Lords Sitting of 10 July 1890

LORD CARBERY.
Report made from the Lord Chancellor, that the right of William Charles Baron Carbery to vote at the elections of Representative Peers for Ireland has been established to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor; read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
TRUSTEES APPOINTMENT BILL.(No. 84.)
Returned from the Commons agreed to.
BANKRUPICY BILL.—(No. 188.) METROPOLIS MANAGEMENT AND BUILDING ACTS AMENDMENT BILL—(No. 189.)
Brought from the Commons; read 1a and to be printed.
PHYSICAL EDUCATION IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS BILL.
A Bill for the promotion of physical education in elementary schools—Was presented by the Lord Chaworth (E. Meath); read 1a; and to be printed. (No. 190.)

INFECTIOUS DISEASE (PREVENTION) BILL.—(No. 117.)
House in Committee (on Re-commitment), according to order.
Clause 23.
LORD LAMINGTON: There is an Amendment on page 8, after line 35, to insert—
"The reference in this Act to Section 120 of the Public Health Act, 1875, is to be taken to a be a reference to the Public Health (Ireland) Act of 1878."
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: Should it not be "reference also"? Otherwise you exclude the English Act. If you make it a reference only to the Irish Act will not that exclude the English Act?
LORD LAMINGTON: I understand it takes them both together.
THE EARL Of KIMBERLEY: What I mean is this. Certain provisions are made as to Section 120 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and the object of the noble Lord is to apply them also to the
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Irish Act; but the words he proposes would, in point of fact, limit the reference to that Act. If it is a reference only to the Trish Act, it will not effect its object as regards the English Statute.
LORD LAMINGTON: If it is a question of words that can be done on the Third Reading. I look upon the Amendment as consequential upon the Amendment made by the Standing Committee in Clause 5.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I do not think the noble Lord quite sees what I mean. Clause 5 says that Section 120 of the Public Health Act, 1875, shall be repealed for certain purposes. This Amendment proposes that the reference to Section 120 of the Public Health Act shall be taken to be a reference to an Irish Act; it follows, therefore, if it is a reference only to the Irish Act, you will not repeal Section 120 in the English Act. Of course, what the noble Lord means is, that the reference to the clause shall include the English Act as well as the Irish Act. Perhaps the noble Lord will consider that point by the next stage.
Amendments made; the Report thereof to be received to morrow.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (PROCEDURE) BILL.—(No. 170.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  LORD HERSCHELL: My Lords, this is a Bill which has received the assent of the other House, and its object is to make some Amendments in the proceedings of our Courts of Justice, which have been suggested by the experience gained since the Judicature Act came into operation. I need only detain your Lordships for a minute or two in., explaining the changes which it is proposed to make. The main charge is this. At the present time, if a case is tried by a Judge without a Jury, all questions of law go at once direct to the Court of Appeal, and are determined there. If the case is tried by a Judge with a Jury, then any questions as to the law, as laid down by the Judge at the trial, or the finding of the Jury, goes to a Divisional Court, generally consisting of two Judges, with an appeal

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  from their decision to the Court of Appeal. I need hardly point out that a double appeal of that description, in the cases in which it takes place, causes very considerable expense to the parties, in addition to some amount of delay. The proposal made by this Bill is that, in future, all applications for a new trial, in eases tried by a Judge with a Jury, shall go direct to the Court of Appeal, instead of only going to the Court of Appeal after passing through the Divisional Court. I think there can be only one possible objection of substance to such a proposal, and that would be that the Court of Appeal would be too much occupied with its existing work to be able to attend in due time to the additional work imposed upon it by this Bill. But I may tell your Lordships that, happily, the Court of Appeal has of late got so well forward with its work that it has been able at times to assist the Courts of the Queen's Bench Division in the disposal of the cases that come before them. I think experience has shown that the additional work that will be cast upon the Court of Appeal by this Bill is not such as they will not be able satisfactorily to deal with. The only other matter with which I need trouble your Lordships is a proposal to enable certain cases which hitherto could only be heard by two Judges forming a Divisional Court to be heard by one Judge. There will, of course, still be an appeal to the Court of Appeal; but there does not seem to be any reason why certain cases should be heard only by two Judges which can be equally well heard by one. There are other matters dealt with in the Bill, but, as they are only matters of detail, I need not detain your Lordships further with them now.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Herschell.)
  LORD ESHER: My Lords, the Court of Appeal finds itself in the usual happy position of people who work hard. The Court of Appeal has worked extremely hard, and reduced the arrears before it, and the result is that they are asked immediately to take a great deal more work. I shall not object to the Second Reading of this Bill, as far as the first clause is concerned, which will send the new trials, of which my noble and learned Friend
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  has spoken, directly to the Court of Appeal. As to the other parts of the Bill, I have a strong objection to them, for I cannot agree to the statement that it would be advisable that special cases which are intended to be taken before a single Judge by the Bill should be so taken. But that is a matter which may be discussed in Committee. I am sorry this Bill is pressed, for a particular reason. I think it is very much as if you were to put a patch on one corner of a large counterpane. This Bill will not satisfy anybody. There are discussions and complaints about the administration of the law in a dozen other points even much more important than this. But I do not think this is an occasion upon which it would be advisable for me to make a speech with regard to law, for I suspect if I did it would not be very agreeable to the House in its present position, therefore I propose not to talk any more law to-night; but, if I may be permitted, I will give notice that I shall, on this day week, call your Lordships' attention to alleged defects in the administration of the law, and ask Her Majesty's Government whether, after hearing that statement, they will not grant a Royal Commission for the purpose of inquiring into those defects, so that with regard to such of them as shall be found really to exist, the Commission may propose remedies, with the object of bringing forward immediate legislation.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I heartily concur with the proposal of my noble and learned Friend who has moved the Second Reading of the Bill. There is no sense or reason in preventing a case from going direct to the Court of Appeal after being tried by a Judge and Jury, and thus causing additional expense. It seems to me very reasonable that it should go immediately to the Court of Appeal, and that it should be there decided whether there should be a new trial or not. With regard to the other points of the Bill, I am not quite sure that I approve of them.
  On Question, agreed to.
  Bill read 2a (according to order), and committed to the Standing Committee for Bills relating to Law, &c.

ALLOTMENTS ACT (1887) AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 151.)

  COMMITTEE.
  House in Committee (according to order.)
  Clause 5.
  *EARL BEAUCHAMP: This clause gives power to the County Council, or any Committee appointed under this Act, to make use of any public elementary schoolroom, that is to say, where the school is receiving a grant for the purpose of elementary education. The purposes described are three-fold: one is for the purpose of an inquiry under this Act; and another is for the purposes of this Act by the County Council or any Committee appointed under this Act. Those are two of the purposes for which the schoolrooms may be compulsorily used; and if the clause had rested there I do not think I should have troubled your Lordships with any Amendment. But the clause goes further, and says that the schoolroom may be used for the purpose of holding public meetings to discuss any question relating to the subject of Allotments under this Act or the principal Act. That is a wholly novel use to which our schoolrooms are to be applied, and I think your Lordships should consider well whether you will give the powers asked for. I should explain that my Amendment ought to come, not in line 31, but in line 32. I do not propose to interfere in any way with the use of the schoolrooms for the purposes of this Act, either by the County Council or by the Committee, but when you go further than that and say that they are to be used for the purpose of public meetings being called by persons who are in no degree responsible, I think the power should not be given. It does not say who the meetings are to be convened by, or under what limitations the schoolrooms are to be used, and I think your Lordships will see you would be making a grave innovation on the rights of property. These schools may be assisted with public money, but many of them have been built under trust deeds for the purpose of education, and they are limited in that way in regard to the purposes for which they may be used. There are, of course,
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  discretionary powers for the purpose of enlarging the use of those schoolrooms by particular persons and under proper safeguards. Those safeguards are wholly wanting in the clause. Therefore, I propose that the consent of the freeholder should be required when the schoolroom is used not under the authority previously mentioned, but by irresponsible persons for public meetings. It is a notorious fact that many schoolrooms which receive grants of public money for the purpose of elementary education are still the property of private persons, and I do not see why, where benevolent persons have built schoolrooms, free of any charge upon them by way of rent, for certain definite purposes, they are to find those purposes suddenly enlarged, and the buildings which were intended for the purpose of education, should be applied to purposes wholly dissimilar, without any consent of theirs, and without any proper limitations or safeguards. Therefore, I move that in line 32, after "Act or," these words should be inserted "with the consent of the freeholder." That will ensure that proper care will be taken in so using the schools, because the freeholder will, of course, not give his consent unless he feels satisfied that the persons holding the meeting are responsible persons. Therefore, I hope your Lordships will assent to the addition of those words, which will ensure proper care and afford a safeguard that our schools shall not be left, without any control or limitation, in the hands of irresponsible persons. The words, if inserted there, will not interfere in any way with the legitimate operation of the Act; they will only tend to prevent the holding of possibly disorderly meetings.
  Amendment moved, in line 32, to insert after the word "or," the words "with the consent of the freeholder."—(The Earl Beauchamp.)
  *THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (The Earl of JERSEY): I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment of the noble Lord, though certainly the altered position in which he proposes now that it should be placed in the Bill would somewhat limit its application. I am afraid that if the consent of the freeholder had to be obtained, it would, in some cases, defeat the intention of this clause. The

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  object of this clause is to enable the people in the locality to hold meetings in village schoolrooms in reference to allotments. Now, the freeholders may be represented in various ways; they may be represented sometimes by the School Board, sometimes by Trustees. In rural places, the School Boards seldom meet more than once a month; and Trustees may be scattered all over the country, so that there would be great difficulty in obtaining their consent. However, as, on the Report, I propose to add some words with reference to the meetings to be held, perhaps it may meet the convenience of the noble Lord to postpone the consideration of this proposal until the Report.
  *EARL BEAUCHAMP: As I understand, from what the noble Lord has said, that he looks with considerable satisfaction upon the proposed alteration, I will not trouble your Lordships with it further on this occasion, but raise it on a later stage.
  Amendment (by leave of the Committee) withdrawn; Bill reported without amendment.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (BLIND AND DEAF) DIED.—(No. 155.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  *THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (Viscount CEANBKOOK): I need not detain your Lordships very long in respect of tin's Bill, which will rather, I think, depend upon consideration in Committee than upon its principle. My noble Friend opposite, Lord Granville, introduced to me early this year a deputation upon this subject which followed upon a Royal Commission which went carefully into this subject, both in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and had also, in fact, studied its position in foreign countries. Their recommendations were, in fact, that blind and deaf children should be placed in the same category as children possessing ordinary faculties; that is to say, that they should be liable to come under the Elementary Education Act, and subject to the same law as to education as other children in the country. At the same time, it was found that the expense necessary for the education of the blind and deaf is
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  necessarily on a very different scale to that which is necessary in the case of ordinary children. Therefore there has been some difficulty in England in endeavouring to frame a measure to deal1 with that point; and, in reference to calling upon the School Boards or County Councils, or the School Authorities in connection with the County Councils to find funds for the proper education, of those children, I need not say, my Lords, how important it is that these poor children should be educated. There are now a great number of blind who are perfectly unable to support themselves in any way; there are, I think, some 4,000 or 5,000 who have no means of support of any kind. It is, therefore, an important question whether it is not better for the State to do something for them in the way of education, in order to enable them to use the other faculties they possess, which they are often well able to use in spite of their deprivation of sight, hearing, or speech. We have seen how many have been able to more than overcome their disabilities, like the late Postmaster General, Mr. Fawcett. We can, therefore, see how important it is that they should have a thorough education. With regard to deaf mutes many of them having no organic defect but deafness, possessing even the means of speech, only that they hear no sound, and, therefore, are of themselves unable to speak on that account, or utter intelligible sounds, it is almost necessary that they should be educated in separate institutions. With regard to the blind, it is-not always the case, but in their case, also, it is necessary that they should have a special education. This Bill will give power to send them to institutions for that purpose. I have received very few communications with regard to the Bill, and very few Amendments. But there is one point which I think is very reasonable, that is, that in the case of parents, who would, if they could, use the ordinary elementary schools they should not be called upon to pay a higher fee for the education of these afflicted children than in the case of ordinary children. The necessity of spreading the expenditure, by not confining it in narrow limits or in particular localities, would, I think, become evident to your Lordships if you

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  were to look into the question and see how unfortunately, by the intermarrying of people of this class, there is a perpetuation of deaf-mutism, and sometimes even of blindness, in the most remarkable manner, and, therefore, the burden would fall with exceeding heaviness in some places when there were many afflicted. To give your Lordships an instance. I received a card the other day giving particulars of a case where two deaf-mutes had married, and had produced five deaf-mute children, who would, of course, require to be educated in some institution. That is a lamentable state of things, but possibly there may be means by oral instruction of bringing a readier communication between the deaf and hearing people. Making provision for educating them in this way will, we may hope, lead to that result, so that marriages shall not so frequently take place as they now do between deaf-mutes. We cannot, of course, interfere in that matter by this Bill, but by means of education we may hope that something will be done in that respect. I am sure your Lordships will feel that these unfortunate children have some claim upon us, and that they need provision for their education quite as much as other children in the country. Those of your Lordships who have looked into the matter, will, I am sure* approve of the measure, and I think I shall meet the wishes of the House on the present occasion by not offering further remarks upon it. I know I have the approval of my noble Friend opposite, and I now leave the matter in your Lordships' bands.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord President of the Council.)
  EARL GRANVILLE: As the noble Viscount has referred to mo, I am anxious to state that the Bill, the objects of which he has so clearly described, will have my warm support. There are two or three Amendments of mine, one of which lie has already mentioned, which I had thought of bringing forward on the Second Reading, but as there is other business of importance before your Lordships, I had better reserve them for Committee. In the meantime, no doubt, the noble Viscount will permit me to communicate with him on the matter.
  On Question, agreed to.
  Bill read 2a (according to order), and committed to the Standing Committee for General Bills.

ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT BILL. (No. 180.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  *THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOE FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): My Lords, I rise to move the Second Reading of a Bill for the purpose of confirming a portion of the Agreement which was signed at Berlin on Tuesday week—that portion of it which provides for the cession of the Island of Heligoland to the German Empire, and, as the Bill is exclusively concerned with that island, I will make some remarks with reference to it; but I hope your Lordships will not consider mo out of order if I go afterwards for a few moments into the general provisions of the Agreement in regard to other places than Heligoland. Perhaps, in strict order, I ought not to do so, but in this House we are indulgent in that respect. The island of Heligoland, as your Lordships are aware, is about three-quarters of a mile in extent, in the bay formed by Germany and the peninsula which ends in Denmark. It was taken in the year 1807, at a time when we were at war with Denmark, to whom it then belonged. Denmark was then the owner of the Frisian territory of Schleswig, to which this island naturally and by population belonged. It was of value to us in that great war for a reason that would not occur at first sight. The year when it was taken was the year following the issue of the Berlin Decrees by Napoleon, of which; the aim was to ruin England by the exclusion of her manufactures and commodities from the Continental markets. It was natural that this strange and unprecedented policy should be met by efforts to break through the line which he had set up, and Napoleon's policy was, to a great extent, fought by the smuggler. Heligoland was of great use, lying within 20 miles of the nearest German coast. It was of great use as a store for goods afterwards to be in that manner intro-

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  duced into the Continental markets in spite of Napoleon's Decrees. Towards the end of the war, but before it had concluded, and while Napoleon was still fighting gallantly in the Eastern Provinces of France, in January, 1814, a Treaty was concluded at Kiel, of which the main object was to provide that Norway, which had previously belonged to Denmark, should thenceforth belong to Sweden. In that great contest Denmark had the misfortune to take the wrong side, and Sweden had the good fortune to take the right side, and the transfer of Norway from Denmark to Sweden was the expression of that fact. Heligoland, which also had been taken from Denmark, was by the same Instrument transferred to the British Crown. I do not think there were any further stipulations with respect to it. It remained part of the territory of this country by virtue of the Treaty of Kiel. No doubt the motive for retaining it was partly the natural wish to retain territory, and partly that, as our contest was not then concluded, the value of the island was still considerable. It was held as a military post for some years. Up to the year 1821 there was a military establishment in the island; but in that year—not a year when peace theories were in vogue, but when the military spirit was very strong in this country—it was determined to withdraw the military establishment, and since that time the island has remained unoccupied by any considerable force, unfortified and practically unarmed. It has remained entirely undefended, and I believe there has been no attempt to defend it. Certainly there has been no indication of any intention on the part of Parliament or the Executive Government of the country to undertake the arming or defending of it; and I believe there is no doubt that the recommendation of the Colonial Defence Commission was expressed strongly against any such course. In truth, the value of the island is generally recognised for any strategic purposes as very small. It has no harbour. It has an open roadstead, which is untenable in a northwest wind, which is the prevailing wind. The commercial value of the island, again, as far as this country is concerned, may be expressed by very minute figures. I believe the import of British goods into the island in the course of
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  the year amounts to £50 in value, or not quite that. The population are, as I have said, Frisian. They speak Low-German, the language of the coast opposite. I believe there are only 5 per cent, that are not of that nationality, and they have not materially altered—they have increased in numbers, not much during the intervening period. Now, the point that we have to consider on the present occasion is, Is this islands of any strategic value to this country? I have shown that commercial, value, from the want of a harbour and for want of a market, it has none. Has it any strategic value? In time of peace, of course, the question of strategic value does not come up, but it may just be mentioned that even in time of peace it is apt to be a slightly inconvenient possession, because I think it was found during the late Franco-German War that its proximity to the German coast was sufficient to invite attempted breaches of neutrality, which are very convenient to belligerents, but which we know to our cost are apt to be exceedingly onerous to neutrals. But I will not dwell upon a consideration of that kind, which is not of paramount importance; I will ask, what would be the value of the island to us strategically in case of war? There are two cases—one a great deal more probable than the other, or rather less improbable than the other. One is the case of our being at war with Germany. Well, as I have said, the island is entirely unfortified. It lies within a few hours' steam of the great arsenal of Germany. If I am to suppose what I imagine is so utterly improbable a case as a war with Germany, I presume that if this island remained in our possession, the very day of the declaration of war a sufficient force, with all necessary materials and guns, would be despatched to it, and would arrive at the island probably considerably before any relieving fleet could arrive from our side. Experts differ a good deal as to its value in the case of war with Germany. Some think it of no value at all, while others think that it might be useful as a coal depôt to a blockading fleet; but a coal depôt, when England is so near, though it may be a convenience, can hardly be called a great advantage. The case, therefore, in respect to a war with Germany would be that it would

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  expose us to a blow which would be a considerable humiliation, and it would not confer upon us any great advantage, if any advantage, in the conduct of the war on our side. But let us take the much less improbable supposition of our being at war with somebody else. This island is undefended, and can be defended only by a sufficient Naval force. If we were at war with any other Power it would be, therefore, necessary for us to lock up a Naval force for the purpose of defending this island, unless we intended to expose ourselves to the humiliation of having it taken. My Lords, our fleet is a largo one, and I am happy to say it has recently been augmented, but it is none too large for the work it has to do, with our extensive and extending Empire, stretching into every corner of the globe, and meeting with new rivalries at every turn. I think all who have studied the subject will say that in defending our dependencies, and in defending our line of trade, our fleet, great and powerful as it is, would be taxed up to its fullest energies. I think we should labour under a distinct disadvantage if we have a position contributing in no degree to the defence of the Empire without commercial or other value, and which yet, in order to avoid a humiliating blow, would require a certain Naval force to be locked up and kept useless for every other purpose. On these grounds, my Lords, we have come to a conclusion, which I imagine is the conclusion held by many persons, and has been held for a long time, that this island, unfortified and undefended, is not an advantageous possession, but that it is one which for a proper consideration it would be well for the Empire to be divested. But the consideration has been raised by noble Lords opposite and others who deal with the question from a different point of view. It is said that the inhabitants of the island are opposed to the cession, and that their veto ought to be conclusive. My Lords, I do not think that the inhabitants of the island are opposed to the cession. There is no reason that they should be. They have not a long descended ancestral connection with the British Crown. There may be men there, living now, who were alive when the island was originally taken. They are related by the closest bonds of language, of race, of religion, with those who live almost
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  within site of their shores. Their pecuniary interests, to come down to motives which are less noble to dwell upon, though they are often powerful in these cases—their pecuniary profit in no way is increased by the connexion of the island with this country, nor can they look with any advantage to the continuance of that connexion. On the contrary, their whole prospect of gain depends on the large number of German bathing excursionists who go there in the summer, and that source of wealth would not diminish, but would, if anything, increase, if the island formed part of the German Empire. And it is probable, though the island is worthless to us from a strategic point of view, it will not be thought to be worthless to those near whose coasts it lies, and the military expenditure which would be the result of any determination to fortify it will form a large addition to the resources of the islanders, and I have no doubt has already been discounted by them. I am informed, and your Lordships, I think, have been generally informed, that a very enterprising nationality have already purchased up most of the land in the island. But while I say this, I cannot admit the doctrine that tin; decision of a population of a position that has been occupied for military and belligerent purposes is conclusive with respect to the uses to which that position should be put or the destiny which shall attend it. You must draw a line between two sorts of possessions—those possessions which you rule for the benefit of the population that is in them, and those possessions which you hold in order to contribute to the defence of the Empire as a whole; and that latter class of positions, of which we have several, cannot complain of any injustice if it is said that Imperial considerations must occupy a place of paramount importance in the mind of the Government of this country with respect to them, just as local considerations would occupy a place of paramount importance with respect to positions of another kind. My Lords, cession is a very uncommon event, and it is not very likely to be repeated; but this doctrine, which has been rather insinuated on the present occasion, may stretch much further than cession. A hint was given that we ought to have taken the opinion of the people in

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  some form or other, and we could only take it by way of plebiscite. Well, if people are asked to vote by pl°biscite on a question of Imperial policy like this, they may also claim to vote on the question whether their country shall not be ceded; if their opinion is to weigh so heavily on the question whether they are to be ceded, it ought to weigh equally heavily in the other direction. But there is another case—a case which might become practical and important, having nothing to do with cessions—I mean the case where it is necessary to get rid of, or to induce the inhabitants to depart when the danger of war is imminent, and the possibility of actual siege arrives. My Lords, most of you who have paid any attention to these subjects know that a problem of a very serious kind attaches to one of our most important positions in that respect, and you would be very unwise to admit that posts which are occupied, or have been occupied, for belligerent purposes, Imperial purposes—that the paramount disposition of them can be affected because the population which has grown up upon the position has interests in a different direction. My Lords, I said we have come to the conclusion that this island is one which it would be not only, no disadvantage, but an advantage to this country to transfer, if we could obtain for it a satisfactory consideration. The consideration for which we look lies on the East Coast of Africa. There we have obtained, as will have been seen from the Treaty which has been laid on the Table, an undertaking from Germany that she will not oppose our assumption of the protectorate of Zanzibar, and likewise a similar engagement with respect 4;o the Sultanate of Witu, and the long line of coast dependent on Witu to the north. The objects of these stipulations are, of course, to make our influence predominant in these countries. With Witu we have had no ancient connection, but it has become a position of considerable value in consequence of the large tract of country which has been acquired by the British East Africa Company, reaching up from the coast to the Victoria Nyanza Lake. As long as the Sultanate of Witu was in the hands of another Power, there was a possibility of annexations and expeditions to the north of us, which would have cut off British influ-
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  ence and British dominion from the sources of the Nile, from the Lake Albert Nyanza and the valley which lies at the base of the mountains of Abyssinia. The advantage of the acquisition of Witu is that it cuts off any rivalry in this respect, and that, save for the Italian dominion over Abyssinia and its dependencies, we have no rivalry to fear from any European civilised Power until we reach the confines of Egypt. I do not, by any means, say that is an advantage of which all the results will appear immediately, for, as we know, the valley of the Nile is occupied by another Power which is not European and which just at present is not very much inclined to make room for us. But the advantage of limiting our rivalry to an Asiatic or African tribe is one which those who are engaged in these enterprises appreciate very highly. But, in addition to this, we have obtained the promise that Germany will not resist our assumption of the protectorate of Zanzibar, including the Island of Pemba. Zanzibar has 300,000 of a population which has very close commercial connection with our fellow-subjects in India, and the more closely it is brought under our influence the more that commerce is likely to flourish. It lies in the pathway from the Bed Sea to Southern Africa; it must always be a commercial place of the first importance; it maintains an enterprising population and has a fertile soil; and there is no spot in all those waters more valuable to a maritime and commercial nation than Zanzibar and Pemba. But it has also to us a very special interest—that, with the exception of what goes on in the Red Sea, I think all the living slave trade, all the slave trade which is now actually in operation, goes upon that sea and is fed by the Arab traders from Pemba and Zanzibar, and the closer our influence over the Government of the Sultan becomes, the more we may hope we shall succeed in that great effort for which this country has sacrificed so much—the effort to destroy the slave trade and gradually to extirpate domestic slavery. I believe that in that effort we shall have a thorough support from the present enlightened Sultan of Zanzibar. We have every ground to believe that he sympathises with us in this respect, and the relations in which we will now stand under the new

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  arrangement to that ruler will very much facilitate our task. But what it is important your Lordships should observe is that the only impediment to our complete influence in Zanzibar was the counter influence of Germany. Germany had a power in the Court of Zanzibar owing to the settlements it occupied on the mainland and the rights it had acquired over the Zanzibar coast; and however friendly the relations of the two Governments have always been, it nevertheless must inevitably be the case where two nationalities are struggling for the mastery that the struggle is not entirely destitute of the elements either of irritation or of danger. It has been said that in taking back our influence at Zanzibar we have only undone what we ourselves had previously done—that we gave to Germany her power over Zanzibar and are taking it back again, and I think that in the observations of Lord Rose bery the other night there was a considerable trace of that impression. [The Earl of ROSE-BEKY: Hear, hear!] That is not the case. I think it is well that anybody, in considering the recent history of Africa, should take notice of the enormous change which has taken place in the attitude of this and other countries towards it during the last 10 years. Up to 10 years ago we remained masters of Africa practically, or the greater part of it, without being put to inconvenience by protectorates, or anything of that sort, by the simple fact that we were masters of the sea, and that we have had considerable experience in dealing with the native races. So much was that the case that we left enormous stretches of coast to the native rulers in the full confidence that they would go on under native rulers, and in the hope that they would gradually acquire their own proper civilisation without any interference on our part. Then suddenly we found out that that position, however convenient, bad no foundation whatever in international law. We had no rights over all these vast stretches of coast both on the West and East Coast of Africa. We bad no power of preventing any other nation from coming in and seizing a portion of them, and the noble Lord opposite, Lord Granville, was suddenly confronted with a demand on the part of Germany, first on one part of the African coast and then on another part of the African coast, to be allowed to occupy
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  enormous stretches of territory which, up to that time, had been looked upon as practically under the protection of England. I do not mention this as complaining of the noble Lord for the decision he took. On the contrary, I think it was a necessary decision. It was impossible that England should have the right to lock up the whole of Africa, and say that nobody should be there except herself; and I think that the noble Lord opposite arrived at a correct solution of the difficulty, when he frankly allowed that Germany as well as England should take part in the task of developing the vast untrodden fields of Africa, making them into new outlets for colonisation by the excessive population at home, and new fields of industry and trade. But I only demur to the statement made that I did it. It was entirely settled before we came into office. I may be allowed, as the noble Earl cheered what I said just now, to read a passage bearing on this point. On May 5, 1885, Count Müns'er makes this Report on the occasion of Count Bismarck's last visit to London. I am reading from a Parliamentary Paper—
  "The English Government, on their part only expressed a wish that we should not call in question the sovereignty of the Sultan over the coast. They further admitted that there was no intention of opposing or running counter to our claims for colonisation in the interior opposite Zanzibar."
  That was what happened. A large portion of the interior opposite Zanzibar was occupied during the early part of that year. Then came the question of what the territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the coast really were. There was considerable discussion upon this point, and it was resolved to appoint an International Commission, which should report what the Continental possessions of the Sultan of Zanzibar were. They went out, they examined, and they reported. On some things they were all agreed; on others they were disagreed; and the noble Earl Lord Rose bery was asked whether he would accept the decisions upon which they were all agreed. He declined to do that, but he said that he was very well disposed towards them. Lord Iddesleigh came into office in August of the same year, and in October of the same year he signed an Agreement practically confirming the unanimous

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  decision of those Commissioners. Of course, I am not now speaking in respect of the line of influence as between Germany and England; I am speaking of the demarcation of the territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and in respect to them I maintain, though I am not complaining of what was done, that we had no special responsibility. Now, my Lords, I have pointed out the advantages which I think will come from the closer bonds which, under the proposed arrangement, will bind the Sultan of Zauzibar and the Sultan of Witu to us and the coast that is depandent on them. But that is not the whole of the African question. It is not the part of it which first gave rise to these negotiations. I think our negotiations arose, in the first instance, from a number of disputed points, but really the matter which occupied the greatest attention, both in Germany and in England, was the decision as to which Power was to inherit the territory which lay inland—the territory South of Lake Tanganyika and the territory to the North of that Lake. I need not describe to you, because I have sufficiently described it in a Despatch which was laid on the Table, the decision to which we ultimately came. The German Government reposed themselves entirely on the doctrine that the interior of the country belonged to those who had the coast. We had, at all events, in regard to the country South of Lake Tanganyika, claims resting upon Livingstone's exploration, resting on the work of a large number of mission stations where our missionaries had worked devotedly for a great number of years, and resting also on the efforts and struggles of commercial companies who had done their best to develop trade and to keep the slave trade at bay in those regions. The result, as your Lordships know, is that Germany gave way to us on the South of Lake Tanganyika and we admitted her claims on the North of Lake Tanganyika. On the North of Lake Tanganyika we had nothing to advance in answer to the argument which she based on the possession of the coast. We had no settlements, no experience of missionaries, or of merchants, and, therefore, the argument advanced by Germany was not easy to be refuted, and we could not have resisted it without abandoning the Agreement altogether. I think there
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  has been only one strong criticism adverse to that Agreement. It has arisen from a very curious idea, which has become very prevalent in this country, that there is some special advantage in having a stretch of territory extending all the way from Cape Town to the sources of the Nile. Now, this stretch of territory North of Lake Tanganyika could only have been a very narrow one. It could not have been obtained without absolutely breaking off the agreement altogether. Germany absolutely declined to be hemmed in by our territories to the sea, and insisted on communication at some point or other with the Congo State. But what possible advantage should we have derived from the possession of, or rather the claim of possession to, a narrow strip of territory stretching for a hundred miles from the North of Lake Tanganyika into the territory that is under British influence? It is said that it would have been the trade route. I cannot imagine any trade going in that direction. Trade seeks either for a navigable river or the sea; trade does not willingly go across a continent. If there was trade coming up from the Congo district, across to the north of Lake Tanganyika, it would make for the sea as rapidly as it could. But if yon look beyond the merely commercial considerations to those which are of a strategic character, I can imagine no more uncomfortable position than the possession of a narrow strip of territory in the very heart of Africa three months' distance from the coast, which should be separating the forces of a powerful Empire like Germany and the Congo State, which is, at all events, in the hands of another European Power. Without any advantages of position we should have had all the dangers inseparable from its defence. We should have had merely those advantages of situation which may be supposed to belong to the function of a buffer. The only other objection to our arrangement in the interior of Africa is rather of a similar kind. Ear away from the country of which I have been speaking, in the south-west, in the year 1885, I think it was, or 1884, Germany had taken possession of a vast territory called Namaqualand and Damaraland, of which the inner boundaries were only imperfectly determined. As far north, I think, as latitude

  1269
  22°, they were determined, but north of that there was no fixed line. They claimed to go as far east as longitude 24°. In these matters we can only deal with latitude and longitude as indications of frontier. We have, in the course of the negotiations, induced them to accept longitude 21° instead of 24°, hut it was accompanied by a condition to which a certain amount of exception has been taken, and that is, at the very north of this Damaraland territory they should have a strip of territory going along the Portuguese border, and giving them direct access to the River Zambesi. It was not an unnatural demand, but I never was able to understand what the objections were that have been raised on several sides. Again, we are told that it would interfere with the progress of trade; but it is the last route in the world by which trade can pass. It is at the head of the waters of all the affluents of the Chobe and the Zambesi, over an impracticable country, and leading only into the Portuguese possessions, into which, as far as I know, during the last 300 years there has been no very eager or impetuous torrent of trade. I think that the constant study of maps is apt to disturb men's reasoning powers. Certainly the enthusiasm which has been evoked for this desolate corner of Africa has surprised me more than anything else in this controversy. "We have had a fierce conflict over the possession of a lake whose name I am afraid I cannot pronounce correctly—I think it is Lake Ngami—our only difficulty being that we do not know where it is. We cannot determine its position within 100 miles, certainly not within 60 miles, and there are great doubts whether it is a lake at all, or only a bed of rushes. I am very anxious that full scope should be given to the enterprise of men who have undertaken concessions in that country from a well-affected chief named Moremi; and I think that the whole country of Moremi has been retained within the British sphere. But when I hear the language that is used, the hopes that are entertained, and the extraordinary reasoning as to the future which is based upon them, I cannot help thinking of similar language and similar dreams entertained by our ancestors some 300 years ago connected with the well-known projects for reaching the land of E1 Dorado. I
  1270
  hope and believe that this is only language, and that the practical sense of our countrymen will not lead them to take for absolute gospel all that has been said on the subject of these countries; for the last few months. I will not trouble your Lordships now with one or two other arrangements in other portions of that part of Africa or the delimitations of territory which have been made there. If I were to do so I believe my noble Friend opposite, Lord Aberdare, would be the only person who would understand me, and I think I may therefore venture to pass them by. But I will say that during these negotiations it occurred tome more than once that it might be wiser to break them off altogether and to allow the years to pass over us until the natural progress of emigration and civilisation and the struggle for existence should have determined in a far more effective way than can be done by Protocols and Treaties who are to be supreme, and in what part of that vast continent each nation is to rule. But, on reflection, we could not convince ourselves that that, though far the most comfortable course, would be our duty, because in the front of this advancing tide of colonisation there are-numbers of men of both nationalities—men of energy and strong will, but probably not distinguished by any great restraint over their feelings—who would be urging, in every part where rivalry existed and the two Powers touched, the claims of each nation to supremacy in each particular bit of territory, pressing them upon the natives, getting from native chiefs Treaty after Treaty, each Treaty conflicting with the other, and trying to establish by means which must constantly degenerate into violence the supremacy of that nation for which they were passionately contending. In such circumstances, whatever the friendliness of the Government at home, some friction and collisions could not be averted. The Governments of Germany and England have been on the most friendly terms, and I think have been able to impart at least a considerable portion of their own friendliness and moderation to those who served under them, but it is impossible to impart it to those not under their control, though they share-our nationality, and are keen for the object which we also desire. It is im-

  1271
  possible to restrain them. It is impossible to prevent the danger of collisions, which., might be murderous and bloody; and then when those collisions took place, the echo of them would be heard here, they would be recounted and magnified in newspapers in both countries, they would be pressed upon popular passion until even the Governments themselves might not be able to resist the contagion of the feeling evoked. The happy sympathy and agreement which exist between the two Governments, and which I trust may long exist, would naturally be exposed in no limited time to very serious risks if we had allowed to remain undecided the many causes of conflict and the many questions of territory and right which had arisen in various parts of the continent between the two countries, and especially in the island of Zanzibar, where we should have been brought to close quarters, and where many questions of difficulty would have arisen. I fear that if the existing state of things had gone on the harmony of the two countries might not be long maintained. My Lords, I commend this Agreement to your approval, not as pretending that we have gained or that Germany has gained any great advantage. I believe we have gained on both sides advantages, because each has obtained what suited its own purposes, and of which it could make the most valuable use. I think we have each obtained what is most advantageous to us, but I do not pretend that either country has gained any advantage over the other. What I believe is that we have come to a common agreement which will remove all danger of disunion and conflict between us, and which will cement, I hope for a long time, the good feeling of those who by sympathy, by interest, and by descent, ought always to be friends.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: My Lords, I am sure it is the wish of those who sit beside me on this Bench to acknowledge in the fullest and the freest manner the fair and conciliatory statement which the noble Marquess has laid before the House, and certainly it is not our wish to pick small holes in an Agreement of this Fast character. If it were, as the noble Marquess said in his concluding remarks,
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  a one-sided Agreement, in which: one side had got all the benefit and the other was conscious only of loss, that Agreement would have no chance of being permanent, and, in my opinion, would be a greater misfortune than no Agreement at all. But perhaps it may be permitted when one looks back a few years to envy, for a moment, the powers of pungent sarcasm enjoyed by the noble Marquess, and to reflect without acrimony on what would have been said if Mr. Gladstone's Government had submitted an Agreement of this description to the House. I do not wish, however, to pursue that subject, and in all that I desire to say—and it will not be long—I only wish to put forward one or two points of not, I hope, unfriendly criticism of the Agreement, and not to carp at or cavil with an arrangement which must in any case, to whomsoever falls the advantage, conduce so largely to the present and future friendship of two great countries. Now, my Lords, I take it that the noble Marquess has put the case very clearly before us in stating that in exchange for the cession of Heligoland, which, of course, in itself is a strange and unusual incident, the main compensation we have received is in connection with Zanzibar. It is with those two points that I propose mainly to deal this evening. I do not wish in any detail to deal with this vast Agreement for mapping out and apportioning Africa, which, to many, forms the central point of interest. My feeling as regards this Agreement is this: that, as the noble Marquess said on a former occasion, we should have larger maps in order to appreciate their importance, and also that on this vast continent there is ample room for all the colonising nations of the world. But I would make two remarks with respect to these Agreements, and the first is, that whatever their merits may be, they are an entirely new feature in European diplomacy, or rather, they are a revival of that form of apportionment by which Pope Alexander VI. mapped out the new world between Spain and Portugal. Of course, such Agreements may be necessary; they may, as the noble Marquess said, be better than no Agreement at all; but, at the same time, they have their bad side too, and they cannot but produce in many quarters a certain feeling of jealousy and discontent

  1273
  among those nations who are not party to them. I confess I believe it would be to the advantage of all parties if Agreements as to apportionments of this kind could be submitted to some formal Conference or Congress, so that they might receive the sanction of the communities of Europe at large. The second point I would call your Lordships' attention to in connection with them is this: that these apportionments ought not to be taken for more than they are. They bind only the two Powers that are parties to them. If I am right in so thinking, they are rather in the nature of influence than in the nature of possession; they confer rather protection than dominion; and, in that respect, I think some misleading language has been used with regard to this Agreement. I think it was the right rev. Prelate who spoke the other day of the policy which had added an Empire to an Empire, but I think even the noble Marquess would disclaim such language as that; and though the great explorer to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of so much of this territory has used language of that character, I presume it is not to be taken as either diplomatic or exact or political. But I will say this, I do not wish now to deal with the large African questions involved in this Agreement. I desire rather to deal with the two points which are practically before us—the cession of Heligoland and the counter balancing advantage which we are supposed to have received in Zanzibar. With regard to Heligoland, the noble Marquess gave us a most picturesque view of our acquisition of that island, but I think that in some respects his subsequent remarks tended a little to contradict themselves. He is against, as I understand him, consulting the inhabitants of a place which we hold for belligerent purposes; and, on the other hand, he tells us there are no belligerent advantages in Heligoland. I do not quite understand how he can reconcile those two statements. But I come to the point of what the strategic value of Heligoland really is. I do not think that we on this side have any theoretical objection to the cession of territory, quâ cession of territory, if the general advantage of the Empire results there from. But I think we have a right to demand that one or two con-
  1274
  ditions shall be fulfilled, and one of those conditions is that in an island which, after all, is so near our shores, we should be quite sure that we are not giving away any military or naval advantage which is essential to us. Well, I confess I never meddle with the opinions of naval or military experts. Those opinions of naval and military experts must rest upon their own foundation and be judged according to their intrinsic merit. But we have never seen the opinions of the naval and military experts on this occasion. I believe they have been confided by the First Lord of the Treasury in another place to an indiscreet follower, who only gave us an appetite for more by alluding to them on a postcard to one of his constituents. At any rate, I think we may refer back to a Despatch written by Admiral Russell in 1807 when he took the island. He said that—
  "With a small expense this island could be-made a second Gibraltar; it is a key to the Rivers Ems, Elbe, Weser, Wesel, and Meuse."
  I do not say this convinces me in the slightest degree, but I say that, in the absence of opinions of existing naval and military authorities it is almost all we have to depend upon. But we have other opinions, not exactly naval and military, but traditional in their character, which may help us in this connection, and, as the noble Marquess has chosen to unite the questions of the belligerent importance of Heligoland and the wishes of the inhabitants, I must say I am not aware that any of us on this side of the House would wish that a plebiscite should be taken of the wishes of the Heligolanders in regard to this cession, whether they wished to be parted from this Empire or not. But we do hold as a condition of the proper consideration of a question like this that the opinions of the inhabitants of any part of the Empire which we think it necessary for Imperial motives to dissever ourselves from should not be so absolutely disregarded as they have been, so far as we know, in the present transaction. The noble Marquess the other day, when pressed upon this point, said that he had ascertained the wishes of the inhabitants. I do not pretend to have ascertained the wishes of the inhabitants myself, but we have as yet failed to find out exactly how the

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  noble Marquess arrived at the conclusion which, he has confided to us. All the rumours which we have heard are adverse to the notion that the wish of these people is that they should be dissevered from this Empire, under which they have enjoyed such great benefits. I know it is said that they are only a population of 2,000, and what does the feeling matter of a population of 2,000 in a transaction of this kind? I want to know what is the test of population which you are to apply to the patriotism of the various peoples of this Empire. If you say that 2,000 is a limit which is not to be considered, you have two of the Channel Islands, one of which has a smaller population than 2,000, and the other hardly reaches a quarter of that population. But I go a little further than that, and I say, whether you have 2,000 souls or one soul, you have some right to be considered in the transfer of your person and the territory in which you live from the flag under which you were born. I venture to say that the noble Marquess himself, great as is his power and his abilities, is only one person and one soul, and I do not think that he would very much care to be transferred against his will with the territory in which he lives to the dominion of a foreign Power. But I do not wish to dwell at all upon or to bandy words with the noble Marquess as to what he thinks the wishes of the Heligolanders may be in this matter. I think we have information of a character which the noble Marquess himself will admit to be authentic with regard both to the strategic value of Heligoland and the wishes of the Heligolanders. In a speech which was delivered in 1885 a distinguished Member of Her Majesty's Government said—
  "He had listened to the speech of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Gorst) with some surprise"
  —the Government was apparently rather divided upon the question at that time.
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We were then in opposition.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: Quite so; but evidently the present Members of the Government, unless they have since very much changed their opinions, were very much at issue on that point—
  "For there was a most extraordinary omission in that speech. The hon. and learned Member
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  had spoken of the ardent desire of the German people to have possession of Heligoland, but he had quite forgotten to refer to the feelings of the Heligolanders upon this point. He was satisfied that there was no desire on the part of the people of Heligoland for the proposed annexation. They had prospered and thrived under English rule, and he was certain they did not desire to come under German rule or German Law, including conscription for military service. He was not prepared to sacrifice these people for the purpose of pleasing and conciliating the German people, however desirable it might be to do so. The hon. and learned Member had stated that from a strategical point of view Heligoland was no use to this country. He was disposed to contradict that opinion even upon the hon. and learned Member's own statement as to the position of Heligoland, but he had the honour of having served on a Royal Commission on Colonial Defences and the Protection of Trade, and although their proceedings and the Report were strictly confidential, yet it would be no breach of that confidence to say that, at all events, some persons of experience entertained contrary views to that of the hon. and learned Member."
  I am not prepared to go so far as that speech, but that is the speech of the present Secretary for the Colonies, under whose amiable and genial rule Heligoland is at present existing, and I hope that at some later moment of the Debate he will give us some explanation of what it is that has caused him to change his views, both as to the strategical importance of Heligoland, and as to the wishes of the Heligolanders. On the same occasion we have another Member of the present Government, Sir M. Hicks Beach, to the fore, saying—
  "He was much astonished when he saw the notice of Motion of his hon. and learned Friend, which appeared rather as a trap for Her Majesty's Government,"
  —if Sir Michael Hicks Beach could have foreseen the present condition of things, he would have known what Government it was a trap for—
  "And he congratulated them that they had escaped the snare. He was very glad that the proposal had practically received no support in the House. As to the point that the island was of no use to us, it had been shown by the noble Lord and others, who had taken part in the Debate, that Heligoland was of great importance to our fisheries in the North Sea. As to the feelings of the people of Heligoland, when he was at the Colonial Office, so far from there being any desire on their part to sever themselves from the British Empire, they were exceedingly well pleased to be connected with England rather than with Germany."
  My Lords, I do not think I can add anything to the weight of those opinions, or

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  to the pungency and force with which they are expressed. They are all, I venture to say, practical upon the point whether the island of Heligoland is of strategical importance, and as to whether the wishes of the Heligolanders should he in any degree consulted on the subject of their transfer. There is another condition which I think, in the opinion of the people of this country, would attach to any such cession of territory as has been made in this instance, and that is, that there should be no breach of faith on our part. Now, I cannot say whether there has been any breach of faith here or not; but it is asserted that by the 10th Article of the Capitulation of 1807 it was provided that the natives of Heligoland should be permanently exempted from any naval service in the future. Whether that pledge has been given, and whether, if given, it has been safeguarded by the noble Marquess in the present Agreement, is a point upon which we shall no doubt receive information farther on. As to that Capitulation, I may say that my interest in it is not newly sprung from the incidents of the cession. I moved for a copy of that Capitulation in this House in 1876, and I remember that my noble and lamented Friend Lord Carnarvon—whom I cannot mention on a subject like this without expressing what I am sure has been the feeling of the whole House during the past fortnight as to the loss this House has sustained through his untimely death—refused to give me that Capitulation, because he said it contained much perilous matter. In consequence, I have never been able to trace or see that document. I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be more liberal now that Heligoland is about to pass away from us. I suppose the least condition that any Parliament would be disposed to attach to a cession of this kind is that we should receive adequate and ample compensation for a sacrifice not so much of territory as of amour propre. Well, the equivalent for the cession of Heligoland is to be found, we know, in Zanzibar. The noble Marquess has devoted some attention to what I have said on the subject of Zanzibar. I insinuated something and I cheered something else the noble Marquess said; and from that the noble Marquess drew something of a most portentous kind.
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  Let me see what I really did say. I said that "the Sultanate of Zanzibar, which the noble Marquess is now acquiring by the cession of Heligoland is not by any means the Sultanate of Zanzibar which we left behind us when we left office in 1886." I must complain a little, I confess, of the language of the noble Marquess on this subject. We were left until the day these Papers appeared with nothing but the Despatch of the noble Marquess to guide us with regard to the Agreement into which he had entered. In that Despatch to Sir E. Malet of the 14th of June, 1890, the noble Marquess says—
  "England will further assume, with the consent of the Sultan of Zanzibar (which has been given), the exclusive protectorate over that Sultanate, including the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba."
  That I felt to be good news. I did not know much about the rest of the Agreement, but I ventured, in order to make assurance perfectly sure, to place a question on the Paper asking exactly what was meant by the "Sultanate of Zanzibar," but being oh that afternoon occupied with the more august duties of the London County Council, I had to ask my noble Friend Lord Kimberley to put that question for me. The question was this:—
  "The exact meaning of the expression 'Sultanate of Zanzibar' used in Lord Salisbury's Despatch of June 14th, 1890?"
  The noble Marquess answered that
  "The word 'Sultanate' bears the same relation to Sultan as the word 'monarchy' does to monarch. The protectorate of Zanzibar means the protectorate over the territory which is under the government of the Sultan of Zanzibar or under his suzerainty."
  Well, that is a perfectly clear statement. That means Zanzibar and Pemba and some 500 or 600 miles of coast, though only of a depth, it is true, of 10 miles on the mainland, which are all under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The noble Marquess made this more clear in a subsequent answer, in which he said that this sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over these hundreds of miles of mainland was perfectly clear and undisputed, but, by a somewhat unfortunate metaphor, as I think, he added that for a part of it the Sultan of Zanzibar had in the German Empire a tenant who understood his relations to the Sultan somewhat more in the way that tenancies are

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  understood in the Sister Island than as they are regarded in this country. Then, my Lords, we had arrived at this point. From the Despatch we knew that we were to take over the protectorate of the whole Sultanate of Zanzibar, and also from the noble Marquess we had got a definition that the word "Sultanate" implied everything over which the Sultan of Zanzibar had sovereignty or suzerainty. We had, further, this concession from him—that the whole of the coast line opposite to Zanzibar was held under that Sultan's suzerainty. Surely the conclusion was irresistible—we came naturally to the conclusion that all that line of coast which we left under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar when we left Office in 1886 was to be transferred to the protectorate of the British Crown by this Agreement. My Lords, what is the case? We gain information only by instalments, and though we thought the information satisfactory as far as it went, our anxiety was rudely put an end to by the publication of the Treaty. Not merely does the Treaty not give us anything of the kind; not merely does the Treaty in a most emphatic way contradict the statement of the noble Marquess in his covering Despatch, but it actually makes out that so far from assuming this protectorate, we are to assist in every way the transfer of the whole of the territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the mainland opposite the island to Germany. What are the words of the Treaty? Article 11 of the Treaty says—
  "Great Britain engages to use all her influence to facilitate the friendly arrangements by which the Sultan of Zanzibar shall cede absolutely to Germany his possessions on the mainland comprised in existing concessions to the German East Africa Company and their dependencies, as well as the Island of Mafia."
  No protectorate; but he "shall cede absolutely to Germany" his possessions on the mainland. I venture to say that, under those circumstances, the expression used by the noble Marquess in his Despatch was not one that was accurate, or that was calculated to convey a real impression of Article 11.
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Have you a copy of the Despatch?
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: Yes, I have marked the passage. Therefore, I think under these circumstances it
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  is not an illegitimate conclusion to arrive at that the sultanate of Zanzibar has suffered material detriment since we left Office in 1886. But the noble Marquess resents that conclusion. He says—
  "I do not think any diminution of the prestige or the power of the Sultan of Zanzibar can be laid to our charge."
  The diminution of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, as far as it is diminished on the coast at all, is, I am afraid, rightly or wrongly, entirely the work of the noble Marquess, and, therefore, I cannot understand his using the language of injured innocence with regard to that transaction. But I am not disposed to rest this matter entirely on figures or Treaties alone. We have had the advantage of the indiscretion of one of the most remarkable Members of the Government, though he has since ceased to be a Member of the Government—the noble Lord who was leader of the House of Commons at the time this course of policy was inaugurated, and who has given us a full, free, and candid, but I think a somewhat indiscreet, revelation of what has taken place in a speech delivered at Birmingham in July, 1889. Lord Randolph Churchill said—
  "Now the price we have paid all along to the German Chancellor since we occupied Egypt for the support of the German Government in our policy there has been one concession after another to the colonial policy of Germany. Now the colonial policy of Germany is essentially an aggressive policy. I will give you one instance of the price which we paid for the support of the German Government in Egypt. It happened at a lime when I was in the Government, and in saying what I do I do not wish to blame the Government; or if the Government is to be blamed, I take as much blame on myself as being a part of it as may be necessary or proper. But this is what took place. The support of the German Government in Egypt was necessary to our policy. The German Government had designs on Zanzibar. Our position there at that very moment was one of immense value and strength."
  That was when we left Office in 1886.
  "The whole of the tribes of that part of Africa were under our influence, and were looking up to us, and were determined to be guided by us. We held at Zanzibar the key to all the commercial development of the great African territory. Well, in order to gain. Prince Bismarck's support for our Egyptian police we had to give up our position of predominance at Zanzibar. We practically ruined almost, but certainly most seriously damaged ourselves with that part of Africa, the commerce of which, at that time, was valued at

  1281
  upwards of.£3,000,000 a year. And we know perfectly well that the state of that part of Africa at the present moment, owing to German designs and owing to German enterprise, is one of utter confusion, utter insecurity, and one where commercial relations cannot, possibly tranquilly prevail. Now that is one price we had to pay for the Egyptian policy."
  He goes on to make some remarks with regard to the Government policy as to Samoa which I will not read at this moment, but which are not devoid of interest to those who have followed the course of events in that island. I think I have proved, out of the month of the noble Marquess himself, from his own Treaty, and out of the mouth of his own Colleague the Leader of the House of Commons at the time of the Treaty concluded by Lord Iddesleigh in October, 1886, that there has been a considerable diminution in the prestige and influence of the Sultan of Zanzibar under the auspices of the present Government. And I think I will go a little further than that. I will lay down this position—that if, by the cession of the island of Heligoland, we are as the noble Marquess has told us, receiving as our equivalent the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, we are only by this cession of British territory—which is, with Malta and Gibraltar, our only remaining European asset from the great war with Napoleon and France, which cost us about a thousand millions and, innumerable lives—we are only re-acquiring a small portion of what the Government of Mr. Gladstone left behind them under the full control of Great Britain. I do hot 'think that this is of itself an overwhelming position, but it certainly puts the concession in a grave light. But I will return to the phrase of the noble Marquess, to which I attach so much importance, and take this Agreement from a different point of view. He says that—
  "England will further assume, with the consent of the Sultan of Zanzibar (which has been given) the exclusive protectorate of that Sultanate, including the islands of Zanzibar and pemba, and that this assumption will he made with the full concurrence of Germany."
  What I have to ask about that is—When did France disappear from the position of a Guaranteeing Power with regard to Zanzibar? We are told that Germany has given her consent and that the Sultan of Zanzibar has been pleased to give his consent, but neither the Sultan nor Germany are the guaranteeing
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  Powers at Zanzibar. The two Guaranteeing Powers are England and Francer: and the solemn pledges that we made by the Mutual Declaration which was signed at Paris, on March 10th, 1882, to respect the independence of the Sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat appear, as far as we can gather from the Papers laid on the Table, and from the expository speech of the noble Marquess, in which the name of France was not once mentioned, to be treated as absolutely non-existent. My Lords, I consider this to be rather a grave matter. I do not know whether the noble Marquess is negotiating with France or not for her consent. I only know what I read in the papers, and it is no part of my duty to believe implicitly all that I read. But I think it would have been more graceful and more conciliatory to the dignity of a great Power, with which we have always been in the most friendly relations, if, in a transaction of this kind, transferring the protectorate of a territory with regard to which that Power and ourselves are the only Guaranteeing Powers, some mention had been made of that other Power in this transaction. So entirely was that position of France recognised in regard, to Zanzibar that the Commission of Delimitation to which the noble Marquess has referred, which was set on foot in order to ascertain the real dominions of Zanzibar, was really see on foot to enable Germany to become a third Guaranteeing Power, there being then only two. Therefore, my Lords, I must add this to my description of the exchange which has been effected of Heligoland for this protectorate of Zanzibar, that we are not only re-purchasing a portion of what we had in 1886, but that we are only re-purchasing it subject to the consent of another Power, which has not yet been given, as far as I know. But I am not sure that I have even yet done with the qualifications which I must attach to the triumphant announcement of the noble Marquess. By Article 11 he is going to facilitate the complete arrangements by which Germany is to get possession of the territory on the mainland. Germany will receive the acquisitions referred to in Article 11 of the Treaty in full and fair freehold, so to speak. Our protectorate, if I am not misinformed, will be by no means of this fair freehold description that attaches to

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  the position of Germany. Our protectorate will be, more or less, subject to all the commercia£Treaties entered into by the Sultan of Zanzibar, and will be subject also to that extra-territorial jurisdiction of Foreign Powers which has caused us so much trouble in Egypt and elsewhere. We must, I am afraid, therefore, attach this further qualification to the description of the noble Marquess—that we are ceding Heligoland in order to obtain at Zanzibar partially now what we had altogether in 1886, subject to the consent of France, and subject to all the restrictions which have been placed by Foreign Powers, at different times, on the full and free action of that Sultan. I shall not ask your Lordships to consider this Agreement any further this evening. I have thought it right to lay before you the view I hold, that it is by no means the triumphant arrangement which it has been claimed to be by the organs of the opposite Party. There may be counterbalancing advantages for us in the "Empire that will be added to an Empire," in the 650,000 square miles which Mr. Stanley says are now open to the Anglo-Saxon race. Your Lordships understand that I am not now dealing with vast intangible regions; I am dealing now with very tangible interests. We have handed over Heligoland and its people, like chattels, to a Foreign Power, and in exchange we have received this extremely qualified and diminished concession, which I have described in detail. It may be thought that this is an Agreement to which we in this House and in the other House should offer open and persistent opposition. But I confess, for my part, I shall offer no such opposition. It would be futile, if I wished to do so, in the present condition of our Party in this House; but if there were behind me, instead of 30, 300 Peers, my attitude in this respect would be exactly the same. In the first place I believe that the Agreement might have been considerably modified for the better, but having been made, and having been accepted by Germany, it would plunge us into the worst possible relations with Germany if the arrangement were not now consented to, or if it were now to be cancelled or withdrawn. I set far more value and importance on our good understanding with a great Power than I do on points of detail, however important, that may be
  1284
  found in an Agreement of this kind. But I confess that, while I am one of those who have always most stoutly and persistently urged that this country should establish the closest and best relations with the united Empire of Germany, and I did so long before I was at the Foreign Office, I do not see that that precludes our paying due and friendly respect to that other great Power with which we nave always striven to be in the most friendly relations, and which, in my view, should have been consulted on this occasion. That is one other good reason for having nothing further to say in opposition to this Treaty. But there is a larger reason still to which I attach personally more importance than that; and it is this—I, for one, will never be party to dragging the foreign policy of this country into the arena of Party warfare. I attach infinitely more importance to our preserving a dignified and united attitude abroad, than to any petty advantage we can gain at home. 1, for one, will never raise my voice by the utterance of a syllable, I will never give a single vote, unless under a major force than any that exists in this instance, which might diminish by one jot or tittle the supreme influence and position of Great Britain in the world.
  *THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Lord KNUTSFORD): My Lords, I should have thought it unnecessary, after the eloquent speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, to interfere with reference to what, after all, is an almost personal matter; but the noble Earl has directly challenged me to explain away a speech I made in March, 1885, in the House of Commons. In fact, he has offered me the tempting proposal to eat my own words; but I entirely decline the leek that is offered to me. Your Lordships will see that that speech was made on a Motion for an Address to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to be good enough to induce Germany to take over Heligoland. There was no question then raised as to whether there should be any consideration for the cession of Heligoland, or whether it was to form part of a great arrangement for the settlement of difficulties with a foreign nation, to which the noble Earl and the noble Marquess have referred, and which might lead to grave complications. It

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  was merely a question whether we should cede Heligoland to Germany, in order to please Germany, and to get rid, as far as we were concerned, of a certain amount of useless expenditure. In these circumstances I was of opinion that it was a case in which the Heligolanders might well be consulted. If the only object of giving up Heligoland was to please Germany, or to relieve ourselves of a certain expenditure, I thought, and venture still to think, it would only be reasonable for us to consult the wishes of the Heligolanders. But the circumstances of the present case are entirely different. I am also free to admit that I do not believe there is any strong desire on the part of the Heligolanders to make any change. They have thriven under our rule, and are content to remain under it. As I said on a former occasion, the main reason for my thinking that the Heligolanders would be unwilling to place themselves under Germany was that they objected to naval and military conscription. But, again, the conditions of things is entirely altered. Germany has now agreed to conditions by which any person living at the date of the Agreement will be free from naval and military conscription. We have also secured to the Heligolanders that there shall be no increase of their dues for 20 years. We have secured to them the observance of their customs and laws, as far as possible; and, looking at these conditions, I believe it will be found that the people will readily come under the German Sovereign whose subjects have already for many years been their best customers. One observation only upon another part of that speech. The noble Earl has pointed out that I, as a Member of a Royal Commission, had referred to persons of experience having expressed opinions different from those of Sir J. Gorst. I would observe in the first place that Sir J. Gorst said that Heligoland was of no value whatever, and could not be so in any circumstances. I ventured to differ from him; I thought that, under certain circumstances, it might be of some value; but, speaking on the spur of the moment, and without reference to books, I exaggerated, unintentionally, the evidence that had been given before the Royal Commission. I find, on closer examination, that there had not been
  1286
  several persons of experience who believed in the strategical importance of the place, but only one, and he did not come up to be cross-examined before the Commission, but his opinion was only stated in a letter. My Lords, I really feel that I ought to apologise to you for having made these remarks, but I was challenged by the noble Earl to defend what I said. I content myself by pointing out that those observations were made in circumstances altogether different from those which are now presented to your Lordships.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I observed when my noble Friend Earl Rosebery sat down, after his extremely able, and, at the same time, moderate speech, that the Prime Minister signed to my noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies to get up; and he seemed to be a little reluctant to do so.
  *LORD KNUTSFORD: I am afraid that is not exactly the case. I asked the noble Marquess whether it was necessary that I should offer a few observations.
  EARL GRANVILLE: If that is the case, I can hardly believe that the noble Marquess thinks that the only answer it is necessary to offer on the part of the Government to the criticisms of my noble Friend is merely the explanation which has been given of a speech made by the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies. We have not heard one word of defence of the manner in which the Treaty has been made. My noble Friend quoted what Sir John Gorst said, what Lord Knuts-ford said, and what the present President of the Board of Trade said in 1885. Those are not quite the latest Parliamentary utterances on this subject. Lord Beacons field is quoted to have said that surprise was the great element of success in politics. This certainly has been a surprise to us, not so much as to the cession of Heligoland, as that it should be Her Majesty's present Government who have taken this course. How is it to be explained that, not five years ago, but some five weeks ago, in the House of Commons, the Representative of the Colonial Office made a strong speech exactly in consonance with that of Lord Knutsford in 1885? I have always pointed out the difficulty of the Foreign Secretary's attending to all the duties of Prime Minister; but I should suppose that when a question concerning the

  1287
  Foreign Office is to be asked or discussed in the House of Commons those who have to answer, for the Foreign Office would communicate in some degree with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office as to the answer to be given. Can any greater surprise be shown than that which has followed the argument of the Representative of the Government, forcing, as it were, a large majority of the House of Commons to vote against the principle which has so immediately been abandoned, and is now embodied in this Bill I No answer has been given to the comments made upon the point referred to by the noble Marquess the other day, when he said he had the means of knowing that the Heligolanders were not dissatisfied with the change. All the general information given to us is exactly the reverse. The noble Marquess did not adduce any facts, but said he had reason to believe that the Heligolanders were satisfied, and that, as reasonable people, they ought to be. There is one ground on which it strikes me they might object to their transfer, and that is that people who have been once English subjects do not like to cease to be English subjects. I think that is a reason which might have weighed with the Government. But as for supposing that the Heligolanders are satisfied, because, in the opinion of the noble Marquess, they ought to be satisfied, that appears to be an illusory way of arguing this question. No answer has been given with regard to the Capitulation. I observed that the noble Lord opposite (Lord Knutsford) when my noble Friend Lord Rosebery read out the words that are supposed to be in that Capitulation cheered, and I imagine that cheer signified that they were privileged not to be obliged to serve on board ship. It is said that these Heligolanders are protected, because the noble Lord opposite said that those who are now living are not to be subjected to the conscription. But what is to happen to the children of those living people? Do the parents consent to their children being subjected to conscription, from which they are free now? Reasons of State may justify this transaction, but one would have thought Her Majesty's Government would have felt the strongest possible stimulus to protect the Heligo-
  1288
  landers in the enjoyment of all the privileges that had been secured to them What does the Agreement come to? With regard to English fishermen, their protection is unlimited to all eternity; but with regard to the Heligolanders, the protection is only for a few years. I really think these are points which have a very great bearing upon the question, and call for a reply from the Government. However much we may rejoice, and I rejoice as much as my noble Friend does, that an arrangement has been made on colonial matters with Germany, I cannot but think that this Agreement has been come to in a sudden and impulsive manner. I have never felt any jealousy of German colonization; I believe they will colonise, and the noble Marquess has been good enough to say he thought I was right in conceding a right to Germany to colonise in Africa, and not claiming a monopoly of colonisation on our part. I really believe that the noble Marquess cannot have thought, of the Capitulation until it was brought forward on the present occasion. Nothing has been said in reply to what my noble Friend said about our ignoring the joint guarantee of France. The noble Marquess, gave us an explanation, and, so far as the mere facts go, it was, perhaps, an explanation; but the state of things was this: That when Mr. Gladstone's Government left office our influence in Zanzibar-was supreme, partly owing to our predominant maritime and commercial position, and partly owing to the character of Sir John Kirk, who was removed by the noble Marquess; and our position was supreme in a way of which neither France nor any other Power complained. But that position has been given up. We are now in this position, and I should like really to know whether we are to assent to the cession of Heligoland without being aware whether we can carry out the Treaty or not as to the Protectorate of Zanzibar which we have arranged with Germany. I think that it is a very important thing, if we give up the island, or are in any way deprived of it, to know whether the Government can say that we are in a position at this moment to carry out the guarantee which England and France have agreed upon. I think, considering how desirable it is that this case should stand as well as possible, it is a pity that

  1289
  the Secretary of State for the Colonies did not think it worth while to answer any of the criticisms of my noble Friend, but left the case exactly as it stoood after his speech, without any reassuring reply from Her Majesty's Government.
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I have no reason to be dissatisfied with the reception which the Agreement has received from the noble Lords opposite, though their criticisms have been somewhat minute. The point to which the noble Lord directed attention most was the question of the assent of the Heligolanders, and the security that we were in possession of that assent. I thought that I had explained the other night that, in my judgment, there is no way of being absolutely sure of the assent of the Heligolanders, except by the mode of taking a pl°biscite, but taking a pl°biscite seems to me to be a plan not only singularly alien from all our practice, but also, what is more important, a precedent full of risk and difficulty with regard to other portions of the Empire. Without a pl°biscite it is impossible to know precisely what the people may think—you may form a guess at it, but pou cannot know it. I must say that I have no doubt myself that the population, as a whole, are well disposed towards this change, but the sources from which I have received that impression are necessarily confidential. I should quite agree with the noble Lord that he has no right to be satisfied with that assurance on my part if the assent of the population is an essential part of the agreement. I have tried to establish that a very strong line of distinction is to be drawn between those countries which were originally occupied for purely belligerent purposes and those countries which were occupied for settlement. In the latter case the veto of the population ought to have an enormous weight, but in the other case they must be subordinated to the general considerations affecting the welfare of the Empire where we are dealing with a possession which was originally acquired on purely belligerent grounds. After all, when we talk of the necessity for obtaining the sanction of the population to becoming German subjects, I would remind the noble Lord that they became British subjects entirely without their consent, by the application of pure force, and that, too,
  1290
  within the lifetime of many who are now alive; and, therefore, I think that the doctrine which the noble Earl asserts is exceedingly wide of any doctrine which has been hitherto laid down, and if it was accepted by authority in the first instance would, in regard to matters irrespective of cession, produce signal inconvenience in the administration of the Empire.
  EARL GRANVILLE: The noble Marquess will remember that on the last occasion he did not take ground quite so high as this. He told us that by means of confidential communications he had ascertained that the whole of the Heligolanders were satisfied, but he was not good enough to answer my question as to how that took place, whether those confidential communications were with the islanders or the Executive Council of the island. He did not tell us whom he had consulted, or whether it was the Governor. If so, I should be glad to know whether he consulted the Governor after the Agreement or before it?
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have simply to say in defence of my conduct on a former occasion that I tried very directly to answer the questions, and, therefore, I did not go into the whole ease for the Second Reading of the Bill. I maintain that the duty of the Government in this case is to consider, in the first instance, the Imperial interests committed to their charge; and, in the second instance, to do all they possibly can for the welfare of the population of the ceded territory. I think that we have fulfilled that demand; and, in the third place, we have to consider the circumstances which would determine the views of the population and the motives by which they are likely to be influenced. Absolutely to ascertain what populations think, I maintain, to be impossible except by a pl°biscite, and to imagine that you can obtain it by simply consulting the Executive Council I think would be a very illusory proceeding. The impressions which I hold have certainly not been contradicted by any trustworthy evidence. The manner in which I have arrived at the impressions I have stated, and which have not been contradicted by any trustworthy evidence, I regret to say I am compelled to treat as confidential. I do not know that there is

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  any other point which my noble Friend has pressed upon me for consideration except only the allusions to France. I will briefly say that we have been in communication, and are still in communication, with France, and therefore it is impossible for me to discuss that question. I can only say that I do not put upon the document the interpretation which the noble Earl puts upon it. Then the only other matter is this. The noble Earl apparently maintains such a vigorous look out as to the communications which pass between my noble Friends and myself that it is impossible to conceal that a whisper did pass between me and jay noble Friend. I am glad that the noble Earl has so much detachment of mind and freedom from care that he is able to give so much study to our personal communications.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: I thought the noble Marquess seemed to suggest a reply from the noble Lord.
  *LORD KNUTSFORD: As I was directly challenged I expressed my desire to answer.
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: With respect to the Capitulation in question I do not read it as conferring upon the Heligolanders a parmanent exemption from serving on board Her Majesty's ships, and I do not quite understand by what argument it is proved that if, when their allegiance was forcibly changed, they were told that they should not be forced to serve upon the King's ships, that therefore there is a promise for all time even after they have returned to the same allegiance as the neighbouring province.
  EARL GRANVILLE: Not "returned."
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: They return to the allegiance of the ruler of Schleswig, which they were under in 1807, though several things have happened to Schleswig in the meantime. I can only say I do not read the Capitulation in that sense, and I do not think any person could do so. I do not in the least believe that any Heligolander will think that faith has not been kept with him in respect to that subject.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: My Lords, I think I said by accident that the Capitulation had not been printed. It was some time ago, and I founded my
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  recollection upon a speech of Lord Carnarvon, who refused it to me. I have; since found out that it was printed, and the words of the Article are worth remembering—
  "As it is one of the privileges of the inhabitants of this island"
  —pointing to a privilege that they had enjoyed in the past, or in perpetuity—
  "Not to be obliged to serve on board a King's ship contrary to their inclination, that privilege is to be continued to them.—Agreed."
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I only desire to make one remark, not to prolong the Debate, but I hope the noble Marquess will take one matter into consideration. He told us that he could not state what the communications between the British and the French Governments were. That Iquite understand. It is, of course, impossible to give Parliament information as to negotiations which are now going on; but what I wish to impress upon the noble Marquess and the House is that we shall be placed in an exceedingly strange position if we ratify the Treaty with Germany for the cession of Heligoland to her without having any assurance whatever that we can obtain the Protectorate of Zanzibar, because we shall not know whether France is willing, in face of the guarantee of the independence of Zanzibar which was entered into in 1862, to allow us to exercise that Protectorate which Germany is willing to give us. I do not in; the least desire to embarrass the noble Marquess in his negotiations with France, but only to point out that the position is one of serious embarrassment.
  On Question, agreed to.
  Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed" to a Committee of the Whole House tomorrow.

  EDUCATION CODE (1890) BILL. (No. 157.)
  House in Committee (according to-order); Bill reported without Amendment; and to be read 3a to-morrow.
ORCHARDS RATING EXEMPTION BILL. (No. 149.)
  SUPERANNUATION (WAR DEPARTMENT) BILL.—(No. 118.)
  Read 3a (according to order), and passed.

  INLAND REVENUE REGULATION BILL.—(No. 166.)
  Read 2a (according to order), and committed to a Committee of the Whole House to-morrow.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.