THE EARL OF CARNARVONMy Lords, I do not propose, as far as I am concerned, to raise any discussion in this House in reference to the Question of which I have given Notice. It is clear, from the reports which have appeared in the public Press, that the position, diplomatically, is one of a certain amount of tension at the present moment. I have no wish whatever to increase that tension. I am quite conscious that the position of Her Majesty's Government is a difficult one, and—giving them credit, as I fully and sincerely do, for an anxious regard for British interests in Egypt, and also giving them credit for taking into full consideration that duty which unquestionably we owe to Egypt, having undertaken a certain mission, so to say, not to leave it unfulfilled—I do not propose to raise any question of debate to-night. I shall not comment upon those reports which have appeared. I shall make no criticisms, however friendly, which might place my noble Friend in a difficult position for reply. I shall leave it entirely to him to say much or little, as he thinks best under the circumstances. One thing only I would say. It is stated, and apparently stated on solid grounds, that great pressure is being placed diplomatically upon Her Majesty's Government 1565 with regard to that Article which gives us, under certain circumstances, the right to the re-occupation of Egypt. I pronounce no opinion on the Convention be far as it has appeared; but I will venture to say this much—that I think the Government have gone to the extreme verge of that which was prudent and safe, and I sincerely trust that no amount of diplomatic or political pressure will induce them to go one single step further in the direction of that re-occupation—I mean, of course, one single step further towards giving up the claim for re-occupation. I adhere, therefore, to my resolution with which I started, and I will merely ask my noble Friend, "When he will be in a position to lay the Papers on this most important transaction on the Table of the House, without the reading of which it will be difficult for your Lordships to form any fair and impartial conclusion?
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)My Lords, I feel that both in this and in the other House very great consideration and forbearance have been shown to Her Majesty's Government in reference to this question, and that no stop has been taken in any way to embarrass us or create difficulties'. That circumstance makes me feel the more regretful that I cannot at once lay the Convention, and the Papers relating to the Convention, on the Table of the House; but the circumstances to which my noble Friend has referred must, I think, without dwelling upon them further, show that it would not be desirable to lay that Convention on the Table until it has been ratified. As soon as it has been ratified it shall be laid on the Table. I may just say shortly what the provisions are. Our position is not one of perfect freedom. We were not dealing with the matter as res integra. We had pledges of a very binding character which we inherited, and binding in two directions. It was not open to us to assume the protectorate of Egypt in the way that the French Government assumed the protectorate of Tunis, even supposing—a question upon which I desire to give no kind of opinion—that such a course, on other grounds, would be consistent with International Law and the interests of this country. It was not open to us to do so, because Her 1566 Majesty's Government had again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so. On the other hand, it was not open to us to abandon the task we had undertaken and leave the Egyptians without any protection from those evils to which undoubtedly, by the force of events, our intervention had tended more to expose them. We had no right to leave them at the mercy either of any kind of foreign invasion, such as they have had to deal with and repel, or exposed to the dangers of internal troubles which had brought their State within a very short distance of destruction. My noble Friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his conviction that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds, and which we have done our utmost to fulfil. Hedged in on one side and the other by these two pledges, we had to find a solution of the question which should be agreeable to both of them, and we did not feel that it was a solution which could be indefinitely postponed. Not only was there considerable expense incurred by this country, for which Parliament would naturally desire to see some practical motive; but it was undoubtedly the fact that our presence in Egypt, unrecognized by any Convention, did inspire the Ottoman Court with considerable disquietude and gave the subjects of the Sultan cause for a suspicion which we did not deserve, but which it was very natural that they should entertain. We were very anxious to sustain the authority of the Sultan, and not to give any handle for the belief that we entertained designs in the slightest degree against his just rights. Guided by these motives, we have agreed to a Convention being signed. We have authorized the signing of a Convention which has been negotiated by my friend Sir Drummond Wolff, to whose skill, tact, and patience I am bound to pay a very high tribute; and the terms, without going into many details, may be briefly described as follows:—There is something in it about the Suez Canal and Protocols in reference to it; and there are other details. But what my noble Friend was most concerned to know was as to the presence and stay of our troops in Egypt. We have engaged, subject to certain conditions, which I shall state, to withdraw our troops from Egypt at the 1567 expiration of three years from the ratification of the Convention, and we shall cease at the end of five years to have the right secured to us up to that time to appoint the officers of the Egyptian Army. But, in the first place, that engagement is limited by the condition that if there is any danger, external or internal, to be apprehended at the time when this evacuation is due, it will be adjourned, and will not take place until that external or internal danger has passed by. After the evacuation has taken place we shall then have to deal with what may happen during the absence of our troops from Egypt. In three contingencies we retain the right of sending our troops back—namely, if there is danger of external invasion, if there is danger of internal disturbance of order, or if there is danger of the Government of Egypt not fulfilling its international obligations. But we are under the obligation, as soon as the danger is dispelled, to withdraw our troops again. The Sultan, it is recognized in the Convention—but it is a right not derived from the Convention—the Sultan has the same right of sending in his troops for the same causes. No other nation is to have any right to send troops into Egypt except for the purpose of transport, which is strictly regulated. These are the conditions which have been agreed upon between the Porte and ourselves. It is simply an agreement between the Porte and ourselves; and your Lordships will, therefore, observe that supplementary proceedings will be required to give it full force and effect. The assent of other Powers will be necessary to some of these stipulations; and unless that assent is given our engagements lose their validity, and we remain in the same position as we were in before. Our engagements are made to the Porte, and to the Porte alone. My Lords, I think that, on the whole, perhaps I had better follow the cue given to me by my noble Friend, and not dwell any further on considerations which I could not enter into at any great length without the risk of saying something which I had better not say. I will merely say that, the earliest possible time after the ratification, I propose to lay on the Table all the Papers connected with this Convention, except, of course, those connected 1568 with the negotiations with other Powers, which will be presented on a future occasion.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI rise to ask the noble Marquess one or two questions on this matter, although I do not wish to discuss now the terms of the Convention which has been signed. The noble Marquess said that in the Convention there was something about the Suez Canal. That is a matter of such high importance that it would be satisfactory if we could know in some general terms what that something is. Another question which I would ask is, whether we are to be the sole judges as to sending the troops back to Egypt in case of necessity, or whether the Porte will join in that determination? I would further ask whether there is any agreement with regard to the time for the evacuation of our troops after the restoration of order?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYAs to the first question in regard to the Suez Canal, I did not dwell upon it, because, as I thought, the noble Earl opposite would be fully informed, from his official experience, that all we have done is to carry out Lord Granville's engagements. Lord Granville engaged that the Canal should be open to all persons at all times, and to that engagement we have strictly adhered. The noble Earl next asks whether we are to be the judges, or the Porte is to be the judge, as to the necessity for the reentry of the troops? We are to act in full communication with the Porte; but we have declined to make the consent of the Porte a condition precedent to our going in, and that for the very obvious reason that the dangers which we wish to guard against might arise at any moment; and if it was necessary to have negotiations with Constantinople before action was taken, the danger might become much more formidable than if action were taken at once. There is a distinct engagement between the Porte and ourselves that the troops shall be withdrawn the moment the danger ceases.