§ LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA,on rising to ask Her Majesty's Government. Whether a considerable reduction in the officers, men, and guns of the Royal Artillery has been in contemplation by the Government; whether Her Majesty's Government will reconsider any such contemplated reduction, seeing that our force of Artillery is at present below the strength necessary for our Army? said, they had heard rumours of large Artillery reductions; but they had not been brought before the public except in Regimental Orders. It was not with a view to embarrass the Government that he had put this Question, but rather in the hope that they might be induced to refrain from reducing a part of our most perfect armament, which took a long and careful training to bring to perfection, and the loss of which was sure to be followed, at no distant time, by increased expenditure, if by no greater evil. The effect of the proposed reductions would be that five batteries of our force of Artillery would cease to exist as batteries, and that 28 guns would cease to be Horse Artillery guns; while, with regard to men, more than 600 trained and skilled artillerymen would be taken from that important arm, and would have to revert to other duties which required much less training. He understood that the ground on which the anticipated reduction was based was that our Horse Artillery was in larger proportion to the Field Artillery than in any other European Army; and as a considerable reduction of guns was said to be intended, he presumed that the number of our field guns generally was assumed to be in excess of our 1514 requirements. He would, therefore, endeavour to show how the case stood. He took the number of our batteries, horse and field, from the published Army List; and though a considerable number of batteries had been reduced from six to four guns, yet he assumed that on emergency we might be able to complete them to six guns per battery. According to The Army List, then, we had 26 Horse Artillery batteries at home and abroad, and 80 Field batteries, giving a total of 106 batteries, or 636 guns. The troops, according to the Establishment, were—British Cavalry, 19,023; Infantry, 143,093; Indian Cavalry, 22,732; Infantry, 105,112; giving a total of 289,960. Our 636 guns would stand to them in the proportion of 2.2 guns per 1,000 men. It would be said that a large deduction of Infantry must be made for garrisons; but against that they had to set off the Militia and Reserve—let them say, 100,000 men. Now, the proportion which Napoleon laid down was three guns per 1,000 men, and that, for the present day, was a low estimate. According to that standard we should require 869 guns, or 233 more than we possessed. The German standard was now 3.6 guns per 1,000 men, according to which we ought to have 1,043 guns instead of 636. The German proportion of guns to their whole Effective and Reserve Force was 2.5. If we took the very moderate number of 100,000 men as our Reserve and Militia, our Artillery would be for the whole Force of 389,960 in the proportion of nearly 1.6 gun per 1,000 men. As to our Horse Artillery bearing a larger proportion to the Field Artillery than in any other Army in Europe, he might point out that it was true that the proportion was larger than that of the German Army, and slightly larger than that of the French Army; but he submitted that the Horse Artillery had no obligatory dependence on the Field Artillery. It was a question that depended on the circumstances of a country and the nature of its warfare. The experienced Artillery officers of the British Army were better judges of their requirements than any foreign officer could be; and he would ask how many experienced Artillerymen outside the Department had been consulted on this matter? The Horse Artillery had much closer relation to the Cavalry, with which it was so often 1515 connected, than with the Field Artillery. The Germans had 4.6 guns per 1,000 Cavalry; the English only 3.6 per 1,000 Cavalry. The Horse Artillery was required for rapid movement from one part of the field to another to strengthen an attack or to prepare the way for Cavalry charges. In the German Army lately a practice had been adopted which probably we might think it wiseto follow—namely, that of organizing a considerable body of Artillery which was called Corps Artillery. That Corps Artillery was separate and independent, and would be able in action to send aid to whatever point of a field of battle it might be required. It was the opinion of many German officers of repute also that Corps Artillery should be formed entirely of Horse Artillery, but that he thought would scarcely be possible, because no country would be able to provide a sufficient number of horses. The Field Artillery could not change ground rapidly for the purpose of strengthening an attack or preparing the way for Cavalry charges. The working complement of gunners might be carried on the limbers and waggons; but if they suffered heavy loss it took a long time for the Foot Artillery to come any distance to reinforce them. He would refer their Lordships to the testimony of Prince Hohenlohe, who had had great experience in active service on the Continent, as to the value of Horse Artillery in the field. In these days of rapid movements Artillery were required to move rapidly. We were even thinking much of Mounted Infantry; how could Field Artillery support them? It was the power of bringing up Horse Artillery at a gallop that enabled Lord Gough to complete the destruction of the Sikh army in its retreat across the Sutlej at Sobraon. Anyone who had seen Horse Artillery in the field would understand how many valuable qualities were required to fit a soldier for that service. Our Service was different from that of most other nations, spread about in every quarter of the globe. It was very often in countries little traversed by roads, where the lighter and more movable Artillery was required. Our Service was one of small armies and detachments, for which a larger proportion of Artillery was required, as it could not be subdivided like other Armies. In the present unsettled state of Europe, with a possi- 1516 bility of a demand from India or Africa, the reduction seemed untimely and a most wasteful and dangerous one, and he trusted the Government would reconsider it.
LORD ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he fully endorsed all that had fallen from the noble and gallant Lord who had just addressed their Lordships, considering that the statement just delivered deserved the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government, for the following reasons—that from the existence of short service it would take about three years to replace these skilled soldiers—that is, by equally efficient ones—whose esprit de corps would not be enhanced by being removed from the élite of their corps, as it were, to the position of ordinary artillerymen; this applies more or less cogently to the reduction of Cavalry, since a lancer or hussar is not made in a day, which is further emphasized by the short service in vogue depriving us of the efficient non-commissioned officers available to make raw recruits into efficient soldiers. The effective use of Horse Artillery was evidenced in a marked degree on the the occasion referred to by the noble and gallant Lord at Sobraon on a retreating enemy crossing, and on the opposite of the river; and considering that this action was fought 40 years since, there are not very many to tell the tale when about 10,000 gallant Seikh soldiers lost their lives. And had it been otherwise, and also not been followed by a rapid march of Cavalry and Horse Artillery, the enemy would doubtless have made a stand halfway between, or at, Lahore, and thus prevented the gates of that city being seized by Cavalry—the 9th Lancers—supported by Horse Artillery, and the city consequently taken possession of without further bloodshed. This compelled him to say that the proposed reduction of Horse Artillery, coupled with the 24 Horse Artillery lieutenant-colonels, a few young subaltern officers were a poor substitute for the more experienced officers reduced; and, necessarily, the proposed reductions were the height of folly, considering the present state of Europe, since that was not the time, or desirable, to thus hastily part with such efficient soldiers as those composing what might be termed a portion of the élite of the Army. The deficiency of Horse Artillery was felt by the German Army in the late War, and was now 1517 being made good, and was further evidence for the retention of that efficient force, which could not be replaced in a day; and although not admitted, Parliaments and Governments acted as if money only had to be voted to produce an efficient Army, which notion led, and would lead, to a further waste of public money, the real economy being in the reduction of the civilian element of the Army and Navy.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord HARRIS)said, that the great experience and knowledge of the noble and gallant Lord who had introduced the subject (Lord Napier of Magdala) no doubt well entitled all he said on military affairs to the highest respect. The noble and gallant Lord, however, would not expect him to offer any opinion with regard to the proportion which our Artillery ought to bear to other arms of the Service as compared with the proportions in other armies. This was a technical matter, on which it would be unwise in him to enter into competition with the noble and gallant Lord. But he could not, in his present position, admit that the proposed changes merited some of the terms that had been applied to them, such as unnecessary, wasteful, and dangerous. He knew—and he thought the noble and gallant Lord himself must know—that the changes could not have been undertaken and brought forward by the Secretary of State without the closest consideration and full conference with his Military Advisers. He could assure the noble Lord that the closest attention had been given to the whole question; and he must also say that the noble and gallant Lord painted the reduction—as the change was in part simply a conversion—in rather too high a colour. The noble and gallant Lord seemed to be under a misapprehension as to the exact extent of the reduction. The actual reduction of the batteries was, in fact, only two; but there was a further conversion, he admitted, of 16 guns which were sent into store in order that these batteries should be on a peace footing, and not on a war footing. The actual reduction was, therefore, 12; in the other eight cases the batteries were placed on a peace instead of a war footing. This course was adopted, he understood, by most of the Continental armies when they put the Army Corps 1518 Artillery Establishment upon a peace footing. As regarded the officers referred to in the Question, there was a reduction, undoubtedly, of 24 lieutenant colonels; and this was because the proportion in that rank was far higher than it had been for a long time in the Artillery, and than it was in any other branch of the Army. He believed, however, it was in contemplation to reduce that reduction, to a certain extent, by increasing the number of subalterns. As regarded the Artillerymen, there was not, taking the whole Force, a reduction; but there was an increase of something like 300 men. There was a reduction as regarded Field and Horse Artillery; but a considerable increase as regarded Garrison Artillery, making the increase in the whole something like 300. The changes which were contemplated would not take place until the commencement of the next financial year. He could assure the noble and gallant Lord that these changes had been contemplated solely with the idea of placing the country in a better military position than it had ever occupied before, in order that two Army Corps fully equipped might be placed in the field, and that our garrisons at home and abroad might be thoroughly provided for.