HL Deb 16 March 1888 vol 323 cc1415-22
THE EARL OF DUNDONALD

, in rising to ask Her Majesty's Government the latest news received of Lupton Boy from Khartoum, and if any steps had recently been taken to communicate with him; also to ask Her Majesty's Government what measures they are taking to pacify the Soudan and produce a friendly feeling with the Natives? said, that that gallant Englishman, Lupton Bey, had had a remarkable career. A mate of a small coasting vessel in the Red Sea in 1878, he was taken by Gordon to Khartoum and placed in charge of the Nile flotilla. He showed such intelligence and integrity that Gordon promoted him to be Governor of the Bahr Gazelle. When he took over the Governorship there was an annual deficit. He soon turned this deficit into a surplus of £30,000 a-year, which he sent to Egypt; and when the rebellion broke out he had £150,000 worth of ivory in store. He defended his post to the last, and only submitted when his garrison were in extremis. This was the record of service of our gallant countryman now imprisoned at Khartoum, and he hoped Her Majesty's Government were using every means available to obtain his release. Lupton Boy's mother, he had heard, was in great anxiety and grief lest her son should be put to death. As regarded the policy of Her Majesty's Government for the pacification of the Soudan, that was a quotation of the first and gravest importance, involving, as it did, the welfare of a vast area of country which stretched over 20 degrees of latitude and 14 degrees of longitude, with its immense population—a question which concerned the whole north-east central portion of the South African Continent and its rescue from barbarism. He would only briefly allude to the incidents which had caused the present deplorable state of things in the Soudan, and for this purpose he would quote half-a-dozen lines from a letter written by the late correspondent of The Times at Khartoum. Mr. Prank Power wrote on February 14, 1884, in this significant and scathing manner— The Soudani and Arabs are splendid follows, ground down and robbed by every ruffian who has money enough (ill-gotten) to buy himself the position of Pasha. For years it has been ' Kourbash, kourbash, et toujours kourbash.' This gets monotonous and the poor devils rebel. The rebels are in the right, and God and chance seem to be fighting for them. He would now only rapidly go through those events which had occurred during the rebellion caused by the abominable conduct he had alluded to. There was the battle of Kashgir, where Hicks's Army of 10,000 men, led astray by false guides and wandering about for three days without water, was set upon by myriads and totally annihilated—the gallant Hicks, with his English staff, spurring into the ranks of the Arab spearmen and meeting a soldier's death—to the defeat of Baker's Army, the battles of Teb and Tamanieb, to the Nile Expedition, the battles of Abu Klea and Gubat, to the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon, to the battles of Suakin, and, later on, that of the Nile. It had been computed that about 200,000 persons had been killed in this rebellion, and we had to deplore the loss of many of our countrymen. Such a record as this the history of few countries, however troubled, could show, and he believed he was right when he said that thinking men of all nations had been pained at the knowledge of all this slaughter and at the state of chaos now existing. But much as the civilized world felt for this state of things, it was England and English feeling that was alone able to bring peace and civilization. There were, in his opinion—and he said it with all due deference—only two policies which this country could adopt. The one policy, and the right one, would be to recognize that when we interfered in the affairs of Egypt we incurred a responsibility towards the Soudan—a responsibility which implied the placing of Governors in the country who should administer justice and maintain peace among the warring elements by which the Soudan was now divided. This policy would entail an armed force, and he was told that this country would never incur the expense. If this were so, as the country was master, its will was law. But there remained another policy—that of letting the Soudanese entirely alone to manage their affairs and to govern themselves, to foster trade, and to trust to it and other influences and to time for the introduction of civilization. But our policy had been one neither like the first he had mentioned nor like the second. It had been a policy of fighting a bloody battle and then retiring. He could not find better words with which to describe our policy than "kill and retire." Such a policy was not dignified. It neither conduced to the honour of this country nor to the welfare of the people, There were hopes a short time back that this kill and retire policy was at an end. But after 18 months of peace, after 18 months during which the outposts at Suakin had not been fired upon, during which officers at Suakin could go out shooting for 20 or 25 miles into the interior without molestation, so long—and this was a point worthy of notice—as they were the English helmet and not the Egyptian tarbush, when trade was increasing, when cattle were being brought in and sold by the Native tribes, there took place a sudden change. In December last an expedition was got together at Suakin for the purpose of attacking Tahar, which was 40 miles off. Tahar was the great grain and cattle district of that part of the Soudan. This expedition was formed of friendly Armars, Hadendowahs, slaves from the town, and other such persons from Suakin. The expedition arrived in the neighbourhood of Tahar, but the looting propensities of a portion of this motley force were too strong for its cohesion. Some of the friendlies began to loot the cattle of the Hadendowahs, and these cattle happened to belong to the very tribe who were forming part of the expedition. These, naturally enraged at their conduct, knowing that if they submitted they would not see much more of their cattle, joined with the Baggaras in driving the Suakin force away, which they did with considerable slaughter. Since that day no peace had reigned in the Suakin district, no officer could go out shooting or beyond the fortifications, and everything had been disturbed; while at other coast ports, where no hostilities had taken place, everything was quiet. In January an expedition was sent out to take Osman Digna at Handoub, a hamlst some 12 miles from Suakin. Osman Digna and his force were driven out, but he rallied his men, returned to the attack, and defeated the Suakin force. It was during this engagement that the gallant Governor was wounded, and also another English officer in Egyptian employ. Another skirmish took place this month in which an English officer, Colonel Tapp, a gallant officer whose death was a great loss, was killed. These raids were not desirable. They were conducted under Egyptian auspices, and the Soudanese, not unnaturally, imagined that their object was to annex their tribal lands, with the intention of re-imposing upon them the hated yoke of Egypt, with its bondage and terrible taxation. They, therefore, resisted to the very utmost of their power. A great evil in these sorties was that they encouraged in the minds of numbers of friendlies and persons at Suakin a desire for a raid for the purpose of enjoying a participation in the loot that might be obtained. In some cases the loot obtained was very considerable, amounting to thousands of pounds sterling. His idea of the policy which should be pursued towards the Soudan, if the policy of responsibility for its proper government was not entertained, was a policy which would forbid all raids or hostilities unless there was necessity for them for the purpose of defence, a policy which should issue Proclamations in the Native Arabic to the people informing them that England had no Intention of attacking thorn, had no intention of helping Egypt to conquer their territory, and only wished to establish good relations with them. Such a Proclamation should be distributed far and wide, should be sent by camels to Berber and Khartoum and far-off provinces. Such, a Proclamation, he was told, would be attended with the most beneficial results; but it should be sent through our English Consul at Suakin, and not through Egyptian channels. He did not believe the Soudanese would place any confidence in a Proclamation emanating from Egypt. Take a case which was sufficient to destroy all confidence. Hicks's Army wished to cross from Suakin to Berber. The Hadendowahs were engaged to provide camels for the transport of the force. They fulfilled, their contract, doubtless, losing many camels and undergoing many privations. They were promised seven dollars for each camel—not outrageous pay, surely, for this arduous journey, but when they had done their work, instead of the seven dollars promised, they received for payment one dollar. Did not this show very good reason why the tribes should place little confidence in Egyptian promises? He could not help feeling that it was his duty to say what he thought on this matter. More especially did it come home to him when he considered the large areas of desert strewn with the whitened bones of the slain, and when he thought of the great numbers of officers and men of the English Army who now lay beneath the desert sands, and whose death required, in his opinion, some justification by the improvement and pacification of the land in which they fought. And yet another consideration weighed with him of far more importance than even the loss of all these lives, and that was that the honour of this country was bound up in the adoption of measures to civilize the Soudan. Otherwise history would say she had sadly neglected her duty.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFEAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)

With respect to the first part of the noble and gallant Lord's Question I have not very much to say, and if I could say much I ought not to say it. As a matter of fact, the last communication we had from him was an undated note which reached our outposts last November, and since that time we have had no communication with him. We believe that he is well, but as to the chances of escape I will not venture to speculate. I need not say that we shall do all that we can, to procure his release, as opportunity may offer; but I should be doing the reverse of my duty if I entered into details upon the subject. The noble and gallant Earl has travelled over a very extensive field, and dealt with events which arose in times for which Her Majesty's present Government are in no way responsible. I am not going to express an opinion as to the acts of our Predecessors. All I will say is that when the responsibility of affairs came to us we found matters in this condition. The British troops had retired from the Soudan; Lord Granville had imposed on the Egyptian Government the policy of abandoning the Soudan, on the ground that they were not in a position to keep it, but he had promised the assistance of the Government to maintain the boundary at Assouan on the Nile, and also to retain Suakin on the Red Sea. That policy, on the ground of continuity of policy, which I have more than once urged upon this House, we have pursued. The British Army is now, I think, almost exclusively confined to the North of Egypt. Suakin, however, has some British troops stationed there. We do not depart in any degree from the policy of leaving the Soudan. As to the civilization which the noble and gallant Earl would impose upon us the duty of restoring, it could only be carried out by a large and costly expedition, entailing enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure, and for the present a continuous expenditure, which I do not think the people of this country would sanction. With respect to the individual cases of collision which have taken place in the neighbourhood of Suakin, there are two points which I think the noble and gallant Earl has forgotten. One is that that very policy of abstention applies equally to the tribes called friendly and to those op- posed to us. We could not, without a far larger force, restrain the friendlies from pursuing such a course as they think fit in the conduct of their desert warfare. The second point is that a defensive position does not necessarily mean constantly standing behind a wall. It is often necessary to attack an offensive position set up outside. I do not believe that anything has been done under the sanction of any British officer which can be described in other language than that it is part of the measures necessary for the defence of Suakin.

THE EARL OF DUNDONALD

If my memory is correct, I especially excepted measures taken for the defence of our position; I alluded only to attacks on distant places.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I doubt whether the noble and gallant Earl will find that British officers have been employed in these distant attacks. I do not take the optimist view which the noble and gallant Earl has taken of the temper and disposition of the tribes at Suakin. I do not think that any Proclamation from Her Majesty's Government will induce Osman Digna to abstain from his attacks upon Suakin. The disturbing cause is the Slave Trade. No appeals simply to Osman Digna's good feeling, or to his desire for better trade, would prevent him from attacking when he sees an opportunity open. The defence of our retention of Suakin is that it is a, very serious obstacle to the renewal and the conduct of that Slave Trade which is always trying to press over from Africa into Asia. I do not think that the retention of Suakin is of any advantage to the Egyptian Government. If I were to speak purely from the point of view of that Government's own interest, I should say "Abandon Suakin at once." But the retention of Suakin is of very considerable value for the j purpose of repressing the Slave Trade, the Soudan is the one spot in the whole world where the Slave Trade has still the greatest vitality, and if your supervision is relaxed it will be revived in all its ancient force. The evil is not confined to that narrow strip of coast or to the desert of the Soudan. The whole mechanism by which the flower of every tribe in the heart of Africa is drawn down for the purpose of satisfying the slave markets of Arabia, Asia Minor, and other countries still exists, and that machinery would be stimulated into activity at once by the knowledge that there is this outlet to the traffic. That is the difficulty with which we have to contend, and I am afraid until the practice of the Slave Trade is abandoned the peace for which the noble and gallant Earl sighs will not be restored.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

said, he thought the noble and gallant Earl was justified in asking for some information; but he entirely accepted the statement of policy made by the noble Marquess, that we occupied Suakin for the purpose of dealing with the Slave Trade, and that our occupation was necessary for that object. He was glad to hear the policy of the Government was not to go beyond the defence of Suakin. Judging from the information in the newspapers, he thought the operations at Suakin had gone beyond what was originally intended. He believed there was some danger in the desire of the Egyptian Government to make use of the friendly tribes in operations against the unfriendly, and that that policy was going too far. It was very much to be desired that trade might revive, especially on the banks of the Nile.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I speak from recollection, but my impression is that the hindrance on our side to a renewal of trade along the Nile has been for some time withdrawn. With respect to Suakin, the control of the town is in the hands of the Egyptian Government, under Colonel Kitchener, who is not an English but an Egyptian officer, and that, to a certain extent, diminishes our influence, I will not say over the general policy, but over the details of individual action.