THE EARL OF CARNARVON,in rising to call attention to the hostilities on the Nile and the general condition of affairs in Egypt, said: I will not repeat now what was said the 994 other evening, in which I so heartily joined—the expression of deep satisfaction at the skill, courage, and conduct of our troops in the recent hostilities on the Nile; those who took part in that short conversation bore emphatic testimony to that, and it would be needlessly taking up the time of your Lordships if I were to advert to it again. I suppose no reasonable man doubted what the issue of those hostilities would be; but, as I said before, there is a larger question behind—a larger question as regards the possible or probable recurrence of such difficulties and the general policy which is to be maintained in Egypt. I need not delay your Lordships by more than the briefest reminder of the circumstances which have brought us to the present pass of events. The House will remember how the dual control was brought to an end, the insurrection of Arabi, the bombardment of Alexandria, and the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Single-handed in fact, and in default of all allies we entered Egypt; single-handed we fought our battles; single handed we won all our successes. But very soon afterwards we were startled by the news of the defeat of Hicks Pasha, and I need not recall the circumstances that followed and ulminated in the tragical disaster to Gordon at Khartoum. Very soon after that the withdrawal of our garrisons commenced, and of those that remained some were massacred, some disappeared, and the history of some is even now buried in complete obscurity. There was a declaration made very soon after that time, or about that time, to the effect that we intended to withdraw from Egypt at a certain specified date. I always regretted that declaration, but 995 that declaration was followed by many similar declarations, if not quite as precise in language, at all events bearing very closely the same character. Then commenced the general policy of withdrawal from the outposts, the concentrating of troops for the defence of Egypt proper, and a gradual reduction of the armed forces. That reduction went on from month to month until recently the force could not have been above 2,500 men, or thereabouts. Then ensued that which had been predicted by a great many persons familiar with Eastern affairs, fresh risings on the frontier, fresh harassing of our positions, till at last occurred the recent invasion which we have been obliged to arrest by sending troops from other places. If we had sustained a reverse we should have been obliged to send many more troops. In the events of the last few days there is very much to rejoice over, and perhaps not the least ground of satisfaction is that the health of the British troops, contrary to what might have been expected, has been admirable. I need not point out that the difficulties of European troops are greatly aggravated by the summer heat of such a country as Egypt. Seasoned troops alone can bear such a climate. But unseasoned troops must die like flies. The reason why our troops did stand the severity of the climate was that they were entirely seasoned troops. We were obliged to bring them from Malta, from Cyprus, and possibly from Gibraltar. I think it has been a wise policy on the part of the Government during the last two years, or somewhat less, to increase the strength of our garrison at Malta, which for a long time had been unduly low. The garrison there, however, is very limited, and if any cheek had occurred, troops of a very different quality and material must have been procured elsewhere. But, my Lords, the question to which I wish to draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government and this House is not purely a military question, it is essentially a mixed one. Egypt, to use a metaphor which was applied to a smaller country in Europe, is now the cockpit of European diplomacy. Rival theories are contending and struggling for the mastery. I do not propose to go very closely into that part of the subject, but I may remind your Lordships that very briefly there are three principal theories 996 that struggle for ascendency. First of all, there is that which is known by the name of neutralisation. It is founded on the idea that Egypt may be placed, by the agreement of European Powers, in the same position of neutrality as Belgium. The answer to that is that Egypt is not, and cannot be for a long time, at all events, a Belgium. Her people are not Belgians. They have not learned the art of Constitutional Self Government; and it would be idle to suppose that anything short of a very long apprenticeship indeed could teach it to them. There are not in Egypt at the present moment the elements for Constitutional Government, as, on the other hand, there are not the elements for a benignant despotism. Then there is that which is sometimes described as the International theory—a theory which finds favour in France, but which I believe to be equally impossible. The idea is that each Power in Europe should be proportionately represented, and should exercise a proportionate power in the management of the country. But the great objection to that is that each country and each Government has its own special object—or rather that certain parties in each country have their own objects and their own interests. These objects and interests are not for the good of Egypt, but generally for the promotion of the interests of capitalists, of bondholders, of financial rings, of persons who have private and personal objects to satisfy. If that theory were attempted in reality it could only end in a crowd of jarring interests, many of them of a very inferior character, and certainly none likely to contribute to the welfare of the country. We next come to the theory which is mainly represented by English ideas, and that resolves itself very simply into this—that "we should either stay and govern, or go." Let me say a word as to our staying and governing, and let me ask your Lordships to consider what we have done and what we have not done in Egypt. What we have done has been, I believe, in many ways a satisfactory record. We have abolished the lash, we have put an end to torture, we have greatly improved the prisons, we have purified the judicial system, we have augmented and developed the irrigation system of the country, that most fertile source of revenue, and we have 997 created an effective and well-drilled army. It is impossible to express too strongly the debt we owe to the able and conscientious public servants who have laboured in this work in Egypt. Moreover, life and property have been comparatively secure, and, lastly, I am told by those who know the country that sentiments have grown up in the mind of the fellah, who has been down-trodden for generations upon generations, which, though they do not actually make him in all senses of the word a free man fit to govern himself, still make him a very different character from that oppressed and miserable person that he was a short time since. That is, briefly summarised, what we have done. What we have not done also is a longer list than I quite like to think of. I do not say that it has been our fault; circumstances and conflicting policies have fought against us; but the taxation of the country still remains unequal, unjust, and often very oppressive. One of the first things which it was our object to do in the purposes of good government was, no doubt, to create a new assessment; but the old assessment continues, and with it most of its injustices and cruelties. I believe (my noble Friend will correct me if I am wrong) that at no very great distance from Cairo, in the interior of the country, so hardly does the enforcement of this old assessment press upon the people that there are very frequent sequestrations of land for the non-payment of taxes. I apprehend that one of our shortcomings is that we really do not govern enough; that the people would rejoice to see greater government, more effective government; and I imagine that the two Departments in which and for which we are deservedly popular are the Irrigation Department and the Army Department. For both of those we are respected; both of those have done, and are doing, a great work. But in each case the work is not adequate; it is stopped in mid career. There is another evil which we met with, and which we still maintain—I mean the conscription. I am not one of those who object to all conscription on abstract and general grounds, far from it; but I think my noble Friend must know well from the facts that have come before him that the conscription in Egypt tells with 998 a peculiar, and a special, and, I should say, an exceptional cruelty; and cannot as matter of argument, in its present form at least, be defended. And, lastly, you have the feeling spread far and wide through the country that there is no abiding confidence in our rule; by which I mean that there is no confidence in the permanency of our stay and of our administration. Then we come to ask, is this a matter of success or of failure? It is certainly not success—it is very far short of it. Now, what are the causes of that? Of course, there are many causes; but there are two which stand out above and beyond all others. The first is the lack of sufficient money; the second the sense of uncertainty pervading the whole country. All improvements in Egypt, as elsewhere, want money. A better system of taxation, a larger system of irrigation, better means of defence, a police force, an army—all these mean money; and what we need in order to obtain that money is a free hand in the management of Egyptian finance. But that is impossible, because then step in diplomatic considerations, foreign jealousies, and, as in a quite recent case, France forbids even the conversion of the debt. I know very well that in the course of a few years, I think it is in 1894, a certain part of the interest on the Canal shares falls in, and there will be a considerable saving, which of course will be applicable to Government purposes. But you have to wait five years for that; and even that amount, after all, is nothing very considerable. But I said there was another difficulty, and another drawback, which took from the complete success of our occupation of Egypt, and that is the uncertainty which pervades the whole of the Oriental mind, whether we are there for long—whether we may not flit like a shadow on the wall; and that I consider to be the greatest evil and the greatest difficulty of all; and for this we have in a certain measure to blame ourselves and our own conduct, because, if there has not been vacillation, there has at least been the semblance of vacillation. There has been the appearance of halting between two professions. On the one hand, we have declared repeatedly that we went to Egypt in order to restore prosperity and order: in the same breath we have said that we were anxious to go as soon 999 as we could get away. On the one hand, we declared that our object was to hold Egypt: in the same breath we have abandoned the outworks of Egypt in the Soudan, and we have reduced our troops till it almost seemed as if we were going to accept a mere corporal's guard. The result of all that is that the Egyptians and the Soudanese disbelieve very much our assertions; that the French place unfair constructions upon our conduct; and that Europe looks on half amused and half perplexed, and designates us as opportunists living from hand to mouth. But what is after all the real position? It is this—that we have assumed responsibilities larger than we can fulfil under existing conditions. We have given to Egypt only one-half of the benefits which our occupation should have tended to give her. Trade, which, after all, is the secret key to unlock success and prosperity, is blighted and comparatively checked. The Khedive, who, as an Oriental Sovereign, had power, is reduced in the eyes of the people to a mere shadow; and all this time we repeat, and repeat, and repeat over again our intention of going at the first opportunity. Now, I venture to think that, on reflection, your Lordships will see that there really are but five possible courses which are open, and I will venture to enumerate them. The first of these is evacuation. That would be a very poor end in the eyes of the country to all the labour and bloodshed and sacrifices that we have made; and there can be no doubt of this—that evacuation would mean anarchy, and must lead to early foreign intervention. Secondly, you may, as some persons desire, but which I should look upon as the worst solution of all, hand the country back again to Turkey. I am satisfied that neither the feeling nor the good sense of this country would tolerate such a proceeding. Every unfulfilled pledge on the part of the Turkish Government, every act of oppression, of misgovernment, of cruelty, would rise up against it, and the very stones of the Pyramids would cry out against it. You have Armenia at this moment declaring that the condition of things is intolerable; you have Crete in a state of semi-revolt; you have Macedonia seething; and, therefore, people who are idle enough to dream that Turkey could resume her authority 1000 in Egypt are living in such a cloudland that it is not worth while to discuss it. Thirdly, we may remain as we are, and drift along, repelling the different attacks which from time to time may be made—as on the recent occasion, sending troops whether convenient or inconvenient, hoping for the best, taking the risk. There are, no doubt, precedents for this, but they are not satisfactory precedents, and I do not think that that is a very good solution of the matter. Fourthly, we might remain as we are, but providing some defence for the Southern portions of the country, the outposts of Egypt. I believe that that can only be accomplished in two possible ways: either by securing a competent and reliable authority, semi-independent, to hold these outworks for you—such as Zebehr, or Emin, or some such person, and that was, after all, the ideal which I believe was mainly in Gordon's mind at the last as a practical solution—or by placing black garrisons, who, however, must be paid and must be officered by Englishmen, to hold the country for you. That, no doubt, is a better solution; it is a more adequate solution; but costly, and not without a good many difficulties. Fifthly, and lastly, you may announce to Europe that you intend to stay in Egypt for the present, and that you are not limited by times and seasons; that you will religiously respect the rights of the bondholders, but that you will administer the country upon your own principles and policy, and then govern the country as firmly, and substantially as wisely, as you have governed the best Provinces in India. That is a solution which is, undoubtedly, much the best for Egypt. It may present difficulties, possibly, so far as this country is concerned, but it is the boldest course, and it is the one to which at any time you may be reduced by a combination of diplomatic conditions. It means, no doubt, an increase of your Mediterranean Squadron, and an addition to your Army of some 4,000 or 5,000 men; but Egypt could pay that if she were willing; and geographically defensible as she is in a singularly high degree by the deserts that flank her on either side, the masters of the sea may easily be the masters of Egypt. My Lords, these are the alternatives. I do not believe that any other solutions exist than those which I 1001 have mentioned. Willingly or unwillingly, one of these the Government must choose, and the time is drawing near when that choice must be distinctly and definitely expressed. I hope I have said nothing which will embarrass the Government. It has been far from my wish to do so. The question is one of the gravest moment; but I do think it desirable that before long some solution should be arrived at, and I believe it is equally desirable that the country should, in some degree at all events, understand the elements of the question.
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)My Lords, once or twice this Session I have had to regret that the only Member of the Front Opposition Bench (I say it without any incivility to him) whom I have had to confront was my noble Friend the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Oxenbridge). I have no doubt he is a repository in the richest measure of all the experience and all the knowledge of the Government to which he belonged; but it is very difficult for me to enter upon matters of detail concerning the action of the late Government—I mean the Government which terminated in 1885—unless some of those who took part in that Government are present. When my noble Friend behind me talks of our failure or our success in Egypt, I think that as far as we are concerned we have a right to require this—that what we have done or that what has happened in our time shall be measured in respect to the circumstances which we found when we acceded to responsibility; and that we shall not be held to have failed because Egypt does not occupy an ideal position with respect to all the circumstances that have been examined by my noble Friend. In saying that, I have no wish to raise old controversies, or to hint any blame of those who went before me. But I only wish to insist upon this—that to ascertain the merits or demerits of Her Majesty's present Government you must simply compare the state of Egypt when we acceded to power with the state of Egypt as it is now, and not impute to us responsibility for any results which may have accrued from circumstances which happened before our time. It is very necessary to take this into consideration, because, whatever the causes were, there is no doubt that the task to 1002 which we succeeded was one of exceeding difficulty; and we have never imagined that the conditions existed which would have enabled us to bring Egypt within any measurable time to the high degree of prosperity and order which prevails in European countries. But I do not in the least admit that there has been any element of failure in what has been done. On the contrary, I think if my noble Friend examines carefully into the Reports which have been laid before the House, he will see that, not owing to any merit on the part of Her Majesty's Government (I do not in the least suggest that), but owing to the wise, careful, and statesmanlike management of the permanent servants of the Crown, and the English servants of the Khedive, who have carried on that great work of civilisation in that country, there has been a constant and steady progress, bringing peace and tranquillity to the country; bringing increased means of prosperity and openings for industry and commerce, abating the evils of misgovernment, of judicial abuse, and of disorder which existed before that time, and even abating that evil on which my noble Friend relies the most—namely, the evil of excessive taxation of the inhabitants. In all the matters which constitute the advance of a nation Egypt has made real progress under the temporary guardianship of. England. My noble Friend has advanced nothing that could be called solid evidence to the contrary. His charges have been so vague that it is impossible to deal with them. He tells me that the assessment it still a grievous wrong. The circumstance that there has been any increase in the weight of the assessment has not come under my observation. I doubt it exceedingly. On the contrary, I believe the assessment has been steadily becoming lighter and more just in proportion as the cadastral survey has been carried out, and the re-partition of burdens has become more equal. I freely admit that the financial state of Egypt is not everything that we could desire. The burdens are heavier than we should wish the people to bear, and that for the simple reason that the Governments of Egypt that existed before our time have so squandered the resources of the people that one-half of the revenues of Egypt goes to pay the interest on her debt. That is the 1003 burden with which Egypt starts in the financial race, and as long as that burden weighs on her it is impossible to say that her financial condition at all approaches to the ideal. But I did not hear from my noble Friend any suggestion of a possible remedy for that evil. He seemed to intimate that it was the business of this country, in some way or other, to get rid of the debt. I hope I do not do him wrong, but I thought I just traced a suggestion that a simple way of getting rid of the debt was not to pay it.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONI must interrupt my noble Friend. Such an. extraordinary perversion of words I never heard. I am afraid the noble Marquess was slumbering on the Treasury Bench if he ever supposed that I advocated for one moment passing the sponge over the solemn obligations that have been incurred. I content myself with a simple denial of the fact.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am exceedingly glad to have drawn that denial from my noble Friend, and I have not the slightest doubt that I misunderstood him; but he did not indicate in what possible way financial prosperity could be restored to a people which begins by having to pay away half its revenue as interest for its debt. It is obvious that the burden is one that must weigh upon it most heavily. I am not therefore able to admit in any degree the suggestion of my noble Friend that the guardianship of this country over Egypt has been otherwise than beneficial to it. For that we have not attained such a measure of success as we had a right to expect. I need not go further and say that the withdrawal of that guardianship would be a great evil to Egypt, for in that I understand that I carry my noble Friend with me; but when he goes beyond the criticism of the past or the examination of the present condition of Egypt and the effect of the measures which this country has sanctioned or encouraged, and asks us to penetrate into the future and say what the future relations of this country and Egypt are to be, I must respectfully ask the House to allow me to decline to follow him. It is very burning ground indeed. We have again and again explained what, in our judgment, are the obligations which bind us to Egypt and which we have intended 1004 to fulfil; and when my noble Friend says there has been vacillation, or the semblance of vacillation, I again cannot admit that the charge is sustained by any evidence or any particulars. If my noble Friend will do me the honour to refer to the account which I gave four years ago of the policy which the then in-coming Government thought it their duty to pursue with respect to Egypt, and the circumstances in which Egypt found herself, I think he will find we have not deviated by a hair's breadth from the line which we then laid down. I need not repeat what I have often expressed—namely, the obligations which we feel bound in honour to fulfil before we withdraw from the guardianship of Egypt. But when my noble Friend asks us to go beyond that and to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors, and to say that, in despite of all that we have said and that our predecessors have said, we will, under the circumstances and conditions as they are now, declare our stay in Egypt permanent and our relation to Egypt that of a conquering country to a conquered, I must say I think my noble Friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken and by which they are bound to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the most profitable course; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European law. We shall try to observe that rule faithfully. Undoubtedly we have no intention of abandoning our task until it is fulfilled; but we have no authority or right to give it the extension which my noble Friend demands.
§ LORD HERSCHELLMy Lords, I do not of course intend to enter at all into the general discussion raised by the noble Earl opposite; but with reference to the allusion that has been made to the reforms which have taken place in Egypt in recent years, there is one matter upon which I should like to say a word or two. Having been in that country not long ago, I made it my duty to inquire, as far as I could, into what was being done with reference to a reform in the judicial system, and the administration of the law. Your Lordships will be aware how very far Egypt was behind, according to our European 1005 notions, in its judicial system, and its method of administering the law. I satisfied myself that in this most important particular there had been a real and substantial improvement during the last few years. I do not mean to say that at the present time in this respect Egypt is on a level with European nations, or has completely achieved the object which those who entered upon these reforms had in view; but I was satisfied, from the conversation which I had with the Prime Minister in Egypt, that he held upon this subject thoroughly enlightened views, that he was profoundly impressed with the necessity of further reforms, and that he was most anxious to bring them to as speedy an accomplishment as possible. Your Lordships will easily imagine that the task of law reform in a country like Egypt is not likely to be an easy one. Even in this country, with all our reforming tendencies, and when reforms have been most in the air, the path of the legal reformer has been generally a somewhat thorny one; and law reforms have never moved very rapidly apace. But in the East the difficulties, of course, are considerably greater. I have thought it right to bear my testimony to the fact that I believe a real endeavour is being made, and has, to some extent, already successfully been made, in this direction, and I have every hope that the progress will be continued still further.