HL Deb 03 July 1890 vol 346 cc643-55
LORD BRASSEY,

in rising to call attention to the state of the Royal Naval Reserve and Artillery Volunteers, and to ask whether officers, seamen, and stokers of the Reserve will be embarked in the fleet during the forthcoming manœuvres, said: My Lords, in putting this question to the Government, with reference to the Naval Reserve, it is not necessary for me to trouble your Lordships with many remarks. It is obvious that in any emergency we must be largely dependent on the Mercantile Marine for the manning of the Navy. The Royal Naval Reserve is an essential element of the Naval Force of the country, for it is impossible to maintain in peace all the men required for the Navy in time of war. There must be a reserve both of officers and of seamen in the Merchant Service. In time of war we should be short of lieutenants, short of experienced engineers and firemen, and short of seamen. The first point which I desire to press on the Admiralty is the necessity of making the lieutenants' list of the Royal Naval Reserve thoroughly efficient. Every officer whose name is retained on the Active List of lieutenants of the Royal Naval Reserve should be capable of doing duty at sea in a junior rank, and every officer whose name is retained upon the Active List should be called upon periodically to serve afloat in Her Majesty's Fleet for a short time or to go through a short course of gunnery in the gunnery establishments of the Navy; that is, on the Excellent or the Cambridge. In the Medical Department it is evident we shall be essentially dependent upon the Mercantile Marine for the supply of experienced men in any time of emergency. On the question of the mobilisation of the Navy, I would mention that last year 3,000 additional stokers were required for service afloat. In point of numbers the reserves in the ports were equal to the demand; but many inexperienced men were embarked, and a severe strain was thrown upon the officers responsible for the effective working of the machinery of Her Majesty's ships engaged in the manœuvres. I would urge that every year reserve stokers should be called out for duty during the annual mobilisation. A certain number of stokers of the Naval Reserve should be called out for service. At present even a limited number of experienced men would be of great value to the raw hands on board the ships and would give useful instruction to the newly-entered men from the naval ports. The arrangements for calling out stokers of the reserves should be worked out in consultation with leading shipowners. In connection with this subject, I would submit to the Admiralty that it is exceedingly desirable to secure for the young engineers, and for the newly-entered stokers of the Navy more opportunities for gaining experience in running powerful machinery at high speeds and for long distances in all states of weather, and I would suggest that arrangements should be concerted with the owners of the finest steamers in the Mercantile Marine by which the young engineers and the less experienced stokers entered for the Navy might be enabled to serve in their finest merchant ships for limited periods. Turning to the seamen of the Naval Reserve, I desire to ask the Government whether it would not be possible that some men from the Reserve should be called out on the occasion of the mobilisation of the Fleet. A short period of service in the Navy occasionally would be valuable to the Reserve men both as a training and as a reminder of the very serious obligations they had taken to serve in the Fleet when called upon; and I venture to add that if they were occasionally called upon for service, it would be an encouragement to them as giving a proof of the confidence felt at the Admiralty in the efficiency of the Naval Reserve. From an Admiralty point of view I hold that the calling out of a certain number of seamen of the Naval Reserve from time to time would be useful both as a test of their efficiency and also as suggesting improvements when weak points are discovered. Now, I will pass on to say a few words with regard to the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. That force was first called into existence when Mr. Goschen was at the Admiralty, and in answer to his appeals to the patriotism of the men both in London and Liverpool. All the admirals who in succession have held the office now so ably filled by Sir George Tryon have reported favourably on the force Patriotic feeling has not been wanting and I think it is no exaggeration to say that in the last year 3,000 additional volunteers might have been enrolled if the Admiralty had been disposed to avail itself of their services. All offers of services were refused, however, by the Admiralty, and mainly, it was assumed, because no scheme had been matured for utilising in any effective way the services of the new force. The consequence is, that the force barely holds its own, and now stands at less than 2,000 men. In many ways the Volunteers might be valuable. They could relieve the coastguard in the duty of watching the coast and transmitting information. They could help to man the coast defence vessels whose crews would be wanted in time of war to make good the wastage in our sea-going battleships and cruisers. Many of the Volunteers could do duty as gunners in a sea-going ironclad. I would strongly urge that the whole question of the organisation of the Naval Volunteers should be carefully considered at the Admiralty with a view to putting the force on a permanent footing; and I have no doubt that upon consideration of the subject, it would be found desirable that the Naval Volunteers should be assimilated rather to the Marine Artillery than to the Seamen Gunners of the Navy. I think the Volunteers should be re-organised and placed on a permanent footing as a corps of Marine Artillery. No doubt the Volunteers have taken a pride in considering themselves a reserve to the Seamen gunners of the Navy, and the changes I suggest might deprive the present force of some of its most enthusiastic members; but I venture to say it is possible to make too large a concession to sentiment. At an earlier period of the Session I had placed on the Paper a notice of Motion with reference to the Colonial Naval Reserves, but on reflection it seems undesirable to press the Admiralty to take any initial steps. It is obviously, however, most desirable that the Colonial Governments should undertake the organisation of Naval Reserves for themselves, and it might be intimated through the proper channels that, should steps be taken for that purpose by the Colonial Governments, the Admiralty are ready, as I feel sure they are, to render them assistance whenever it is sought. I have no wish to impute to the present Admiralty indifference to the Naval Reserves. On the contrary, they have done a great deal to promote the efficiency of that force, and I have much pleasure in making that well-deserved acknowledgment to the Government. I beg to ask the question of which I have given notice.

*LORD SUDELEY

My Lords, I am very glad that this question has been brought forward by my noble Friend, for the subject is one of enormous interest to this country in case of war, and certainly no one is better fitted than Lord Brassey to go into the question. I most cordially concur in everything that has fallen from my noble Friend. It is most desirable, on all grounds, that when the mobilisation of the fleet takes place in the summer of every year a large number of officers and men from the reserves should be brought on board for a certain amount of training. It is very important that we should have as large a contingent as possible of officers, seamen, and stokers so employed. It is most desirable that in time of peace the Navy should be made to harmonise as far as possible with our mercantile marine. It would be very unsatisfactory if, when we had suddenly tr expand our fleets, we should find our Naval reserves in the state, which is so often the case, of raw and untrained levies. I quite agree, as my noble and learned Friend has said, a great many difficulties have been overcome by the Admiralty, and they are very much to be congratulated upon a great deal they have done, and the Admiralty certainly deserve to le specially congratulated upon the arrangements they have made for inducing a number of officers from the merchant navy to serve in our ships for a whole year's training. But, while I say that I should also like to say that I hope they will go a step further, it would be most desirable to have double the number of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants on the list as being held in reserve. There are at present, I believe, 106 lieutenants and 209 sub-lieutenants. That is all very well, but in time of war undoubtedly we should want a very large number of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. I think it most desirable that these numbers should be at least doubled, and I sincerely hope steps will be taken to double them. In regard to our reserve seamen, there is one point which I think has been forgotten, and which I should like to mention. So far as I can understand, we give a retaining fee to our seamen in the Merchant Navy witout taking sufficient care to see that any misconduct would forfeit it, and I have heard a good many times in the Mercantile Marine that the Naval Reserve men are not looked on with satisfaction with which they ought to be looked upon. It frequently happens on large merchant passenger steamers that seamen who belong to the Royal Naval Reserve are apt to give themselves airs and become somewhat troublesome, knowing that, whatever happens, they will have their pay in the Naval Reserve. It appears to me that if a seamen misconducts himself he ought to be taken off the Reserve List. It appears to me that if it were distinctly told them that their retaining fee depended upon the character of their discharges this difficulty might be easily overcome. It is a small matter, but one hears the complaint so constantly that I thought it ought to be mentioned. There is, however, one question of great importance. Your Lordships are aware that our ships are no longer what they used to be. They are, in the present day, nothing more or less than huge gun carriages with an enormous amount of expensive machinery in them, most of them without yards and without sails. I apprehend that, although it is undoubtedly necessary to have a large number of executive officers and men, it is, as my noble Friend said just now, of even greater importance that you should have a large number of competent engineers, mechanics, and stokers ready. If you have not you may depend upon it you will not be able to exert the same force that you otherwise would, and the ships would be absolutely powerless in time of war. No retaining fee whatever is given to engineers or assistant engineers to go into the Reserve. As a matter of fact, there are only at this moment 60 engineers on the list, and instead of there being an inducement to them to take a commission it is a ques- tion rather of money out of pocket. If you look at the mercantile marine there is no doubt you have a splendid reserve of officers of the highest quality and capacity as engineers. In our great passenger ships the engineers are accustomed to very excellent work; they run at high rates of speed; they steam on day after day, and it is very rarely if ever that you hear of any accident happening. This, I think, proves that these men are of undoubtedly high character and ability. My Lords, it seems to me, that it is suicidal in time of peace not to take steps to get more engineers on your Reserve Lists. Undoubtedly there is some truth in the statement that is very often put forward, that in times of war we should have a large number of steamers thrown out of employ, and that we should, therefore, have a great number of men available. That may be true to a certain extent; but, on the other hand, we must remember that we have upon our ships a complicated mass of machinery—in some of our ships there are up to 60 or 70 steam engines, and I apprehend that no engineer could go on board those ships without, for a considerable time, feeling himself adrift. It would take some time before he could know exactly what to do. I hope the Admiralty will really consider this matter, and see whether a considerable extension might not be made in that respect. Then the other question to which I desire to call attention is with regard to our firemen and stokers. In the Navy there has been for some time very great difficulty in obtaining good stokers, and at the time of the two last mobilisations, I understand, it was with the greatest possible difficulty that some of the ships could be got to sea owing to the want of this class of men. The policy of the Admiralty has been to create a small reserve of stokers. There are now 557 stokers on the Reserve List, who receive £5 a year, but never have any training, and it is very doubtful whether they are thoroughly trained stokers or not. The curious thing about these men is that, although as regards other Reserves you take care to test them, call them out and see what they are worth, the stoker is never called out. You pay him £5 a year, and you do not know whether or not he is a competent stoker. Surely it is absolutely necessary that these men should be called out from time to time to see what they really are. In some of our large passenger ships, such as those of the Peninsular and Oriental and other large Steamship Companies, it is the habit to employ in the engine-room, as firemen, natives of the East, who are accustomed to very great heat, and who have no objection to working in the stokehole. It has always appeared to me a great act of cruelty to place Europeans in the stokehold in a hot climate if it could be avoided, and, if you can get men of the kind I have mentioned, it seems to be absolutely unnecessary. The class of natives that have been employed in the P. and O. Service for many years are negroes from Zanzibar, who go to Bombay and are readily obtainable, making excellent stokers. Latterly their numbers have a good deal decreased; but their places have been taken by natives from the Punjab, who have proved themselves eminently fitted for the work. I have made careful inquiries on the subject, and I find that there would be no difficulty in getting large numbers of these Punjab men at Bombay who would be very willing to work in our stokeholds, both in peace time and in war. Of course, it would be necessary in all our ships to have one or two European firemen; but, with this exception, I do not think any ship ought ever to be employed on a foreign station in warm climates unless we have this class of men as stokers instead of Europeans. Indeed, I do not see any reason to anticipate any difficulty if we were to employ these men in all our ships, not only in hot climates, but also in the Mediterranean. It is said that in time of war we could not employ these men; but no one who is acquainted with the Punjabis could think that we should have any difficulty. The Punjabi men are as brave as any in the world, and, provided they understood when they were engaged that they would be employed if there was war, we should have no difficulty whatever. I make these suggestions believing in the enormous importance of the strength of our Naval Reserve and the urgent necessity of harmonising our Navy with the merchant navy, so that in time of war we could easily expand it. They occur to me to be in con- nection with the question asked by my noble Friend, and I sincerely trust when the noble Lord answers on behalf of the Admiralty he will be able to say that they are looking into this question.

THE EARL OF RAVENSWORTH

My Lords, I do not wish to enter upon any long discussion upon this subject, but merely to put one or two questions. I think the House will admit that the two noble Lords opposite have done a valuable public service in directing attention to the condition of our Naval Reserve. We are accustomed in this country to regard it as drawn from the cream of the Merchant Service; but both my noble Friends have pointed out that the conditions of service in the Navy are so different from what they are in the Merchant Service that it is impossible to regard the Reserves as a thoroughly efficient force unless they consist of men who have been brought into contact with the sailors of the Royal Navy face to face with work on board a man-of-war. The handling of one of our battle ships, cruisers, or gunboats requires an experience very different from any that can possibly be obtained on board a merchant vessel of whatever kind. Merchant seamen, therefore, are not fitted without special training for service on board a man-of-war, and unless they are brought into communication as often as possible with the sailors of the Royal Navy. The question which I want particularly to put to my noble Friend who will reply is this, what proportion of the whole number of 18,000 men of the Royal Naval Reserve are called out every year? For without that information it is impossible to know whether the whole force has ever been called out, and unless all are periodically called out and trained on board Her Majesty's ships it is impossible to have a thoroughly effective force. If the noble Lord can tell us what proportion is called out every year we can form our own conclusions as to what number of years would be required for training the whole force. It is important also to know whether in all cases gunnery practice is required to be carried on at sea by the Naval Reserve. Those are two points upon which I should like to have some explanation, and I think the House will admit they are very important ones, in order that we may know whether the Naval Reserve is in that state of efficiency which it ought to be.

*LORD ELPHINSTONE

My Lords, if I fail to meet all the points which have been raised by my noble Friend opposite, I must remind him that it was only at 12 o'clock to-day that I was put in possession of the questions he wished to put to me. Although this question as it stands on the Paper is a very innocent-looking one, as put to me by my noble Friend, it has assumed rather formidable proportions. However, I will endeavour to the best of my ability to reply to the points which have been raised. I will at once say that the importance of the Royal Naval Reserve iss fully appreciated and recognised by the Admiralty, and, in fact, by all parties. It is not difficult to make suggestions that in the abstract appear admirable; but when these suggestions are investigated in detail, they are not found to lead to practical attainable results. We have two classes of Naval Volunteers. The first is the Royal Naval Reserve, a force composed of nearly 20,000 officers and men who have followed the sea as a profession; the second is the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, a force of 2,038 with an entirely different organisation, the members of it being recruited from every profession and trade. In the question, as put by my noble Friend Lord Brassey, he calls attention to the state of those two forces. The state of the Royal Naval Reserve is in every way satisfactory. There has been a steady increase in all the ranks during the last year, as shown by the following figures. There are 558 officers of all ranks, which is an increase of 183 since June, 1889. Of men of all classes there are 19,293, an increase on the year of 267. These figures make a total of 19,851, an increase on the year of 450. It is not intended to embark any of the seamen or stokers of this reserve during the forthcoming manœuvres, but officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who may volunteer will be appointed to ships, and I may mention that up to the present time 15 have volunteered. This is totally independent of the number of Royal Naval Reserve officers, who were allowed to go on board for their annual training in the fleet, and that number, limited to 20, are already serving their year in Her Majesty's ships, namely, five lieutenants, 11 sub-lieutenants, and four engineers. The reason why it is not intended to embark any of the Royal Naval Reserve during the manœuvres is that the embarking section of the coastguard, numbering 1,972, will be embarked, and will be quite sufficient to fill up all the ships employed in the manœuvres without calling out any of the Reserve Forces. It is found in every way advisable to employ our own coastguardmen on board ship. In order to keep this thoroughly reliable and always available reserve in a state of efficiency it is absolutely necessary that they should be embarked every other year. They are the first people we look to to put on board, even before the Royal Naval Reserves. As to the number of inexperienced stokers, to which Lord Brassey has referred, it is not possible suddenly to increase the number of men employed in any one trade unless-there is an extraneous source of supply, and that particularly applies to stokers The number of suitable men in the Mercantile Marine is not considerable, and, indeed, is barely sufficient to meet its own requirements; but satisfactory progress has been and is being made on this point, and it is one which has been occupying really the serious attention of the Admiralty. In the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers there has been an increase of 21 during the last 12 months. The manner in which their services could be most usefully employed in the event of war is a question that has received a great deal of consideration at the Admiralty. One of the difficulties, as I have explained more than once during last Session, is that by the Act of Parliament under which they were enrolled the Admiralty has power to employ them (unless they otherwise consent) only in ships engaged in the defence of the coasts of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and the seas adjacent. Under such circumstances, the Admiralty would naturally hesitate to embark these men on board a ship of war, which might at any moment be ordered on distant service. Lord Sidmouth, who put a question to me on this subject last year, said that the Volunteers were ready to go to any part of the world, and I say all praise to them for that; I have no doubt that Lord Sidmouth was right, and the majority would be actuated by that patriotic sentiment. Lord Brassey suggests the possibility of affiliating them with the Royal Marine Artillery. There is much to be said in favour of such a proposal. I wish I could see the probability of that being carried out, and I think Admiral Sir George Tryon, to whom he referred, is also in favour of that proposal. But I would ask my noble Friend has he ever fairly considered the difficulties—for there would be very serious difficulties—in carrying it out. Has he ever seriously considered those difficulties himself? Of what are the two forces composed? As I have already explained, the Royal Naval Reserve is composed of men who have followed the sea as a profession, both as to officers and men. Among them are to be found some of the very best men in the Mercantile Marine. The Naval Artillery Volunteers, on the other hand, are men enrolled from all professions and trades. Has the noble Lord ever seen Returns of the various professions and trades of which this force is composed? They are very remarkable. The Returns of last December show that it contains members of no fewer than 254 different professions and trades. All good and gallant men, no doubt, but they are not seamen. The class most fully represented is that of clerks, of whom there are 439, and the number of men in any way, however remotely, who are connected with the sea, is under 150. That is the position of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers. It is difficult to mix oil and water, and I would venture to ask whether Lord Brassey does not think that it would be very difficult to get those gentlemen to join the Marine Artillery? I do not know whether the noble Lord has taken any steps to ascertain their feelings in the matter, but I am afraid it would be found that there were difficulties in the way. I stated last year that the Admiralty suggested that the commanding officers of the different divisions of corps or stations should meet and submit a plan by which the services of the Royal Naval Reserves could, in their opinion, be utilised to the greatest advantage. They met in Spring Gardens in June of last year, and they sent in suggestions and submitted their views. I can only say that those suggestions have not been lost sight of; but the matter, involving as it does so many serious considerations, is not one that can be settled without very careful thought. Lord Sudeley has practically put three questions to me. First, whether able-bodied seamen should be given their retaining fee in the Royal Naval Reserve unless they could show good discharges from their merchant ships. When my noble Friend first told me of his intention to put this question I confess it struck me very favourably, but on further consideration of the matter I am not at all so clear about it. This is virtually a proposal to discipline merchant ships through the Royal Naval Reserve, and it might in some cases act very prejudicially on the men themselves. For instance, the captain of a merchant ship might hold the granting of a "good discharge" in terrorem over the seaman, the good discharge might be withheld, and the seaman would in that case lose his retaining fee. The Naval Authorities prefer to judge of the men as they find them for themselves, and I may add that very few complaints, indeed, are received or offences recorded against them. Then the noble Lord asks, in the second place, why Punjabees should not be employed in the Royal Naval Reserve, as they were in the P. and O. Company, as stokers in time of war, and for that purpose be trained in time of peace. It is perfectly true that the P. and O. Company employ Punjabees as stokers, but do all the other great steamship lines follow the same system? I am not at all sure that they do. No doubt for ships exceptionally employed, that is to say, in hot climates, those men would be of use as an addition to the stokehold staff; but does the noble Lord suggest that they should be brought to this country and employed in the Channel? Because, once taken on board ship, they must, of course, go wherever the ship goes, and they would scarcely be able to stand our cold climate. In the years 1887 and 1888 a good deal of correspondence passed between the Colonial Office and the colonies on the subject of raising Royal Naval Reserve forces out there, and in June, 1888, a question on that subject was put to me by Lord Brassey. In my reply I told the noble Lord that the answers received were generally unfavourable, and it was therefore decided to take no further action in the matter. That is really a question which, must rest primarly with the colonies themselves, some of whom, notably Australasian Colonies, have already a very considerable Naval Service of their own. The noble Lord has pointed out that no inducements are held out to engineers to join the Royal Naval Reserve, and that, in the event of war, it would be impossible to obtain them from merchant ships. The noble Lord further said that similar inducements should be held out as to lieutenants, and that engineers should be bound to serve a certain time. The subject of engineers has been very much discussed this year at the Admiralty, and it is intended to somewhat improve their position in the Royal Naval Reserve, and to increase their pay when called out for service. The number of engineers enrolled has considerably increased. During the last year it has increased by 33, or double the increase of last year, and the number of firemen has been increased by 50. As my noble Friend will allow, there are, of course, considerable difficulties to be overcome in reconciling the interests of the State with the interests of individuals. The Admiralty want to get the best men, but the best men are fully employed in the mercantile marine and elsewhere. Shipowners, of course, have a difficulty in sparing them, because their ships are hardly ever at rest; and if the men left their ships, even for a short time, to meet Admiralty requirements for training, their places would at once be filled up, and their professional interests would suffer materially, to an extent far beyond any advantages the Government could offer. The only other point to be mentioned, I think, is that all officers and men enrolled in the Royal Naval Reserve, or Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers, are bound to serve when called out. The noble Earl, Lord Ravensworth, put two questions to me just now, but I am afraid I am not in a position to answer them at present. He will see that the question put to me by the noble Lord opposite did not lead me to expect that I should be asked those two questions, but I will endeavour to get him the information if he desires it. I should not like, by attempting to answer them off hand, to perhaps mislead him.

House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.