Lords Sitting of 21 December 1888

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Second Heading—Committee negatived—Third Reading—Friendly Societies Act, 1875, Amendment (No. 4).*
Second Reading—Committee negatived—Third Reading—Employers' Liability Act, 1880, Continuance* (307); Probate Duties (Scotland and Ireland)* (308).

LIBEL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 304.)
(The Lord Monkswell.)
LIBEL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 304.)

  CONSIDERATION OF COMMONS' AMENDMENTS.
  Commons' Amendments to Lords' Amendments, and Commons' reasons for disagreeing to one of the Lords' Amendments, considered (according to Order).
  LORD MONKSWELLsaid, he would ask their Lordships to agree to the Commons' Amendments. There were only three. In Clause 4 the Commons' had re-inserted after the words "public concern," "and the publication of which is not for the public benefit." He did not understand that their Lordships, upon a previous occasion, felt very strongly on this point; and he hoped their Lordships would now agree to these words. The next clause was one moved by Lord Waterford, making, under certain conditions, a speaker whose speech was reported liable for the words spoken as if he had himself
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  written and published them. That clause had been struck out, and, having regard to the very extensive change it would make in the law, he was not indisposed to agree to its omission. In Clause 9, which placed the power of granting a fiat for criminal proceedings against a newspaper in the hands of the Attorney General or a Judge at Chambers, the House of Commons had struck out "the Attorney General."
  Moved, "To agree to the Commons' Amendment on Clause 4."—(The Lord Monkswell.)
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)said, he thought the alteration was an unfortunate one. Still, he would assent to the Motion.
  Motion agreed to.
  Moved, "Not to insist on the Lords' Amendment inserting Clause 5."
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, that the clause was not originally inserted in the Bill, but was inserted by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Herschell), and subsequently amended by a Motion proposed by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Waterford). Though he voted in favour of the clause, still it no doubt made a very considerable alteration in the law, and it might be desirable that the subject should be more fully considered and dealt with in a separate Bill.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he was placed at a disadvantage owing to the absence of both the noble Lord who proposed the clause, and the noble Lord who moulded it, and also by the period of the Session at which they had arrived; but he felt the House would do well not to insist upon the clause. It was rather hard that the House of Commons should, owing to the peculiarity of their mode of disposing of business, have given practically no time for a reasonable discussion on their Amendments. The change entailed by the clause was undoubtedly very large; it was quite a new one, and required the most careful consideration, and they might very easily, if they adopted it without consideration, inflict hardship. It proposed to make a speaker liable for a report of his speech, unless he proved that such report was inaccurate. Public

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  men were exceedingly well reported when the reporters were near them; but there was no limit to the extraordinary statements attributed to a speaker when the reporters were at the other end of the room. It would, he thought, be necessary to provide better machinery than that contained in this clause in order to carry out its object; and this might best be done by a separate piece of legislation, after having watched the Libel Amendment Bill in practice, and having seen whether any evils arose. If evils did arise, doubtless they would be able to induce the House of Commons to join with them in providing the necessary remedies. He, therefore, hoped that their Lordships would not insist on this clause.
  Motion agreed to.
  Amendment to Clause 9 agreed to.

EAST AFRICA.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN, in rising to call attention to East African affairs and to move for Papers, said, that the Zanzibar question was a most serious one, and it had become more serious than it was when he last addressed their Lordships on the subject. The information before Parliament and the public was of a most meagre kind. We had embarked in an undertaking of which the end could not be foreseen. About three weeks ago he gave their Lordships reasons for anticipating that great difficulties might arise out of our action in those waters. He then said that there was no reason to suppose from the Correspondence before Parliament that Germany was in any sense precluded from military undertakings, and that he was very anxious and uneasy on the subject. Unfortunately, events had justified him in what he then said; and he devoutly wished they had not done so. Operations had been undertaken on land; two towns had been bombarded, and one completely destroyed; and British Indian subjects had suffered grievous loss of property, while, of course, there had been loss of life on the part of the natives. If the matter was serious three weeks ago it was much more serious now. What was the object of the operations? Our object in the blockade was the suppression of the Slave Trade; but we had the authority
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  of Bishop Smythies—and it was difficult to find a better—for the belief that the operations of Germany had nothing to do with the Slave Trade, and, as affecting its suppression, the blockade was, to use his words, a "gigantic fraud." There might be some exaggeration in these words; but there could be little doubt, from the strong opinion he expressed, that the suppression of the Slave Trade was not likely to be furthered by the blockade, and that the operations on shore were not rendered necessary by any proceedings of the Slave Traders. It was easy to see what the effect of the operations was to be. It was to re-establish the German East African Company in the position which it had forfeited by its blunders. The Prime Minister, in a despatch to Sir Edward Malet, was very strong on that point. He had no objection to the re-establishment of a trading company of any country. England would always be willing to assist any nation in extending civilizing influence in savage or semi-savage countries. But the question was not quite so simple when the lives and interests of British subjects were involved. British subjects had suffered, and were suffering seriously, and the correspondent of The Times said that their position wag daily becoming worse. British interests were likely to suffer in a diminution of British influence, for which no compensation was possible. Our position was peculiar, because the British Crown had more Mahomedan subjects than any other Power. On that account it behoved us to be exceptionally careful in dealing with questions that affected Mahomedan peoples. At one time we had a large and even a commanding influence at Zanzibar; and the waning of our influence had not been attended with salutary results. It would be a lamentable thing that the influence of this country should be jeopardized, not only in Zanzibar, but on the mainland, by the action we were taking in concert with Germany. It was idle to say we could dissociate ourselves from responsibility for the action of Germany because we did not participate actively in the operations on land. It would require more sophistry and casuistry than were possessed by the Natives to enable them to draw a distinction between operations on land and operations at sea. He did not see what the end was to be. The

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  debate in the Richstag was most instructive. The tenour of it was to the effect that operations on land were to be continued. The Representative of Hamburg said that the Slave Trade would not be suppressed by operations confined to the sea. The Representative of another important town said that the object was to re-establish the East African Company, and to let all people know that when Germany had put her foot down she would not withdraw. These sentiments were not explained away nor extenuated as the debate proceeded. The Foreign Minister suggested that there should be a gendarmerie of 800 or 900 men under 30 European officers, with a reserve at Zanzibar. What would be our position supposing this gendarmerie was created? It appeared to him that we were going too far, or else not far enough, in this matter. He could judge only by the Papers which had been presented to Parliament, and, as far as he could see, no provision had been made whereby this country had any voice whatever in determining whether operations were to be conducted on land or not, and what limit was to be placed upon any operations which might be undertaken. He saw no provision whatever whereby this country was to withdraw from the arrangements, whatever they might be, that Her Majesty's Government had entered into with Germany. These partnerships were, in his opinion, matters of doubtful utility, and the experience of them in the past was not very re-assuring. The utterance of the Prime Minister the other day, and what had taken place since, reminded him of a statement made by Lord Derby some time ago. Lord Derby assured their Lordships and the country that there was no reason to suppose that any foreign country had designs upon New Guinea. That utterance was closely followed by the annexation of the greater part of New Guinea and one or two other islands. With regard to Zanzibar, the Prime Minister a little while ago said that the German Government had no intention to resort to any action on shore, and these words were closely followed by action on shore. He did not mean for one moment to attribute any want of bona fides on the part of the noble Marquess, but he wished to point out how impossible it was for the best instructed mind to foretell in cases of this kind the
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  course which events might take. There was another matter which appeared to be very ominous, and that was the absolute silence of noble Lords who usually sat on the Front Bench opposite. Lord Granville had been Foreign Secretary and Colonial Minister. Lord Derby had also occupied those posts, and his policy changed sides before he did himself. He had no hesitation in saying that the general policy of those two noble Lords must be baneful to the interests of this country; and that if their policy had not been controlled and interrupted by the occasional inroads of a sensible Tory policy it would have been disastrous to the interests of the United Kingdom. He thought it most ominous that noble Lords who sat on the Front Bench opposite appeared to entirely approve the state of things which existed at the present time on the East Coast of Africa. He had before said that certain eventualities might occur which would possibly entangle this country in a position from which it might be difficult to extricate her without jeopardizing her neutrality or without causing friction. An influential portion of the French Press had expressed the utmost satisfaction at the position of this country in connection with Germany at Zanzibar. France and Germany were happily at profound peace with each other, but it was absurd to suppose that they entertained towards each other feelings of profound affection, and we could not blind ourselves to the fact that things might occur which might lead to a European war. He held it most dangerous, therefore, that this country should be placed in a position in which she would be likely in any way to compromise her neutrality, or from which she could only extract herself by giving offence to one country or another. That was all he wished to say upon this question. What he complained of was the scantiness of the information laid before Parliament. They had absolutely no knowledge whatever of the attitude of France in regard to this matter. They only knew that France absolutely denied the construction put upon her words and intentions. They had no information of the nature of the arrangements made with Portugal, or of the actual opinions of Italy or any other of the Great Powers. They had no knowledge as to the nature of any agreement entered into by this

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  country with Germany, or as to whether any agreement had been entered into. They had no knowledge as to whether this country had any voice whatever in deciding the nature of the operations that took place, or as to whether any operations would take place on shore. And they had no knowledge of any means by which the Government could extricate the country from its present position. If he were speaking from a Party point of view he would urge the noble Lords on the Front Ministerial Bench to consider the fact that the one thing which the people of this country disliked was to be kept in ignorance. He hoped that it might be possible before Parliament was prorogued for the Government to give some further information upon these matters. Before he sat down he wished to say a word or two as to the position of affairs at Suakin. The action of the Government in both these cases was influenced by the same motive—the suppression of the Slave Trade. He would not enter fully into the question whether or not negotiations might have been attempted before an action was fought. His opinion was that, considering the position in which matters were, it would have been perfectly useless to attempt to negotiate without having first dislodged the enemy. They had dislodged the enemy, and had had a very brilliant and complete success, occasioning, no doubt, a considerable loss of human life, which must be regretted. This action might have been absolutely necessary; but at least it was their duty to consider whether they could not in the future deal with the question without the necessity of destroying human life. He took it that Suakin was to be retained. The words of the noble Marquess upon the retention of Suakin had been considerably canvassed of late, and no doubt it would be interessing if the Prime Minister would explain what his meaning was when he spoke about the value of Suakin to Egypt. He looked upon what the noble Marquess had said as not being the words of the Prime Minister, speaking, as it were, ex cathedrâ, but merely saying that if he were in the position of Egypt he would not consider Suakin of vital importance. It was a totally different thing to lay it down that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern
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  ment Suakin was of no importance to Egypt. He took it that Suakin was of great strategical importance to Egypt, and to any country vitally interested in Egypt. Suakin was also essential to our success in dealing effectually with the Slave Trade. He therefore hoped it was the intention of the Government to retain Suakin. If so, the question was how it could be occupied at the least expense of human life and money. The course of re conquering the Soudan was out of the question, but there was the alternative of endeavouring by negotiation to occupy Suakin with the consent of the neighbouring coast tribes. One thing which was universally held to be utterly repugnant to the coast tribes was Egyptian rule; and if they were assured that they would not be handed over to Egyptian rule, and that we occupy Suakin directly and not as agents of Egypt, there was little doubt that negotiations could be successfully entered into with them. There was a strong feeling among a military party that our policy was to take Handoub and other places, and establish ourselves in the vicinity of Suakin. Therefore, he thought it would be well if Her Majesty's Government would express their intention not to go any further, if that was their fixed determination. He also asked whether they would endeavour to open negotiations with the coast tribes. By that proceeding, and also by encouraging legitimate trade, they would be doing the only thing by which they could succeed in suppressing the Slave Trade. The Arabs were keen traders, and by all accounts the coast tribes were anxious to trade; and there would be no difficulty in dealing with them provided they felt certain that under no circumstances would they be handed over to Egypt, and that Suakin would be occupied by us directly. He believed that in the adoption of that policy lay the only solution of that question. The future repetition of the events of yesterday morning, brilliant as was their success, would be a subject of regret, but they must look for their recurrence unless they could devise some more safe and satisfactory way of occupying Suakin; and that result could only be attained, as he had said, by securing the friendship of the coast tribes and occupying Suakin ourselves in the manner that he had indicated.

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  The noble Earl concluded by moving for the production of Papers.
  Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Papers relating to East African affairs."—(The Earl of Dunraven.)
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): My Lords, I confess there is some difficulty in following the noble Lord in all the matters with which he has dealt. In view of the present state of the House, and of the Bench I see opposite, I feel some difficulty in discussing the colonial policy of Lord Granville and Lord Derby; and I do not know that, in the absence of those two noble Lords, any other occupant of the Bench opposite will care to do so. But my noble Friend is very angry with the German Government, and objects to many things which they have done. He is also angry with the German Reichstag, and objects to many things which the Members of that body have said. I have nothing to say against his taking these objections, but I must protest earnestly against the idea that I am responsible for the German Government or for the Members of the German Reichstag. The noble Lord was severe on me because he said that I misled him as to the intentions of the German Government. Well, in the first place, I would say that in furnishing my views to him as to what I thought the German Government was likely to do, I was not to be understood as entering into any pledge on behalf of the German Government or on my own behalf; and it cannot give the noble Lord any right to complain if my anticipations were not fulfilled. I was misunderstood when I talked of action on shore. I was speaking of the wider question of a military expedition into the interior. Whether bombardment is to be described as an action on sea or land is a nice question, because the shells obviously start from the sea and fall on the land; and it may, therefore, be described either way. When the noble Lord asked the question some time ago, there had already been action of this kind on the part of the German Fleet on the coast of Zanzibar, and therefore it is obvious that I could not have meant bombardment when I told him that the German Government would not take action on land. But as
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  he holds me responsible for any forecast I may make as to the action of the German Government I will not make any more; and I will leave it to the noble Lord's imagination to fancy that the Germans are going to march across Africa, if he pleases. Whatever the German Government has done, whether good or bad, expected or unexpected, it would have been done in exactly the same manner if we had taken no action at all. The German Government is dealing with a territory under their own influence, with regard to which it has Treaty rights, and is acting within the strict limits of International Law. We have no claim to remonstrate against or to prevent its action; and we are in no way responsible for the action it has taken. We have a certain partnership with the German Government in respect to one particular matter. My noble Friend says we have come to the assistance of the German Government. I am not prepared to admit that that is a correct mode of describing the action we have taken. I should say that we have accepted the assistance of the German Government in carrying out what we have been engaged in for three quarters of a century—namely, the suppression of the Slave Trade by sea. For that purpose we have accepted the assistance of the German Government, and it is very valuable, because it enabled us to establish this blockade of the coast by which we can stop vessels of all Flags. But beyond that strictly limited department we have no action in common with the German Government; and if they are, indeed, as my noble Friend thinks they are—I do not myself think they are—going to undertake military operations into the interior, it will in no degree concern us, and we shall not imitate them. We are not going to undertake action on land, but intend to confine ourselves to action by sea, to paralyze the Slave Trade. I am sorry my noble Friend has not had more information on these matters. Almost all the points he adverted to are dealt with in the Papers already laid on the Table; but it was not possible to get them ready for circulation in time, considering the vast amount of work which the printers' offices have to do. Of course the noble Lord is aware that before despatches are published it is necessary to consult those by whom they are written, and a con

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  siderable length of time elapses necessarily before they can be published, but I hope that the Papers which he asks for will be before Parliament in a very short period. As to Suakin, I imagine that I agree very closely with my noble Friend, but I do not know how far his view extends. I entirely agree that there should be no expedition into the desert; I agree that Suakin must not be abandoned to the Soudanese. The precise limit of the interest of Egypt in Suakin I will not discuss. When I discussed the matter before in this House, as far as I remember, I was trying to give an explanation of the grounds on which the Egyptian Government was acting, and I indicated that I thought, from their point of view at the time, they were not likely to attach much value for their own purposes to Suakin; but it is a subject on which a great many different opinions are held, according to the point of view from which the matter is looked at. And I do not think it is necessary or expedient to discuss further how far the Egyptian Government is interested in keeping Suakin. I will only say I believe that that Government and the Turkish Government, if we consulted together, would agree with us that Suakin should not be abandoned to the Soudanese. My noble Friend says you must not be satisfied with repelling attacks on Suakin, but you must make such attacks for ever impossible by negotiating with the friendly tribes. Is he not a little misled by mere words? What does he mean by negotiating with the friendly tribes? What have we to offer them? You cannot negotiate with them unless you have something to offer or something to threaten. Well, we have nothing to threaten. What have we to offer? We might offer them one thing—that is, to defend them against the dervishes; but that would involve us in an expedition into the interior—the very thing against which my noble Friend desires us to guard. No doubt you might invite the friendly tribes to come into closer connection if you extended the circle of your operation and defended a large circle around Suakin; but if you extend the circle of your defence, you must also extend the garrison and means required for that defence. You extend the cost of the measures by which that defence will be accompanied; and that will make
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  it essential to inquire how far the return is likely to be equivalent to the great sacrifices you have been called upon to incur. My noble Friend has one simple solution of the difficulty. He says that it is a matter universally acknowledged, that the tribes detest the Egyptians and like us. I beg to withdraw my own individual unit from that universal acknowledgment. I do not know where he gets the evidence of that universal belief. I expect it is to be found chiefly in the minds of persons who, I think, assume their information on this subject very readily and very rashly. The tribes differ, I believe, very much in opinion. They differ very much in the strength of their Mahomedan fanaticism, and they do not hold the same mood from year to year or month to month; and I believe any policy founded on a belief in the permanent inclination on the part of the tribes for England rather than Egypt would be a policy based on the sands. I have only one other suggestion to offer. I do not like to dwell on it, but the importance of it my noble Friend will recognize at once—that before he recommends us to hoist the English Flag at Suakin and keep the town for ourselves, he should study the provisions of the Treaty of Paris.
  THE EARL OF DUNDONALDsaid, he wished to refer to the question of the wounded at Suakin. While our own wounded, he was pleased to think, had all the medical attention it was possible to command, it was far otherwise with the wounded of a gallant enemy, who, probably, were scattered about the desert, or were laid in the enemy's camp, subject to the most horrible tortures under a burning sun. No one who had not seen the surroundings of the ordinary battle fields in the Soudan could adequately understand the sufferings of those wounded, who crawled under the scanty shade of a thorn tree to die in agony. A great deal might be done to alleviate the sufferings of the enemy's wounded, and to produce a friendly feeling with the Natives, if Her Majesty's Government would recommend to the Governor at Suakin that he should issue a Proclamation to the enemy informing them that their wounded, if sent into Suakin, would be cared for. It could also have no other effect than humane and beneficial, if a convoy of camels laden with lime juice, oranges, or other

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  medical comforts for the wounded, was sent into the enemy's camp. The enemy, as we knew, were suffering great privation prior to the battles, and their wounded must be in a bad way for even the bare necessaries of life. The arrival of a few camel loads of medical comforts for the sick in their camp must tend to blunt the edge of their hatred towards the victor, and to facilitate the negotiations which he trusted would now follow. If Emin or other European prisoners were in the hands of the Mahdi, it was likely that their treatment would be favourably influenced by such conduct on our part, as it would prove to the enemy that, though England resists aggression, she acts magnanimously to the vanquished.
  Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

  AFRICA (EQUATORIAL PROVINCES)—MR. STANLEY AND EMIN PASHA.
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY): I have received the following telegram from Sir John Pender: "News just arrived that Stanley and Emin Pasha have arrived on the Aruwhimi. Details follow. News reliable." I cannot, of course, answer for the accuracy of this news; but at least it is as reliable as that which Osman Digna sent.
  EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 1880 (CONTINUANCE) BILL.—(No. 307.)
  (The Marquess of Salisbury.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
  LORD BRAMWELLsaid, that one reason why the working classes had so earnestly promoted Employers' Liability Bills was because they conceived that the present law inflicted an injustice upon them. They thought that that which was true of the rest of mankind was not true of them. If that were so, he would not blame them in the least for endeavouring to get the law set right; and with his whole heart he would help them if he thought so. But they were entirely wrong. He did not blame the working classes for entertaining the
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  opinion, because they held it on the highest authority. The Master of the Rolls had told them that they were right, and that the law was unjust to them; and therefore they were perfectly warranted in getting rid of it. He differed entirely from his noble and learned Friend, and he did so with the greatest confidence. Where there was no relation or contract between a person who was injured by the negligence of another person's servant and the master, the master was liable to the person injured by the negligence of the master's servant acting within the scope of his duty. As an illustration, he mentioned the case of a coachman who, in driving, ran over, by his negligence, a person in the street, a stranger with whom the master had no contract or relation. The master in that case was liable. But when there was a contract or relation between the master and the person injured, they must look to the terms of the contract and see whether or no there was a liability. In the case of the master and his servant who was injured there was a contract—a relation between them; and they were not strangers, as in the case of the person injured in the street. All that the law said was that where a servant was injured by the negligence of a fellow servant, the relation or contract between the servant injured and the master was not such that there had been an agreement on the part of the master to compensate his servant for injuries sustained by the negligence of another servant. If a man rode in an omnibus or railway carriage and was injured by the negligence of the company's servants, he had a remedy against the company; but if a man met a friend on the road and gave him a ride gratuitously, and afterwards by the negligence of the servant of the owner the friend was injured, the latter had no remedy against the master of the servant. If a man went into a shop or an hotel, and by the negligence of the servant in the place sustained an injury, he had a remedy against the owner of the shop or the hotel. But if he went into a friend's house, and, under precisely similar circumstances, sustained an injury, he had no remedy against his friend, because it was no part of the terms of relationship between them. What the law said was that in the

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  ordinary case of a servant, the master had not agreed with the servant to be liable for the damage done to him by a fellow-servant. The law did not say that there might not be a bar gain to that effect; far from it. But it said that in the absence of any such affirmative bargain the master did not undertake to be liable for damage done by the negligence of a fellow-servant He cared not what the law was, so long as people were allowed to make their own bargains; but to say that such bargains should not be made, that master and man could not agree for higher wages and no liability, or lower wages and liability, was preposterous.
  THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS (Lord ESHER)said, that his noble and learned Friend had not convinced him, because he had heard his argument many times during the last 25 years. That there was any difference between his noble and learned Friend and himself as to what the law was could not be supposed What he had stated 20 years ago, and what he still believed to hold good, was that when the law was first declared it had been declared erroneously. The law had been declared that, although the master would be liable to any stranger for the negligence of his servant, yet, if a fellow-servant were injured, there was a contract on the part of that servant who was injured that he should not claim compensation. He believed that the law had no right to imply a contract on the part of the injured servant not to claim the same compensation as a stranger might. If the master were to be liable to anyone for the negligence of a servant, why should he not be liable to a fellow-servant for that negligence? The ground of the law was that a master was liable for the negligence of a servant as if he himself were in the place and doing the act of the servant with the same negligence. If the master actually did the same negligence, no one could deny that he would be liable; but it was said that the fellow-servant had contracted himself out of the claim for compensation. There was no expression of such a contract; it was an implied contract by the law, and the law ought not to have implied it, for there was nothing to justify such implication.
  LORD BRAMWELL: I said that the servant has not entered into a contract that he shall have compensation.
  LORD ESHERsaid, that in his opinion the law, although it was the law, had originated in a mistake, and that mistake had made a difference as between fellow-workmen and other people.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a; Committee negatived: Then (Standing Order No. XXXV. having been dispensed with) Bill read 3a and passed.

LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES BILL.

  CONSIDERATION OF COMMONS' AMENDMENTS.
  Commons' Amendments considered.
  Moved, "That this House doth agree to the Commons' Amendments."—(The Lord Monkswell.)
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Lord KNUTSFORD)said, he desired to draw attention to the omission of Clause 9. The main argument against allowing trustees to invest in Colonial securities had been that there was no check to prevent a Colony from issuing new loans to any amount. To meet this objection an automatic clause had been prepared, and had passed in their Lordships' House. That clause in effect provided that Colonial securities could not be bought except at a certain price, but doubts had been raised as to whether that clause was sufficient in its terms. There was not time to consider those objections fully; but, at the same time, as the other clauses of the Bill were of very great importance to trustees, it had been thought best not to let the Bill drop. It had, therefore, been de-decided to omit Clause 9. It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that any reflection was cast upon Colonial securities by this action; and, indeed, the market price of those securities was a sufficient answer to any such supposition. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in the other House had expressed a strong hope that no such doubt would be thrown upon Colonial securities by this action, and he also had expressed a hope, in which he (Lord Knutsford) heartily joined, that before next Session some solution would be found by which the difficulty with regard to Colonial securities might be removed.
  Motion agreed to.

UNITED STATES (RECALL OF LORD SACKVILLE).

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF DUNRAVENrose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, When it was intended to appoint a Minister to the United States? In putting this Question he did not desire to enter into the circumstances which led to the departure of our late Minister at Washington. That was an incident that, in the interests of both nations, had better be forgotten as soon as possible. He regretted, however, that it had so far been found impossible by Her Majesty's Government to present Papers to Parliament on the subject. He still hoped that they might be presented before the Prorogation. The Prime Minister not long ago alluded to this matter at the Guildhall, and suggested that the action of the President was not approved by the American people. It was well known that the people of America were sensitive—he might say extra sensitive—as to the opinion of the Prime Minister and as to the opinions of the people of this country. Whether there was any blame in the matter, whether any one was to blame, and whether our late Minister acted in any way which was unjustifiable, was beside the point; but it was desirable that both the English and the American people should have correct information on the subject. His point, however, was not whether or not the British Minister was guilty of conduct which justified the action of the American Government. He desired to urge that a Minister ought to be appointed as soon as possible. Though diplomatically speaking the United States was a foreign country, still our relations with them were quite different to our relations with other countries, and we did not regard its inhabitants as foreign in the ordinary acceptation of the word. Inhabitants of the two countries could each understand in a way that others could not the exigencies of Party feeling, and could make allowances for each other in that respect. Any ill-feeling or misunderstanding between the two countries would be greatly deplored. The first duty of this country was towards the Empire and India; and, secondly, towards the United States; and it was our bounden duty to do everything that
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  we could, and make any sacrifice that could be made without dishonour, to create and maintain good feelings between the two countries. Owing to the change of Government in the United States Mr. Phelps would soon be leaving England, and it might be, if the appointment of a Minister to Washington were further delayed, that the delay might be taken by the people of the United States as intended as a punishment for what had occurred in the case of the late Minister, or that they might retaliate by delaying the appointment of a Minister to London, the result of which would be very much like a suspension of diplomatic relations. At the present time there were special reasons for desiring a good understanding between this country and the United States, for there were two important international questions pending for settlement with regard to the Fishery question and the Extradition Treaty, and these could only be settled by mutual amity. Upon these grounds he thought he was justified in saying that it was desirable that no cause of offence should be allowed to exist between the two countries, and that any honourable sacrifice should be made to avoid such a state of things. He hoped that the Prime Minister would assure the House that a Minister would be appointed to Washington without delay.
  THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)I told my noble Friend privately that the Correspondence on this subject was incomplete, and, therefore, according to the uniform usage, I can say nothing on the subject. It is also the usage in regard to appointments of this kind made by the Executive Government for Parliament to express, if necessary, its judgment upon such appointments after they have been made, but not to require information beforehand as to the intentions of the Government. On both these grounds I shall leave the responsibility for introducing this subject with the noble Earl, and I must respectfully ask the House to excuse me from making any statement on the subject.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Eleven o'clock, p.m.