Lords Sitting of 21 March 1889

Preamble
An Asterisk at the commencement of a Speech indicates revision by the Member.
HOUSE OF LORDS (DISCONTINUANCE OF WRITS) BILL.—(No. 18.)

  SECOND BEADING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Beading, read.
  *THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, when I first undertook to bring this subject before your Lordships, I was in much doubt whether I should invite your Lordships to proceed in this important matter by Bill or by Resolution. In favour of a Resolution there was the fact that we should be dealing with the whole subject ourselves, and should be exercising those inherent powers which almost every Legislative Assembly, so far as I am aware, is possessed of. On the other hand, if we proceeded by a Bill, that Bill must pass through the ordeal of another place, where there were certain risks attending on it which I need not further specify. After consideration I decided to proceed by a Bill, and I did so for two reasons—first of all, when Her Majesty's Government last year proposed to deal with this matter they did so by a Bill, and I had every right to suppose they had considered this important question with care. In the second place, so far as my limited judgment went, on looking into the matter, it seemed to me clear that a Bill was the right, if not the only course open to us. This opens, no doubt, what I may call a Constitutional question; and if your Lordships will bear with me, I will endeavour to state the few precedents
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  which, I believe, govern this matter, so far as I have been able to acquaint myself with them. They are not without some historical interest. There are, as far as I know, only two cases in which this House has ever proceeded in great affairs of the kind by Resolution. The first was the case of the great Chancellor, Lord Bacon; the other, only a few years subsequently, was that of the Earl of Middlesex, the High Treasurer. Lord Bacon was tried before the House of Lords and convicted, and was fined £40,000, and condemned to imprisonment during the King's pleasure. The Earl of Middlesex was, as your Lordships will remember, ruined by the Duke of Buckingham. That prosecution, undertaken against the strenuous wish of King Tames I., gave rise to one of the anecdotes of the time which has been preserved. Anyhow, he was tried, found guilty, fined the enormous sum for those days of £50,000, and sentenced to a long imprisonment. But in both these cases this House took a further and very important step. They came to the resolution that each of those offenders—
  "Be for ever incapable of holding any office, place, or employment in the State and Commonwealth;"
  and, secondly, that they—
  "Should never sit in Parliament, or come within the verge of this Court;"
  and they concluded by this emphatic declaration—
  "This is the judgment and resolution of this High Court."
  In looking into those cases I came upon a very singular passage written by the great Lord Clarendon only a few years afterwards with regard to Lord Bacon's case. Lord Clarendon, as your Lordships know, was a great Constitutional

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  lawyer, and, writing as he did immediately after the time, he may be fairly supposed to have represented the Constitutional Law of the day. Lord Clardendon says, with regard to this resolution, that Lord Bacon should never sit in Parliament—
  "A clause of this nature was never before found in any judgment of Parliament, and in truth not to be inflicted upon any Peer but by attainder."
  There was a third case, that of another high functionary, the Chancellor, Lord Macclesfield. He was tried for corruption, was found guilty, a fine of £50,000 was imposed, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. But it is remarkable that on his conviction it was at first proposed to visit him with the punishment of never sitting in Parliament, as in the cases of Lord Bacon and the Earl of Middlesex. After deliberation, however, the House came to a negative conclusion, and it was decided to leave Lord Macclesfield to the punishment of fine and imprisonment. The inference I would draw is that the House took the same view as Lord Clarendon did, and came to the conclusion that it was beyond their power, of themselves, to impose such an exclusion. May I now trouble your Lordships with the cases where the House of Lords has proceeded by Bill? They are very few; indeed, there is only one case that I know of, and it goes back to ancient times. George Nevill, Duke of Bedford in the time of Edward IV., was disabled from attendance in this House on account of poverty. The Act recites that the Duke of Bedford had not a livelihood to support and maintain the state and dignity of Duke of Bedford, and enacts that the making of the said duke and all his state and dignity should be hereafter void and of no effect. That is a precedent of a very early time; but perhaps the inference that may be drawn from it is this—that even in those disturbed and stormy times of English history, it was felt that if a Peer was disabled from his Constitutional functions for a particular time, it could only be done through the instrumentality of a Bill. There was, however, one case which seems to me strictly applicable to the question I am now arguing. It was a case in the Irish House of Lords. There was a Lord Strangeford, who was accused and found guilty by the House
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  of having abused his high privileges as a Peer of Parliament by the acceptance of a bribe. The Irish House of Lords resolved that he should be disabled from sitting in Parliament or making a proxy, and they then adopted that which I apprehend was the right course, they proceeded by a Bill, which went down to the House of Commons, and was passed by the two bodies. I concluded, therefore, my Lords, on these precedents, in favour of proceeding by a Bill. There may, no doubt, be dormant powers within your Lordships' jurisdiction to exercise this right of exclusion, but I think you will agree that it is the safest course to proceed by Bill, and accordingly I have now the honour to ask your Lordships to give a Second Reading to the present Bill. Its provisions are very simple. I propose that whenever any Peer shall be proved in any Court of Law to be guilty of felony or misdemeanour, the Court should make a record of the conviction and sentence, and should forward the same, and a record of the evidence, to the Lord Speaker. I propose, secondly, that whenever in the opinion of a Judge of a Superior Court, any Peer should proved to be guilty of discreditable conduct which appears to the Court to be inconsistent with his character as a Member of the House, the Court should report the fact with a statement of the evidence to the Lord Speaker, who should lay it before the House, and the House should address the Crown, and the Crown should then cancel the writ of summons. The Peer thereupon would be unable to take part in the duties of the House until a new Writ was issued in his favour. These are the two courses which I propose to your Lordships to adopt. Your Lordships will see that in either case it depends upon the previous judicial action of some Court. But I propose, further, to give your Lordships an independent action in certain cases. There may be, no doubt, extreme cases where the character and conduct of the person may be matter of notoriety, and may come under your Lordships' cognizance. I think it is not fair to the House to withhold from it the power of taking independent action if it should think fit, and, therefore, I have introduced into the fourth clause the words "or otherwise,"

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  which cover that independent action. In such cases this House might take the initiative, and address the Crown. I apprehend there can be no valid objection on the part of anyone here to such a course, where there is a question of felony, and where a Judge of a Superior Court forwards his opinion to this House. But I have heard in conversation an objection to the word "misdemeanour." Misdemeanour no doubt applies in certain cases to very venial offences, but on the other hand "misdemeanour" is also a legal term which applies to a multitude of offences, some of them of the very gravest natnre. Therefore, I do not see how it is possible to omit "misdemeanour" from the category of offences. I do not lay very great stress upon the retention of the words "or otherwise." I thought it was desirable that your Lordships should have that power, and accordingly I inserted it. Your Lordships will remember that this House still keeps the matter entirely in its own hands, and it has the option to proceed or not as it thinks best. But I wish to point out that there are certain safeguards attached to my proposal, and those safeguards are practically two. First of all, it is optional on this House to proceed in any question, whether on the report of a Judge or on the record of a conviction, or its own initiative, and I cannot conceive for a moment that this House would ever proceed lightly or indiscreetly on such a subject; and, secondly, I desire to point out that by giving the Crown the power to reissueta Writ of Summons you practically give che power of reversing an act which it is onceivable might have been done under false imformation and consequently unjustly. In fact, at every single stage, there is an opportunity either of arresting or of amending a false step in this matter. My Lords, that is practically the whole Bill, and I scarcely know what objections can be brought against it. My noble Friend on the other side astounded me the other night with two objections which he raised to the proposal I then made—namely, that this might affect prejudicially bankrupts, and that in former times there have been many bad characters in this House, and that the House has gone on very well in spite of them. My noble Friend seems to have overlooked
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  the fact that in the last Bankruptcy Act there is a specific clause which does disqualify Members of this House and the other House so long as they are in a state of bankruptcy, and therefore that matter is really beyond our control now. As to the second proposition that my noble Friend laid down, it is really too remarkable. He said that in former times there had been discreditable and unworthy Members of this Assembly. I recognize the fact that unhappily there have been unworthy and discreditable persons Members of this Assembly; but we are living, not in the 18th century, but in the end of the 19th, and in the full glare of a publicity which none of your Lordships can afford or will desire to disregard. No institution in the present day, unless it can command public respect, has any chance, and, I believe, has any real right to stand. But then I see that a noble Earl on the other side proposes to silence my Bill altogether by a proposal that it is inexpedient to proceed with any Bill affecting the privileges of Members of this House which does not deal with the question of the amendment of its constitution. Now, in the first place, I take exception to the phraseology of that amendment. This is a much larger matter than merely one affecting your Lordships' privileges. Those privileges are very great, and they deserve to be cherished; but at the same time that is comparatively a small matter. The important considerations are, the position you hold in the country, and your power to execute the great trusts confided to you. I venture to state that when the noble Earl, as he does, links together these two questions—a Bill for removing a great scandal, whenever that scandal arises, and a Bill for the Constitutional reconstruction of this House—he mixes up two things which have, comparatively speaking, very little in common. In the last few years we have had several Bills before us for the Constitutional reconstruction of this House; and, it may be, many years will pass before any of those Bills are consummated On the other hand, a Bill for the removal of a great scandal—as undoubtedly it is a great scandal that any one should sit and vote and take part in this House who has forfeited all claim to public respect—stands on a wholly different footing, and, I

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  maintain, cannot be deferred by one single twelvemonth. I put it to your Lordships that the purging of this House of unworthy Members ought to and must precede any abstract schemes of Constitutional theory. I do not know what the noble Lord's views may be as to the reconstruction of your Lordships' House; but if he succeeds in stopping this Bill to-night he will find it hard to make any one out-of-doors believe that he really is influenced by a great anxiety for Constitutional symmetry. It will be said—very unfairly, but it will be said—that this Amendment is a mere excuse for inaction, and that, under cover of a Parliamentary subterfuge, we postpone to the Greek Kalends the removal of a great scandal. I thankfully admit that the cases with which this Bill can have to deal are, happily, most few, and that, such as they are, they are grossly exaggerated every week in scandalous publications which go through the length and breadth of the country. I do not think that numbers are to be accepted as any measure or criterion in this case; but be they many or be they few, be it even one single case, it seems to me wholly indefensible that anyone who has been tainted by a public judicial conviction should sit here to make the laws, to pronounce on public policy, and to administer the justice of the Empire. I believe we are the only great legislative assembly that is without this power. The House of Commons has the right, and has frequently exercised it. The old Roman Senate, which gave the pattern and the idea of so many Legislative Assemblies, had and exercised the right with no sparing hand. There is not a club, not an association, that does not exercise this power. And shall we be told that we alone are so immaculate that we need no such measure; shall we be told that we are so disabled and tied up and crippled in our legislative functions that we alone are to submit to this intolerable burden? In the age in which we live, when practical utility is almost accepted as the only standard, the House of Lords is a very remarkable institution; it is unique. For nearly a century the clearest thinkers have noticed the curious contrast of hereditary right to sit here and the practical work which has been achieved. Mr. Pitt, even in his day, before the House of Commons was
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  reformed, ventured to give a short life to the House of Lords. Lord Macaulay more than a generation afterwards repeated the same prediction. In the opinion of those two eminent men this House seemed doomed to a short existence; it seemed to be incompatible and inconsistent with the new ideas that were springing up at the end of the last and the beginning of this century; and yet, as a matter of fact, this House exists, and it exists in honour and in public respect. And why? What is it that has enable it to sustain itself so long? This House has had genius, high learning, great honour, accomplished eloquence, and a great fund of administrative capacity, and where it has not inherited it has welcomed within its ranks eminence of every kind; but the foundations of this House, I believe, have been laid yet deeper in the individual character of its Members. Stainless conduct, high moral qualities, the desire for the good of others, wholly irrespective of self or of party—these have been the foundations and the pillars of this great institution. If I wanted an illustration, I can think of no one who rendered such deep services to this House, who so conciliated public respect, who laid as regards this House so deeply the foundations of English respect for old institutions as the late Lord Shaftesbury. My Lords, it is these traditions to which I now appeal. I entreat your Lordships to be true to them, and not to allow any doubts, or scruples, or timid counsels to mar the unanimity of the vote to which I now venture to invite you.
  *THE EARL OF FIFE: My Lords, in rising to move the Amendment which stands in my name, I should like, first of all, to say that I yield to no one in my desire to see this House purged of any Member whose presence here may be considered undesirable; but, with all respect to the great experience and abilities of the noble Earl who has introduced this Bill, I do not think that he has chosen the best course to attain his object. I gather that the noble Earl does not wish to raise any of the large questions connected with what is called the reform of the House of Lords; but does the noble Earl really suppose that if he were fortunate enough to obtain your Lordships' approval for this Bill, it would receive the same delicate treatment

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  in another and stormier Assembly? The Second Reading of this Bill would provide a splendid opportunity, indeed a glorious field-day, for those Members of the other House to whom abuse and misrepresentation of your Lordships' House is an ever congenial topic. While cordially admitting the theoretical existence of the anomalies which the noble Earl has pointed out, I cannot see the advantage of courting discussion elsewhere on all the large questions involved in the constitution of this House, if we were only going to obtain the infinitesimal result of excluding from the House one or two Members who in point of fact never attend. I have always desired to see a large and well-considered measure for the reform of this House introduced; and five years ago I was one of a small body of Peers who supported the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs when he raised the whole question in a speech of great interest and singular brilliancy. But it now occurs to me that the majority of the noble Lords who now sit on the front Bench below me divided the House against my noble Friend, their late Colleague, although they are now held up to us misguided Liberal Unionists as the quintessence of true Liberalism. Since then I have very often thought this question over, and I become every day more convinced that the real solution of the difficulty lies in adopting a system of delegation as a basis of reform. In any system of delegation that may be adopted, those who are called black sheep would not be elected; and you would also get rid of the anomaly of Peers who very rarely attended, or of young Peers, almost fresh from school, coming down and being able to defeat useful and important measures. My Lords, I feel that this is not a fitting opportunity for me to venture to inflict upon your Lordships any detailed scheme of reform, but whatever other step may be deemed advisable, I am convinced that legislative powers should be delegated by your Lordships to a certain number of your body; and I cannot believe that it would pass the wit of man to devise some simple mode of carrying this out without interfering with the rights of actual sitting Members. I know that ultimately the delegated Members would make too small a
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  body, and, therefore, it would be necessary to add other and more popular elements; but I think that some system of delegation should form the basis of any reform that was undertaken. I have always deplored the fact that the oldest and wisest Members of the House have always seemed to wish to avoid this question; and that, while men of all parties in the country are agreed that reform should be effected in this House, nothing whatever has been done. The noble Marquess at the head of the Government told us the other evening that nothing would be done, although last Session he admitted the necessity of legislation by introducing two very important Bills on the subject. We have been very frequently told that the best mode of treating this question is to leave it severely alone; and of course we all know by heart that collection of sapient phrases which have been grouped round the memory of the late Lord Melbourne. For my own part, it has never seemed to me that all these specious pleas for getting rid of every difficulty by delay constitute the highest form of statesmanship. The question of the reform of this House has been discussed on every platform, both Conservative and Liberal; last year it formed one of the principal topics in the address to his constituents of the present President of the Board of Trade; and we all remember that remarkable manifesto in favour of reform which was signed by the heirs to peerages sitting in the other House of Parliament. Indeed, everyone in the country is in favour of the moderate reform of this House, except our enemies outside. We have been told—and no doubt shall be told again—that the difficulties of getting measures through the House of Commons are so great that nothing can be done. But I fail to see why that House should require weeks to discuss a measure which does not directly affect its own constitution; but my point is that it is but timely wisdom, regardless of what may occur in another place, to put on record some measure to remove the inconsistencies and anomalies for which we are so persistently blamed, and throw on the other House the responsibility of not not passing it. Now I am sure your Lordships all sympathize with the noble Earl's desire to improve the composition

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  of this House; but I cannot see the advantage of raising the whole question on such a fragmentary measure as this, because this Bill will raise all those larger questions connected with your Lordships' House when it arrives in the House of Commons, and it will afford our enemies there a sort of football for their surplus energies, and, after all said and done, no real progress will be made. There is a considerable section of the public outside who have a great and sincere veneration for this House, and who would like to see it placed in a stronger and more defensible position. But they do not follow very closely the debates of Parliament and the elaborate pleas put forward for delay; and it will seem to them that this Bill is really all that is going to be done. Naturally, they will begin to wonder whether your Lordships are seriously in earnest in this matter, and will at last cease to look for any reform whatever. Although I am one of those who have been anxiously desirous of seeing this great Constitutional question taken up by a responsible Government—and I am sanguine enough to believe that if it were only energetically taken up it might be successfully accomplished—yet I think that a man must have very strangely read the lessons of history if he is not prepared to admit that this House has played no mean part in the development of the liberties of the British people; and if only the altered circumstances are now boldly faced, I believe that the future has in store for your Lordships' House a part equally useful and as illustrious.
  EARL COWPER: My Lords, I hope I may be allowed to second the Amendment. Both sides of this House seem to be so thoroughly convinced that something ought to be done, that I confess that I am diffident in holding to the opinion that this particular matter may be let alone. I believe that we fill a very high position in the estimation of the country, particularly with respect to our integrity and uprightness. A great deal, no doubt, is said about us, very justly, at public meetings and elsewhere, but I think that the clamour as to our morality and good repute is utterly unfounded. Those who wish to destroy this House use that argument, but as they strike at random they may very
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  well be treated with silent contempt. Your Lordships have been warned about the clamour out-of-doors if this Bill does not pass. I am in favour of remedying everything which is shown to need it; but I think your Lordships ought not to be unduly influenced by clamour out-of-doors. My noble Friend said that, after all, we hold it in our own hands, and that we need not exercise the powers given by the Bill unless we choose. But this Bill will put us in a very different position with regard to the "black sheep" than we are now in. At present we are not responsible for the one or two noble Lords who may exist, but whom we do not see here, whose conduct is reprehensible. It is not your Lordships' fault that they belong to this House; but if we pass this Bill we shall be responsible for them. We cannot afford to allow the Bill to remain a dead letter; we must put it into practice at once. It will be your Lordships' fault if, in future, anyone possessing a bad character is allowed to exercise his privileges as a Peer. If we legislate in this matter we must legislate thoroughly, otherwise we shall be accused either of clumsiness in drawing the Bill, or of hypocrisy in appearing to do what we do not wish to do. Certainly, at first sight, the Bill does not seem calculated to remedy the imperfections complained of, but there are the words "or otherwise," to which attention has been called. Without these words the Bill would be of little use, because it would only enable us to get rid of those Peers who had been convicted before a Court of Justice. It would not enable us to get rid of a man who had been turned off every racecourse in the kingdom. Nor would it permit us to deal with a man who might have neglected every duty pertaining to his station as a landowner, or otherwise. The name of such a man might be used in every speech throughout the country in which the House of Lords was mentioned, to point a moral or adorn a tale; but without those words we should not be able to touch him. My noble Friend has alluded to the example set by the Roman Senate. If your Lordships consider that this House is such an Augean stable that it wants thoroughly cleansing, you will be driven to adopting something very like a Censorship; and the question is, "Who is to be

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  the Censor?" The noble Lord has not told the House how the Bill is intended to be worked. Is this power to be put in the hands of the Lord Chancellor? If my noble and learned Friend is willing to incur such a responsibility, I do not envy him. When a noble Lord is convicted of misdemeanour or felony, or declared by a Judge to be guilty of conduct unworthy of a gentleman, and when his name is put on the Table of the House, who is to take up the matter and carry it through? Who is to put the machinery in motion? Is it to be the Government? I cannot imagine anything so invidious for a Government to undertake, because the Peer in question must either be one of their own supporters or an opponent. It would be just as unwise to intrust a Government to put this machinery in motion as it would be to leave Election Petitions to be tried by the House of Commons. Perhaps my noble Friend would propose that there should be a Committee of Censorship; but would he care to be Chairman of such a Committee? I doubt it very much indeed, and I think my noble Friend would find very few of your Lordships willing to help him in the disagreeable work of examining into the morals of brother Peers, with a view to expulsion from the House. There are far more pressing matters which ought to be taken up—such, for instance, as the bringing of the House into harmony with the spirit of the times by the introduction of Life Peers. There is also the question as to whether we cannot eliminate by some means not only the unprincipled and disreputable Members of this House, but also those who are inefficient and incompetent, and who, if they put themselves prominently forward, would do us every bit as much harm as those Members of our body at whom this Bill aims.
  *LORD FITZ GERALD: My Lords, as no noble Lord on either side of the House seems inclined to rise to continue the debate, I will just make one or two observations, although the matter under discussion is not one particularly within my province. My Lords, I am not aware that any provision exists in the constitution of this House under which any Peer can be deprived of his rights as a Peer—nor can he voluntarily renounce them. There undoubtedly exists outside this
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  House a strong desire that power should be vested in the hands of the House by which a delinquent Peer maybe deprived of his right to sit and vote. In support of that view I may cite as my witness the noble Lord (the Earl of Rosebery). He has been a very active promoter of this reform, and I may refer to two speeches of his, one dating so far back as the year 1884, and the other made last year. I have had sent me from Mid Lothian a print of a speech delivered in this House on the 19th of March, 1888, on "The Reform of the House of Lords." In one passage the noble Earl says:—
  "I would do nothing to impair the independence of the House of Lords; but something, surely, it would not he impossible for the House of Lords itself to do—something to purify itself from those black sheep who can now disgrace it with impunity."
  In a further portion of this print the noble Lord is represented to have used this remarkable language. Referring to the hereditary principle, he says—
  "But it does not merely make unwilling legislators—it also makes unfit legislators. I have quoted to you what Sir Michael Hicks Beach has said on the subject. It is not a particularly agreeable one to dwell upon; but I think we may say generally that 500 or 600 not unprolific families must always be accompanied by a proportion of black sheep. I do not think the percentage in this House is greater than in any other 500 or 600 families. I should rather be inclined to say less; but a percentage in an hereditary Legislative Chamber, be it large or small, is a thing you cannot admit. What you require in an hereditary Legislative Chamber, by the mere fact and principle of its existence, is an unblemished succession of hereditary virtue, hereditary wisdom, and hereditary discretion."
  Again, he says—
  "If a Peer should happen to be a knave or a fool, people outside do not greatly blame him, but at once begin to talk of the constitution of the hereditary Chamber in which he sits; and they say that—'This unworthy man is able at this moment to go down and give a vote equal to that of any noble Lord on the Ministerial Bench.'"
  And further on the noble Lord says—
  "Now, would the mere addition of Life Peers, whatever the number, have the effect of accomplishing what is one of the principal objects of all reform—namely, the exclusion of unworthy Members from your House?"
  I do not think anything I could cite could more strongly justify the necessity for some measure of this kind. Your Lordships must bear in mind that at present

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  you are powerless to deal in any way with the cases of delinquent Peers save, perhaps, by the cumbrous process of impeachment. Somehow or other, there has grown an idea out-of-doors that there are a number of these men who do come down on particular occasions and interfere with legislative work. I may add to the extracts I have read from the speech of the noble Lord that we must not forget this—that the brightest jewel in the Peerage is that power which is intrusted to your Lordships to superintend and enforce the administration of justice, not only in the United Kingdom, but also throughout the wide dominions of our Empress Queen. The noble Lord who introduced this measure cited several precedents, and I must say that in two of the cases that he quoted this House appears to me to have exceeded its powers when it presumed to enforce the exclusion of the Peers from the House, coupled with the declaration that they should be for ever incapable of serving the Grown. There is no such power by law, and I say that there is not in this House any power to expel a Member for misconduct, or any power to punish him for misconduct save on impeachment, or any power whatever to take from him the privileges of Peerage. Now this Bill proposes to give the House the power which it does not now possess of dealing with unworthy Peers who have been convicted of felony, or misdemeanour, or of gross misconduct, on the Report of a Judge of one of the Superior Courts. Such Report would come before your Lordships, and I apprehend the ordinary course would be to refer the matter to a Committee of Privileges, and, finally, it would be before the House again on a Motion to act on the Report of the Committee by addressing the Crown. The object of that Address would be to place in the hands of the Crown a power which the Crown does not possess at present—power to suspend the Writ by which, and by which alone, a Peer of Parliament sits in this House. In the case of the Lord Grey of Ruthyn it was held that—
  "No Peer can extinguish his honour; that it descends to his descendants; that even a surrender to the King is void—a Peer cannot surrender."
  This Bill simply gives your Lordships a power which you have not at present.
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  I need hardly remind your Lordships that this Bill differs very little from the Bill which was before us last Session. The noble Lord (the Earl of Rosebery), in the speech from which I have quoted, calls attention to the fact that on the occasion of previous discussions some of your Lordships have admitted the necessity for some steps in this direction. The noble Lord says—
  "I remember that two of my colleagues in the Government of 1885 expressed themselves strongly in favour of ending this House; one in the Government of 1886 expressed himself to the same effect, and I was left almost alone on that side of the question, pleading to a somewhat listless country the advantages of a Second Chamber."
  As to the argument that this is part of a larger question—the re-modelling of the whole constitution of this House—I look upon this question of power to purge the House of unworthy Members as quite apart from any such question. I am not opposed to some more general reform of this House; but the question now is whether you are, or are not, to have the power of dealing with delinquent Members. I am strongly of opinion that you should have that power, and accordingly I support the Second Reading of this measure.
  LORD ESHER: My Lords, I think it my duty to submit to your Lordships how strange and dangerous and impracable this Bill is. I think it is strange, because it places the first step towards the depriving a Peer of his duties and privileges in the power of a Court outside of this House. It seems to me exceedingly strange that that power should be given to a Court outside this House, and that it should not give the same power to the same Court under the same circumstances with regard to the other House. But I desire to point out to your Lordships that, in my opinion, this Bill is also impracticable and dangerous. In the first place it says—
  "Whenever a Peer of Parliament shall have been found guilty, in any Court of competent jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, of any felony or misdemeanour."
  What Court does that include? It includes, in England, Ireland, or Scotland, every Court of Quarter Sessions, any Recorder's Court, any Court at the Assizes where a single Judge is sitting, and it requires any one of those Courts—for they are all "Courts of competent

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  jurisdiction"—upon a verdict, with regard to the slightest misdemeanour, at once to send a Report to your Lordships' House—what for?—in order to found a Motion that a Peer of Parliament may be deprived of his rights, and prevented from performing his duties. But, when a Peer has been so convicted, however slight the offence, this House will be bound, I should think, to take the matter into its consideration, and upon this House will be thrown the duty of considering whether the felony or misdemeanour is of such a kind as will satisfy it that the Peer "has been guilty of discreditable conduct inconsistent with his position as such Peer." It is not said that any Peer who is found guilty of a felony or misdemeanour is to be excluded from the House; but the House has to consider whether the felony or misdemeanour committed is such a felony or misdemeanour as is inconsistent with the position of a Peer. Now, with regard to the third section, it seems to me to be more difficult and more impracticable. It is—
  "Where in any proceeding before any Superior Court in any part of the United Kingdom, a Peer of Parliament is proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been guilty of any discreditable conduct which appears to the Court to be inconsistent with his character as a Member of the House of Lords, the Court shall report the fact," &c.
  Under that section, where a Peer is called as a witness in some very trivial dispute between parties, and is cross-examined as to credit, and, in answer to some question, he states something which, in the opinion of some Judge, will entitle that Judge to consider his conduct inconsistent with the character of a Member of the House of Lords, then that Judge is to go into an inquiry, and consider whether he will report to this House. It will put a new danger upon Peers of Parliament allowing themselves to be called as witnesses. And what is to become of the parties? What is the Judge to do? Is it possible that, upon a mere answer of the Peer himself, or upon the mere allegation by some other witness, which appears to indicate discreditable conduct on the part of the Peer, the parties to the cause—neither of whom may have anything to do with the Peerage—are to stand by whilst the Judge determines that question? The section
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  says, "proved to the satisfaction of the Court." How can such a thing be proved to the satisfaction of the Court, unless the Peer whose conduct is impugned is called, and proposes a number of other witnesses? Even if the case arises upon an answer of the Peer himself, one would think that he must be allowed to discuss the question, so important to him, whether his conduct is or not consistent with his character as a Member of this House? Is the Judge to stop the cause in the presence of the parties, to allow the Peer to nominate counsel to defend him, and try out this issue as to the conduct of the Peer? Then, to go a step further, by what standard is the Judge to determine this question? Can anybody tell me by what rule of law, or by what rule of conduct, a Judge is to determine whether a thing is not simply discreditable, but "inconsistent with the character of a Member of the House of Lords." I confess that, for my part, I have no idea what that standard is. Then, in the next section, there are the words "or otherwise," by which the noble Lord intends to give this House power of independent action. But how is the matter to be determined? Is the incriminated Peer to be called to the Bar of the House, and counsel to be heard to show cause why his conduct should not be considered discreditable; or are you to invite a Peer who is accused of such unworthy conduct that you think you cannot sit with him to sit and discuss with you whether or not the case against him is established? It really seems to me that as a matter of practical utility there is no means of carrying this Bill into effect. There is another point. Supposing that a Judge reports to this House that the conduct of a Peer is in his opinion discreditable, and that this House, upon going into the matter, holds that the Peer is guiltless of discreditable conduct; what will be the position of that Peer? He will have a Report made against him by a judicial authority, and in his favour he will simply have a Resolution of this House that the conduct in question was not such as to be inconsistent with his character as a Member of this House. I can see no way of amending the Bill; I must, therefore, vote against it at this stage.
  VISCOUNT MIDLETON: After the answer that my noble Friend received the other day from the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government, I am not surprised that he has taken it upon himself to introduce this measure, upon the principle that "half a loaf is better than no bread." Although this measure may be called a small one, it is by no means an insignificant one; because, although the number of Peers affected by it may be extremely small, on the other hand the mere existence of such Peers is magnified in publications which rarely reach the eyes of any of your Lordships, and in which the proceedings which this Bill seeks to deal with are stated to represent the ordinary morals of Members of your Lordships' House. I think the time has come when an attempt should be made to do for the British Peerage what, by means of Representative Peers, is done for Scotland and Ireland. In the case of Ireland, the Irish Peers have the power of electing certain of their number to be Representative Peers for life; and in the case of Scotland, Peers are elected at the commencement of each Parliament. There have been well-known cases in which the desire of Irish and Scotch Peers to be elected Representative Peers was persistently ignored, and similarly there ought to be some means by which British Peers might, either permanently or temporarily, remove undesirable Members. I recognize in this Bill an honest attempt to grapple with a difficult question, and I hope that for the sake of the principle underlying it the House will read the Bill a second time, and reserve all criticism of its details for the next stage in Committee.
  *THE EARL OF DERBY: I must confess that when I first came into the House to-night I felt considerable doubt as to the course I should take, because I believe we all sympathize with the object of the noble Earl who has moved the Second Beading of this Bill. But the more we look into the subject, the more we feel the extreme difficulty of the grave and complicated questions which are involved. I am bound to say that I do not altogether agree with the opinion that has been expressed more than once to-night, that it is not desirable that we should deal with questions affecting the reform or the construction of this House unless we are prepared
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  to deal with them in a large and comprehensive manner; for I am afraid that if we are to wait for a comprehensive scheme of reconstruction we may have to wait a long while. Half a loaf is better than no bread; and if we are to have practical reforms, these will probably best be effected by dealing with separate parts of the subject, not in any one comprehensive scheme, but in a variety of separate measures. Nor should I be restrained by the possibility that whatever we do here our labours will be unsuccessful. An attempt to remedy an acknowledged defect can only be to our credit, even though it should fail by no fault of ours. But I think there is a great deal of force in the argument of the noble Earl below the Gangway (the Earl of Fife), that it is not desirable to open up, by a small measure such as this, the whole question of the constitution and character of this House in another place, where it is not very likely to meet with particularly friendly criticism, for the sake of the very small result which is all that can be hoped for from this measure In the second place, the more I look at this measure, the more I am convinced that the object we have in view—namely, the exclusion from this House of Members of disreputable character—would not be attained by it in any appreciable degree. The words of the 2nd clause are such that it is easy to imagine—not to refer to any actual cases—individuals who might bear notoriously bad characters, and be unfit to take part in the deliberations of this House, or even to be admitted to respectable society, and who yet would not come within the categories mentioned in the Bill—namely, of persons found, guilty of felony or misdemeanour. The Bill would not cover many cases that required to be dealt with, and would cover many cases that were not intended to be dealt with. There are a great many technical offences which are constituted misdemeanours, but which do not involve any moral delinquency. The non-repair of a road is, I believe, under certain circumstances a misdemeanour; a person who allows his chimney to emit smoke so as to be a nuisance to the neighbourhood is also guilty of a misdemeanour, and numerous cases of a similar character may be adduced

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  I do not believe that this subject can be adequately dealt with by attempts to exclude individually and by name those who are considered to be unfit, but I think rather that the method should be by giving to some body the power of choice among the whole number of Peers. In many cases, though there may be nothing proved against a Peer which would justify his exclusion from legislative functions, he may, upon moral or intellectual grounds, be quite unfitted for the duties of a legislator. In such a case it would be scarcely possible to exclude him directly; you will not alter your object by shutting out a limited number of persons, but rather by selecting from the whole body of Peers such as should exercise the right of legislation. Again, a measure of this kind ought, I think, if it goes to the House of Commons at all, to be backed by a general consensus of opinion in this House. It is quite clear that there is no general agreement in this House upon this Bill, and if we are divided among ourselves we cannot expect that our opinions would have proper weight and authority when they came to be considered by the other House. I hope, therefore, that my noble Friend will be satisfied with the discussion he has raised, and withdraw the Bill, which, in its present form, would not be likely to pass in another place, and which, if he persists with it, will place noble Lords in the dilemma of having either to vote against a measure the object of which we approve, or to vote for a measure which we do not believe will effect its purpose.
  *THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I confess I am in the same position as the noble Lord who has just sat down. I came down to this House with a disposition to vote for the Second Reading of this Bill. But I have listened very carefully to the debate which has taken place; and without wishing in any way to express any hostile opinion as to the aims and objects of my noble Friend, with which I entirely sympathize, I must say that I agree with the view of the noble Earl who has sat down, that it would be better that this Bill should not be proceeded with. I do not feel able altogether to agree with the proposition of the noble Earl below the Gangway (the Earl of Fife) that we must never deal with this question
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  except in conjunction with the question of the general constitution of this House. I think that would be too wide a doctrine. I should prefer, if the noble Earl saw his way, that he should withdraw his amendment and allow us to divide on "the Previous Question." This seems eminently an occasion for the "Previous Question," when we do not wish to express ourselves against the principle of the Bill; but owing to many circumstances of the time and the peculiar structure of the Bill—which has been rather knocked to pieces in the course of the criticisms of the noble and learned Lord behind me (Lord Esher)—we do not think it desirable to carry the Bill to a Second Reading. And I feel this all the more because I think there is something shadowy and unreal in the operation we are going through. My noble Friend has used again those words "great scandal," and "intolerable evil," but I think that these words go very far beyond the realities of the case. I have asked again and again for a list of "the black sheep" and I have never got it, and I am getting very sceptical as to their existence. I am quite certain that we shall not get at the black sheep by this Bill except by a very liberal use of these words "or otherwise." It is not the other provisions of the Bill that will exclude black sheep, unless you add an Interpretation Clause, and recognize the Jockey Club as "a Court of competent jurisdiction." Otherwise I do not think the Bill will have any effect at all. It is impossible to say that the grievance at which it aims is a practical grievance. I only know familiarly Peers who are in the habit of coming to this House. I utterly deny there are any black sheep among them. Whether there are among the Peers who never come to this House any to whom that description may attach I do not know; but the grievance, in so far as it is not an idle and imaginary grievance, really refers to the history and the experience of past times, and aims at dealing rather with a foolish outcry than with any practical state of things. At the same time, I think it is an anomaly, and an anomaly which, at a proper time, and under suitable circumstances, I should be very glad to see removed, that we do not possess the same power in this matter as the House of Commons. I believe

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  that the best solution of the question would be that we should place ourselves, as far as we can do in reference to this measure, precisely in the same position as the House of Commons—namely, that we should have the power of expelling Members, subject to having them put back here by the authority that sends us here. Just as, in the case of the House of Commons, if a Member is expelled, he can be put back by his constituents, so in the House of Lords, if a Peer is expelled, there should be power in the Crown to put him back here. But I do not believe that we are aiming at an urgent grievance, and so I do not ask your Lordships to proceed with the Bill now. I confess, though I do not agree with his doctrine in all its entirety, I was very much struck by the argument of the noble Lord who moved the Amendment. I do not think it is desirable, except for some adequate reason, to subject the constitution of this House to the dissecting-knife of the House of Commons. The House of Commons have blunt methods of their own of expressing their friendly sentiments, which might interfere with the good feeling between the two Houses. As we showed last year, we are rather disposed to deal with this question as an adjunct to the general question of the constitution of the House; we have never elevated it into such importance that we should wish to deal with it alone. With regard to the general constitution of this House, I have only to say that we hear many proposals for abstract and very few for concrete reform. The noble Earl, I think, denounced Lord Melbourne for one of his observations—"Let well alone." If I mistake not, there was another observation of Lord Melbourne's which is very applicable in the present case, and that was that things were never in so much danger as when people said that something must be done. Now we have got this question rather in the position of "something must be done." Definite plans have not been very often laid before us, and, when they have been laid before us, I do not think they have attracted much support from any side of the House. For myself, I see my way no further than the importance of giving to the Crown, under certain conditions, the power of introducing Life Peers into the House. I believe that would be a very considerable
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  improvement to the constitution of the House and the conduct of our debates, and I should be very glad indeed if I saw any chance of this being carried into effect. But in the present state of Parliamentary Business and the disposition with respect to the forwarding of it which is being manifested by those who hold the forces of obstruction in their hands, I cannot honestly say that I see any prospect of bringing such an attempt to a successful conclusion, and therefore I do not think it is desirable we should enter upon a controversy so fraught with difficulty. Under the circumstances I have only to repeat that I think the best way to deal with this Bill is not to read it a second time, though I should be very glad to be spared the necessity of appearing to record my vote against the principle it contains.
  LORD HERSCHELL: My Lords, I should not have troubled your Lordships with any observations but for what has fallen from the noble Lord who moved the Amendment and from the noble Marquess opposite. I quite agree with what has been said as to the delicacy and difficulty of dealing with this subject, though I cannot quite assent to the view that it purports to deal with an entirely imaginary and unsubstantial grievance. Undoubtedly, there is a good deal of ill-founded and unjust criticism with regard to this House; but, certainly, when we find that under the existing practice an individual whose conduct and character may be of the most discreditable and even criminal description is, nevertheless, as potent in this House, by recording his vote, as the most honourable Member of it, I think that state of things can hardly be called an imaginary evil. If it be possible, without introducing greater evils, we all desire to get rid of any well-founded subject of criticism. Therefore, I think the noble Lord opposite, especially considering what was done in this matter during last Session, was well justified in bringing this measure before your Lordships' notice. I agree that if you are to get rid of what your Lordships wish to see excluded, it can only be done by delegation or selection. Nor should I be hostile to this measure on the ground that it might provoke unfriendly criticism in the House of Commons. No doubt there have been criticisms, and there are likely to be

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  criticisms, which many of us consider exceed the bounds of justice; but if we are not strong enough to stand well-founded criticism elsewhere, we must be in a weak and unstable condition, and I should be sorry to admit that we could not stand the criticism of the other House of Parliament. My special object in rising was this—that it has been laid down as clear and unquestionable that your Lordships' House has no power of expelling Members in cases in which it would be open to the other House to do so. I am not going to lay down the contrary of that proposition; it would require more consideration and more examination than I have given to the matter to justify me in doing so; but I feel bound to say that I am not satisfied that that power does not exist. The power of expelling for grave offences in the House of Commons rests on no Statute; it is inherent in the Assembly. True, Members of the House of Commons are chosen by constituencies in obedience to a Writ issued by the Crown, while your Lordships' House is summoned together by Writ of Summons, but at the moment I am not prepared to admit that that distinction in any way shows that this House has not inherent in it, just as the House of Commons has inherent in it under similar circumstances, the power of expelling Members who bring disgrace and discredit upon it. It may be worthy of your Lordships' consideration whether we might not inquire how far that power does exist in this House which is possessed by the House of Commons; but I felt bound to make these observations to your Lordships after what was said by the noble and learned Lord.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: My Lords, I confess that I am in the same position of perplexity as a considerable number of those who have already addressed your Lordships. I sympathize warmly with the object my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) has at heart, and I sympathize at least equally warmly with my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Fife) in the Resolution he has put forward. Nor have I heard any trumpet give a very certain sound in this debate except the speech of the noble Earl who brought forward the Bill. More especially has been my confusion increased by the speech of the noble Marquess who leads this House.
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  He is going to oppose the Second Reading; but it will require a microscopic examination of the Bill of the noble Earl to discover what are the essential differences between that Bill and the Bill which the noble Marquess laid on the Table last year. Let us take another point. The noble Marquess does not approve the contention of the noble Earl behind me that this is not a subject which ought to be dealt with separately; but again last year the noble Marquess presented twin Bills, one of which bore a remarkable resemblance to the Bill of the noble Earl, and the other of which dealt with the constitution of your Lordships' House. When, owing to untoward circumstances in another place, one of those Bills was withdrawn, the noble Earl made a special appeal to the noble Marquess that the second innocent might at least be saved from the massacre; but the noble Marquess sternly said that he would not deal with the question of black sheep apart from the question of the constitution of your Lordships' House. It does put a simple and innocent and confiding and perplexed Peer like myself in an awkward position when he finds his natural guide and pastor in a position of difficulty. Then there was another speech which did not tend to assist me. The Master of the Rolls pointed out, by a series of detailed instances, how very dangerous this Bill might be to any of your Lordships who went into a witness-box. The contention, as I understood it, was this—that your Lordships might make a slip in the accuracy of your evidence, and might, after leaving the Court, find the doors of this House eternally closed against you. My fear is the reverse. My fear is not that it will operate so extensively or so injuriously as the Master of the Rolls suggests; my fear is that it will scarcely have any operation at all. The noble Viscount has made some very sound remarks on the principle of delegation. He said that by delegation we could get rid of this evil, and by delegation alone. He illustrated this by the case of the Scottish and Irish Peerages, and he said that it worked well in those cases, and that in both instances it had operated to remove unworthy Peers from sitting in this House. I can understand how that can be in the case of the Scotch Peers; but how that can be in the case of the

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  Irish Peerage, where the Peers are admitted for life, is an additional perplexity to the many others which harass me at this moment. As regards the general question, I believe that reformers in this House are divided into three distinct categories. There are those who wish the utmost possible reform; there are those who wish for the least possible reform; and, in the third place, there are those who wish for no reform at all. I shall do the noble Earl who introduced the Bill no injustice in putting him in the second class. It has been my melancholy experience to see the noble Marquess begin in the first class and gradually descend through the second into the third. I think my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Fife) is, like myself, an ardent and convinced Member of the first class. When we come to consider how ardent and convinced reformers are to be benefited by this Bill, we find ourselves in a position of some considerable difficulty. Those Peers on whom a Judge shall have pronounced a sentence, or as to whom a Judge shall have to report as provided in the Bill, are Peers who can never in those circumstances attend the Sittings of this House, for in these days so gross a public scandal would be practically impossible. Therefore, if you pass this Bill, you might in a case of a very flagrant nature move an Address to the Crown and keep out a Peer, whose entry again into this House would be practically impossible; but does it really touch the matter at issue going beyond that? Is the object which our reformers have at heart simply to keep out the black sheep, the Peers guilty of flagrant felonies and misdemeanours? It is nothing of the kind. There are a great many offences—scarcely offences at all in the eye of the law—which unfit a Peer to sit here or legislate here. There are offences for which a Peer would be expelled by the committee of a club at a moment's notice which do not come under the operation of this Bill, which would be almost more repulsive to your Lordships than any offences that do come under the Bill. When we come to deal with the action that should be taken, we find what our difficulties are. Some propose a Censor. I once took the liberty of suggesting that we should have a Censor, and that if we did have a Censor
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  he should be the noble Duke, whom I do not see present (the Duke of Argyll), who is well qualified to perform those functions; but that, again, is not a practical suggestion. Well, can we have expurgation by ballot? That, again, would seem a natural way to get rid of those Peers who are undesirable; but who would be the Peers to be got rid of? I am sorry to say that from all that I have seen of the proceedings of this House for the last two years I am led to believe that the first ballot would be not against the black sheep, but against myself and my noble Friends who sit on the front Opposition Bench. Then, when we come to the definition of black sheep, there is a difficulty there again. If Sir Wilfrid Lawson were asked to define the black sheep he would define them as the men who took too much wine, and I believe the definition which would be given by the strict teetotaller of the blackest sheep of all would be the moderate drinker. I have seen a Catechism framed by members of the Church of England which lays it down as almost a mortal sin to enter Dissenting places of worship. The noble Marquess the Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire pointed out on the last occasion on which we discussed this Bill that any person who had been twice on a racecourse should be unfit to sit in this House. When you come to your category of offences and the persons committing them you find an insuperable difficulty which can have only one issue. The real difficulty in your path has been ignored this evening. The difficulty is the hereditary condition of this House. I do not wish to speak offensively, but these are the only words by which I can describe what I mean. This House is not an ordinary Legislative Body such as exists elsewhere in the universe. It is a legislative caste, constantly recruited, I grant, constantly renewed by the exertions of the noble Marquess and those who have preceded him in office, but still a legislative caste; and the measures which are sufficient to deal with an elective body are not sufficient to deal with a hereditary body. My Lords, the painful truth is this—to put it as decorously as I can—that a person of very indifferent character who comes to a Legislative Body by the process of popular election has a safer position than a person of unimpeachable character who comes to a

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  House by hereditary descent. Our duty, therefore, is a singularly complicated one. We have not merely to take the steps which the House of Commons may take, and which we are told we have not the power to take, but we have to keep absolutely pure, unspotted, and untainted, free from any possibility of suspicion of taint, the hereditary constitution of this Assembly. The Bill of my noble Friend will not do that, nor, indeed, is it possible. His position, which is the reverse of the parable, is this—that he is constructing an elaborate crane to remove a large single beam, whereas what we are suffering from is an innumerable multitude of motes. There are three courses open to us. There is the course open of voting for my noble Friend opposite; there is the course open of voting for my noble Friend below the Gangway (the Earl of Fife), but I not feel inclined to adopt either. I feel in the position of a man who says, "Any port in a storm." And the port I select on this occasion would be the inquiry by Select Committee which has been suggested by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Herschell) to ascertain if we have or have not the power possessed by the House of Commons. If we have, it will render the Bill of my noble Friend unnecessary, whereas if we have not the power we may come then to the reconsideration of the subject with renewed freshness and vitality.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I am sure we shall all agree that many of the arguments used by the noble Earl who introduced this Bill are weighty and excellent arguments which cannot be contradicted. I fear, on the other hand, that the noble Earl who moved the Amendment very courteously administered a mild reproof to some Peers older than himself for the course they have taken in this matter; but I cannot help thinking that his principal argument—to the effect that the reform of the House of Lords is very desirable and so important that it should be introduced and pushed forward in the most effectual manner, and that it is injured instead of advanced by petty dealing with the question—is very much the policy, right or wrong, which, owing to the over-caution of old age, has been the policy of some of the older Peers upon whom he animadverted. Now, with
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  regard to the Bill itself, arguments have been addressed to your Lordships in favour of and against the Bill; and I think that, as not infrequently happens, the speeches of the learned Lords in this House have to-night had more practical importance than those of lay Lords. The noble and learned Lord opposite me (Lord Esher) advanced criticisms, some of them of a startling character, others with respect merely to minor details of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord below me (Lord Fitz Gerald), while arguing strongly in favour of the Bill, laid down positively the doctrine that there is no power in this House to get rid of its delinquent Members. Now, any obiter dictum of the noble and learned Lord must have great weight, but it is notable that he gave no reasons or argument in support of his proposition. He was followed by my noble and learned Friend the late Lord Chancellor, who, without laying down positively and dogmatically any proposition upon the subject, pointed out that, in his opinion, it is exceedingly open to doubt whether this Assembly, like all similar bodies, had not such a power inherent in itself. My Lords, I think that, especially after what has fallen from the noble Lord who has just sat down, who so justly has taken the lead with regard to the reform of the House of Lords, my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) will see that any Bill for the reform of your Lordships' House ought to go down to another place with very great authority and very great support from this House. It is said that the House of Commons, if this Bill went down to it, would take advantage of that opportunity of discussing the constitution of this House. I have no right to speak for any of the Conservative Party in the other House; but I have no doubt that there is a considerable portion of that Party in the other House who do not like the principle of reforming this House, because they think that if such a reform were once begun, it would tend ultimately to destroy an institution which they wish to perserve. On the other hand, there are in the other House honourable Friends of mine on the same political side as myself who would be no party to any measures that would strengthen the House of Lords. I think, after the difference of opinion there has been

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  among noble and learned Lords as to what our power is in this matter, that the suggestion that we should inquire before we act is one which it is impossible to resist. Therefore, while strongly agreeing with the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) in wishing to get rid of what is a blot on this House, however small, I venture to express the hope that the noble Earl will assent to the course suggested by the noble Marquess; and, as there are many of us who would not have it supposed that in the vote we are about to give we are voting for the retention of black sheep in this House, I would ask my noble Friend whether he cannot consent to the proposal of the noble Marquess, and let us vote upon the previous question?
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: My Lords, I feel myself in some difficulty after the appeals which have been made to me. I freely confess that I should infinitely prefer the action of the Government on this question, which is one far more befitting the Government to deal with than any private Member. It falls within their province, and they are more competent to speak in tones of authority in regard to it both here and in another place. My noble Friend at the head of the Government, however, must remember that when I first mooted this question in this House, he gave me a distinct invitation to take it up; and therefore I could not quite anticipate, without any notice, that there had been a change of purpose on my noble Friend's part. My noble Friend objected to this Bill, and even went so far as to describe the evil which most of us acknowledged as an ideal one. If that is so, I am at a loss to understand why my noble Friend introduced the Bill of last year, which was framed on precisely the same lines as those on which the present Bill is moulded. The chief difference between the two Bills was that I have introduced into the present Bill the two magical words "or otherwise," which gives this House the initiative. At the same time, I now find myself in a very great difficulty. Having carried the question up to this particular point, and having proceeded on the assumption that I should receive the support of Her Majesty's Government, based on their own action last year, and on the fact that I had received no intimation of change of mind on their part, I think
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  I was warranted in supposing that I should not have met with that objection at the last moment. I should be quite content, if the House would agree to the Second Reading, to allow the Bill to go to a Select Committee, and would accept the decision of the House upon it cheerfully. But I feel that I ought not to be asked at the last moment to withdraw the measure altogether.
  The Amendment of the Earl of Fife was, by leave of the House, withdrawn. Then, the original question being stated, the previous question was put, "whether this question be now put;" Contents 14; Not-Contents 73.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: I should like to ask the noble Marquess whether the Government will consent to the appointment of such a Committee as that suggested by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Herschell)? I have just voted for the Second Reading, and so produced an appearance of dissidence from my noble Friends, because I thought that the Bill should be read a second time, in order to be referred to a Select Committee.
  EARL CADOGAN: I understood the noble and learned Lord to suggest the appointment of a Committee on the general question—not upon this Bill simply.
  EARL GRANVILLE: The point is that, if the view of the noble and learned Lord (Lord Herschell) be correct, there will be no necessity for any measure of this kind.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I did not understand my noble and learned Friend to express a definite opinion. All he said was that he had considerable doubt as to the accuracy of the view put forward by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Fitz Gerald) as to the non-existence of the power of dealing with delinquent Members.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: All I can say is that if any Committee were appointed it could certainly not be upon this Bill, which is now absolutely dead; but if a proposal is made to appoint a Committee such as I understood the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Herschell) to suggest, the Government will carefully consider the advisability of such an appointment.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.