HL Deb 28 June 1888 vol 327 cc1514-22

Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.

Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD BRAMWELL

said, he would remind their Lordships that the advan- tages of limited liability were so great that the great banking houses of London had adopted the principle very much to the good of everybody concerned. He believed the principle of limited liability had been very useful in enabling parties to combine small capitals. They were told the law had been abused, but he would ask their Lordships not to attach too much weight to that. He did not make these remarks for the purpose of objecting to any amendment of the law. On the contrary, the good will with which he regarded the law of limited liability would rather make him desire to see any improvement made that could be devised; but he doubted whether his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack or the Gentleman who drafted the Bill were the persons most qualified to discover the defects and to remedy them. Long before he knew this Bill was to be introduced he stated his own inability to do so. Lawyers were not so well acquainted with these matters as those who were concerned in the promoting and winding-up of Companies, and he thought those who could best inform their Lordships of the defects in the law were the solicitors, accountants, and others who were concerned in such business. He thought that this Bill would be a proper subject for consideration by a Select Committee which could take evidence. The first clause provided for the provisional registration of the Company. This he did not think at all unreasonable; but it was to be remembered that under a previous Act such provisional registration was required, and that Act had been repealed. The provision as to the appointment of trustees in whose names the money paid in respect of shares was to be deposited would not, he thought, afford much protection, for promoters who meant mischief would appoint trustees who would be puppets in their hands. The second clause appeared to have been drawn up upon the assumption that all Companies were publicly advertised and that the shares were allotted to the public. But that, he was informed, was a very great mistake. Many Companies were got up by persons who allotted the shares among themselves. He did not suggest that there was anything secret or irregular in these cases; they were perfectly respectable and bonâ fide. The conditions necessary to entitle a Com- pany to complete registration were some of them open to great exception. It was provided that one-fourth of the shares should have been subscribed for, and that not less than one-tenth of the nominal amount subscribed should have been paid in cash. That would mean that if the capital was £1,000,000, shares to the amount of £250,000 should have been subscribed for, and that £25,000 should have been paid in cash. But it now often occurred that though the nominal capital was very large, the amount required to be called up was very small. Thus, in the case of the Law Fire Assurance Company, the nominal capital was £5,000,000, but an exceedingly small portion of this had been actually paid. He knew of a case of a Mining Company in Cornwall whose success was such that it was never found necessary to call up more than £10. This provision would be exceedingly inconvenient in many cases. Thus, in the case of a patent, a small amount might be sufficient to test its value and work it, yet no Company could be formed unless this large proportion of the subscribed capital was called up. If the capital was fixed at a high figure more would have to be called up than might be required, whereas, if it was fixed at a low figure, it might turn out that extensive experiments were required, and the capital would in that case not be sufficient. The requirement that each director should not hold less than 10 shares, and that the total number of shares held by the directors should be not less than one-fifth of the total number applied for, would also, he thought, unduly interfere with the legitimate creation of Companies. According to the Bill it appeared that the provisional directors would alone be responsible for misstatements in a prospectus. He thought that the directors who succeeded them ought also to be held responsible, for they ought not to become directors without having made all proper inquiries into the arrangements made by the provisional directors. Clause 11, which dealt with the liability of directors in respect of qualifying shares, was a well-intentioned section, but the provision that any man who accepted the post of director must at once pay up his shares was open to criticism. A preferable arrangement would be that the director should either pay up his shares or undertake not to transfer his rights in respect of them. Section 13, which provided for the issue every year of a balance-sheet seven days before the meeting of the Company, contained what was really a useless provision, for it was impossible to guard against fraud and roguery by the publication of a balance-sheet. The provision was objectionable because if a Company were compelled to distribute a balance-sheet its secrets would become known to its competitors, and it would thus be seriously hampered in its operations. He had personal knowledge of a most respectable and successful Company which had certainly been in existence for 60 years and which never produced a balance-sheet for the inspection of the shareholders. Clause 15, providing for a report by the liquidator on the winding up of a Company, was open to objection because it would impose a very disagreeable task upon the liquidator, who was generally nominated by the directors of the Company to be wound up, and because it contained no provision giving a person incriminated by the report the right of being heard. A provision ought to be inserted in the Bill to enable a man who was ask to lend money to a Company to inspect the register before making the loan. As the law would stand, unless the Bill were amended, he would not have the right to inspect the register before lending his money, and that right ought certainly to be given.

LORD THRING

said, he was bound to characterize the Bill as a retrograde measure, for it would re-impose upon joint-stock Companies all the burdens and difficulties from which they hoped the past legislation had set them free for ever. The series of Acts which were consolidated in 1862, and again subsequently, had enabled Companies to be formed with a minimum of cost, and as a result commerce had increased by leaps and bounds and the country had benefited largely in a variety of ways.

THE EARL OF MORLEY

asked the Lord Chancellor to explain how the permanent directors were to be made liable for any statement calculated to mislead in the Memorandum issued by the provisional directors.

LORD HERSCHELL

said that he would not trouble their Lordships with many observations, as most of his re- marks on the Bill had been anticipated by the noble and learned Lord who had addressed the House. Were they in a position to judge whether a measure of this sort would be likely to work well or ill? Schemes might look very well on paper and yet work indifferently; indeed, if they did not do good they might do harm by creating a false impression or by hampering undertakings which it was not desirable to subject to difficulty. Therefore, unless there was reasonable certainty, and this scheme was likely to answer and do good, there would be the danger of serious risks in adopting it. Had they the information which would enable them to express a substantial opinion? He had read criticisms praising the Bill as likely to be useful and others condemning it as mischievous; and the light of nature did not enable him to arrive at any certain decision. In his opinion some modifications would be necessary in the scheme proposed for the requisites to complete registration. He doubted whether any real security was gained by requiring that the directors of a Company should hold one-fifth of the paid-up capital. The result might be to exclude from the directorate the men best fitted to direct the affairs of a Company, for it did not follow that the man who had the most money would be the best director. What might be a large interest to one man might be a small one to another. It might be well to require that each director should have a status which should insure his taking interest in the affairs of the Company; but a large interest on the part of the directorate as a whole was compatible with one man having a very large stake and with the stakes of others being very limited. He had some doubt as to the expediency of presenting the form of the balance-sheet. In cases where there was keen competition, balance-sheets would be studied with the object of injuring those who published thorn, while they could easily be made to appear to be satisfactory in the case of Companies that were not on a sound footing, and the good done in checking reckless conduct might not at all compensate for the injury that might be done in other cases. In the case of paying Companies, he did not think the provision as to audit would be of much value; and as to the allowance for depreciation, the directors were left to fix that as low as they pleased. He did not make these remarks in any spirit of hostility to the Bill, for some improvement in the working of the Limited Liability Acts was called for, and if anything could be done to make them work better it was well worth doing. He only doubted whether they were in possession of sufficient information to enable them to remedy existing evils.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

said, that, as there was no Notice of Amendment, he did not see what was aimed at by critical speeches on all the clauses of the Bill. There were serious evils deserving of a serious effort to remedy them if it could be made, as he believed it might be, without retrogressive legislation. Some of the provisions of the Bill might require to be amended, but he did not see in it any evidence of intentional retrogression. It was generally felt that more might be done than had been to check frauds and abuses in connection with the formation of Companies, and the Bill seemed calculated to do that. The subject was one on which the opinion of the Board of Trade might be important; and, if the Bill was a lawyer's measure, and had not been considered by the Board of Trade, then it might have been desirable that it should be referred to a Select Committee, if the state of the Business of the House had made that course possible.

EARL GRANVILLE

said, the noble and learned Lord's strictures upon the debate would apply to the discussions upon all second readings. The subject was not a new one; still it was a convenient practice that, on the second reading of a Bill, some justification of its provisions should be offered. He was not quite sure that it was a matter upon which the authority of the Board of Trade would be absolute, for it could scarcely possess any special knowledge. But it would be satisfactory if they could hear some defence of the Bill against the arguments of the noble and learned Lord by whom it had been criticized.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord HALSBURY)

said, it seemed to him that one of the speeches that had been made would properly have been followed by a Motion for the rejection of the Bill. But it was an error to suppose that this was a lawyer's Bill, in the sense that its provisions had been suggested by lawyers. They had only put into shape the remedies that were recommended by mercantile men for the evils that had been complained of in the working of the Act of 1862. No one who had to do with the Courts of Law could doubt that there was an enormous amount of fraud committed in connection with some of those Companies, or that there was an enormous quantity of capital taken from innocent people by persons who issued fraudulent prospectuses. It might almost be said that a class of persons existed who lived by getting up fraudulent Companies and then wrecking them. In using the word draftsman on a former occasion, he had simply adopted the phrase as it was commonly used in the Courts of Law in reference to any clause. It very often happened that there was a volunteer draftsman of particular clauses when a Bill was going through Committee, and he certainly had not had the smallest idea of reflecting on the noble Lord (Lord Thring) in using the phrase in the sense in which he had employed it; nor had he supposed that the noble Lord was the draftsman of the particular clause in question. He felt the difficulty which a noble Lord near him had pointed out—that if he were to go through the Bill and justify it clause by clause, he should be doing what was not usual on the second reading, although he admitted that it was quite right that he should be asked to state the substance of the measure. The principle of those clauses was that, in the first instance, the promoters of a Company should, during the period of provisional registration, be Directors, and should be responsible for the conduct of the intended enterprize; and the provisions to which attention had been drawn in that discussion were designed to make it necessary that those persons should have a real and substantial interest in the concern. The object was to make those who presumably would issue the prospectus and put forward the scheme personally responsible for every false statement in the prospectus. There were now persons without means, without any capital at all to work the concern, who got up the scheme in the first instance, and then coaxed or beguiled a number of respectable persons to join the Company; and after that other persons were deceived, by seeing those respectable names, into taking shares and investing their money. That was the system which it was now sought to challenge; and it had been thought, not by lawyers, but by commercial men, that legislation with that object should be introduced. He had received remonstrances against the Government not being sufficiently active in bringing forward that Bill for the protection of commerce from many of our great towns. A noble and learned Lord had said that the insistence by legislation on the preparation of a balance sheet was one of those mediæval superstitions which it might have been thought had died out. But an analogous provision of that kind had been introduced into a previous Act with good effect, and it was considered that it would prove useful in the present measure. With regard to the comments which had been made as to the defaults of Directors, he did not agree that a man who by his negligence caused injury to others should not be called on to pay a fine. If a Director wilfully and intentionally issued a false prospectus, or in other respects issued statements which were fraudulent to his knowledge, he ought to be held guilty of misdemeanour; but if the thing was not done wilfully or with his knowledge, but through the want of proper care on his part, he could be fairly made to pay a pecuniary fine. If their Lordships thought that the proposal of provisional registration was itself a mistake, then he conceded that a Bill on those lines could not receive their approval; but if there was to be provisional registration, and that provisional registration was only to be for a certain period, then he asked what class of legislation was desired in order to insist that persons putting forward a scheme of a Company should be themselves really interested in it and should give such a guarantee to the public that they had a substantial stake in the concern? Nothing could be, he thought, more appropriate than that such persons should subscribe a certain amount of the capital. The Government, having considered the matter on their responsibility, had deliberately adopted the principle of provisional registration. The history of that Bill was this:—As originally framed it was introduced to their Lordships by his noble Friend (Lord Stanley of Preston) when President of the Board of Trade. That noble Lord had since been called to another sphere of duty; and now he himself had succeeded to the treatment of the subject, he should say, rather than of the Bill of which that noble Lord was the author. The result of that had been that the Bill now before their Lordships was the Bill which Her Majesty's Government now asked the House to read a second time. As to the suggestion that the Bill should be referred to a Select Committee, he had to remember the period of the Session at which that suggestion was made. If the Bill had been brought in early in the Session he would at once have acceded to that suggestion; but it was impossible not to see that acceding to it now would mean that they were not to pass any such Bill at all this Session. There was a pressure on the part of commercial men for a measure dealing with that subject, and he did not feel at liberty to agree to send that Bill to a Select Committee. At the same time, when they came to the Committee stage of the Bill, he should be very glad to receive the assistance of noble and learned Lords in improving its details.

Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly.