SECOND READING.

HL Deb 25 April 1890 vol 343 cc1385-406

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

*THE EARL OF MEATH

My Lords, the Bill which I am about to ask your Lordships to read a second time to-day might, perhaps, more properly be called a "Bill to Regulate the Custody of Children," in as much as the adoption which I propose is a very qualified one. It will be within the recollection of your Lordships that last year I brought into this House a Bill for the adoption of children. That Bill met with somewhat severe criticism at the hands of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, and in deference to his opinion several alterations have been made in the present Bill; the result of which is that that now proposed is, as I have already said, a very qualified one. The object of the Bill is, as your Lordships are aware, to prevent parents or other guardians who have consented to the adoption of their children afterwards resuming possession of them until they have satisfied the Justices in Petty Sessions that it is to the interest and for the benefit of the children that they should be given up. It is a very common occurrence for children who have been adopted with the willing consent of their parents or guardians to be removed from the custody of their foster-parents with the sole object of the disreputable parents deriving pecuniary advantage either from the services of the children or by extracting money from the persons who have adopted them, when it would be to the welfare and best interests of the children for them to remain with those persons, the position of the parents rendering them neither pecuniarily nor morally fit guardians to maintain and educate the children. The object of the measure is to prevent the continuance of this abuse. It is most urgently needed in the interests of the little ones them selves; and I contend that it is idle, and worse than idle, to plead the claims of parentage in cases which are marked, for the most part, by heartless indifference to all parental obligations. As I have stated, this Bill is different to that introduced last Session, inasmuch as it is not proposed that institutions shall have the power of adopting children. That clause has been left out in deference to the remarks which were made by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. It has been most unfortunate for me that a certain well-known institution has, both last year and this year, taken very marked steps in a direction of which, on the whole, I do not approve, because the result has been that my Bill has been, in some measure, mixed up with this particular institution. People have thought that I have brought in this Bill for the purpose of enabling persons to break the law, which is very far from my intention; and it has also been thought that this Bill has behind it some hidden motive in the direction of proselytising. I venture to say there is no Member of your Lordships' House who is more distinctly opposed than myself to taking children away from their parents and bringing them up in a religion contrary to the wishes of those parents. I think it would not only be a very unwise thing, but a very immoral and wrong thing to do; and I desire, here, most emphatically to say that I could never give my support to any measure which I thought would have a proselytising tendency. Happily I have had the opportunity of obtaining the kind advice of the head of the Roman Catholic Church in this country; and I hope that the clause which has been inserted in this Bill at his desire will remove or prevent any fear on the part of Roman Catholics that this Bill is intended for the purpose of bringing their children over to any other faith. There is a proviso in Section 2 which appertains particularly to the subject to which I have just referred. It is that the Justices in Petty Sessions before they can give an order for the adoption of any children must pay proper regard to "the religion of the parents and all other circumstances of the case." The primary object, then, of the present Bill is to empower the Justices to regulate the adoption of children, and to suspend the right of parents to resume possession of them until they have shown the Justices that it is to the interest of the children they should do so. Besides the case of vicious parents, there is the case of parents who are disposed to do all they possibly can for their children, but who have not sufficient means to provide them with even the bare necessaries of life, and whose children suffer consequently in health and well-being; and it is notorious that there are a large number of benevolent persons who are quite willing to take over the care of such children if they could be certain that by doing so they would not expose themselves to annoyance afterwards and get themselves perhaps mixed up with legal difficulties. Last year I gave your Lordships several instances of the way in which the present state of the law operates to the detriment of children. Since then, I have obtained the assistance of two ladies, one of whom, Miss Rye, is very well known by name to your Lordships. She has taken great interest in the emigration and care of children, and she has given me a list of 25 cases—and another lady, Miss Alexander, has given me a similar list—where children who had been handed over to them had been taken away after they had expended years of care and large sums of money upon their education. Now, in all those cases, Miss Rye assures me that the parents of the children were nominally Protestants, and that formal documents had been signed sometimes in open Court handing over the children voluntarily to her care, and yet in those 25 cases, notwithstanding the formal documents thus drawn up, they were taken from her. The parents had evidently withdrawn them with the intention of deriving some pecuniary advantage from the institution or from the lady. In one case the children were placed there and removed some years afterwards by the father, who was a most disreputable character. In another case where the father was dead and the mother had deserted the child, it was years afterwards claimed by her. One most lamentable case was that of a child named Ruth Minnel, who after several years was reclaimed by the mother. In all the cases the parents were more or less disreputable. The particulars are given in the lists handed to me by the ladies I have mentioned, which your Lordships can see for yourselves. Now, it has been said that it is contrary to the principles of English law to legalise adoption. Of course, it is: we know that. But I would ask whether every alteration in the law is not to the extent of that alteration contrary to the principles of English law as then existing; and whether all our reforms have not been contrary to the principles of English law at the time? Our laws, my Lords, are not like the laws of the Medes and Persians, that they cannot be altered. What is the reason that your Lordships sit in this House and that we have two Houses of Parliament if it is not for the purpose of changing these laws of ours if we find that change is necessary? On the other hand, your Lordships are aware that the adoption of children is no novelty in other countries. Some noble Lords on the occasion of the last Bill being brought forward spoke as if the adoption of children was a subject quite unknown to the laws of civilised countries, whereas the exact reverse is the case. I believe I am right in saying that there is hardly any civilised country in the world that has not some law of adoption, and that our own country is peculiar in not possessing such a law. France has very stringent laws with regard to the adoption of children, and so has Germany. All our Colonies have laws with regard to the adoption of children. Since last year I have visited America for the purpose of ascertaining what has been done there in this matter, and I have here some extracts from American State laws on the adoption of children, and I shall be very glad to give a copy of them to any noble Lord who cares to read them. They are extracts from the laws of five States—Ohio, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massachusetts. In all these States there are laws regulating the adoption of children, and very stringent laws too. In Ohio the President of an Orphan Asylum can sanction adoption without the consent of the surviving parent if the child is abandoned or voluntarily surrendered to the asylum; and if a child is a vagrant or incorrigible he may be placed by the Court in an Orphan Asylum. An adopted child in that State becomes the child and legal heir of the person adopting him. In Connecticut the adopted child can also inherit property the same as a natural child. In Pennsylvania, an institution which has maintained a child for one year may consent to its being adopted even though the parents object. If the parent is a drunkard or a profligate, or if he has deserted the child for two years, it can be adopted by any person who chooses to come forward, with the consent of the Court contrary even to the consent of the parent. Again, in Pennsylvania an adopted child can inherit property from his foster parent. In Illinois if a child is abandoned by his parents they lose all right to the control of it; and one year's desertion in that State is enough for the Court to sanction its adoption by any benevolent person who chooses to come forward. A child is not entitled to inherit property in Illinois unless under certain circumstances. In Massachusetts the period of maintenance is two years instead of one year, as in the other States. If a child is supported for two years in a charitable institution that is sufficient to enable it to be adopted even contrary to the wishes of the parents. Also if the parent is a drunkard, or not in circumstances to properly provide for the child, a civil proceeding handing it over to an institution operates as an adoption of the child by that institution. So that in Massachusetts such a sanction as was given in the case mentioned by Miss Rye would have been sufficient to prevent the child being afterwards taken away. In Massachusetts the child does not lose the right to inherit property from the natural parent. The result is that in three States Ohio, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania—a child can inherit property from its adopted parent under all circumstances. In Illinois the child can inherit, unless the inheritance is expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the adopted parent; and only in Massachusetts is the inherit nice for bidden. My Lords, it may be said that it would have been wiser to have changed the title of this Bill, and that I should have called it instead of a Bill to regulate Adoption, a "Bill to Regulate the Custody of Children." I have thought it better to adhere to the original title; but if it is considered by your Lordships' House that the title does not properly represent the scope of the Bill, I shall be very willing to alter it. A great deal of stress was laid in the last discussion upon this question of parental control, and the noble Lord on the Woolsack said that parental control was one of the cardinal principles of the law. No doubt it is, and very justly so. But why is it one of the cardinal principles of the law? Because parental control is considered to be for the benefit of the child. But if it is once shown that parental control is not for the benefit of the child, then surely we are losing the spirit while adhering to the letter, and giving the control of the child to one who is not fit to be entrusted with that control ! It is for the interest of the State that we should give the control of a child to a person who is fitted to bring it up as a good citizen of the country; and it is distinctly contrary to the interests of the State that we should permit a bad parent to exercise a bad moral influence upon his child. Doubtless, the general effect of this Bill will be to ensure the continuance of adoption in the case of children whose parents remain in a position which debars them from properly providing for the children; but it will be seen, on reference to the clauses of the Bill, that the foster-parent has always to run the risk of the child's parents or natural guardians coming forward and showing that circumstances have arisen which would make it beneficial that the children should return to them. It may be argued that the Poor Law Act of last Session has now given power practically for the same thing to be done. But that is not the case, for the Act refers only to guardians; and there is no system at present in existence by which a person may obtain the right of guardianship over a child, even though an orphan, unless the child be first pauperised. A case appeared a short time ago in the newspapers which illustrates this very forcibly. Mr. Drummond, one of the Trustees of the Doek Labourers' Uuion, made an application to Mr. Mead, the magistrate at the Thames Police Court, for advice respecting the children of Henry Mark Vale, a dock labourer, who had died from starvation, brought about, it transpired, from his having denied himself food for the sake of his children. The children were found in a backyard in a very dirty and neglected state, and they had no one to look after them, their mother being in the Banstead Lunatic Asylum. A question arose as to the religion of the children, and it was stated that the father had been a Roman Catholic, and a Roman Catholic priest gave an assurance that the children would be received into a school. There was a step-daughter, however, and it was considered necessary for the children to be removed first into the workhouse, or in other words to be pauperised. The Dock Labourers' Union had been paying £1 a week for their children's maintenance, and they would rather the children should not be pauperised if it were possible to avoid that course. But Mr. Mead thought the better course would be that the children should be taken to the workhouse, otherwise the Dock Labourers' Union might find themselves involved in all sort of litigation. Consequently, those children, in order to be taken care of, must be sent to the workhouse and made paupers. That I contend is not right. Now, my Lords, Clause 2 of the proposed Bill provides that anyone who is desirous of adopting a child must obtain the sanction of the Justices who are to pay due regard to the religion of the parents and all other circumstances of the case; and they must be satisfied that it will be for the benefit and advancement of the child in making an order for adoption. Clause 3 provides for the cessation, on adoption by the foster parents, of the parent's authority. Clause 4 relates to the attendance of the father and mother and foster parent before the Justices, and of the husband or wife of the foster parent, as the case may be. The object of Clause 5 is to provide that an order for adoption shall not be made until after careful inquiry by the Justices. In the last Bill in the latter part of Sub-section (d) the word "solely" was found to give rise to a good deal of comment, but as its insertion was unnecessary it has been thought better to leave it out in this measure. Clause 6 provides that if the child is 14 or upwards, an order shall not be made without the child's own consent. So that here the Chancery rule is adopted. Clause 7 gives the foster parent, so long as the order continues, all the rights of the father, and he is, on the other hand, to be liable to all the obligations of a father. In Clause 8 a most important change has been made in deference to the Lord Chancellor's criticism. So far as the promoters of the Bill are con- cerned, they feel strongly that for the purpose of inheritance the adopted child should be deemed to belong to the foster parents; but they have expressly limited the clause, in deference to the views expressed by the Lord Chancellor, so that the adopted child shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the bodies of the parents by adoption. In most countries where adoption is allowed, it is usual to make the adopted child, to some extent, heir to the foster parent. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that there are many arguments which may be used in support of the opposite contention. Your Lordships will understand that I am not at all anxious that this clause should be retained if you should think it ought to be omitted. It was put in, as I have said, simply because the Lord Chancellor made a point of it last year. Clause 9 is inserted to make more clear the restriction on the right of the foster parent to take property from the adopted child. Clause 10 is put in to cover cases where the children have no parents. The object of Clauses 11 and 12 are in regard to rescinding the order for adoption, if it be shown to the Justices to be for the benefit of the child, and to protect the former foster parent from future claims for the maintenance and education of the child. Clause 13 is for registration. In nearly all cases where adoption is recognised by law some public register is kept; and it is specially necessary in this case, where application may be made to revoke the Order. Then Clause 14, the last, relates to the fees to be allowed to the Justices' clerk. I think they are the customary fees. Now, my Lords, I hope I have made out a case for the Second Reading of this Bill, and I trust your Lordships will feel I have done everything I possibly could to meet the objections raised by the noble Lord on the Woolsack and other noble Lords in the Debate of last year. In fact, the ship has been lightened as far as that could possibly be done, in order to enable it to contend with and weather any storms it might meet. I trust, therefore, the measure will now make good its passage through this House. Your Lordships must, I am sure, feel that there is a real necessity for some alteration in the law. It is a matter of perfect indifference to me what the form of the alteration may be, so long as I attain my object that the children should be benefitted, and that bad parents should not be placed by law in the position of being able to act detrimentally to the interests of their children. As our population increases and becomes more and more congregated in vast town—centres there can be no doubt, I think, in the minds of most people that there is greater need now to look more carefully after the children than in the past. In villages and small towns people know what is going on, and each person has more or less knowledge of his neighbour. Bat in large towns we have not that knowledge; and I think, therefore, that the law, so far from putting difficulties in the way of those who are doing all they can to benefit the rising generation, should, as far as it possibly can, assist them and make it easier for workers among the poor to help the little ones, and to avail themselves of opportunities to bring them up as good citizens worthy of the country in which they live. I shall not detain your Lord ships any further, but will only add, in expressing the hope that you will parmit this Bill to be read a second time and pass into Committee, that if there are any objections made to it they will not be objections to principle, but simply to details which may be altered.

Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2^a."—(The Earl of Meath.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the noble Lord has referred so repeatedly to my objections to his measure, and to his having, as he says, dealt with and met them, that I feel bound at once to tell him that my objection to the Bill is one of principle and not merely of detail. I think he has somewhat misapprehended the effect of the objections which I made last year, and which to a great extent will have to be repeated on the same lines upon this occasion. I then endeavoured to point out that the very serious and important change in the law contemplated had not been thought out to its natural consequences; that the noble Lord had introduced a Bill which did not settle the law which he proposed so to change at all, but had left a great many things uncovered; and, further, I pointed out how rash and inconsiderate was the change sought to be made If that objection were met it would dispose of my objections altogether. With regard to the principle of the Bill, I think the measure is founded on a mistaken view. Yet I desire to do every justice to the noble Lord's motives. I am sure he will, on the other hand, not do me the injustice of thinking that in anything I said last year I intended to convey an impression that he was acting from proselytising motives. On the contrary, I think I acknowledged that his motives were worthy of the highest praise, as were the efforts he was devoting to those who, he thought, required protection. To this extent I am prepared to go. I think the law as regards the custody of children is not altogether satisfactory as it stands; and if this Bill could be made into anything like a Bill for the regulation of the custody of children I should have no objection to its Second Reading. But I do not think it can. The Bill is pervaded from first to last with the idea that there can be such a thing according to the law of England as the legal adoption of children and transfer of parental rights and obligations, so that the foster parent when such adoption has taken place is to be the parent for all intents and purposes, and the real parent is to lose all claim to parental control. That is a principle against which I must protest. If I were to adhere to it I should be acting contrary to one of the cardinal principles of the law of England; and I think, unless there is shown some great and important reason why these principles should be changed, we ought to maintain them. I do not deny that there are great evils which require to be met in connection with the custody of children. I know there have been very many cases of poor persons, distant relations or even strangers, who, from kindness and in charity, have taken charge of deserted children, and where years afterwards, the children having been properly maintained and brought up, the parents or persons having the legal claim over them have intervened and taken them away for very unworthy objects, quite adversely to the welfare of the children. That is certainly an evil which ought to be met, I agree; but I do not think it can be met by empowering the Justices at Petty Sessions to make orders for adoption in this way. I think it could be done by a measure empowering the Courts to prevent a parent re-asserting his parental control, where, by his own misconduct, or by the desertion of his children, he has forfeited his right to exercise that parental control. But that is not at all what is done by this Bill. This Bill suggests that there shall be a change in the principle of our law by introducing adoption. Its object is— To prevent parents or guardians who have consented to the adoption of their children afterwards resuming possession of them. I object to the explanatory note that the reclamation is often made to the injury of the child, and simply for the pecuniary advantage of the parent, because it is stated that the Bill is to operate in cases where parents have agreed to make over their children, and is to render them bound by their agreement The English law does not recognise such a thing as contract to get rid of parental authority and obligations. No such agreement can, by law, be made. I really do not know what effect the curious performance referred to by the noble Lord could have. Is it suggested that the parties should go before a notary, sign a solemn document of some description for this purpose, and then take it before a Magistrate for his sanction 1 I cannot imagine a Magistrate lending himself to any such performance, and for the reason that it would be an absolutely idle one. There is no such adoption recognised as the noble Lord supposes. If it means that there should be a consideration given to parents which would induce them to get rid of their children and hand them over to somebody else, that seems to me at once to come within the description of my late lamented Friend, Lord Fitz Gerald, when he said that this was "exactly the thing which would conduce to the traffic in children," which the noble Earl objects to, and I think it would. My Lords, this is not one of those objections which can be affected by altering a clause and bringing in a Bill next year with one clause altered and another got rid of. Then, again, what is it that the Magistrate is to do? It is stated in the Bill that he is to "have regard to the religion of the parents." What does that mean? What discretion is the Magistrate to exercise? Does it mean that he is only to allow the adoption of a child of Protestant parents by a Protestant, or of a Catholic child by a Catholic? But that may not be the only difficulty. Supposing one of the parents is of one religion, and the other of another, what is the Magistrate to do. Which religion is to be preferred? The Bill does not explain itself in that respect, and perhaps the noble Earl will throw some light upon it before the Debate closes. The Magistrate is "to have regard to the religion of the parents." What regard, and what is to be the criterion? This is a very important matter, for it is a question which would very much divide people, and lead to great unpleasantness and inconvenience if such a Bill were passed. This appears to me to be a serious objection in principle to the Bill. I will not detain your Lordships longer in discussing its details. The plea put forward for this alteration in the law might be met, as I have pointed out, by further regulation of the custody of children, which would give to Magistrates the power now exercised by some of the Courts to refuse to allow the assertion of parental authority in cases where that authority has been abused. That, I think, would effect all the noble Earl desires, and this Bill, therefore, is unnecessary. Certainly it is not very well conceived. Next year the noble Earl might again say that he has met all my objections in detail, and I only want to show that that is not a sufficient answer. Even upon the theory on which it is based it is not well designed, and I repeat that my great objection to it is that it introduces into our law a totally new principle, which is not demanded by public feeling, and which, I believe, would be fraught with mischievous consequences to the proper relations between parent and child.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, I am sorry I do not find myself in the position of being able to support the noble Earl's Bill. My objection to it is based very much on the grounds which have been mentioned by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. It seems to me, though there exists an acknowledged evil in the present law with regard to the custody of children which ought to be remedied, this is not the proper remedy for it. We know very well that it not unfrequently happens that children are taken possession of by worthless parents many years after they have been adopted, and cared for under circumstances of great hardship to the children themselves. It appears that this proposed legislation is directed to that particular grievance: but I can easily conceive, and I am sure your Lordships can well imagine, that there are various ways in which that evil can be satisfactorily met, as I hope it may be met. But to introduce this plan of legalised adoption, is, I think, quite a mistake. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has pointed out some of the consequences which would follow from this Bill, and I should like for a few moments to point out some of the objections which present themselves to me. In the first place, it is provided in Clause 4, that the parents or guardians, or some one or other of the next of kin of the child, shall appear before the Justices. It does not say "if there are no parents." Now just observe what may happen. The parents may be abroad, or at some great distance from home—under this clause, one of the next-of-kin might proceed to get the child adopted and taken away from the custody of its parents. Again, I do not think the noble Earl has considered the incidence of the Law of Settlement, for under the Bill as it stands this singular consequence would follow, that a foster grandparent would be obliged to support an adopted grandchild, which, I think, would be very hard. Then, I do not quite understand the meaning of the clause as to the devolution of property, but, if I read it rightly, it provides that the child is to succeed to both the property of its adopted parent and of its real parent. That seems to be a remarkable result. By Clause 8 all the legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation between parents and children are to follow, but the result of that must be considered in connection with the Marriage Law. It is quite obvious that under our Marriage Law, if this clause were to become law, an adopted child could not marry the child of its adopted parent; but I am not at all certain that it might not be able to marry its own sister or brother, as the case might be. Then I would point out this remarkable result under Clause 11. By that clause, any person desiring to vary or rescind the order for adoption may apply to have it rescinded or varied. Now, I will suppose this not at all improbable case. A child is adopted and brought up with the other children of the foster parent, and afterwards in life it may desire to marry one of those children. Is it to be at liberty to apply to have the adoption order rescinded in order that it may marry the child of its adopted parent? There are a variety of other wide results which might happen, and I can hardly imagine any subject which would require more careful and minute consideration of the whole consequences which would follow upon such adoption. Then look at this important point. Unfortunately we have known many cases, although I am quite certain the noble Earl has not the least intention of promoting anything of that kind, where great controversies have arisen of a very unpleasant character with reference to what is termed proselytising. This Bill would not in any way cure that evil, because, under Clause 11, any person may apply to have the order rescinded, and that provision would offer a positive premium for interfering with the bringing up of an adopted child in one religion, because some people might be of opinion that it should be brought up in some other faith. In truth, all kinds of disagreeable consequences would follow. I must apologise for detaining your Lordships by drawing attention to matters of detail which should be rather dealt with in Committee, but I thought it right to point out to the noble Earl some of the chief objections which occur to me. If there can be shown a necessity for embarking upon such novel legislation, be it so; but I contend that there is no such necessity, for we can remedy the existing evil by other and much less objectionable means; and, therefore, although I fully appreciate the motives of the noble Lord, and certainly think it is desirable the matter should be dealt with, I cannot support the Bill as it stands.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (Viscount CRANBROOK)

My Lords, I should like to say a few words on one point which has been referred to, the desertion of children by unprincipled parents, and their falling into the hands of the next-of-kin. Take the case of a grand-daughter. A woman takes the children of her daughter and brings them up, the father never coming near them at all. If he deserts his wife for two years she becomes independent of him and free from his control. I do not see why something of the kind should not be provided for in the case of the children, and I think that, in any case, their possession should not be resumed by the parent unless the expenditure of the foster parent, or next-of-kin, has first been paid. It should not be left so easy a matter for the parent to resume possession of the child, and I think the noble Earl might do well to turn his attention to some of those matters affecting the custody of children without going into so deep and wide-reaching a question as that which is involved in his present Bill.

LORD HERSCHELL

My Lords, I entirely feel the force of the criticisms upon this Bill, which have been made by the noble Lord on the Woolsack, and by my noble Friend the Earl of Kimberley, and I feel quite alive to the difficulties they have pointed out. I am not, however, quite sure that I feel as impressed as the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack with the idea that the adoption of children and freeing parents from their natural obligations and rights is opposed to the cardinal principles of English law. A great many cardinal principles of English law have been found to be most objectionable and indefensible. We have got rid of a great many so-called "cardinal principles," and, therefore, simply to be told that a proposed measure, if it be beneficial, is "against the cardinal principles of the English law" does not weigh with me a feather's weight. If a thing is bad, it is bad of its own inherent nature: and if it is good, it is none the worse for being opposed to a cardinal principle, which is, on account of that opposition, injurious, and ought, therefore, to be got rid of at once. But I quite agree that such an extreme and serious change in the law of England as this ought not to be made without grave consideration and great deliberation, and the very fact that it is a far-reaching change from the principle at present underlying and deeply rooted in our law, is, of course, a very strong argnment why that change should not be made, and a new principle adopted, unless it is clearly proved that it is necessary, expedient, and wise. So far, I am entirely in agreement with my noble and learned Friend. And further, it may well be a question whether public opinion is yet ripe for such a solution as this Bill presents of the difficulties which have arisen upon this question. It is a very great change to make to free the parent from the liabilities which the law imposes upon him towards his children—to take away from him the obligations imposed upon, and the rights of control given him, and transfer them to some other person. I think it is not unimportant to consider that in some of the States in America, where the laws are founded on our ancient Common Law, this important change has been made, and, experience has shown, with advantage. It seems to me that we are too apt to cling to things that have been, and not ready enough to inquire whether changes which seem necessary have been made elsewhere, and, where they have been made, whether or not experience has shown them, on the whole, to be advantageous. I trust we shall not lose sight of admitted evils in our desire to preserve the existing rights of parents which this Bill, like every other proposal of the kind that I have heard, recognises can only cease to be theirs with their consent. I trust we shall not be led in any such views to disregard or treat lightly the real evils which exist. This Bill has been conceived in the interests of neglected children, and it is designed for their benefit and protection. And, after all, the advantages of parental care and the exercise of parental rights by those who care so little for their children that they are willing to hand them over to somebody else, are presumably not of any great benefit to a child; because, as I understand, it is only where the parents are willing to divest themselves of those rights that this proposal for adoption will operate. My object in addressing the House upon this occasion is not either to meet the arguments which have been adduced against the Bill, or to urge your Lordships to read the Bill a second time, but to say this—that, as there is an admitted grievance in this matter, I trust that evil will be dealt with. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack admits that it exists, and I think it is a pressing evil. We are not troubled in your Lordships' House with any particular excess of legislation, and I am quite sure that we shall have ample opportunity and leisure for doing justice to any legislation that can be proposed. Her Majesty's Government have not favoured this House with any measures for consideration during this Session, and any measures of theirs, which may come before us from the other House, will do so at a comparatively late period. I, therefore, invite my noble and learned Friend, before we have to consider measures from the other House, to favour us with some proposals upon this subject. I am quite sure your Lordships will be most happy to consider them, and will do your best to put them in a shape which would give general satisfaction. In that way the object of the noble Earl might be carried into effect without any unreasonable delay, and without raising the objections which I feel may fairly be adduced to this Bill.

*LORD MORRIS

My Lords, I had not the honour of being a Member of this House when a similar Bill was introduced by the noble Earl; but I confess I was a good deal startled on reading the Bill which he has introduced this Session. Giving him credit, as I am sure everybody who knows him will, for great philanthropy, for entire freedom from any sinister motive of proselytising, and for a simple earnest desire to benefit neglected children, it does amaze me how such a Bill as this could have been introduced. It violates one of the cardinal principles of the Common Law of this country. I confess I do not at all share the readiness of my noble and learned Friend, who spoke immediately before me, with the greatest lightness of heart of getting rid of cardinal principles of the law, on the assumption that a change might be for the better. I think it is always a matter for the gravest consider ation when your Lordships' House, the last Court of Appeal on matters connected with the law of this United Kingdom, is called upon to change the principles of the English Common Law. In this case you are asked to change one of them with extreme readiness, for none of its principles are more settled than that of parental authority. By a great Judge it has been called, in a remarkable and comparatively recent case, "the sacred right of the father to be the ruler in his own household," and any interference with the parental authority, so as to either abrogate or diminish it, should never be contemplated, except for the most weighty reasons. Now, I have heard no reason given of any satisfactory character to lead my mind to the conclusion that there is a feeling abroad of the existence of any extraordinarily great grievance upon this subject. Instances have been shown where philanthropic societies have been taken in. I am not aware of any charitable institution which has not been repeatedly taken in, and bringing forward 25 out of the thousands of cases which arise, in order to show misconduct on the part of parents in attempting to get back their children, after they have given them up, is, I think, useless. A parent cannot finally give up the custody of his children to another person, and divest himself of that which the Common Law imposes upon him, the right to control and the obligation of maintaining his children. This Bill has received no approval from any noble Lord on principle. I, too, object to it on principle. But, if possible, I object to it still more in detail. A more singular production I have seldom read. Forexample, in the 2nd clause it says that a Bench of Magistrates is "to have regard to the religion of the parents." If a very conscientious man, or I will call him an over-conscientious man, sees that a child is of a religion which he abhors, he ought, if he does what he thinks right, to order the child to be taken from persons who are of that religion and given into the charge of persons who will bring it up in another faith. To "have regard to the religion of parents" is one of the vaguest and most unmeaning phrases which it is possible to introduce into an Act of Parliament. The noble Earl who introduced this Bill said that the principles of our law are often amended. So they are; but only for grave reasons. But as I read this Bill it is not only the principles of the law that are to be violated, but the Decalogue itself is to be interfered with by this measure, for children are to be freed from all obligations of respect or obedience to their parents. I thought one of the Commandments was "Honour thy father and thy mother," not an "adopted father and mother." Then, Clause 6 provides that a child of 14 years is to have a voice in its adoption. Why should not an intelligent child 13 years of age have the same privilege? Why should the age of 14 be fixed upon as the limit at which a child is to be allowed to protest against being deprived of the natural guardianship of its own father and mother, and handed over to strangers. In this clause, too, the child is looked upon rather as an atom, for he or she is called an "it." The proviso is— If it consents to its proposed adoption, whereas in Clause 8 the "it" is properly translated into a "he" It says that a child so adopted shall be deemed the child of the foster parents, For the purposes of inheritance by such child and his descendants, and husband, or wife. But if the child were a "he," he could scarcely have a husband. Then by Clause 10 it is provided— If on any application for adoption it shall appear that the child intended to be adopted has neither father nor mother nor guardian, nor next-of-kin, or having such, that they are lunatic, or in prison, and so on. As if it were the same thing to be a lunatic or to be in prison. A parent might have been imprisoned for what, after all, was but a venial offence, or one of a not very immoral character, for instance, for committing a slight assault; and yet, if once committed to prison, then during his incarceration his child may be adopted upon an affidavit sworn by an intelligent foster parent, and when the man comes out of prison he will find that he has been deprived of his child, not because he was a lunatic, and therefore unfit to have the custody of it, but because he has been temporarily committed to prison. Really I should only be detaining the House if I were to go through what I must call, with the greatest respect to the noble Earl, the many absurdities of this Bill. It is a most dangerous kind of legislation, although it may have been prompted by philanthropic motives. The whole law of the descent of real estate is put aside by the Bill; the Statute of Distributions is set aside by it; in fact, a branch of our law of the most important character is interfered with by the provisions of this Bill, dealt with in the most summary manner, and its application handed over to the discretion of any Bench of Magistrates at Petty Sessions. Nobody has greater respect than myself for the Magistrates at Petty Sessions, when they are employed in their own proper busi- ness; but if there be a subject which more than any other has to a great extent exercised the highest Courts of the realm, it is the settling of a principle on which a parent shall be deprived of the custody of his children for misconduct, or for other reasons. The instances are numerous in which Judges have differed in opinion. In proper cases the Sovereign, as parens patriœ, has delegated to the Court of Chancery the care and custody of children, in order that they should not be taken possession of by parents who have been guilty of misconduct. But interference with parental control is a branch of the law which has always been regarded as of the greatest difficulty, and yet it is now proposed that the administration of that branch of the law which has been found of the greatest difficulty by men of legal training, and most eminent authority, is to be handed over to any Bench of Magistrates at Petty Sessions in the United Kingdom ! Everyone who knows anything of Petty Sessions will recognise how soon there would be a contest there, as to who should capture the children. I am sure nobody who knows the noble Earl would fail to acquit him of any proselytising ideas, but though he is not to be charged with any idea of that kind the Bill would lead to that result. For those reasons I am glad that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has opposed the Bill, but I hope that he will go farther and move that it be read again this day six months.

*LORD THRING

My Lords, after what has been said, I have very little to add in reference to this Bill. My noble and learned Friend who spoke last has been very successful in pointing out its defects, in laughing at the philanthropic efforts of its supporters, and in urging the necessity of maintaining the sacred rights of a parent to bring up his children in the gutter, in sin, misery, and dirt. But if any noble Lord who is of that opinion, had sat as I have done in two Sessions upon inquiries into the conditions of the poor, once on the Sweating Committee, and again on the Poor Law Committee, he would know that there is a great evil existing which this Bill seeks to remedy; and therefore, although the Bill may not be well-adapted for that purpose, it ought not to be ridiculed or laughed at. Case after case was brought before the Committee, of which my noble Friend Lord Kimberley was Chairman, in which it was proved that female children who had been brought up by kind and good people to be chaste and good members of society, were, at the time of greatest danger when they were just reaching womanhood, claimed by their parents for the vilest purposes, and were delivered up beyond doubt for those purposes. My Lords, are those facts to be laughed at, simply because the form of this Bill does not please the noble and learned Lord? I say there is a great and grievous evil existing, and an immediate necessity that the law should be so altered as to give greater protectiou to those benevolent people who rescue children from misery and vice, and are afterwards compelled by a harsh law to hand them back to parents who are un worthy to have any power over them.

*THE EARL OF MEATH

My Lords, before this discussion closes I should like to say a few words. In the first place, I must thank the noble Lords upon my right, who have kindly supported, not the Bill, for that they have not done, but the view which I take, and which the majority of your Lordships seem to take, that there is a necessity for legislation upon this subject. We have heard a great deal about the cardinal principles of English law, and about the sacred rights of a father; but I would ask, what are the sacred rights of a father? Are they that he shall permit his child to be degraded? Is that a sacred right of a father? Has he a sacred right to take his daughter to be prostituted? That, my Lords, is what is going on at present. But I would ask the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack whether it is not the fact, when he tells us that it is contrary to the law of England that children should be taken from their parents, that that power is possessed and constantly exercised by the Court of Chancery?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If the noble Earl will forgive me, I did not say so. What I said was that such a bargain as that which he describes as solemnly taking place before a magistrate would have no operation according to English law.

*THE EARL OF MEATH

Anyhow, my Lords, I believe the Court of Chancery does interfere to take a child from the custody of its parent. There was a well-known case in which a respectable Dissenting minister was left a legacy of £500 on condition that his child was taken from his custody. The Court of Chancery decided that this sacred principle of English law could be broken in that instance, and the child was taken from the custody of its father because he accepted the legacy. Where is this "sacred principle of the law of England,"1 should like to know, after that? I do not think the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will deny that that is a fact, and that the custody of that child was taken away from the father. It has been with great pleasure that I have heard the noble and learned Lord (Lord Herschell) suggest to Her Majesty's Government that they might bring in a Bill to effect this purpose; and I do sincerely hope that instead of contenting themselves with criticising my Bill and the Bills of other people they will come forward and do something in this matter. I am not a lawyer myself, and I do not profess to be one; and I should very much like to see some of the lawyers in the House come forward in this matter. Let us have the tiring done; I do not care at all how it is done; and it can, I think, be best done by Her Majesty's Government.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Does the noble Earl proceed with his Motion for a Second Reading?

*THE EARL OF MEATH

No; I withdraw.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

Bill (by leave of the House) withdrawn