons alone. In the 7th paragraph it says— The Senapatti has more than once incurred the displeasure of the Government of India on account of the violence of his conduct, and if the Maharajah, in 1888, had not been afraid of his turbulent brother, he would have been banished from the State. The Maharajah whom we have recognised as the Ruler of Manipur, has now been ousted by a cabal in his own family led by this man, and if the British Government acquiesce in the present state of affairs, and recognise the Jubraj as Ruler of Manipur, the Senapatti will wield the real power in the State. The Government of India cannot regard occurrences, of this kind with indifference. Now, my Lords, of course they cannot. Mention has been made of two instances in which this man's character had shown itself before. One in 1881 and one in 1888. In another place those were treated rather as slight matters. One took place, by the bye, when the noble Marquess opposite was Viceroy. The Rajah had punished his brother; the Political Agent asked the noble Marquess to say that that punishment was not enough, and to interfere, and to have a Court of Inquiry. The noble Marquess very properly said— He has been punished by the proper authority. I am not going to interfere. That is all quite right. But when it came before the Government of India, in 1888, it was a very different story. The Government of India write in this sense to the Maharajah about the punishment of his brother. This is the deliberate judgment of the Government of India at that time— This is not the first instance in which the inhuman conduct of the Senapatti has been brought to the notice of the Government of India, and although ordinarily the Governor General in Council would not interfere if the brother of a Native Chief illtreated a subject of the State, the circumstances of the present offence are such as to justify a departure from our usual policy. I am, therefore, to state that the Governor General in Council approves of your addressing a letter to the Maharajah, and advising the banishment of this man from the Manipur State for a year. You may tell the Maharajah that His Excellency the Viceroy (that is Lord Dufferin) has seen the correspondence; that he much regrets to hear of such cruelty having boon practised by the Maharajah's brother, and that as this is not the first offence of the kind which has been brought home to him, His Excellency thinks that he should be severely punished. Now, there are grounds for thinking that this was a bad man; there are grounds for thinking that this man was a turbulent character, and that his presence in the State was undoubtedly mischievous. The last word of the Government of India, when they finally say that he is to be removed, is to this effect. It is to be found on pages 25 and 26— It is evident that the Jubraj owes his present position rather to the successful issue of his brother's insurrection than to the authority of the British Government, and that, while the Senapatti remains in Manipur unpunished for his treachery against his eldest brother, the Maharajah, the real power in the State, will be in the Senapatti's hands. This is not a state of affairs which the Government of India can view with indifference, nor would it be to the credit of the British power any more than to the interests of the people of Manipur itself that the Governor General in Council should acquiesce in such a settlement of the case. As I have already, in my letter above cited, informed you, the Governor General in Council considers that it will be desirable that the Senapatti should be removed from Manipur and punished for his lawless conduct. My Lords, I think I have shown this, that in the opinion of the Government of India, and as I think rightly, this man was a dangerous man to the peace of the State of Manipur. This man had been the leader of the revolt. He had practically made himself a sort of chief of the Praetorian Guard, and there was no sense of security, and there could not be while that man was in Manipur. He was the leader of the revolt, and as the leader of the revolt the Governor General came, in my opinion, to the wise determination that he ought to be removed from the State. Then the Viceroy writes to Mr. Quinton— In the opinion of the Government of India it is desirable that you should visit Manipur and make known on the spot the decision which the Governor General in Council desires you to enforce. You should take with you a sufficient force, even though opposition may not be expected, and you should report for the orders of the Government of India the conditions which you propose to attach to the recognition as Maharajah of Manipur of the present Jubraj. Upon that Mr. Quinton makes his preparations, and he sends that telegram which has been already alluded to, in which he tells the Viceroy what he proposes to do. Those propositions which Mr. Quinton so telegraphed to the Viceroy received the Viceroy's approval. Now, there is an end of the Viceroy's action in this matter. There is nothing in the subsequent proceedings which touches the Viceroy himself or the Government of India. And I ask your Lordships whether the Viceroy was not right in the course he adopted. It was his duty to settle the disputed succession in this State of Manipur. He had striven hard to continue, if he could have done so, the old Maharajah in Manipur. He yielded at last, and with great difficulty, to the opinions of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton, but he stipulated that this man who had been the leader of the revolt should not go unpunished; and I venture to say that the judgment to which the Viceroy came would commend itself to the Chief of every native State in India, because he had done his best to maintain the man in power, and he had done his best to show that anyone who revolted against his own Chief and against the paramount Power should not be allowed to remain in the State. Now, my Lords, having dealt with everything I have to deal with, I think, so far as the Viceroy of India is concerned, I must say one word about what took place afterwards. I, no more than the noble Marquess opposite, want to say more than I can possibly help with regard to any of those unfortunate officers who lost their lives upon this occasion. There is a strict inquiry going on at the present moment by the Viceroy to find out everything he can with regard to what actually did take place. Until the Report of that inquiry comes, no word of mine shall throw blame either on one person or on another. The noble Marquess asked me about the force and the ammunition. I would only say that the orders of the Viceroy were to take a sufficient force. It was not for him to say what force was sufficient and what was not. Colonel Johnstone, who wrote to the Times some time ago, said that 200 or 300 men would have been quite sufficient. With regard to the ammunition, they did take 40 rounds. I understand that General Collett first told them that they were to take a considerable quantity more; but no doubt the roads were very bad, and transport was very difficult (although, I think, that might have been overcome if it had been necessary), and they left with only 40 rounds. But after they had left, General Collett had some doubts about it (and I do not wonder), and he telegraphed to Mr. Quinton to say that they would find at Kohima some more ammunition if they chose to take it—that it was entirely at their service. Unfortunately, they did not take that ammunition, and they apparently had been relying upon some 13,500 rounds of ammunition, which were at Manipur, and which they found there, and which were actually used. Still, I am disposed to think that the quantity taken was not enough, but that will be investigated when the time comes. No doubt there was a series of blunders, it may be of civil, it may be of military people; there are a great many things it is impossible to understand. It is impossible to understand how the troops got placed as they were; it is impossible to understand how it came to pass that, after the Manipur is had been victorious, our officers should have attempted to treat with the enemy; it is quite impossible to understand these things. I confess I cannot do so. But there are one or two things in respect to Mr. Quinton about which I want to say a word or two—in his favour. I think I am only bound to do so. The noble Marquess has talked about the secrecy with which he moved. There is no doubt that Mr. Quinton did mean to keep this secret. The misfortune was (and it is a misfortune which I hope will never happen again, because it has been remedied) that there is no cypher in Manipur with which Mr. Quinton could communicate to the Resident. He dare not telegraph en clair, and there was no cypher that he could use. Therefore, until he got somehow into communication with Mr. Grimwood, he could not tell him what really was going to happen. His assistant Commissioner, Mr. Gurdon, went to Manipur, and there he explained what Mr. Quinton was going to do. Oddly enough, Mr. Grimwood thought, and so I understand it was given out in Manipur, that when the troops were coming they were to bring back the old Maharajah. That was the view that Mr. Quinton himself had, and that was the view we are told that was popularly put about in Manipur itself. There is no doubt Mr. Grimwood objected altogether to the proposal, and he objected altogether to the Senapatti being deported; but he eventually came to the following compromise with Mr. Gurdon: If the orders for the deportation of the Senapatti provided that in the event of his good behaviour he should be allowed to return after a certain period—the length of such period depending entirely on his conduct—then Mr. Grimwood was prepared to give a reluctant assent. Therefore, you will find in that telegram which was sent by Mr. Quinton to the Viceroy those words—that it was to be seen how he behaved, and if he behaved well he was to be allowed to come back. I only want to defend Mr. Quinton from any undue secrecy, which I think the noble Marquess rather cast in his teeth. Now, my Lords, there is one other matter, and that is about the treachery. I agree with the noble Marquess that Mr. Quinton was a man incapable of treachery; and I also agree that no treachery was ever contemplated by anybody in this case, of that I feel absolutely certain. There is no doubt that there are durbars and durbars. You may have a durbar which is a mere Court ceremony, and if you were to ask a man to come there and then put him in prison, that would be a breach of faith, undoubtedly of the grossest character. But this was a durbar which was held as a Court, and everybody knew it was a Court, and everybody knew that the decision of the Government was going to be pronounced in that Court; nobody had any other notion than that. I mean the Senapatti was not allured into this place, he was not induced to come there under false pretences—in fact, he never came at all. If any treachery had ever been intended it was carried out in such a clumsy way that the bird was effectually frightened from coming into the net. But I am only now concerned to defend Mr. Quinton against the notion that there was ever any treachery thought of in this case. Now, as to the durbar itself. Was it right or was it not right under any circumstances to arrest a man in the durbar? Well, I have made every inquiry which I can from those who are most conversant with Indian affairs in this country, and, with the exception of those precedents which were quoted in the other House, and have been alluded to to-night, of Sir Robert Sandeman, I can hear of no precedent where a man was summoned to durbar even as a Court where he was arrested. And the Secretary of State for War the other night, with my fall assent, after a conversation with him, stated in the other House what I state in this House frankly and fairly, that it is a practice which I individually should entirely discourage. I do not think it is a proper thing to do, and I should be very sorry to see this case taken as a precedent. It was stated, I think, in the other House that the Viceroy was responsible for this. Nothing could possibly be further from the fact. This arrest in durbar was never thought of until the 21st March. On the 21st March Mr. Quinton, Colonel Skene, Mr. Grimwood, and one or two others met at Sengmai, four miles from Manipur, and there the matter was fully discussed. I have the whole Paper here, and everything that was said about it; it is a paper which will be laid before Parliament as soon as it can be printed. Then you will see that the whole question was discussed for the very first time, and the Viceroy had no more notion that the Senapatti was going to be arrested in durbar than I had myself. If your Lordships will look at the Papers you will see that it was not until the 7th of May that the Viceroys heard, practically, that this attempt at arrest in durbar had been made. Therefore, I think, you will see that not a word can be said against the Viceroy so far as the durbar is concerned. I know it was stated elsewhere that after it had been done the Viceroy in a long telegram, which you will find in the Blue Book, gave a qualified sanction to it. Granted; but it is one thing to order a thing; it is another to excuse an act which is done by your subordinate. They seem to me to stand on totally different grounds; and I maintain most strongly and stoutly that that was never contemplated by the Viceroy from the first, and that he never knew anything at all about it until a long time after it had taken place. My Lords, I have, I am afraid, detained you a considerable time. I hope I have put the case of the Viceroy, at all events, before your Lordships in a plain and in telligible way. I cannot sit down without bearing my testimony, if it is wanted, to the gallant conduct of Major Grant. He has shown what a few troops can do. I should also like to bear my testimony to the courage and the physical endurance and patience of Mrs. Grimwood. The gravest responsibilities rest upon our Viceroys and upon our Governor Generals in the Dependencies and Colonies of all the distant parts of this great Empire. If they fail in their duty, it is, no doubt, within the competence of Parliament, and it is one of the highest and at the same time one of the most painful duties of the Government of the day, either to censure or to recall them. But if you have no fault to find—and I would say that the actions of persons placed in those difficult positions are to be discussed in no carping or critical spirit—they are entitled to that which I am quite sure they ought to and will receive always in this country—to an ungrudging and a generous support. In the case of the present Viceroy of India, I should like to bear my humble testimony to the zeal and efficiency and ability with which he has discharged the high duties of his office. He has maintained untarnished the honour of the British name. He has cultivated the most cordial relations with all the Native States of India. He has greatly added to the strength of the defences of the Empire. And, above all, he has done much to improve both the social and the moral condition of all the various races and peoples committed to his charge. I trust your Lordships will agree with me and with Her Majesty's Government in thinking that Lord Lansdowne is deserving of the unabated confidence of his Sovereign, of Parliament, and of his country.

*THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

My Lords, I hope that the able, clear, and most judicial speech which we have just heard from my noble Friend opposite will set at rest in the public mind any doubts which may have arisen, either as to the policy or the moral straightforwardness of the conduct of the Government of India. When I saw upon the Paper a notice by my noble Friend the noble Marquess behind me, I felt quite sure that from his own personal character and from the recent date at which he had filled the highest office in India, he would present this subject to the House with judgment and in the most temperate language. But I am bound to say that, although the expectation was entirely fulfilled, he did present to this House a narrative of affairs which materially differed in its impression from that which I have derived from a perusal of these Papers. My noble Friend opposite, the noble Marquess, has pointed out two or three mistakes which the noble Marquess made in the few adverse observations which he made bearing upon the policy of the Government of India. In the first place, my noble Friend distinctly misunderstood the facts, as I think, when he said that there was an immediate recognition of the present Regent, and that any subsequent conduct in derogation of that recognition was a second thought on the part of the Government of India. The noble Marquess, as far as I can see, was entirely wrong in that supposition, because on page 5 of the Blue-Book to which the noble Viscount has referred, I see that the Government of India say,— Jubaraj may be acknowledged as Regent till sanction of the Government is received; and that was immediately after the outbreak in September, and upon that footing it remained during the whole of the six months before the Government of India came to its final decision. I have no doubt that my noble Friend the noble Marquess had not observed the telegram, because he went on for many weeks and months, and quoted a few words which seem to imply that there had been a fall recognition from the very beginning, and that the Government of India had retracted its policy in consequence of the advice of its local officers. Now, again, the noble Viscount opposite has, I think, effectually answered an opinion which has been shadowed forth by the noble Marquess, and that is that the Government of India may never consider the proverbial three courses in a policy. I do not understand what my noble friend meant. A great statesman in this country was accused of always saying that there were three courses in everything; but there are in human affairs almost always at least three courses to be taken, and I am sure my noble Friend would not issue an order to the Government of India that they are always to say "Yes" or "No" to two extreme propositions, and never to consider the circumstances which may recommend a middle course. I hold, on the contrary, that in the peculiar circumstances of this case a middle course was clearly the best that could be taken. What were the two courses? The first was to recognise the Jubaraj as Regent, as the result of an atrocious conspiracy on the part of his own brother, in defiance of the recognition of the Government of India, and its refusal to sanction his right to the throne. My noble Friend will hardly say that that was an alternative the Government of India ought to have said "Yes" to. What was the other alternative? It was that the Maharajah, who had distinctly fled from the Gaddi, should be restored to the throne of Manipur. Well, have your Lordships read the evidence that this Blue Book contains as to the character of that Prince? Why, he seems to have been one of the poorest creatures that ever sat even upon an Indian throne. The account that is given by Mr. Grimwood of, his conduct on the night on which his place was invaded represents a man who had no nerve at all, who was utterly shattered by a few shots being fired in his palace, and who was utterly incapable of withstanding the more powerful character of his brother. Is that the other alternative that my noble friend would have had the Government to adopt? Surely not. Then what was the middle course? The middle course was recommended by Mr. Quinton, and I think also by Mr. Grimwood, that the Jubaraj, the existing Regent, should be acknowledged, but that the author of the revolution should be deported from the State, Now, my Lords, was there really any other proposition before the Government of India which could be taken with equal advantage? It is quite clear that if the Regent had been continued without the removal of the Senapatti, the Senappatti would have been considered, and would have been, the real governor of the State. My noble Friend has stated that the Senapatti's talent and ability had been much exaggerated. I do not know much about his character for ability, but I do know a good deal from these papers of his moral character and of his fitness to rule, and be the real and virtual ruler of any State. The Government of India do not hesitate to say that he was a man of infamous character; he was a man who was personally cruel; he was convicted of the most atrocious cruelty, carrying us back to the most savage times of the most savage governors of India. Would my noble Friend have admitted that the Government of India should have recognised a sovereign—a nominal sovereign—who was a mere catspaw to a man of this character? I contend that the Government of India had no other course to adopt but that which they did adopt—that what my noble Friend calls the middle course was the right course, and, under the circumstances, almost the only course which they could adopt. My noble Friend has used more than once, I think, the expression, "this unhappy massacre." He used no other expression about it. For a long time I could not quite understand what the object of my noble Friend was in using those words, because, after all, his blame of the Government of India was very mild; and all that it amounts to really is that, if he had been a member of the Council of India, he might possibly have given other advice. Well, that is not much to the purpose. We do not govern India from the House of Lords, or from this country, in these matters of detail. We leave them to the Government of India. But then came the part of his speech which it was evident excited my noble Friend most, and that was an answer to a speech by Sir John Gorst in the House of Commons. I am under the unhappy disadvantage of not having read Sir John Gorst's speech, and I can quite understand that anything said by a man in his position, however almost of the character of a joke, may have a bad effect in India, and so far my noble Friend may have been justified in the severe comments which he passed upon it. Certainly, if my noble Friend thinks that the Government of India, or the Government opposite, as representing the superior Government of the Empire, adopts the policy of removing from all Native States every able man they can find, out of mere spite or jealousy, he is well entitled to bring the subject before this House; but I do not think my noble Friend can really believe that any such policy is in the mind of anybody. But I must remind my noble Friend of this, that, if we are to consider the effect in India of speeches made in either House of Parliament, the defects of speech may be as serious as excesses of speech—such, certainly, as those that are attributed to Sir John Gorst. Now, I must say I do regret that my noble Friend has not said one word of severity against the conduct of the Government of Manipur. Of course, I do not mean to say that my noble Friend meant to speak lightly or to think lightly of the transactions that took place there, but remember, my Lords, this is a transaction almost unprecedented in the history of India. We are not dealing with mere savages in the native States of India. They are not so civilised as we are, of course; they stand on a lower plane of civilisation; but they are very far from being mere savages. Many of them are represented and governed by enlightened men. They know the usages of civilised life; and I do think that if a speech is to be made in this House on the whole of the Manipur business, some expression should be given of our horror at the atrocious treachery and the abominable cruelty of the massacre of our officers in Manipur. I am not at all sure that the total abstinence of any such censure in my noble Friend's speech, and in other speeches which have been made in Parliament, may not almost have a worse effect in fact than any of the absurd sentiments ascribed, rightly or wrongly, to Sir John Gorst. Now I come to the point which is of real importance in this matter. As far as I can understand, nobody really blames the Government of India as respects its policy in this case. What is thought is that there was some trickery or treachery in the mode in which the orders of the Government of India were executed by its officers. My noble Friend has entirely acquitted the Government of India, and especially Mr. Quinton, from any suspicion of treachery. When that is said, all is said that can be said upon the subject. The question becomes one of the mere mode in which the Senapatti was to be deported, and the sentences of the Government of India to be recorded against him. The noble Viscount opposite has said that he has consulted many authorities in England, as many as he could, upon the meaning of the word durbar. Of course, my noble Friend has access to authorities to which most of us have not access in the India Office. He is surrounded by very able and very competent men, no man more able or more competent than the Chairman of the Foreign Committee, my distinguished Friend, Sir Henry Rawlinson; he must have means of knowing what the word durbar means. But we have no need to go farther than this Blue Book to see the variety of the senses in which the word durbar is used. It is used at least in three senses in these very Papers. It is used in the sense of a place—a place where an assembly is held—again, it is used for a company of men—for the prince and his cabinet. My noble Friends opposite are the durbar in that sense. The noble Marquess and his colleagues would be called a durbar in India, and they are so called in this Blue Book. Then it means also a ceremonial assembly, and that is the meaning most familiar in this country. The people of England think of the accounts which they had had of splendid durbars given by my noble Friend the noble Marquess or the noble Earl behind me (Lord Northbrook) in which the princes of India have been received with splendid ceremonial by the Viceroy, and the idea of arresting a Native Prince when he comes to a ceremonial of that sort, probably at the invitation of the Indian Government, is abhorrent to the moral sentiments of the people of England—very naturally, and that is what they think has happened in this case. My Lords, it has nothing-to do with it. There is a note at the, foot of page 27 which will explain exactly how this matter stands us to the meaning of the word durbar. I think it is quite clear from this note that the Government of India did know that Mr. Quinton intended to summon the Regent with his ministers and his brothers to meet him at a certain place, and at that meeting announce the decision of the Government, and, if necessary, enforce it. But that was not what the English people understand as a durbar. These are the words of Mr. Quinton on the 18th of March: I propose to require the Regent and durbar"— that is to say, I propose to require the Regent and his ministers— to meet me on arrival. The word durbar is used as the people who are to come. It is not used of the place, or of the assembly, or of the nature of the occasion. Mr. Quinton says— I propose to require the Regent and durbar to meet me on arrival, announce the decision of Government, arrest Senapatti, and inform him that the length of his exile and return depends on his conduct and the tranquillity of the country. To that the Government of India answer— Your telegram, 18th. Subject to reconsideration, if necessary, of the amount of the Maharajah's allowance, proposals are approved. That shows clearly that the Government of India did approve of the proposal of Mr. Quinton to summon a durbar—that is to say, to summon an assembly or a Court, as the noble Viscount opposite called it, at which Court he was to announce the decision of the Government and to enforce it; but it was not a durbar in the ceremonial sense or in any of those other mixed senses of the word in which men are invited to come for ceremonial purposes, and at which an arrest on the part of the superior power would savour undoubtedly of treachery or of something of an unusual kind. My Lords, this being so, I see nothing that remains to be discussed except the unfortunate military miscalculation which the local authorities made, and into which inquiries are now being conducted as to the sufficiency of the force which might, under certain circumstances, be required. But I do not think it is very difficult to understand how that miscalculation arose. The Manipuris are essentially a feeble folk. They have a very small military power, and almost no military prowess. Look at the flight and rout to which they were put by a mere handful of our men under that gallant fellow, Lieutenant Grant. My Lords, an accident will happen even with the tamest animals. In India it is not un-frequent that many men are injured from the sudden going wild of a tame elephant. Here you had to deal with a violent and treacherous man, a man whom the Government of India knew to be violent and treacherous, but they had no idea of the extent of the atrocity of his character. That is the whole explanation of the case. I confess that I see no difficulty in understanding it, although some of the details, as my noble Friend says, are very difficult to understand. The disposal of the force, the method of attack, the small amount of ammunition carried by the men—all these are points of detail upon which we cannot form any judgment until we have heard the evidence which may be brought before the Government of India. Now, the noble Marquess behind me went on to speak of other matters as regards the future, upon which I desire to express no opinion. I should be very unwilling to balance my opinion against that of my noble Friend. He knows better than I do the working of the Council in India, and I think the objection which he has stated to certain proposals which were lately made, and which objections seem to be, I think, approved by the noble Viscount (Cross) opposite, are probably sound objections. At all events, I should say that this is a very trivial case indeed to found upon for any great or considerable or organic change in the Government of India. It is a mere accident—a deplorable accident—an accident owing mainly to the villainy of one man, and I do not see that it throws any doubt upon the ordinary transaction of business between the central Government and its feudatories. Before I pass from this question of the mode in which the orders of the Government were issued, I cannot help saying that I have heard—I do not know whether it is on good authority—that even at durbars of a more serious and ceremonial character it is not without precedent that the Government of India should make very grave intimations as to its intentions with regard to those who attend them. I have been informed by a friend of mine that on a celebrated occasion—a great occasion—in a no less important city than Cabul, at a great ceremonial meeting there, certain chiefs of Afghanistan were touched on the shoulder as they went out of the durbar, and were told that their loyalty to the Government of England was doubted, and that their detention had been determined upon by the military authorities. So that, after all, whatever may be the general rule of the Government of India—and I cannot doubt that the general rule is very much what has been stated by the noble Viscount opposite, with the assent, I think, of my noble Friend beside me (Lord Northbrook), who cheered what he said—there is a certain pliability in the practice of the Government of India depending on the circumstances of each particular case. Now the noble Marquess behind me went on to speak of the sentence on the Regent, and he expressed a hope virtually that the punishment of death would not be inflicted upon him. Well, my Lords, individually we are always naturally in favour of mercy, and I certainly should be so myself on this particular occasion. But I think much depends upon the evidence which has been brought forward, not as to the Regent having made war against the Government of India, because I entirely agree with my noble Friend that, under the circumstances of the case, infliction of capital punishment for that offence would be an extreme course, and, as I understand, the sentence has been passed upon that ground; but if the Regent has been found guilty of taking part in the abominable treachery of inveigling our officers within his palace, then having them decapitated by the public executioner one by one, that would entirely alter the case. My noble Friend went on to refer to the question of annexation. I should be very reluctant to give any opinion upon the point at all; but there is one thing that I should like to say, and that is that these general assurances against what is called the policy of annexation are assurances against a policy which as a deliberate policy has never been pursued by the Government of India. We have never set before ourselves annexation as a policy. Sometimes we have suffered severely through not having annexed. You remember the two Sikh wars. You remember the conquest that was achieved over the Sikhs in the first war. You will remember the determination of the Government of India at that time not to annex. You will remember the deplorable results which followed—the second Sikh war, during which for a moment there was a time when England held her breath lest the Empire of India should slip from out her hands. My Lords, these questions of annexation come upon us by the force of circumstances, by the necessities of the case, and not by a deliberate policy on the part of the Central Government, and assurances of this kind in truth of very little value. Before I sit down I cannot help saying this, that discussions on details about the Government of India and the administration of her affairs ought to be very rare indeed in the two Houses of Parliament. We ought to remember how that Empire has been acquired, and how it is still governed. It has not been acquired by the House of Commons, nor by the House of Lords, nor by the Crown in its Imperial capacity in this country. It has been acquired by great Englishmen, great Scotsmen, and great Irishmen sent out to India, and acting largely on their own discretion and their own responsibility. That is the way in which the British Empire in India has been acquired beyond all question and all doubt, and if that Empire had been under the daily government or the yearly government of the English Parliament it never would have been acquired, or it would have been lost long ago. Under those circumstances, I say, I am not at all sure that the electric telegraph has not made a serious and injurious inroad upon the discretion of the authorities in India. We attempt to interfere where we ought not to interfere. For after all, when we come to balance nice considerations, one course with another course, and a middle course, as my noble Friend did to-night, what means have we of judging here compared with those who are charged with the great responsibility of the government of India. My Lords, we have none. And if there is one-Department of the Government of India-more than another in which we should trust that Government to the utmost extent, and be most chary of interfering with it, it is its relations with the native States. They know the Imperial traditions under which we act. They know the duty of good faith. They know the general desire of the English people that mere passion for dominion should not lead to unprincipled annexation. They know all that, and yet, in spite of their knowing that, look what has happened. From the days of Clive and Warren Hastings to the days of Canning, of Dalhousie, and Hardinge, and last, not least, Lord Dufferin, immense provinces have been added to the Indian Empire. It seems to me that at present we have arrived pretty nearly at the geographical limits which Nature has imposed upon that vast dominion. But there is another thing that I think we ought to remember—not merely how that Empire has been acquired but how it has been governed; how smoothly that immense machine is working. Why, my Lords, from month to month, and from year to-year, except for an occasional war on the frontier, we hear little or nothing of the government of India. It is like a vast mechanism which moves automatically. And yet it is a government over various tribes and races animated with fierce fanatical passions and opposite religions, and we govern it more easily, more peacefully, more successfully than we do the neighbouring country of Ireland. Surely, my Lords, that is a ground for placing confidence in the Government of India. I cannot understand anyone being disposed to make carping objections even to details in regard to accidents, which may now and then happen in the working of that great machine. I rejoice, nevertheless, on the whole that my noble Friend has brought forward this Motion to-night. It has enabled the noble Viscount to defend with most complete success the Government of India, and I trust the people of this country will now clearly understand not only that the policy was right, but that it was carried out in a manner perfectly consistent with the traditional maxims of honour upon which the Government of India stands.

*THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Duke in what he has said as to the statement of the noble Viscount opposite. Though I may not agree in every point of detail, yet I recognise with the greatest pleasure the fairness and the calmness with which he spoke; and also that he, on more than one point, responding to the appeal made to him by my noble Friend, repudiated doctrines which I think were unsound and accepted others which we all desire to see observed. My noble Friend who has just sat down has made what I may call a somewhat militant speech. He found fault with my noble Friend behind me for his observations upon a speech which my noble Friend had not read—I mean the speech of Sir John Gorst—and concerning which, therefore, I must say that I think his judgment is worth nothing. But he was not satisfied with that. To my great astonishment he discovered a gap in my noble Friend's speech, one which I hardly think any one would have sought for, and to which I think it was perhaps rather ungenerous to allude. He imagined that my noble Friend the noble Marquess actually did not feel the greatest abhorrence at the cruel massacre at Manipur.

*THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

Oh, no.

*THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I really would appeal to my noble Friend whether he could for one moment have supposed that the noble Marquess had any less feeling of abhorrence of that abominable massacre than the noble Duke himself or any other member of this House.

*THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

Certainly not.

*THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

Then why make that attack upon him. I regret it. I think it might have been very well omitted. I do not wish to allude further to Sir John Gorst's speech, except to say that I was extremely glad to hear what the noble Viscount said upon that subject. I do not want at all to attribute any extraordinary weight to that speech. The noble Duke seemed to think that it was of very little consequence, indeed, but I would point out to your Lordship that Sir John Gorst did not speak as a private member of Parliament; it is only because he spoke on behalf of the Department charged with Indian affairs that importance attaches naturally to what he said, and I think the noble Marquis was perfectly right in pointing out that in India probably more importance would be attached to the declaration than we should attach to it here, not on account of any want of ability on the part of Sir John Gorst, but because he is not a member of the Cabinet, and, therefore, did not speak with all the authority with which the noble Viscount speaks. I will not allude to that any further. With regard to what the noble Duke said at the conclusion of his speech, I entirely concur in his general principle, namely, that it is most undesirable, as a rule, that the details of Indian government should be discussed in Parliament. No one who has had any connection with Indian affairs will not feel that the continued success of our Government in India depends essentially upon our appointing able men whom we trust to govern that country, and trusting and supporting them here. At the same time, there are occasions when it is necessary, I think, that Parliament should take notice of what takes place in India, and although I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this event as a political event—except as regards the murders, which were very horrible—still I think that when such events have taken place in India as these unfortunate and unhappy events at Manipur, it is proper that Parliament should take some notice of them—should take notice of them, as I think notice has been taken of them, in a judicial and temperate spirit. We may not entirely agree with the noble Viscount opposite in the the complete approval which he bestowed upon the Government of India. I do not think that serious blame can be attached to the Government of India in the matter, though we may differ in some matters as to whether it acted in the wisest manner. Above all—I think my noble Friend justly said it is extremely easy to be wise after the event—but I still think that some observations which were made by noble Friend behind me had a little more weight than, perhaps, the noble Duke who has just spoken attached to them. My Friend's criticism of the Government of India depended, I think, principally on two points, namely, that there had been an unnecessary and unfortunate delay in coming to a decision, and that there was in the decision itself something in the nature of a compromise which was unfortunate and had unpleasant effects. With regard to the delay, looking at the usual course of the Government of India, the delay certainly does not surprise me, but I think that we have a right to observe that the peculiar circumstances of the case ought to have led the Government of India to see that it was necessary to deal with unusual promptitude with this particular matter. The reason I say that is this: The noble Viscount found fault with my noble Friend for having supposed that the Jubaraj had been recognised as Regent. That he was actually recognised as Regent I think was shown by the noble Viscount not to be the fact, but he was recognised undoubtedly as the temporary Governor of Manipur, and dealt with by our officers as the temporary governor for no less than five or six months. Now, during the whole of the time you will observe that the Senapatti was as much virtually governor as he would have been supposing the Jubaraj had been permanently recognised. He was there upon the spot, and all the objections which existed to his wielding power existed at that time. I think that the Government of India ought to have seen that if the Senapatti was to be removed—they knew the character of the Senapatti from the first, and they knew also that the Senapatti was the author of the revolt from the first—then it was very unfortunate and likely to lead to much misconstruction, to leave the Jubaraj supported by his brother, whom they knew to be paramount, for about five months in peaceful relations with our Resident and with the Chief Commissioner. I observe that in one of the Chief Commissioner's letters which the noble Viscount did not refer to, the letter of 9th of February, he says, speaking of the Government of the Jubaraj, "The present Government has now been in existence for nearly six months, and is conducted with tranquility." Now, although the Jubaraj was not formally recognised as Maharajah, it is in vain to say that his Government was not recognised when it is spoken of in that way. It was recognised, subject to the decision as to whether it should be permanently recognised. Then my noble Friend pointed out that there were two courses which might have been taken, or indeed three—to restore the Maharajah, to adopt the state of things which existed in Manipur, or to take the course which the Government of India finally did determine upon. Notwithstanding the observations that have been made, I think the course taken by the Government of India is open to very obvious criticism. I daresay they were quite right in not restoring the Maharajah. They say he is a very weak man, but upon that I am not competent to express an opinion, as I know nothing except what I see in the papers. But the course pursued seems to me to have been, as my noble Friend pointed out, exactly that which involved all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of either of the other two courses. If they had taken the advice of Mr. Grimwood, and Mr. Quinton's first advice also—though he modified it afterwards when he had been to Calcutta—they would have acknowledged the Jubaraj, and left the Senapatti untouched. That would have been a course which, at all events, had something to recommend it. But to set up the Jubaraj, and get rid of the Senapatti, who himself had set up the Jubaraj, seems to me to have been taking the most singular course that could be conceived. Here is a man obviously, and it is admitted on all hands, the mere tool of the younger brother. The younger brother makes a revolt, and sets up this man on the throne. Then what is to happen? You are to confirm on the throne the man who has been set up by a revolt and in defiance of your authority, and you are to punish the man who set him up. I must say that that is a policy which seems to me to have very little to recommend it. The impression left upon my mind is that it arose from this:—Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood had one opinion, the Government of India had another opinion; but the Government of India wished to send back the Maharajah; Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton were equally strong the other way. As very often happens, unfortunately, when there are two opinions expressed, a middle course was determined; and I believe in this case that middle course was injudicious. The event has certainly proved it to be so. But more than that I do not think you can say, in criticising the judgment of the Government of India. It is undoubtedly a matter upon which judgments might differ, and as to any severe blame being attached to the Marquess of Lansdowne in the matter, I entirely repudiate that suggestion. No doubt we are entitled to express our opinion, and to criticise what was done, but to say that it was a very serious error of judgment I think would be to assume, on our part, a greater knowledge of all the difficulties, and a greater power of determining them here, than really belongs to us. I have only one or two other observations to make—because really the matter lies very much in a nutshell. One word with regard to the durbar. I do not profess myself to have any opinion worth stating upon the question of the durbar derived from any peculiar knowledge of my own, and I entirely agree with those who do not ascribe any notion of deliberate treachery to Mr. Quinton. That I believe to be perfectly out of the question. But I confess I think that to arrest the Senapatti at a durbar to which he was summoned without any notice of what was going to be done—I mean, without any notice that there was going to be a judgment passed upon him at this durbar—was not that plain, ordinary, straightforward course which is better in all these matters. The more straightforward we are in dealing with Asiatics I am quite certain the better it will be for our rule. The one great mistake we could fall into would be to adopt anything like Oriental methods, and the only criticism I have to make is that I think that this idea of arresting the man at a durbar, after having received him in a friendly manner when he came out to meet Mr. Quinton, and after he had been for five or six months no doubt virtually governing the State, savoured a little too much of Oriental finesse, and I am very glad to hear that the noble Viscount opposite does not think that this course, whether or not it has been practised before, should be continued in future. Now I have only one word more to say, and that is on a point to which, in common with the noble Marquess, I attach the greatest importance; I mean as to the policy which is to be pursued in regard to Manipur in the future. My noble Friend behind me (the Duke of Argyll) I confess stated some doctrines with which I am quite unable to agree. He said that our policy in India had not been a policy of annexation. I quite agree that we never professed a policy of annexation, but facts are stronger than theories, and we have annexed State after State in India until, as we all know, we have this immense Empire. Neither do I agree with the noble Duke in saying that assurances given upon this subject are of no value, and should be lightly spoken of. The assurance to which my noble Friend referred was the assurance of the Sovereign herself—the assurance after the Mutiny, given in the most solemn manner; and although I do not pretend to say that such an assurance as that would prevent the Government of India from an annexation which might be absolutely unavoidable and necessary, yet I do say that after that assurance no annexation should be sanctioned without the gravest and most paramount necessity. I myself had some experience on the subject at the time of the annexation of Burma. That is not a parallel case, because Burmah is not an Indian State, and it was annexed after a war and for reasons which could in no way arise as regards any native Indian State properly so called; but, nevertheless, I was exceedingly struck with the wide-spread jealousy in India on the part of the native princes in that Empire at the annexation of Burma, and at the strong opinion which was expressed to me by all those who had the greatest knowledge of Indian affairs, that there was no portion of our policy in which we ought to be more cautious, and nothing in which we ought to be more firm and consistent than in adhering in all circumstances, except those, as I have said, of paramount necessity, to the declarations made by the Queen, and which, I believe, have had the most important and admirable effects in pacifying and reconciling the native princes of that country and making them truly loyal subjects of Her Majesty. I therefore welcome what the noble Viscount said upon this subject. Of course he very properly, not having the opinion of the Government of India, would not pledge himself absolutely to the particular policy which is to be pursued, but I gathered from him—I think I am not going too far in saying—that he shares the opinion of myself and my noble Friend, and of many others who have more experience than I have upon this subject, which is against annexation unless, as I have said, it be from some paramount and overbearing necessity. My Lords, I will not detain you any further. I think it is on every account a matter which must give satisfaction to the House that the subject has been brought before us, and especially because, I am most happy to say, we have had the opportunity of hearing so clear and satisfactory a statement from the noble Viscount opposite.

*THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

My Lords, I was very glad to hear the speech of the noble Viscount, the Secretary of State for India, because he appeared to me to give a fair and accurate account of the whole of the circumstances connected with this unfortunate catastrophe at Manipur, and because I entirely agree with the conclusion at which he has arrived, namely, giving the approval of Her Majesty's Government to the course taken by the Viceroy in respect of these events. The speech of the noble Marquess, who brought forward this motion, was, like all his speeches, both temperate and fair, but I think my noble Friend must have been convinced by the noble Viscount opposite that he had not given that careful attention to the Papers in the case which he would have done supposing he had been either in India or at the India Office. I myself have felt it to be my duty to pay the most careful attention to all the Papers that have been laid before Parliament, and I am quite satisfied that the answer given by the Secretary of State to the criticism of my noble Friend in respect to the alleged delay on the part of the Viceroy in dealing with this matter was a complete, a substantial, and an accurate answer. I am quite surprised at my noble Friend, the Earl of Kimberley, trying to defend the noble Marquess in respect to that matter. Just let us put the other case. My noble Friend says that the affair ought to have been dealt with with unusual promptitude. Now if the Viceroy had dealt with this case with unusual promptitude, what would have happened? The Maharajah of Manipur, a good friend of the English Government, who, when Mr. Dament and 40 men were killed on the frontier and Kohima was assailed by the Nagas, led 2,000 of the troops of. Manipur with Colonel Johnstone to the defence of Kohima, and who has supported the Government on many subsequent occasions—this Maharajah petitions the Viceroy to have his case inquired into, and the unusual promptitude which my noble Friend the Earl of Kimberley recommends would have involved neglecting the appeal to the Viceroy of an old friend and supporter of the Government simply because there was a gentleman called the Senapatti, who appears to have got on the brain of both my noble Friend the Earl of Kimberley, and my noble Friend who brought forward this. Motion. I should like to know what native opinion would have been if this unusual promptitude had been shown. I should like to know what Native Princes would have thought if the claims of an old friend had been set aside because the Government of India was afraid of a man who is described by one who was seven years Resident there as a man of most infamous character, who had already committed some murders.

*THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

If the noble Lord will excuse me, I never said that the claim of the old Maharajah should be put aside. What I said was that it was not necessary to take five months to consider it.

*THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I must ask my noble Friend to follow me a little further. Would my noble Friend have accepted the representations of the ex-Maharajah without any inquiry from Mr. Grimwood? Would he have taken the ex-Maharajah at his word without obtaining the opinion of Mr. Grimwood? Would he have said, "Oh! yes, you shall go back." Would he not have thought it necessary to ask Mr. Grimwood to report upon the matter? If my noble Friend concedes that, his whole case is gone. It would be necessary to consult Mr. Quinton, and to consult Mr. Grimwood, and to have Mr. Grim wood's reply; and I say that the unusual promptitude recommended by my noble Friend, and rather by implication by the noble Marquess, would have been neglect of the fair consideration to be given to the claims of an old friend, and would have been considered as an injustice by all the Native Princes in India. Therefore, I think that the attack made upon my noble Friend the Marquess of Lansdowne, for the delay in the matter, must fail to convince anyone who has carefully gone into the circumstances of the case, and who knows the duty which devolves upon the Viceroy in India of considering fairly and dispassionately the claims which are brought before him, and especially the claims of Native Princes. That is my answer to the main criticism made by my noble Friend upon the reply given by the Secretary of State to the same criticisms made by the noble Marquess who brought forward the Motion. Now, my Lords, no doubt the case that was presented to the Government of India was a difficult one. Undoubtedly, in ordinary cases, the Government of India are quite right to accept this kind of revolution happening in Native States; and so long as the person who assumes power is loyal to the British Government, and likely to govern his State decently well, to accept the circumstances, and to deal with the person who succeeds. But this State of Manipur is a very exceptional State. I must confess that I myself, on first reading the Papers, thought that, upon the whole, it would have been better to have let the matter go and dealt with the Government de facto after the Revolution. I must admit that I never, until these difficulties arose, gave the same attention to this small State of Manipur that I have done since. In fact, I never heard when I was in India of the State of Manipur, except in con- nection with a team of polo players who came down and beat the Calcutta Polo Club in Calcutta. But I took every pains I could to read the history of this State, which is contained in an elaborate memorandum written by Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who is now the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, and who was at one time Secretary to the Government of Bengal. I saw that it differed entirely from an ordinary case. We had set up this small State of Manipur entirely ourselves. We were obliged, because of the quarrels among the different members of the Rajah's family, to give our sanction and authority to the reigning Rajah, and to interfere to prevent any conspiracy against him. I found that this very Rajah, against whom the conspiracy-took place, had been twice supported and kept on the throne by. British arms, and I saw at once that the revolt against him, organised as it was by this Senapatti, must have been made with the full knowledge by the Sanapatti that he was acting against the authority of the Government of India. In those circumstances I saw that the case was very different to an ordinary case, and, in my opinion, the Government of India were justified in interfering. And, having to interfere, I believe that in the circumstances of the case, and even with what we know upon the Papers, the Government of India took the right course. I should like to ask my noble Friends who have criticised the Government of India upon this matter, just to think for a moment in what position the State of Manipur would have been if their advice had been followed. They proposed that this Senapatti was to be made practically the ruler of Manipur. Does it not occur to my noble Friends that the very catastrophe which has happened shows how dangerous it would have been to leave that man as the ruler of Manipur? Just conceive a man the de facto ruler of a petty State like that, who had so absurd a notion of his position as to think that he could set himself up against the Government of India. That is what this man has done. I think the very facts have shown that the Government of India were right in not conceding to the Senapatti the control of Manipur. That is the con- clusion I have arrived at after very careful consideration of the papers, and I hope the considerations I have suggested may induce my noble Friends to reconsider their position, to read the papers very carefully along with Sir Alexander Mackenzie's memorandum, and I hope that having done that they will be satisfied that the Government of India has acted in the circumstances of the case in the manner most for the interests of the people of Manipur and of the Government. Because your Lordship must recollect that in recognising this Rajah of Manipur, and defending him against all comers as we have done, the Government of India, assumed a considerable responsibility. They assumed the responsibility of taking care that no great oppression was committed in the State of Manipur. My noble Friends would have put a man as principal ruler of the State, who, on two occasions, was guilty of such oppression that on one he was banished by his own Sovereign, and on the other the Government of India required him to go away from the State for a year to expiate his offence. I think that this part of the question has been threshed out sufficiently, and that that is the conclusion that any impartial person would come to, is, that on the whole the Government did what was right under very difficult circumstances. Your Lordships must remember that in discussing the conduct of the Government of India everything does not appear in the papers that are laid before Parliament. It is impossible to lay before Parliament, or even to send home, the mass of documents which come to the Indian Foreign Office, and which are no doubt consulted by the Viceroy before he forms an opinion, and, moreover, the Viceroy had an opportunity of conferring personally with Mr. Quinton before he decided this matter. I do not think, my Lords, there has been any other point made at all adverse to the conduct of the Viceroy in this case. I wish, however, to allude to two other matters. One is the question which has been raised as to the nature of a durbar, and whether the idea of arresting the Senapatti at a durbar is one which is altogether to be commended or the reverse. There is no doubt, as the noble Duke observed, that in the telegram from Mr. Quinton to the Viceroy, the word "durbar" was used for "persons," and not for "ceremony" or "place." Mr. Quinton said that he proposed to summon the Regent and the durbar to meet him; that meant the Regent and all his entourage—his brothers and everybody connected with the State. Then when those people met him it was at a "durbar," and in the further telegram towards the end of the book, your Lordships will see that it was proposed to arrest the Senapatti "at a durbar," because the Government say in a late telegram that they were not aware of that intention till the 7th of May. Therefore, it is clear that it was intended to arrest the Senapatti at a durbar. I agree with what has fallen from the Secretary of State for India upon this matter. It seems to me, even if there should be found any precedent for taking that course, it is not a desirable course to take. It might possibly occasion disturbances, collision, and bloodshed at these solemn assemblies, which should be carried on with all the state which ceremonies in the East require. I think it would be very undesirable that this should be considered a precedent for any such course to be taken in the future. I entirely agree with all the noble Lords who have spoken, that Mr. Quinton was perfectly incapable of any idea of treachery; all those concerned were perfectly incapable of such a thing; but, nevertheless, the durbar was not, in my opinion, the proper place to make the arrest. If I were to describe the manner in which I think the decision of the Government of India should have been communicated, I agree with what fell from the noble Duke, that it would have been quite right that an intimation should have been given in the most solemn manner possible of the decision at which the Governor General in Council had arrived; and having given that intimation, I should say that the right course would have been to have placed it upon the ruler of that State to carry out the decision of the Government of India. If the Regent had been told at the durbar that he would not be recognised unless he himself removed the Senapatti for a limited time under such conditions as might have been considered right, in all probability the difficulty would not have arisen. The only other point, at this late hour of the evening, upon which I would venture to make a very few remarks is the question whether it would be desirable or not that tins little State should be annexed to the territories of Her Majesty in India. I agree with all that has fallen from those who have addressed your lordships in deprecation of the annexation of native States. In regard to this particular case, I would say that the offence, grave as it has been—and none can be greater than the treacherous murder of English officers—has been committed, not by the ruler of the State, but by those who revolted against the ruler of the State. The ruler of the State now is the ex-Maharajah who is at Calcutta, because the Jubaraj, as they call him, had not been recognized by the Government of India as the ruler of the State. I would say also, to come to the question of expediency, that it would be very undesirable to take over the government of a small hill State like Manipur. The State is in a very limited state of civilisation, totally unfit for our laws and regulations. It has been very fairly managed under the influence of British Residents, and it is a State the annexation of which might bring us into collision with some of the neighbouring tribes, and, as any of your Lordships who have paid attention to the matter know, these tribes on the north-east frontier of India have given very considerable trouble at different times. That was my own impression, and it has been confirmed by the opinion expressed by Sir James Johnstone, who was for seven years Resident in Manipur. Sir James Johnstone's opinion upon a matter of this sort is one of great value. He is one of those excellent Indian officers who have devoted themselves towards the civilisation of the hill tribes in India. He was employed for many years among some of the hill tribes in a different part of Bengal, and he was for seven years, I think, Resident at Manipur. His opinion is, that if we were to annex this little State we should be brought into collision with other tribes: we should probably be involved in several small expeditions, and we should be also losing a source of strength which we now possess in this native State. He says—and I think quite rightly—that if this State had been annexed we might very likely have lost the frontier station of Kohima, because there would not have been any force of 2,000 men ready to defend Kohima from the Nagas in 1879, and similar incidents might well' take place. I do not know that I can add anything to what has fallen from other noble Lords with regard to the feelings of the rulers of different native States in respect to annexation. One-third part of the whole of British India consists of these native States. Their armies now number something like 300,000 men, and there is no doubt that they watch most carefully any case in which they think the assurances given in 1858 may not be carried out by the Government of India. Fortunately, I do not think since 1858 there is any case in which they have a right to say that those assurances have not been strictly followed by the British Government. I was very glad to hear from the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, with all the due reservation with which he naturally spoke previously to having received the opinion of the Government of India upon the subject, that his own individual opinion was very much in accordance with the views which I have ventured to put before your Lordships upon this matter. I was glad to hear what fell from the noble Duke (Argyll) in regard to the manner in which the officers who are serving their Queen and country in India should be treated both in Parliament and by the Government, and I will add that when I had the honour of serving under the noble Duke his dealings with me were entirely in accordance with the opinions which he has expressed in your Lordships' House.

*LORD REAY

At this late hour of the evening I do not intend to detain your Lordships very long, but as I have only recently returned from India I am anxious to corroborate what has been said with regard to the principles which at present inspire the action of the Government of India in their relations with the Native States. A great deal of misconception seems to exist on that point, and, if possible, I should like to remove it. The motive of our interference in Native States is the benefit of the people by securing to them law and order, peace and justice. Such interference does not weaken, but strengthens the hold the Chiefs have over their subjects, who are cordially attached to them. One of the best instances that can be given of this process is that which the noble Earl Lord Northbrook gave when he interfered in Baroda. What did we do in Baroda? We did not look for an incapable man, but we looked for a promising young man, to whom we gave the best tutor we could find, and we made of him one of the best rulers who is now at the head of a Native State. The result, therefore, of our interference was to strengthen the Government of Baroda, to establish better relations between it and the people, and to accelerate the assimilation of Baroda administration with that of a British district. Now, this is only one instance, and many others could be given. We are constantly lending Native British officials to Native Chiefs with the deliberate object of improving their States. We do not interfere, as a rule, against the wishes, and certainly not against the interests, of either the Chiefs or their subjects. Perhaps, my Lords, the best illustration that I could give is what happened to me personally when the brother of a Native Chief came to me and asked me to take up his grievance against his brother. He said—"You have taken away from us the summary means which we had when our States were governed in a less civilised manner; therefore, it becomes your duty to interfere so that we may obtain justice in accordance with your notions of procedure." Therefore, the interference in the affairs of a Native State is for purposes of good Government—for the general security of our own Empire, and for the benefit of the people in those States. Now, the only question, my Lords, which seems to me to be of importance is whether the interference of the Government of India in the affairs of Manipur, for which the Government of Assam was primarily responsible, was conducted in accordance with those principles which have hitherto prevailed. I think the question cannot be answered otherwise than in the affirmative. You could not restore the ex-Maharaja to whom the ex-Maharaja had resigned the "gaddi" without, as we have seen, causing bloodshed in the State of Manipur. You could not, it seems to me, allow the Jubraj and the Senapatti to wield a kind of dual power, and when you, therefore, accepted the Jubraj as the lawful heir it was natural to remove the cause of former disturbances. It is impossible to agree with what the Political Agent seems to have thought that the Senapatti "would assist in making the Jubraj's rule strong and popular." It seems to me undoubted that after a certain time the Senapatti would have dealt with the second brother as he dealt with the elder brother. It is unfortunate that the Senapatti was not removed at an earlier date. The slowness of the Indian Administration might undoubtedly in times of real trial become a source of danger, and decentralisation must be carried further. In this case the letters were answered by the Foreign Office at Calcutta with promptitude; in fact, the Archives of Bombay would not produce many instances in which letters on a subject not declared by the Local Government emergent had been answered so quickly as were those of the Chief Commissioner of Assam by the Government of India. Why the Chief Commissioner did not see the desirability of arriving at an early and definite solution of the difficulty does not appear from the Papers, and, in the absence of such an explanation, criticism must be silent on this as on several other inexplicable points. In India no Provisional Government ought to last longer than is absolutely necessary. In the Mutiny there was a Senapatti of the Mahrattas. The news reached Poonah that this Senapatti was collecting men and was dangerous. A squadron of Cavalry was sent at night from Poona to Sattara, and the Senapatti was there and then arrested and, tried, and in that way Sir Robert Phayre averted the danger. That is the result of enforcing local responsibility in troublous times. The slowness of the mechanism of the administration of the Government of India in normal times there is a great deal of excuse, and I am sure that no one will regret more that prompter action was not taken by the Local Authorities than the Viceroy. In fact, that is evident from paragraph 6 of the letter of January 24 to Mr. Quinton. The Viceroy's policy with regard to the Senapatti's removal was, I think, in accordance with precedent, and such as will commend itself to the ablest men in Native durbars, the Native statesmen who exercise such great influence in feudal India, and whose diplomatic skill would surprise many a European diplomatist. I was very glad, my Lords, to hear what was stated by the noble Viscount that the Secretariat at the Foreign Office had been strengthened, as I was going to make a suggestion to that effect. I am not in favour of the idea of depriving the Viceroy of complete control of political affairs, which I think it extremely desirable that he should exercise. One other point I wish to allude to, namely, the organisation of the political service. I would urge that the organisation of the political service should be passed under review, and that if it is found that at present causes operate which do not induce the ablest men—either from the Civil or the Military Service—to enter upon a political career, those causes should be removed. I think it will also be found that very often after men have entered the Political Department they get disheartened by slow promotion, at any rate as compared with promotion in other Departments of the Public Service, and naturally do not continue to serve as Politicals, but rejoin the Revenue or Judicial Department. I hope that this state of things will speedily be altered. Then, my Lords, I wish to say a few words upon the durbar question. I believe that a friendly durbar in the circumstances under which this durbar was held was a perfect impossibility; a friendly durbar could not be held by a Commissioner accompanied by such a numerous escort; the Manipuris must have realised what the object was of the Chief Commissioner's visit; therefore, the whole notion of treachery seems to me to be absolutely out of the question. The durbar would have been held as a Court, and all I can say is that so far from there being treachery my impression from these Papers is the reverse; my impression is that the procedure was adopted as an alternative to one less objectionable, which Mr. Gurdon suggested to the Political Agent, namely, arrest by the Regent. If a police officer were to invite a man whom he was going to arrest to meet him in a Police Court, such action would not be treacherous, but it would probably deserve another name. At all events, anyone who has known Mr. Quinton is well aware that he was quite incapable of doing anything which would be a dishonour to the English name. At the same time, I agree with the remarks which have been made that arrests should not be made in durbar. In Bombay I am sure it would never have occurred to us. With regard to the question whether Manipur should be annexed or not, I think that such a step should only be taken in the last resort. At present, when we find it necessary to depose Chiefs—and, unfortunately, I found it necessary to depose two Chiefs—our strength lies in the fact that the people and the members of the Chief's family know that we only establish an interregnum, and that either the Chief himself is restored to his legitimate rights, if he improves, or his lawful heir. Such an interregnum is of the greatest benefit to the Ruler as well as to the people, because all branches of the Administration are improved. Therefore, I hope that if annexation can be avoided it will be avoided. Before I sit down I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that I was very glad to hear the tribute which was paid by the Government to the merits of the noble Marquess who presides over the destinies of our great Indian Empire. I am the only one of your Lordships who has bad the honour of being associated with him in the task which he performs so well, and I was able to witness the great ability, the great conscientiousness, with which he fulfils the arduous duties which have devolved upon him, and which have earned for him the respect of his countrymen and of the natives of India. With reference to the horror of the massacre, not to incur the censure of the noble Duke, I shall only say that I fully share in what must be the prevailing feeling in your Lordships' House with regard to that terrible catastrophe.

*THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, this question has been so thoroughly threshed out, it has teen spoken to by so many noble Lords who have had practical experience of Indian administration, and I will add, that notwithstanding differences upon specific points, there has been so general an agreement among us on the main principles involved, that I almost hesitate to trouble you at all, and I shall only do so to the extent of a few words. In this business of Manipur there are three distinct and separate questions. There is the question of the policy pursued by the Government of India towards the State of Manipur. There is the question of the execution of that policy and the disaster to which it led. And, lastly, there is the far more important question, what are we to do with that State in the future? One of those questions may be very easily disposed of. The misfortune which led to the loss of valuable lives is one as to which it can serve no useful purpose here to endeavour to apportion whatever blame there may be. To say nothing of the natural feeling towards those who cannot defend themselves, we cannot do it in justice, because those who are mainly concerned have their mouths closed; if they made mistakes, they have far more than expiated them; and if there was on their part no error, they are doubly unfortunate in being unable to repudiate unjust attacks. There are only, I think, one or two remarks which need be made upon that part of the case. In the first place, popular information and report has enormously exaggerated the extent of the disaster. We heard at first of the sacrifice of 400 lives. Now it turns out, as I understand (I hope I am right), that the total loss does not exceed some 25 dead or missing. Well, everything goes by comparison, and however we may regret such a misadventure, it is not one on a great scale relatively to the armies of India, and to the work which those armies have to do. Scarcely a year passes in which much larger losses are not incurred in frontier expeditions, which excite very little interest here, and sometimes in actions of which nobody ever hears. In the next place, the military honour of the troops is safe. Acts of signal courage were performed, and the alleged causes of failure do not in any way touch the courage or the discipline of the soldiers engaged. And, lastly, let me suggest that we ought to be very slow to blame Indian officials, whether in the Civil or Military Service, for acts which may seem to us rash and imprudent. If our officers in either Service had been always prudent, if they had not often run risks which might have been avoided without dishonour, we might have escaped a few mishaps, but our position in India would not be what it is. I have no doubt that such inquiry as is now possible is being made by the competent authorities, and in their hands, I think, we had better leave it, probably altogether, at any rate for the present. The question of policy is far more difficult, and naturally leads to more difference of opinion. What I gather from all that has been written upon the subject, and from the speeches that I have heard here, points to the conclusion that in general there has been no desire to interfere unduly in the internal affairs of Manipur. That is the view of other noble Lords whose authority goes far to decide the question, and the best proof that they are right is that we were at one moment—I speak on the authority of the then Governor General—about to withdraw our Resident altogether from the State of Manipur when the late Rajah desired that he should be allowed to remain. That does not look like a policy of undue interference on our part. My Lords, I will not waste time in proving what is not disputed, but looking at the position which we have assumed in India, I do not think that our right to interfere when this revolution broke out can be denied. We had recognised the deposed Rajah; we were not bound in any way to acquiesce in his disposition. No native would have thought that, in using our discretion to give or withhold the sanction of the paramount Power, we were going beyond our proper and legitimate sphere of action. And there is in such a case as this no question of ignoring or resisting the wish of the people, because the revolution was one of an entirely Oriental kind; it was a revolution of the Palace, made simply by force. The Governor General might accept the results of that revolution or he might repudiate them; but he could not reasonably say, and no one could say for him or of him, that it was a matter with which he had nothing to do. He is responsible for the peace of India, and peace may always be endangered by a change of rulers in a Native State. But the question of right is one thing, the question of policy is another; and if I ventured to express, or even to form, an opinion of my own upon a matter so doubtful, and about which we really know so little, I should have doubted whether it would not have been wiser to discard at once the ruler who, though we might have no cause of quarrel with him, had run away from his country in a fright with very little cause, and who was evidently unfit for his position, and in that case to have accepted unconditionally the ruler who had replaced him and his advisers, and to influence and control the country through them. No doubt the new ruler would not have been a nominee of ours, he would not have owed his throne to us; but I do not know that that makes very much difference in the long run. There is a very memorable instance in Indian history. We all remember what happened in Afghanistan fifty years ago. We tried to put Shah Soojah on the throne, and we failed. He was replaced by the very man whom we had unsuccessfully tried to dethrone, and whom we were compelled to recognise again—Dost Mahomed. Dost Mahomed was an able man, and saw that it was not his interest to bear malice, and he reigned for many years in perfectly good understanding with us. I do not say that the cases are precisely parallel, because, of course, Manipur is a dependent State, but I do not see why, on a smaller scale, the same results should not have followed in the present case. And I will own frankly, though with no wish to criticise, that I do not quite understand the policy recommended by my noble Friend the Secretary of State. As I understand the speech of my noble Friend, he puts it in this way—that it was quite right and judicious to recognise a new ruler, but that he had been placed on the throne by an unlawful revolt, and that, therefore, though he was to remain, the people who had put him there ought to be punished. That is a new doctrine in politics. I do not understand accepting the results of a resolution, and then proceeding to imprison or banish the people by whom it has been made.

*VISCOUNT CROSS

I would like to say that it was specially stated that the Jubraj took no part whatever in the revolution; he had disappeared from Manipur for eight miles—it was only after his brother had gone away that he came back.

*THE EARL OF DERBY

The revolution was made in his interest, if not made by him. However, I do not want to argue that point because what I was going to say, and I say it quite unaffectedly, is that I shall entirely distrust my own judgment in a matter of this kind. It is a question which depends so much upon details, upon the character of the men, upon the feeling of the people, and upon the circumstances of the country that I do not believe anyone here, and I hardly believe even my noble Friend the Secretary of State is capable of pronouncing dogmatically. It is essentially a question for the Government of India. We give our Viceroy immense powers; we surround him with able assistants, and it is not wise, I think, to take such decisions out of his hands. He is better able to judge in such matters than we are; and, what is perhaps still more important, he is not exposed to those disturbing and distracting influences which prevail at home. As a matter of fact, questions of this kind are, I imagine, commonly left to him, and it must be remembered that but for the military mishap which has caused all this discussion, nothing would have been heard of the affair here, and it would have passed absolutely un-noticed. There is one point with regard to which I listened—to the explanation of the Secretary of State—with much satisfaction. I confess that in reading the Papers I did not understand the long delay of the Government of India in coming to a decision. I think even now that that delay was unfortunate, because silence and forbearance give a sore of consent, and we might have been supposed to acquiesce in what we did not immediately resent. But I am bound to say that I think the Secretary of State has given sufficient reasons. In formation had to be waited for; there was no distinct agreement among the authorities concerned, and no doubt other important business intervened. I still think the delay that occurred was a misfortune, but I do not think after what we have heard that it can be treated as a clause of censure. My Lords, I do not think that it is worth while, after all that has been said, to go into that story of the durbar and the charge which has been made outside this House, but which has not been made here, of treachery and foul play against the Viceroy or his subordinates. The Governor General, I apprehend, is entirely out of the question. He could not have taken it upon himself to have arranged a detail of this kind; and as to the others, a durbar, as I take it, is merely a public audience of a formal kind. It may be held for all sorts of purposes; it has no sacred character about it. The real question is: Was anybody invited there—called upon to attend there—under an implied promise of safety, and was that promise violated? For my own part, I do not believe that to be likely, or even to be possible. On that point, which is really the important part of the question, the officers concerned have been completely exculpated, not only by the Government, but by others who speak independently. If it is only a question of etiquette, especially if it is determined that to avoid misunderstanding no such proceeding shall take place in the future, I do not think that matter is worth discussing. But, my Lords, the question still remains, and it is really that upon which I rose to speak—what is to be done with Manipur? Upon that I wish to join my bumble and earnest representations to those of my noble Friends, and to say, whatever you do, do not annex. I do not think we could possibly ask from the Secretary of State a more formal and binding pledge than that which he has given. He could not speak in a definitive manner without reference to the Government of India; but though I rather agree with the noble Duke who has left the House that Parliament had better not interfere habitually in Indian affairs, I think there are exceptions to that rule, and that this is one of them. As we all know, there exists in India, always has existed, and probably always will, both among soldiers and among civilians, and for a reason which we can very easily understand, strong feeling in favour of annexation: and what I wish is, not that we should interfere with the discretion of Lord Lansdowne, but that we should give him such support as is in our power to help him to resist that feeling. It is not merely that annexation of a very poor State surrounded by wild tribes would be a source of increased military expense, though it certainly would be, and that is rather serious, because, as we all know, finance is the one weak point of our Indian administration; but we have to look, as several noble Lords have said before me, to the effect produced over the whole of India. Everybody who remembers the year 1857, and the events which followed, knows how widespread was the feeling of insecurity and distrust prevailing at that time among the Native Princes. They had seen many of their Kingdoms swept away, and no one knew whether his turn might not come next. When the company's power ceased, in 1858, opportunity was taken to give solemn assurances that the policy of annexation (for so I must call it) was at an end. Those assurances produced a complete change of feeling. For the last 33 years the Native Princes have been our best friends, and they would stand by us in case of need, because their interests are ours. We protect them, we respect their position, and a good many of them know that if the day of our expulsion from India were ever to arrive their Thrones would be, to say the least, very insecure. But though they trust us, and though they act cordially with us, it is not possible that they should entirely forget the past, and I believe that one Native State annexed within the limits of India, whatever might be the cause, whatever might be the justification, would create a feeling of alarm from Kashmir to Cape Comorin. I do not know that any benefit could be conferred upon us or upon Manipur itself by annexing that State, but certainly no such benefit could be worth the risk of mischief done elsewhere; and I am quite sure, from what he has said, that the Secretary of State for India and the Government, who know the recent history of India as well as I do, if they think it necessary to practise a certain amount of reticence, agree with me in what I have said. That is really the one important and the one practical part of this whole discussion. The rest relates to the past—to matters which are disposed of and cannot be altered. But we must have no more of the Dalhousie policy. We must have no more annexation. The Native Princes trust us now. This is an occasion to show that we deserve their confidence, and I hope and believe that we shall avail ourselves of it.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

I do not propose to detain your Lordships more than a moment or two. I am very well content to rest upon what has fallen from my noble Friend the Earl of Kimberley and from the noble Earl who has just sat down, and who has expressed his views with so much force and authority. But one matter fell from the noble Viscount upon which I want to say a single word. He spoke of me as having complained of the secrecy of some of Mr. Quinton's proceedings. I beg the noble Viscount to understand that when I spoke of the secrecy of those proceedings I did not use the expression in the smallest degree in a disparaging sense to Mr. Quinton. I regretted that the intentions of the Government were not earlier and more openly declared, but I never had it in my mind for a moment to think that Mr. Quinton pursued a secret course in any dishonourable or unworthy manner. I am anxious to make that statement, because Mr. Quinton has been, as I think, so unjustly attacked that I should be exceedingly sorry if I could be supposed to have said anything disparaging to him in any way.

*VISCOUNT CROSS

I am sure the noble Marquess will not think that I have said one word in disparagement of Mr. Quinton.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

Quite so.

On Question, agreed to.