Lords Sitting of 20 November 1888

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Sweating System, Earl Brownlow added.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Local Government (England and Wales) Electors Act, 1888, Repeal (282), negatived; Sea Fisheries Regulation* (264); Statute Law Revision (No. 2)* (258); Municipal Funds (Ireland)* (278).
Withdrawn—Companies Relief* (241).

AUSTRALIA—QUEENSLAND—APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR—SIR HENRY A. BLAKE.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he rose to put to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a Question of which he had given him private Notice—namely, whether he could communicate to the House the reply sent by Her Majesty's

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  Government to the telegraphic despatch received from the Acting Governor of Queensland in reference to the appointment to the Governorship of that Colony. The difficulties which appeared to have arisen respecting the appointment of Sir Henry Blake to the Governorship of Queensland were of a twofold nature. There was first the question of how far that particular appointment was a suitable or an unsuitable one; and there was also the question which had been raised as to what was the right, if any, which a Colony possessed of selecting or of being consulted as to the appointment of a Governor. As to the first point, he desired to say very little. If the Secretary of State for the Colonies thought it advisable to enter into that part of the subject, and to give his reasons to the House for the appointment, their Lordships would, no doubt, be glad to have his explanations; but he felt that under the circumstances that might not be desirable, and, as far as he was concerned, he would not press for any information on that point. But what appeared to him to be a matter of much greater importance was the question whether a self-governing Colony had any kind of right of selection in the appointment of Governors. It seemed to him that a very grave and serious Constitutional question was raised in connection with that matter. The Governor of a Colony was not merely sent out by his Sovereign to exercise certain functions. He was the direct representative of the Sovereign; he was even more than a mere representative of the Sovereign, but in many respects it might almost be said that he actually was the Sovereign for the time being. That was to say, he not only exercised the functions delegated to him by the Sovereign, but he represented absolutely the person of the Sovereign in the Colony to which he was appointed. Therefore, for a Colony to set up a claim to have any right to select a Governor appeared to aim to be not only un-Constitutional, but of necessity to bring about, or be the first stop towards bringing about, that which they would all deeply deplore—namely, a tendency to separation, and to break up the British Empire. It was scarcely an exaggeration to say that if a Colony had a right to select a Governor it had an equal right to choose the Sovereign; and if it had no right to
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  select the Sovereign, he hold that, constitutionally, it could not have any right to select the Governor who was to represent the Sovereign. He, therefore, could not but think that, if in the Colony they had reflected on the grave Constitutional questions which they had raised, they would not have entertained the views that were attributed to them. He admitted that he thought in some cases the greater self-governing Colonies might reasonably expect that the Governors sent out to them should be of a certain status and position. The great Colonies in Australia had developed in a comparatively short time into large and important communities. At the same time the position of Governor had very much changed—in some respects it had diminished, in others increased in importance. It was obvious that with telegraphic communication and self-government the Governors of self-governing Colonies had not that importance and power in some respects which they formerly enjoyed. Administrative ability, although of the utmost importance, was not the sine quâ non which it was at one time. But if the status of a Governor had deteriorated in that respect, it had increased in what might be called its social aspect, and it therefore became of more importance that a Governor should be able adequately to represent the Sovereign in that point of view. He thought also that every legitimate means should be taken to ascertain that the appointment to be made would be one that was suitable, and not only so, but acceptable likewise. Further than that he would not go.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Lord KNUTSFORD): In reply to the Question which my noble Friend has put to me, whether Her Majesty's Government have returned an answer to the reasons for the opposition on the part of the Queensland Government to Sir Henry Blake—reasons which Her Majesty's Government thought fit to call for—I have only to state that those reasons are still under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. As regards the production of Papers, it would not be for the pnblic interest to produce them at the present moment; but I see no reason why they should not be hereafter laid on the table. I regret that I am unable to deal with many matters which have been

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  brought to your Lordships' attention by the noble Earl. I shall content myself with expressing a general concurrence with what has fallen from him, but I think your Lordships will agree with me that the discussion on the general subject just now would serve no good end. It would be premature, it would not advance the public interest, and it might tend to impede a satisfactory solution of the important questions that are now under consideration. I would also add that, as regards one very important part of this case to which the noble Earl has referred, the opinion of Her Majesty's Government has in fact been expressed very clearly and very fully in a letter which was addressed to the Agent General of South Australia on November 15, and which has been read in the other House. I am sure your Lord ships will agree that this is not the fitting occasion for discussing the particular appointment in question, and the merits or demerits of Sir Henry Blake. I desire to assure your Lordships that in making the selection I was not unmindful of the great responsibility which attaches to every Secretary of State in selecting a Governor, whether for a Crown Colony or for one under responsible Government.

AFRICA (SOUTH-EAST)—THE BLOCK-ADE OF THE ZANZIBAR COAST.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I beg to ask the noble Marquess at the head of the Government whether he can, without inconvenience to the public service, explain what seems to be a discrepancy between his statement and that of the French Foreign Minister on the right of search on the coast of Zanzibar. On the 6th of November the noble Marquess stated that this country and Germany had approached France, and the French Government, although unwilling to depart from their traditional policy, had stated their readiness to look upon the blockade such as is proposed as one carrying with it the incident of the right of searching all vessels under whatever flag, so that we have obtained for the first time under this arrangement with the German Government that which is of priceless value, the right of stopping and searching all vessels, under whatever flag. I find that the Paris Correspondent of The Standard gives the
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  following explanation of the declaration of the French Foreign Minister on the subject:—
  "M. Goblet said that the matter was in the stage of negotiation. No undertaking had been entered into. In the interest of civilization, it could not but be desired that foreign Governments should extricate themselves to their advantage from the difficulties they had encountered on the Eastern Coast of Africa. France had stated that, so far as the importation of arms was concerned, if England and Germany established a blockade, the right of search would be a consequence of that measure. With regard to the Slave Trade, although France had honoured herself by taking the initiative in the suppression of that criminal traffic, she had never sanctioned the right of search."
  The correspondent adds, what seems obvious, that the French Government consent to a search for arms, but not for slaves. But, if this is the case, it would appear that, unfortunately, we Lave not obtained for the first time a thing of priceless value. We have only got what blockaders always had—the right of searching neutral vessels for contraband of war.
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): I have received no notice from the noble Earl, and therefore am rather at a disadvantage.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I was not able to give a long notice, but I left a letter for the noble Marquess with a very courteous porter at the noble Marquess's house, who said he would send it immediately to the noble Marquess.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am sorry to say that the very courteous porter has not acted up to his professions. The noble Lord will see in a moment why I am placed at a disadvantage in consequence of that telegram in The Standard. If my memory does not deceive me there is a much fuller report in The Times, which gives a rather different colour to the statements of M. Goblet that the matter is still under negotiation, and that there is no engagement. I am rather, therefore, apprehensive of entering upon a subject in regard to which that statement has been made, because I might say something which might disturb the negotiations. But I think I may say this, that the impression of the two Powers derived from the verbal communications with the French Government has not

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  been so fully borne out by subsequent communications. I believe for all practical purposes the concession of the French Government will enable us to put a stop to the traffic in slaves; but, as the noble Earl, I think, indicated in his speech, that will rather result from the ordinary rights extending to a blockade than from any special concession of the French Government. But I do not like to dwell upon the matter more than that, except that I only wish to indicate that the objection which the French Government has taken is rather in theory than in practice. I do not believe any practical difficulty will arise. I am bound, also, to say that the French Minister was also misunderstood on another slight matter. We understood him to say he was about to send a French vessel, I think I said, to take part in the naval operations. He has corrected that. He has said that a French vessel will not be sent to take part in naval operations, but merely to supervise, to survey the French vessels flying the French colours on the coast. That, of course, is a different statement, but it is not different in practice, because the only difficulty we have with the Slave Trade is with vessels flying the French flag, and if that difficulty is effectually met by the survey of French ships, all our difficulties, so far as the French flag is concerned, will be at an end. I do not know that I have anything more to say. If I went into the matter fully, I should like to comment on some observations which have been made as to the frequency of these abuses of the French flag, but I think, as the matter is still under negotiation, I shall be pursuing the ordinary practice in not saying more now.

LAW AND JUSTICE—COST OF LEGAL ADMINISTRATION.

  STATEMENT.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY): My Lords, I must ask your Lordships' indulgence while I make a statement which is, no doubt, of an unusual kind, arising out of unusual circumstances. The Lord Chancellor and the Department of which he is head—a Department not the least in the State, either in extent or importance, being, in fact, the Department of the administration of public justice—is in the singular
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  position of having no responsible Representative in the other House of Parliament. With every other great Department of State, the Minister may be in one House, and there is a Parliamentary Secretary in the other, whether for the purpose of meeting criticisms, or for the purpose of promoting desirable measures. This state of things is very disadvantageous. As regards personal attacks, the prevailing courtesies of public life, and the sense of honour and fairness that a man should not be assailed except when and where he may defend himself, have caused this inconvenience to be but rarely experienced. My Lords, according to the ordinary channels of information, I have learnt that both the Legal Departments and myself were lately the objects of violent attack, without Notice, in "another place." Let me dispose at once of that which is merely personal to myself. I will not repeat the gross language which has been used. Your Lordships know how many and how important offices the Lord Chancellor has from time to time to supply with fit and proper persons. I believe there are people who sigh for patronage. I am sure all who have had experience of it will agree that it is not the least anxious and ungrateful part of a Minister's duty. If any should wish to have a return of the appointments I have made, he can easily find it; it would be a long and varied list, and in it he would find—that which is, I presume, the foundation for the unseemly remarks which have been made—the name of a relative whom I appointed a Registrar in Bankruptcy. My Lords, the gentleman in question has now been engaged in the performance of the important duties intrusted to him for something more than three years, those duties being constantly under the supervision of the Court of Appeal; and I venture to say that he has proved himself fully qualified for the Office, for which of my own personal knowledge I knew him to be well fitted. If I add—though it is not very relevant to my present subject—that I transferred a connection, who was already possessed of a benefice, to another benefice, slightly better in point of emolument and in a more genial climate, I have stated the whole foundation for the charge made against myself personally. In no other instance have

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  I ever exercised any power of appointment in favour of any relative or connection whatever. My Lords, I am aware that the attacks made upon myself are not new; but I certainly would not ask your Lordships' indulgence in replying to them if they remained in those publications the existence of which I think is not very creditable to English society. I have always felt and have not hesitated to avow my contempt for, and dislike of, collectors and vendors of petty defamatory gossip. Not unnaturally, perhaps, those interested in such wares have replied by a chorus up and down the whole gamut of vulgar invective. But, my Lords, I think words spoken in Parliament, by whomsoever spoken, stand upon different ground. I now feel bound to apply myself to strictures passed on the Legal Departments. It appears to have been said generally that Commissions and Committees had reported adversely to these Offices, and that the Reports were pigeon-holed. Then, further, particular Offices were mentioned, and personal charges made, without Notice, on absent and defenceless officials. As to the general complaint, there were two Commissions mentioned—one of 1874 and a recent one of 1886. A very strong case was made out in many instances by quotations from the later Report, which indeed was signed, and I believe actually drafted, by the Permanent Secretary of my Department. My Lords, the principal Representative of the Government in "another place" certainly did not go too far when, though without communicating with me, he pledged the Government to carry out these Reports. I fully recognize the advocacy of the Attorney General, spoken without preparation or opportunity for inquiry, in a matter for which he is in no way responsible. Your Lordships will agree with me that this is startling when you learn that the fact was not stated in the other House that, so far from being pigeon-holed, the recommendations of the Commissioners of 1874 were practically exhausted by my Predecessors, and that the further recommendations of the Report presented to myself only last year were in the main realized and brought into operation before the close of that year, and as to the rest are in active and rapid progress. I will now deal, as briefly as I can, with the par-
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  ticular criticisms. For the statements and figures I refer to the report in The Times. I will first take the Offices referred to in the Report of 1887, that is to say what is called the Central Office, meaning the Offices of the Queen's Bench Division. It was said that the Masters—who are the heads of the Central Office—were excessively numerous, and had salaries unnecessarily high, ranging from £1,500 to £2,000. The fact is, the number of Masters has actually already been reduced to the point recommended in the Report, and their salaries fixed from £1,200 to £1,500. The reduction has actually been from 22 to 15, with a saving of at least £10,000 a-year. I ought not to pass from the Masters without saying that I am making inquiries as to the statement that they attend Boards of Companies during office hours. Next as to the clerks in the Central Office. They are stated to be over numerous, 85 in number, with salaries ranging from £250 to £700. The fact is the clerks are reduced to 77, and their salaries fixed from £100 to £600. The reduction has already been from a total of about 110, with a saving of about £8,000 per annum. Then it was said that there were five clerks wholly nn-employed, yet receiving full salaries. It is the case that under arrangements with which I am not personally acquainted a class of redundant clerks was created, liable to be called upon when the office should be reduced to its normal level. Four of these, having reached an age when their services cannot be efficient, were some weeks ago, in pursuance of the general scheme of reductions in progress, called upon to resign, and placed themselves in my hands. There is a fifth, who is a younger man, and whose position is still under consideration. A further class of clerks—namely, those who are superfluous above the limit of 73, to which the Central Office is in course of reduction—are stated to be doing nothing, instead of being transferred to other offices. The fact is, the number of such clerks now only amounts to four. Several such transfers have taken place. Of course they can only be effected when a vacancy in another office occurs, and they cannot be made wholly regardless of the fitness of the clerk for the office to which he is proposed to be transferred. I have met

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  with difficulty in this matter, and I am glad to have the support of Parliament. The next charge I find is one of general unpunctuality. I have some difficulty in dealing with it, because it was said that some clerks left before 5 and some did not come before 11. The case is, that some of the offices have their official hours from 10 to 4 and others from 11 to 5; and I do not know whether it is charged that an officer who was entitled to begin at 11 was or was not the same officer who left before 5. However, the answer is that this complaint, quoted from the Report of 1887, has been already dealt with under the regulations introduced since that time, and that any breach of those regulations will be severely dealt with. As to the number of hours of attendance, they are regulated by rules of Court, under statutory authority, and the system of six hours was recommended by the Commission of 1874. Whether or not seven hours should be adopted is a question which I certainly think must be answered with reference to all the public offices, and not piecemeal; and it must be considered with reference to the question whether or not additional pay should be allowed for additional hours. In connection with this subject, it was mentioned that there was no attendance book in the Central Office. I may say that I am in favour of an attendance book, but the Report which has been so much relied upon does not recommend it. I think that I need say nothing about the Queen's Remembrancer's Office; the duties are performed by the senior Master with a small addition of salary, which is expressly secured to him by so recent an Act of Parliament as that of 1879. There was probably a misapprehension about it, which was removed in "another place." I will take next the question of the number of Official Referees. Your Lordships may be aware that this tribunal was constituted, on the recommendation of the Judicature Commission, by the Judicature Act, 1873; the object being to relieve the Courts from a class of cases involving accounts or inquiries which tend to block the way for business requiring, in a greater degree, the attention of a Judge in person. Before the institution of that office nothing was a greater evil and expense to suitors than the cases which were brought into Court, when everybody knew they must
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  end in a special reference, and everything have to be done over again. The number was settled, according to that Act, in 1876, by the then Lord Chancellor, the Chief Justices of the Common Law Courts, and the Master of the Rolls. That order still remains, and, until changed, I have hitherto considered ought to be my guide. I have received no intimation from the authorities co-ordinate with me that they think the number should be reduced; and the Report of 1887 makes some recommendations for adding to their work and enabling the number of Masters to be thereby diminished, but does not say anything about reducing the number of Referees. My Lords, I am of opinion that the number of four was a right number for the purpose in view at the time it was determined upon, and I think so still. When there is so much complaint of delay in the Courts, I did not think I could willingly be responsible for diminishing any channel of relief to the congestion. But I am bound to admit the office has not hitherto met the expectations of those who created it. The cause has, I believe, been attributable to the misfortune of the ill-health from which, almost from the first, more than one of the Referees suffered, and those who are aware how great an age was reached by more than one of these officials before actual retirement will not be surprised that the business dwindled. It is my belief that had the fortunes of the office been different, a different return of its utility would have been obtained. I have done my best, as I was glad to see reported to have been fully admitted in "another place," to infuse vigour and efficiency into that most valuable office; and it is the fact that the amount of business has already materially increased. Now, I wish to say something as to the Chancery Division, which, however, was not referred to in any detail. It was described generally as over-crowded with overpaid officers. I admit, indeed I have more than once stated to your Lordships, that there are points in which I believe the administration of the Chancery Division might be improved and material reductions made. A Committee, of which my noble and learned Friend the Master of the Rolls was Chairman, made recommendations on that subject which I have been desirous to carry into effect

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  ever since I have been in Office. But the scheme submitted to me was based on the addition of a sixth Judge, and until I am given to understand that such an addition, which I believe to be necessary, is unattainable, I am not in a position to take up another scheme. I may mention, however, that the general scheme of reduced salaries, commencing at £1,200 and rising to £1,500, has been applied to this Division as well as to the others. It was stated that a novel system had been introduced and caused dissatisfaction, that the junior clerks in the Chambers of the Chancery Division were appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and not by the Chief Clerks. That is provided for by the Judicature Acts; and in so acting I and my Predecessors have been merely complying with the Statute. But the system which appears to be suggested in preference is utterly contrary, I believe, to the principles of the Public Service, according to which salaried officers must be appointed by the heads of Departments responsible to Parliament. I find a charge made that £600 a-year is paid to an officer to look after the ushers. I have to guess that this refers to the office of Superintendent of the Royal Courts of Justice. He has the whole responsibility, not only for the care and cleaning of that great public building, but also for the preservation of order. He has under him a staff of 150 men; and the police are relieved of duty there. It is a most responsible and arduous post; and the salary is no more than that of a first-class clerk. An officer called the Superintendent of Stationery was also referred to, and I think it was said he had £300 a-year for filling the ink bottles. In fact, he has the whole supplying of stationery and books throughout the Courts and offices. He was an instance of an officer transferred, and not abolished. His present duties are regulated under the recommendations of a Committee formed by the Lord Chancellor at the request of the Stationery Office, and I believe the system has effected a most beneficial economy in relation to the Stationery Office. I have not mentioned the Judges' clerks, as to whom it is complained that they cost £8,700. My Lords, the existing arrangements is that each Judge is to have one clerk; I hardly think it can be seriously sug-
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  gested that a functionary of such dignity and with so much labour as a Judge should have no clerk at all. As far as cost is concerned, I believe the saving under this head amounts to at least as much again as the existing charge. There is only left for me to remark on the criticisms upon the Lord Chancellor's immediate official surroundings. The multitude of his secretaries and of his ceremonial attendants appeared both to amuse and to shock those who referred to them. The ceremonial, I think, is more for your Lordships to consider than for me; I have no desire to perpetuate any pomp and circumstances which your Lordships would desire your Speaker to dispense with. But in point of fact I have no ceremonial officer personal to myself who was not declared necessary, and his salary confirmed in the Report of the Commission of 1874. Both the number and the cost of the Lord Chancellor's personal attendants has been reduced even below that which was recommended by that Commission. There is no office of Purse Bearer; the purse is carried by the Lord Chancellor's confidential clerk. There are not three Private Secretaries, as has been stated, but two. One of them, for my ecclesiastical business, is the same who was Secretary of Presentations in 1874; it has been said that the Commission thought the salary might be reduced on a vacancy; it was never suggested by the Commission that Mr. Thesiger should be prejudiced. I doubt if any Minister's secretaries are fewer in number, or have so much and so delicate correspondence to deal with. As to the Permanent Secretary, he is no more part of the Lord Chancellor's personal attendants than is the Permanent Secretary of any other great Department of the State. The office is of modern creation, arising out of the concentration, under the Judicature and other Acts, of the administrative departments of the law under the Lord Chancellor, as, in fact, a Minister of Justice. The principal personal officer of the Lord Chancellor, who formerly received £1,200 per annum, until 1874, when the Commission recommended that £1,000 was enough, has been abolished and ceased to exist. It is true that the first Permanent Secretary was appointed from the personal office which he held before. But I feel bound to say that what I believe each of my

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  Predecessors would say, that for ability, industry, and zeal it would have been impossible to find a gentleman better fitted for the post. I have no doubt the Treasury Minute or other documents relating to the constitution of the office could be obtained by moving for them. As to the salary of £1,500, it is materially lower than that of any other Permanent Secretary of a Department of State presided over by a Minister. Two objections I have been informed were taken at the time when the constitution of the office was proposed by the then Lord Chancellor. Lord Cairns—who was ex-Chancellor—said he did not think the office would be maintained in the hands of one holder as a permanent office if the salary were less than £2,500. The Treasury recorded their doubt whether any one officer—or succession of officers—could, for any length of time, perform all the duties laid upon this office. I ought not, perhaps, to pass from these questions of public expenditure without correcting the expression which has been reported about robbing the taxpayer. I am, my Lords, no less the guardian of the suitors than the Chancellor of the Exchequer is guardian of the taxpayer; but I am bound to point out that all the expenses of these offices are borne by the suitor, that these offices are, at least, self-supporting and cost the general taxpayer nothing. I regret to have been obliged to go into so much detail and occupy so much time, and I will only add this much, that while I deprecate the injustice to individuals and the injury to the Public Service which is done by reckless and indiscriminate attacks, I am in complete accord with the feeling displayed in Parliament that a vigilant watch must be kept in order to establish and maintain both the economy and the efficiency for which, as regards the legal establishments, the Lord Chancellor is responsible; and while I will defend to the utmost of my power any officer under my jurisdiction from unjust charges and insinuations which he is precluded from answering for himself, I am glad that it should be clearly known that the efforts which, with the assistance of the Committees already referred to, I have been making and will continue to make, are supported by the general feeling of Parliament.
  LORD ESHERdesired to say, with respect to the Registrar in Bankruptcy who had been referred to, as it was his duty to hear appeals from the Registrar, that, in his opinion, this gentleman was a conscientious, hard-working, very able, and very efficient officer, and entirely worthy of the appointment which he held.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he had listened with interest to the statement read by the noble and learned Lord, who had pointed out with great clearness the disadvantage under which he suffered in not having a representative in the other House when attacks were made upon him without Notice. He thought it was quite natural that the noble and learned Lord should have taken the first opportunity of answering these personal attacks, and he felt sure that no noble Lord would wish to make attacks on the noble and learned Lord. But he did not think it was convenient to deal with the whole general subject without Notice, as it was one of considerable importance. There had been a long debate on the matter, which was one of importance, in the House of Commons, and its decision was come to by only a small majority. If Notice had been given, many noble Lords might have been anxious to take part in the debate. In these circumstances it was not necessary for him to express any opinion.
  LORD COLERIDGEsaid, that he was Chairman of the Committee referred to, which was appointed to consider the working of the Central Office. But, like the noble Earl, he was not aware, till a couple of hours before, that his noble and learned Friend was about to make a statement, and he was therefore not able and had not materials to go into the matter with anything like detail. He quite agreed with his noble and learned Friend that there was a great difference between attacks made by irresponsible and anonymous persons, and those made in the other House of Parliament, and by persons occupying an important position. He only wished to refer to that portion of his noble and learned Friend's speech with which he was able to deal from personal knowledge. It was found some time ago that reform was wanted in the Central Office that there were too many officers, and that

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  the work was imperfectly done from want of organization. Certain recommendations were made, some of which largely interfered with his noble and learned Friend's patronage. He desired to say that these recommendations were most loyally supported by his noble and learned Friend, though the Committee was not appointed by his noble and learned Friend, and he was by no means bound by its Report.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ENGLAND AND WALES) ELECTORS ACT, 1888, REPEAL BILL.—(No. 282.)
  (The Lord Denman.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Denman.)
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY), in moving the rejection of the Bill, said, their Lordships could hardly consent to the repeal of an Act passed in the present year.
  On Question, resolved in the negative.

  SEA FISHERIES REGULATION BILL.
  (The Earl of Onslow.)

  (NO. 264.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF TRADE (The Earl of ONSLOW), in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said that for some time past fishermen had complained of the destruction of immature fish, and of the increase of steam trawlers which could go into the shallow and less accessible parts of bays, and were in the habit of destroying young fish and throwing rubbish into the estuaries of rivers. Some time ago a Commission, under the presidency of the late Lord Dalhousie, had inquired into the subject, and made certain recommendations, some of which were embodied in the Scotch Fisheries Act. The Scotch Act gave power to the Fishery Boards to prohibit fishing within certain areas and to make bye-laws and regulations. An objection, however, remained in the Scotch Act, and that was that there was no representative of the fishing industry itself on the
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  Board. In this country there was now machinery at hand, in the new County Councils, to which it was proposed by the Bill to entrust with a power to regulate fisheries in their districts. The Bill proposed to add to the Fisheries Committee appointed by the Borough or County Council a number of representatives of the fishing industry equal to that of the members of the County Council. The Bill would enable sea fisheries committees to be established on every part of the coast where they might be required. There was one important omission in the Bill, which he hoped to remedy if their Lordships read the Bill a second time, and that was that Boards of Salmon Conservators had not had their authority preserved by the bill as it came up from the other House. The salmon conservators had made representations to the Board of Trade on the subject, and he proposed in Committee to insert regulations to meet the defect.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Earl of Onslow.)
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.

  MUNICIPAL FUNDS (IRELAND) BILL.
  (The Lord Privy Seal.)

  (NO. 278.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (Earl CADOGAN), in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, it was a Bill for authorizing the expenditure of local rates in Ireland in promoting or opposing Bills in Parliament, and in defraying the cost of the necessary legal proceedings incidental thereto. Their Lordships were, perhaps, aware that, unlike the circumstances under which municipalities in England existed, municipalities in Ireland had no power to expend rates, or money derived from rates, either in the promotion or the proposition of Bills in Parliament. The matter was brought before Her Majesty's Government recently in an application that was made by a deputation of the Lord Mayor and Municipality of Dublin to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the loan of £500,000, three-fourths of which was to be applied to the reduction of their debt, and one-

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  fourth in the promotion of public works in Dublin. The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that he was unable to lend public money for this purpose, and suggested that the Corporation should promote a Bill to attain their object. It was found, however, that it was beyond the power of the Corporation to do so, and that there were no means whereby they could apply the rates for such purposes. Subsequently, upon a consultation between Her Majesty's Government and the representatives of the municipal authorities in Ireland, it was decided that the better plan would be, in order to assimilate the Irish with the English practice in this matter, to apply to Ireland the provisions of the English Borough Funds Act, 1872. This would be carried out by the Bill which he now asked their Lordships to read a second time. Whilst the provisions of this Bill were in the main similar to those of the English Act of 1872, there were two exceptions which, perhaps, he ought to mention. In the first place under the English Act no expenditure of the rates for such purposes could be incurred unless it was approved by a resolution of the owners and ratepayers of the district, whereas under this present Bill they proposed that the vote of approving or disapproving of this expenditure of the local rates should be taken by the resolution of a general meeting of all persons qualified to take part in the election of members of the governing body of the district; and, secondly, there was another point of difference between this Bill and the English Act in this respect, that whereas in the English Act the proposed expenditure was forbidden unless it had the approval of the Local Government Board or the Secretary of State, in the Bill, the second reading of which he now moved, it was proposed that the expenditure should not be incurred if disapproved of by the Local Government Board of Ireland or the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. These were the points upon which the two measures differed. This Bill would carry out an object to which he believed the consent of the two former Governments had been given. At all events, he had been so informed. It was brought into the other House of Parliament by the Secretary to the Treasury, and also by the Chancellor of
  1632
  the Exchequer and the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and it passed through the other House with perfect unanimity, and he hoped it would also meet with their Lordships' approval.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Privy Seal.)
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he did not wish to interfere with the second reading of this Bill. He thought it ought to be read a second time, because its principle was good, and it would be a useful piece of legislation. The noble Earl was a little in error in stating the disabilities of corporate bodies in Ireland. Corporations in Ireland had certain powers for the construction of works and for sanitary purposes. The object of the present Bill was to enable them to promote or oppose Bills, or to prosecute or defend certain legal proceedings and defray the expenses out of the rates. No doubt English Corporations had that power; and, as the English Corporations were trusted with it, he would not oppose extending the same privilege to corporate bodies in Ireland. Yet they must be very cautious in this matter. They must see that the Bill proposed by the noble Earl was essentially the same as the Act of 1872, and furthermore, that there were those safeguards provided which were essentially necessary to prevent abuse. The safeguard under the English Act of 1872 was that, in the first instance, the proper officer on his responsibility should approve of the step proposed to be taken, while the provisions of this Bill did not place on the Local Government Board or the Chief Secretary the responsibility of examining into the thing and approving of it. The provision was that the proposed expenditure should not be incurred if, after the lapse of a stated time, they had not expressed disapproval of it. He also thought that there should be some safeguard provided against the temptations to litigation which such a measure as this might hold out to small and irresponsible communities, as many of the Irish townships undoubtedly were.
  THE EARL OF MEATHsaid, he was afraid that if the Bill passed as it stood at present they would have a great deal of litigation in the case of small boroughs, and he did hope that the re-

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  commendations of the noble and learned Lord who had just sat down would be very seriously considered by Her Majesty's Government. If it were possible, he would like to see the operation of this Bill limited to townships of not less than 10,000 inhabitants. With that limitation he thought they might safely pass this Bill, and he very earnestly hoped that Her Majesty's Government would take into consideration the possible risk of promoting litigation with the view of preventing small boroughs from being ruined.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next; and Standing Order No. XXXV. to be considered in order to its being dispensed with.

  COMPANIES RELIEF BILL.—(No. 241.)
  (The Earl of Crawford.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee, read.
  Moved, "That the House do now resolve itself into Committee upon the said Bill."—(The Earl of Crawford.)
  THR LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY)observed, that it appeared to him to be a somewhat serious Bill, as attempting by a side wind to evade the provisions of the Companies Act of 1862. He would not object to the Motion to go into Committee, but would reserve liberty to himself to limit the application of the measure, so that it should give relief only in cases when persons had acted in a valid and honest manner. In his opinion the Bill, as it stood, would have too sweeping and general an effect.
  THE EARL OF CRAWFORDremarked, that it had been pointed out to him that the words in Clause 2 would go almost beyond the Preamble of the Bill, and, therefore, he thought it would be to the interests of all parties, especially after what had fallen from the Lord Chancellor, if he were to postpone the present stage of the Bill, so that further time should be given for the consideration of Amendments.
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, he considered the Bill unsound in principle, and one which the House ought not to assent to. If passed in its present form, it would cover and give legal validity
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  to a great number of transactions which might be of a very fraudulent character.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

EAST AFRICA—THE SLAVE TRADE.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he rose to call attention to the Correspondence respecting the suppression of the Slave Trade in South African waters, because on perusal of the Papers which had been presented since the discussion took place in their Lordships' House, many matters which appeared simple and easy before seemed to him, at least, to be beset with many difficulties, and possibly with many dangers. He should be glad, therefore, if the Prime Minister would give some further explanations on the subject. In the first place, he should be glad to know whether any definite arrangements in the shape of a Treaty, or anything approaching to a Treaty, had been executed between this country and Germany, or was contemplated. The word the Prime Minister used the other day was that there was an "understanding." If, however, there was anything more fruitful of misunderstandings than another it was an "understanding." They were so indefinite that misconceptions were almost certain to arise. It appeared from what the noble Marquess said that evening, that misunderstanding about some not unimportant points had already taken place as regarded the understanding between us and France. He wished to know, not so much what was the object of the blockade, but rather against what commodities or goods the blockade was to be made. In fact, what was contraband? He could not well ask what was contraband of war, because we were not at war; and it would be rather ridiculous to inquire what was contraband of peace. But he asked what was contraband in that particular blockade. The Correspondence was rather peculiar on that point. In the Memorandum communicated by Count Leyden on October 8, it was stated that—
  "The object of such a blockade would be to cut off all traffic with the insurgent coast districts, and especially that in slave vessels, and the carriage of arms and ammunition."
  The words "all traffic" were not used

  1635
  further on; they were dropped in Count Hatzfeldt's letter to the noble Marquess, and were not mentioned in the noble Marquess's reply to Count Hatzfeldt, nor in his despatch to Sir Edward Malet. In the latter despatch the noble Marquess said that "the blockade will be strictly limited to the two objects I have named"—that was to say, to the prevention of the exportation of slaves and the importation of arms. But there was nothing in those Papers to show whether that view of the matter was accepted by Germany. That was a point of the utmost importance, because the blockade of all traffic along a great strip of coast in time of profound peace was, he believed, what no nation had attempted before, and what he imagined was absolutely contrary to International Law as generally understood. He should like, therefore, to know against what objects the blockade was directed, and if they were clearly and distinctly defined. He also wished to know how the blockade was to be carried out—whether the action of the British ships was to be confined to the coast line that was under British influence, and whether the action of the German ships was to be confined to the part of the coast tinder German influence. That was, he thought, a point of too much importance to be left to be decided as a matter of detail by the admirals on the station. It would be idle to expect any distinction to be drawn, in the native mind at any rate, between the action of German and of English ships if they were operating conjointly in the same waters. Then he wanted further to know how far our operations were to be limited to operations by sea. On that point the correspondence was a little ominous. The Memorandum communicated by Count Leyden said—
  "It appears doubtful to the German Government whether military expeditions into the interior are suited for such a purpose."
  But there was a very large line between operations by sea and military expeditions into the interior. Military expeditions into the interior would not include operations on the coast—certainly they would not include the lauding of seamen and marines or the bombarding of coast towns. The Memorandum proceeded to say that—
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  "Under these circumstances it appears desirable to confine the joint action of Germany and England in support of the Sultan at first to maritime action."
  But there was nothing in that document to say that Germany was not to be at liberty at any time to engage in military operations. The operations were to be confined to maritime operations "at first." That last expression appeared to imply that it was contemplated that at some future time the joint action of England and Germany might be directed towards military operations on shore. The noble Marquess, the other day, said distinctly in that House that there had been no suggestion or intention of any military action. He confessed, for himself, he did not see how that was quite compatible with what he had read from Count Leyden's Memorandum. But what was, perhaps, the most important part of the matter was to define clearly what was military action. What was to be our position if Germany, for instance, thought it necessary to bombard some places on the coast, or Zanzibar itself; and how far were we to be at liberty to withdraw from the arrangement or understanding in such a contingency? It was most essential that it should be distinctly laid down that on no occasion should we be called upon to act on the coast or on land, and we ought to have some assurance by the agreement that no operations of that kind should be undertaken. If anything of that sort was done it would be utterly impossible for us to avoid responsibility—at any rate, as far as the native mind was concerned. The Natives could not well make a distinction between Englishmen who were making it very inconvenient for them at sea, and Germans who might also be making themselves very disagreeable to them and annoying them on land. Therefore, especially in view of our good name among the Natives, it was very important that our position should be safeguarded in that respect, and that we should not be drawn into operations of a nature of which we should not approve. Then, as to the whole nature and character of that blockade, he asked what were our rights and duties, and, above all, what were our responsibilities under the circumstances? Blockade in war was a very simple matter. To

  1637
  establish it it was only necessary that there should be due notice of it and that it should be effective. But this was not a blockade of war. We were not at war with anybody, and, therefore, according to International Law, a blockade of the usual character could not come into force in that case. A blockade without the right of visitation and of search and of stopping vessels would be of little worth. Those rights were acquired by belligerents, and only by belligerents. There was another way in which those rights could be acquired, and that was by Treaty. In regard to the Slave Trade, we had treaties with nearly all powers allowing us the right of visitation and search in the case of all vessels reasonably suspected of being slavers. He believed that was not the case as far as France was concerned, but at any rate it was the case with other nations, and with the United States. But this blockade was not directed merely against the exportation of slaves, it was directed also against the importation of arms; and he was not aware that this country had any Treaty with any European Power, or with the United States, giving by Treaty a right of visitation and search in the case of vessels suspected of carrying arms. He should like to know what our rights were with respect, say, to German or United States vessels. What were our rights and responsibilities in enforcing this blockade so far as the importation of arms was concerned against United States vessels? He thought we were entering upon a path with a light heart when it might be necessary to pursue it some day with a heavy one. Germany, France, and Great Britain were more or less interested and engaged in this matter. All those Powers had great interests in this portion of the world. It was all very well to talk about community of interests between England and Germany; but although there was in a certain sense a community of interest between all civilized nations when dealing with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples, there was at the same time a great conflict wherever civilized nations were engaged in colonizing, in gaining influence, and pushing their trade in undeveloped countries. The whole situation in that respect was a very difficult one, and it would be so even if the con-
  1638
  dition of Europe were entirely normal. No one could pretend, however, that the condition of Europe was normal. As far as this country was concerned our position was, he believed, a very good one. It had never been better. We were in a state of profound peace, and it was difficult to see any reason why such a happy state of things should not continue. But it was idle to pretend that the other two Powers interested were as well situated in that respect. It was certain that if a cause of quarrel were at any time required, a cause would be found at any moment in the operations of this blockade. There was nothing on which nations were so properly sensitive as the honour of their Flag upon the sea. He did not anticipate that there would be any cause of quarrel sought; but in such a ticklish condition of affairs it appeared to him that, were matters brought to a state of tension in Europe, it might be suddenly changed into a state of conflict by a comparatively trifling incident arising out of the blockade. We were therefore entering upon a course which might not only lead us into great difficulties, but might place us in a very false position, so false that we might find it difficult to extricate ourselves from it. What was it we were going to receive in exchange? What was the object of the blockade? It was believed that it had originated in a desire to restore the authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar. While recognizing its advantages, he doubted whether the process would be successful. But the main object was the suppression of the Slave Trade. That was an object with which everyone sympathized most deeply, and he believed the sentiment of the country would be strongly in favour of making great sacrifices to put a stop to that most horrible traffic. It was, however, doubtful whether the means adopted were the best. It was, at any rate, strange that the persons most deeply interested in the matter—the Universities Mission—looked upon the blockade with great disfavour, and their opinion ought to be of some weight. There were two ways of putting down the Slave Trade—either by stopping the exportation or cutting off from the markets. That was an operation in which this country had been engaged for the last century, and one in which Germany had but lately become interested. There

  1639
  was another way—that of enabling the people from whom the supplies of slaves were drawn to be strong enough to help themselves. It was obvious that if they could stop the importation of arms and ammunition, the partially civilized tribes would be unable to defend themselves against their warlike and savage neighbours, and certainly against the slave-raiders, who were armed. He doubted whether we could prevent these people from getting arms or ammunition, or whether any blockade would deprive the slave-raiders of their arms and ammunition. By stopping the importation of arms they deprived the coast tribes of all means of protecting themselves. There was one other danger to fear—it was this, that we should infallibly suffer greatly in the estimation of the people. Rightly or wrongly, we stood high in the estimation of the people at present; rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly, the Germans did not. This country would be mixed up with the Germans in this matter; the Natives would not distinguish between the two, and whatever odium Germany incurred would have to be shared by England. That was a great misfortune and an important factor to be considered in the case. As a rule, partnerships of this kind were not desirable, and past records were not of such a character as to lead this country to expect that it would reap any great benefit from the partnership. He would only add, in conclusion, that he was anxious to obtain fuller, clearer, and more definite information, and he hoped the noble Marquess would be able to supply it.
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): My Lords, I think that my noble Friend in reading these Papers has imagined that the despatch from Count Leyden is a statement of the policy of this country, and that we were prepared to defend it. I cannot accept any such interpretation. I inserted the Memorandum to show how these negotiations commenced. It is a statement that proceeds from the German Government, expressing their opinion. It is not my purpose nor my duty to explain their policy. The language which they use they will, no doubt, be able to defend; but I entirely decline to be in any way bound by anything that is stated in that Memorandum.
  1640
  The only thing which binds Her Majesty's Government is the communication from the Foreign Office to Count Hatzfeldt, which appears signed with my name. Anything outside of the four corners of that document does not bind England in any way. I may say that I think my noble Friend rather exaggerates the effect of some of the language of the German Memorandum. He saw a threat of military action in the words "at first," whereas the words were obviously merely used for the sake of diplomatic caution, so as not to bind the Government unnecessarily in circumstances which have not yet arisen. There is no ground for believing that the German Government have any intention to resort to any action on shore. I have strong grounds for believing the contrary, but, at all events, whether they do so or not, with that we have nothing to do. We have merely engaged in certain naval operations, and we have not the slightest intention of engaging in military operations. Then my noble Friend insists upon the use of words of a similar kind to the words in the German Memorandum—namely, that the object of such a blockade will be to cut off all traffic to a certain coast, especially that in slave vessels. I noticed that phrase, and at once objected; and I was informed that there was not any intention on the part of the German Government to ask for the suppression of all traffic. But, of course, such an understanding as that cannot depend upon a verbal interpretation. In that Note to Count Hatzfeldt, and in Count Hatzfeldt's Note to me, the blockade is distinctly stated to be against the importation of munitions of war and the exportation of slaves; and it is for nothing else; and that is the only object we shall have. As to the international position of the blockade, my noble Friend will see that this coast is no doubt mainly a German coast; but there are menaces of insurrection on the English coast also. The coast behind which German influence lies is in rebellion against the Sultan of Zanzibar. There are several precedents for the blockading by a Sovereign of a portion of his dominions which are in rebellion against him. We are acting as his allies in the matter, and it is against these insurgents, especially the Arab Slave Traders, that the blockades is exercised. There are several precedents which fully

  1641
  justify us in exercising all the rights of blockade as against this insurgent population, and among those rights we have the power of stopping ships which are suspected of carrying munitions of war, and of preventing all ships that intend to break the blockade. The French Government have not the slightest doubt of the legality of that position, and I do not see how any difference of opinion can arise with them upon the subject. My noble Friend seemed to think that the action of the German Government was actuated by some hostility towards France in this matter, and that there was great danger of tension between the two Powers, and the possibility of some collision arising. I can assure my noble Friend that the very reverse is the case.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN, interposing, explained that what he said was that the circumstances were peculiar, and that eventualities might occur in Europe which would produce a state of tension between the two countries, and that that tension might be snapped by an incident of this blockade.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am glad to hear that. It is entirely my own opinion that there is in this matter no feeling of hostility and no danger of friction between these two Governments. But I think my noble Friend has much exaggerated the part which France bears in this matter. In the speech of M. Goblet which has been quoted, he disclaimed any great French interest in these parts. The only interest France has is an accidental interest, which she is trying very hard to get rid of. The Arab dhows will occasionally obtain surreptitiously and on false pretexts French papers and will float the French colours; but a French ship is going out there to prevent that wrong issue of the papers and that abuse of the French Flag. Therefore I do not anticipate the slightest danger of any difficulty with France on the subject of this blockade. Undoubtedly the interest of France is not prominent, and that difficulty is not likely to arise. I think I have now answered the questions of my noble Friend. The only point on which I have still to offer any remark is with regard to the separate action of the two Admirals. No doubt it is our opinion that separate action should be preserved.
  1642
  No doubt the two Admirals themselves are of that opinion, and have arranged accordingly; but I hesitate to bind our Admiral by any absolute prohibition which would prevent him from taking the course of action which in his own discretion, acting in the circumstances on the spot, he may think necessary. Still, the Admirals are quite aware that in our judgment it is better for the forces to act apart. I do not myself attach much importance to that consideration on which my noble Friend dwelt—namely, that the Germans and English will get confused in the Native mind. I think the Natives have a mind more perspicacious than my noble Friend gives them credit for, and that they perfectly well know the difference between the two nations. I think it is undesirable that German ships should be engaged in stopping English traders. It is much better that English people should be dealt with by their own officers. On that ground I very much hope that any operations which may be necessary—probably they will hardly be necessary—in the neighbourhood of that coast where the English are interested will be conducted entirely by English vessels. I think my noble Friend altogether drew in too dark and sombre colours the character of these operations, and attached to them a larger importance than they deserved. We are really, after all, doing in respect to slaves what we have been doing for any number of years; only we are doing it under the more efficient circumstances of a blockade, and we shall be able, therefore, to exercise a vigilance and control which otherwise we should not have had. There is no doubt that the Slave Trade has increased in malignity and volume very largely in recent years. We have a proof of that in the various outbreaks that have taken place in Nyassa, in the Soudan, and on the Zanzibar coast. We have a proof of it in the very clear account of travellers and Missionaries who have gone inland; and, from all that we hear, the cruelties which now attach to the Slave Trade far exceed anything which attached to it in former times. I cannot look upon it as an evil that we have got the active assistance and the pledged co-operation of a Power so great as Germany in resisting the spread of this great evil upon a particular coast where it has lately shown

  1643
  the greatest signs of spreading. But my noble Friend asks me what we are to gain by the existence of this blockade? Well, if it had been a question whether or not any operations should have been undertaken, I could understand my noble Friend asking the question. I could understand a man saying, "We have gone on peaceably for a long while in the old way, without any great success, it is true; but why should we encounter new and unknown hazards when the original path of action still remains open to us? "The point which I wish to press on the noble Lord is, that the question we had to decide was, not whether there should be operations or not, but whether we should see Germany conducting them by herself or not. We had also to consider the hazardous position occupied by the Sultan of Zanzibar. We cannot abandon Zanzibar to its fate, or allow it to incur any risk which the course of events may bring upon it. We are bound to watch over it, and the question which really presented itself to us was whether we should watch over it more effectively by standing aside and renouncing, not only all co-operation, but all voice in the operations that were taking place; or whether we should not rather show our friendship and interest in the Sultan more effectually by acting up to the professions which we have made for any number of years, by joining in more efficacious measures against the Slave Trade, which we have pursued with so great persistency, and by joining also in cutting off from the slave dealers that supply of new and deadly arms which science has furnished, and which enables them to reduce to a state of utter vassalage and to inflict the most terrible and innumerable evils upon the helpless and unarmed populations on that vast Continent. Those poor people have no arms, and have no money to buy them. They are helpless before a resolute and unscrupulous and fully-armed race, such as these slave-trading Arabs, and we can only effectually prevent this by diminishing the power of evil and the power of oppressing them possessed by their persecutors, and possessed by those persecutors because they have come in contact with the science and the progress of the Christian world, and have bought from us the arms of destruction, in the manufacture of which, unhappily, we have acquired
  1644
  such deadly skill. I can assure my noble Friend there is nothing new in the policy of excluding and shutting out arms. It has been under discussion again and again. It has been carried out, as he will see, on the Congo. We have endeavoured to carry it out in the Soudan; but, unfortunately, have not been successful, and we are suffering a very disagreeable conflict at the present moment in consequence. It is a policy the soundness of which up to this time has been generally recognized; and I cannot believe my noble Friend will find any considerable number of men familiar with the problems of that trade and of that coast who will condemn us for trying to diminish the importation of arms into the interior. When we have prevented the taking of arms by a blockade, and have taken part in the prevention of the exportation of slaves—when we have done that, we shall not have departed from any sound principle, and we shall have obtained powerful assistance for the policy which we have pursued, and the objects for which we have always been anxious; we shall have secured a voice and control in the operations which are carried on upon that coast; we shall have put ourselves in the best position to assist our ally the Sultan of Zanzibar, and to secure his permanence and his independence; and, I should think, when we have done these things, we shall have struck a very heavy blow at the Slave Trade without incurring any of the dangers which my noble Friend has indicated, and which could only have been incurred if we had undertaken measures beyond our own element—the sea, or if we had undertaken any of those larger and wider enterprizes which my noble Friend mistakenly attributes to the Government.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, the only key of the situation was to consider whether, under the circumstances, it was wise or prudent for us to hold aloof. Whatever might be the merits or demerits of the policy which we had pursued in the past with regard to Germany, on which he reserved his opinion, the question we had now to consider was what, in the actual position of affairs, was for our own interests and those of the Sultan of Zanzibar and the civilized nations who were anxious to put down the Slave Trade? He could

  1645
  not agree with the noble Earl that it would have been wise to refuse all co-operation with Germany in this matter—he entirely agreed with the Government that within certain limits we were right to co-operate with Germany; but he had heard with the greatest satisfaction the restrictions which the noble Marquess had imposed on our operations, and repudiation of any intention of carrying on operations inland. There was the more reason for caution in this respect, because we could not disguise from ourselves that Germany had her own schemes to further, in which we we had no interest. Germany had found herself in great embarrassments in consequence of the failure of the Colonization Company, and, naturally enough, she desired to re-establish her reputation. But it was no valid reason against co-operation with Germany, as far as our common interests were concerned, that she had other interests in Africa. In his opinion, it was far more likely that embarrassments in the future could be avoided by timely action such as was now contemplated. He had also heard, with true satisfaction, what the noble Marquess had said as to the policy of this country not to abandon the Sultan of Zanzibar. This was not only a matter of policy, but of national feeling, and it would have been ungenerous to abandon an ally of so many year's standing, who, if allowance were made for the difficulties of his position, had done much to suppress the Slave Trade, and had shown towards us a desire to consult our wishes as far as possible. It was more likely that the interests of our Indian subjects on the coast would be safeguarded if we acted in concert with Germany than if we had left Germany to take her own course alone. As we were acting in the name of the Sultan of Zanzibar, the blockade was quite in accord with the practice of nations. He agreed with the noble Marquess that the steps which he had taken were not a new departure, but a carrying out of old traditions. He would like, however, to know whether the noble Marquess had secured the co-operation of Portugal in this blockade. He had no doubt the noble Marquess had been in communication with the Portuguese Government, but he would, of course, not press the question if the noble Marquess did not think that it
  1646
  would be prudent to make any statement.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he trusted the measures which had been taken would be successful. The assurances received made him believe that Portugal would co-operate with the two Powers thoroughly in adopting measures to prevent the exportation of slaves and the importation of arms. He knew the co-operation of Portugal in this matter would be invaluable.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he had given a sort of pledge to make some observations when the Papers were in their hands, but he felt that it would be a kind of surplusage if he added anything to what had been said by his noble Friend, and with which he entirely agreed. With regard to what had been said by the noble Earl who brought forward the subject, there were certain things with which he agreed, but there was need of caution, and there might be considerable complications, but he could not say whether he concurred in the advice given, and he could not make out what the drift of it was. He wished also to entirely reserve himself with regard to the arrangement as to the boundaries in the agreement with Germany. This country had made the greatest sacrifices, not only in money but in precious lives, in repressing this traffic; in fact, they had prided themselves on the lion's share in preventing slavery and putting down the Slave Trade during times past, and they had complained of the want of assistance which they received from one Power and another. This being the case, it appeared to him that there would have been some danger of their being placed in an illogical position if they had refused to co-operate with one of the most important Powers in putting down that trade, because it was said that Power was not animated exclusively with a desire to end that trade, but was also actuated by commercial considerations.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.