HL Deb 12 May 1885 vol 298 cc302-23

Order of the Day read for resuming the adjourned Debate on the Duke of Argyll's Motion; viz., That the circular despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Russian Representatives abroad dated 21st November 1864, be reprinted

Debate resumed accordingly

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

My Lords, when we were interrupted last night by a painful incident, I had come very nearly to the conclusion of the observations which I had intended to address to the House, and I was approaching the practical result which I was desirous of impressing on the mind of Parliament and the country. Before I proceed to that, however, I wish to mention two circumstances. One is, that since I put this Notice on the Paper, and, indeed, only yesterday morning, I received a letter from a Gentleman whose name is well known to many Members of this and the other House, and who has been long connected with the Diplomatic Service at the Foreign Office. I mean Mr. Jerningham, the Member for Berwick. He has just published a circular containing a short prècis or abstract of the public documents connected with the Central Asian Question, which, as far as I have had time to look over it, appears not to be coloured by any political feeling. That Gentleman volunteered this statement to me— I have directly shown by the aid of these documents that all Russian action since 1864 has been entirely based on the principles expounded by Prince Gortchakoff in that particular Circular. Another circumstance I wish to mention is, that I find the numbers of the populations of the Provinces of our Indian Empire, annexed within the last 45 years, which I quoted last night, and which were suggested to me by the Secretary of State for India, were erroneous. The figures should stand thus—Oude, 11,000,000; the Punjab, with its warlike population and great resources, 17,000,000; Scinde, also with a very warlike people, 2,000,000. Those figures, I believe, are pretty nearly accurate. Now, my Lords, in the observations I addressed to the House last night, I was mainly concerned with the past, and I endeavoured to show that Russia for the last 20 years had been acting in Central Asia on the formidable doctrine she had laid down in this particular document—namely, that all half-civilized States were to be swallowed up within her frontiers, and that she would only contemplate diplomatic and peaceful relations with those States whose populations were settled in agriculture and commerce, and leaving it entirely in the mind of Russia how she would look upon any particular State, and whether she would place it in the one category or in the other. That is the principle on which she is proceeding; that is the principle which has now brought her direct from the Caspian to the borders of Afghanistan. Now, my Lords, for the future, the question naturally arises how will Russia look upon the Kingdom of Afghanistan? Is that a Kingdom which answers to her description of a population engaged in agricultural and commercial pursuits, and with a settled and stable Government? My Lords, no man knoweth. So far as Russian advances are concerned, she is absolutely free to put Afghanistan in the one category or in the other. That shows the formidable position in which we are now placed. Well, I believe no man can accuse the Afghans, as the populations of the other Khanates of Central Asia may justly be accused, of being a predatory Power, or a people living by the Slave Trade. The population of Afghanistan has hitherto consisted of tribes not unlike the old Highlanders in Scotland; they have often carried on internecine warfare between themselves; perhaps making raids upon each other now and then; but certainly have never lived, as the populations of other Khanates, upon robbery and the Slave Trade. Still, Afghanistan can hardly be described in the language of this Russian Circular as a State whose populations are given up solely to agriculture and commerce with a settled and stable Government. Therefore, my Lords, I say that the declaration of Russia leaves us in a most formidable position as regards the Kingdom of Afghanistan; but on one supposition she will be bound by that principle, and that supposition is this—that we become answerable for Afghanistan. In that case, of course, Afghanistan comes under our ægis and protection, and we are the Power which will undertake to get from Russia those obligations which she will only trust to a settled Government. Here, however, comes the crux of the difficulty. Are we prepared to say that we are ready to undertake for Afghanistan all those obligations that are due to Russia? That is the position of difficulty with which this Government is called upon to deal with in the future settlement of this grave question. Now, my noble Friend the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) has just asked my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) a Question which he has declined to answer in the meantime—a Question which I confess I am not curious to ask—whether Russia will undertake to promise to respect the fron- tier which, may be laid down? Why, my Lords, that is not a question of paramount importance. Of course, Russia will respect the frontier in times of peace; but the question is, what will Russia do in time of war? War dissolves not only all promises, but all Treaties. We must practically now consider ourselves as bordering on Russia, and we must look to our own defences upon that principle; and I am not at all sure that we are in a worse position, even if we are conterminous with Russia. I remember the late Mr. Cobden used always to argue—perhaps your Lordships will not consider him a great authority on these matters, but still he was a great man, and knew a great deal about them—I remember he used to argue with myself and in public that it would be much better for this country that we should be conterminous with Russia, because, unquestionably, unless in the new arrangement which my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs concludes, he secures a complete control over Afghanistan, we shall be in perpetual danger of quarrels on the frontier, for which we shall be practically responsible, and which it will be extremely difficult to restrain. Therefore, my Lords, so far from my remarks being intended to allay the fears or calm the mind of the public, or to lull them to sleep, I wish them to see the extent of the risk and the real magnitude of the dangers that lie before us. The real truth of the matter is this—and it is a very formidable one—we have lost in Asia our hitherto insular position. We hardly realize in this country how completely hitherto our position has been insular, not only in England, but all over the world. In England, of course, as Tennyson says, we are "compassed by the inviolate sea." In India, hitherto, we have been compassed on one of its sides by the inviolate mountains; and it is a curious fact that most of our Colonies have been hitherto purely insular. There is one great exception, and that is the magnificent Colony of Canada. I can hardly explain the strange impression that is made on a subject of the Queen when, for the first time, in Canada he comes in contact with a geographical position in which the English Dominion is no longer insular. Standing under Brock's Monument, erected where the Niagara forces its way into the Lake Ontario, I recognized for the first time what it is to have a Dominion which is not insular. There is another place in Canada where the same experience can be gained—namely, on the battlements of Quebec, on those heights where Wolfe and Montcalm lost their lives for their respective countries. There one feels the interest which the Duke of Wellington felt in the existence of a military frontier in the event of a war between Canada and the United States. Well, my Lords, we are now no longer insular, we are now in the position of having lost our insularity in India. We are there now in the geographical position of a Continental Power, and what I want to point out is this—that being there so, we must now submit to all the burdens and all the necessities which fall upon other Continental Powers. After all, it is the position in which all the other States of Europe have long been—France, Belgium, Holland, and even Italy, although she has a natural frontier in the great barrier of the Alps. All other Powers, including Russia herself, are compelled to look after their own frontiers, and to contemplate the possibility of war and invasion, and we must do the same thing in India. We ought not, of course, to depend upon the promises of Russia; we ought not to depend upon the Treaties made with Russia, because, in the event of war, Treaties are of little worth; but we ought to depend upon our own resources, and upon the foresight with which we can make our preparations as a great Military Power. Now, the question naturally arises—where is our frontier to be? It would be presumptuous in me if I were to give any advice or express any opinion upon that point. It is a question for military experts; but I think I shall be borne out by the illustrious Duke whom I see on the Cross Benches (the Duke of Cambridge) when I say that in England, unfortunately, we have no one great authority on these subjects to whom all military men will bow. We have no Moltke, as they have in Germany. Well, there are great differences of opinion upon this subject; but still I have no doubt that, after due consultation among the ablest men we have, and looking at the military and political considerations of the case, it will be found possible for us to prepare a military frontier which shall be practically impregnable. But there are one or two—certainly two—political considerations which seem to me predominant in the case. I apprehend I cannot go far wrong when I say that it is a first principle in regard to such great fortifications that we shall not be outflanked, or flanked at all, by great populations whose fidelity to us is doubtful; and the second is, that we shall be as near as possible to our base of operations. Now, if, in the course of a short time, we are able to consolidate our relations with Afghanistan—if, remembering how, under the late Government, we proved our power, and how, under the present Government, we have proved our goodwill, they are satisfied that their interests are bound up with ours, and that we desire the independence of their country and the practice of a settled life and civilization amongst them, I see no reason why the programme of the late Government—sought, I think, too soon to be fulfilled—may not be fulfilled; why our officers should not be heartily received in those cities where they have hitherto been received only to be murdered, and why the Afghan people should not see what advantages they will derive from their forces being disciplined and their fortifications being strengthened by the science and bravery of Europeans. My Lords, under these conditions, I believe that we shall be safe. That, I feel, is the only alternative to which we can safely trust. I agree with noble Lords opposite, if that is considered their special doctrine, that we should not trust to the promises of Russia. We should establish for ourselves, as Continental Powers have been obliged to do, a great military frontier, so that we may rest in peace. I have made these observations with no Party object. I see a most dissatisfied and unrestful state of the public mind with regard to India; I feel it myself; every man must feel it in the present condition of the world; and I think it a most dangerous thing that the public mind should be continually in this condition. It reacts upon the Indian people. I desire to see this country in such a position that there shall not be a series of panics and agitations in respect of our danger in this matter; and I say that no number of millions of money within the number that could possibly be re- quired would be too much for us to expend in restoring perfect confidence to the public mind in England and perfect confidence to the public mind in India that we shall defend our Eastern Empire to the last.

Moved, "That the circular despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Russian Representatives abroad, dated 21st November 1864, be reprinted."—(The Duke of Argyll.)

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

My Lords, the speech to which the House has just listened is one which I confess has given me a great amount of satisfaction, because it deals with the subject in a statesmanlike spirit, and without any of the partizanship, which I, for one, most heartily desire should be withdrawn from the consideration of this question and others relating to India. There is nothing that the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll) has said to which we on this side of the House will take exception. Though he has alluded to the past, he has made no hostile comments with reference to it, and he has refrained from discussing the course which the Government are now following. I shall not either say anything about the conduct of the Government in connection with the negotiations with Russia. We have been promised Papers upon the Afghan Question by the Government; and though far from saying that the Government have dealt with the question in a manner satisfactory to myself and those who think with me, it would not become us, nor would it be useful, to enter upon a discussion at present on these topics. The noble Duke, in that part of his speech which he delivered yesterday, spoke of the blindness of European statesmen after Russia's views had been placed before them by the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff. But the noble Duke might have referred to earlier documents than that. In 1838, Prince Nesselrode, in his correspondence with Lord Palmerston, expressed very much the same view as was subsequently expressed by Prince Gortchakoff—namely, that there was no intention on the part of Russia to extend her Dominions, or to interfere in any way with the Indian Dominions of Great Britain; that Russia, on the contrary, desired that these Dominions should remain in a tranquil and happy condition. I am afraid that Lord Palmerston answered diplomatically, apparently ac- cepting the reasons given, though he did not really receive them, as satisfactory; for he wrote to Lord Clarendon subsequently, as if he suspected that certain intrigues carried on by Russian agents in Central Asia were carried on, not at the will of those officers themselves, but by the instructions of their Government. I pass on, however, only remarking that, though the Circular of Prince Grortchakoff was all that the noble Duke described it to be, and not-withstanding repeated assurances from Prince Nesselrode downwards that the objects of Russia were not what they seemed to be, yet she has been doing what she professed not to wish to do, though I admit that, in many respects, she may have been compelled to do what she has done. That seems to me a special reason why the statesmen of this country should be very firm in their policy. I do not agree with the noble Puke that there was that blindness or that stupidity on the part of our politicians of which he spoke; but there was a hand-to-mouth policy; there was a desire to escape from the fatal day, and to put off by excuses the necessity for securing a permanent and satisfactory defence of our territories in India. There was not, at that time, any necessity to protect India from invasion, for invasion was not the object of Russia at the time; but what was necessary was to protect India from the belief that England was giving way before a stronger Power, and from the unsettlement and discomfort caused to its Government and people by the approach of a Power whose strength was magnified by distance, and which was advancing by rapid strides. The Russian advance has been like that of the tide, and has now reached a point where we must build up a sea wall, so to speak, to prevent further encroachment. I think it would have been far better if we had taken earlier steps, and made it thoroughly understood by the Russian Government what she might not do, and that she was approaching a Power thoroughly resolved to defend her rights. Warnings were given us long ago in emphatic terms by those entitled to be listened to. Sir Henry Rawlinson was never insensible to the inevitable character of the Russian approach. Warnings were given of the character of the Power described by the noble Duke; and of the necessity, when civilized and uncivilized nations come together in the way in which they did in Central Asia, that the uncivilized should fall back before an inevitable advance. The un-uncivilized people had to give up their raids and robbery, or, at all events, they were not to advance into the territories taken by Russia, because, if they did, it was an excuse for Russia taking possession of their country. It is rather a common-place illustration; but Sir Bartle Frere speaks of Humpty-Dumpty, when once overthrown, of whom it is said that not all the King's horses nor all the King's men can set him up again. There is no recovery for these uncivilized States—once overthrown, and subjection to the aggressive Power follows in due course. It is only justice to the men who wrote on the subject to call attention now to what they have said. We find Sir Bartle Frere in 1873, in giving warning about Russia, recognizing to the fullest extent the impulse which was driving her forward. He says— The result of all this is that Russia will go on, whether her Government wish it or not, till something stops her, and what will stop her? Nothing that I can see except an impassable barrier, such as the Himalayas, or a political barrier, such as finding herself on a frontier which she cannot pass without fighting an equally powerful nation on the other side, and when that powerful nation is civilized and able and willing to give her honest hearing and reasonable redress with regard to frontier discussions and to require equal justice from her. As to a neutral zone, about which we have heard so much, if it consists of an uncivilized country, it is useless, because it will only give ground for attack. On the subject of a neutral zone, there had been communications between Lord Clarendon and the Liberal Government of the day; but it is due to both to say that, in their view, the neutral zone was to be something beyond Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan was to be always under the influence of England, and England was always to be in a position to take steps in Afghanistan for its preservation. Afghanistan was never treated as a neutral or independent zone, but as a zone to be armed, if necessary, and to be placed in a position to resist the advance of Russia, and Russia itself has acknowledged this position. Sir Bartle Frere recognized what it was that made Russia advance. He said— What is it that impels Russia to advance? We are pretty well agreed that the impulse is the same as that which impelled ourselves from Calcutta to Peshawur. We were a strong, united, aggressive, and growing Power, in contact with States so disunited and demoralized that their power was paralyzed, and they had no inherent vigour and capacity for resistance, still less for growth. And then he went on to say that the men in whose hands the military power of Russia was did very much as our Governors General did in India, who, in spite of constant opposition and the strongest orders from home that there should be no further annexation, did, nevertheless, annex, for, in their view, it became a natural necessity, and when the annexations were made it became too late for the Government at home in England, as for Russia, to prevent it. That was foreseen by those writers who were in favour of arresting the progress of Russia at an early period without war. They said that Russia was driven forward by an absolute necessity, and would very soon be brought into contact with us. I suppose that no one believes that Russia has rushed blindly forward; for certainly she has taken occasion for advancing when our hands were full; and, perhaps, if the necessity was upon her, it was only natural that she should do so. What hindered us from taking steps was not from ignorance of the opinions of our statesmen, but I believe very much in part from the necessities of our Indian finance, and also from the feeling that Russia would not advance so rapidly as the experts fancied, and the belief that the day was far distant when the expense of making preparations would be called for. There was also a feeling at home against spending money too long in advance. And so, in like manner, it was only under pressure that we were doing in these recent days what we ought to have done long ago for the defence of our coaling stations. When the finances of India were for along time disorganized, it was natural that the expense of fortifications should be put off as long as possible. But we have, however, now taken steps. We are carrying our railway to Quetta with the object that we should be as near as possible to our base, in time and facilities, if not in space. If we are at Quetta we are near the important position in Afghanistan. Being at Quetta, it is obvious we have a policy upon which must be founded the question of the frontier. It has always been an object that wherever the frontier of Russia was, it should be as far as possible from our frontier in India Proper. It is a curious thing that long ago Prince Nesselrode expressed a desire that we should keep the frontiers of India Proper and Russia as far as possible apart, because there might be danger if they touched. I consider this, as it were, an outlying frontier, and I trust it will lead to carrying on a railway to Candahar. If you get a railway from Candahar to India, you will have one of the most civilizing of all processes, and a means by which the people of Afghanistan may bring their produce into the markets of India, while Central Asia would have the same advantage. But the railway is also a very important movement from a strategical point of view, and I quite agree with the opinion that we should not draw our enemy down into the plains of India if we can possibly avoid it. Now, I wish to say how gratifying it has been to see the loyalty which the Native Chiefs and Princes and people in India have displayed. I had the satisfaction in 1879 of returning thanks to them for their offers of assistance. At that time they expressed the desire to share with us our dangers, and they are now showing, as then, their love for England, and their appreciation of the civilizing influences which this country bestows upon India. Let, then, Parties at home meet this question in the spirit which has actuated the noble Duke who introduced this subject; and I would say let us have union in what we are about to do with respect to India. I hope there is not a man in this country who wishes to give up that country. If India were a burden to us, to desert the country and give it up to confusion and anarchy after all we have inflicted upon it, and after the pledges we have given to it, would seem to me to be a fatal and wicked policy. But India is a source of wealth; it is one of our best customers, and is a growing one. It is one of those countries upon which you may have to rely for food, and it is united to us by many ties. It is the joy of many in India that they are united to England. Do not let us betray those who are trusting us, but resolve that we will defend them. I do not wish to deal with this matter in a Party spirit; but I desire to point out that when the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Northbrook) was at the head of the Government of India, he wrote strongly on the subject of the Russians arriving at Merv, and said that whenever that time came, it would be time for English officers to be at Herat, and to make intimate associations with the Afghans. Like terms were also used by the noble Earl now the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby), and in the Papers on Central Asia it will be found how strongly he wrote when he told Count Shouvaloff that the only thing that could lead to the advance of English troops towards Central Asia would be the advance of Russia to Merv. Russia came to Merv, and Her Majesty's Government began to take certain steps which I will not enter upon now. The question now before us is this—We are becoming practically conterminous with a great Power; let us treat that Power with respect as a great Power. It is no use bandying charges or making imputations on one side or the other; but it is necessary that for true friendship there shall be complete independence. If we are to be a friendly nation with Russia, it must be as an independent and as a strong nation. Russia must understand that she is not dealing with a people who are for ever to give way to her, even if she be impelled forward by necessity, and that there are necessities resting upon us as great as those laid upon her—to defend the interests of India and to protect the honour of England.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, I most cordially reciprocate the feeling which has been expressed by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) that this great subject should be treated as far as possible apart from Party politics. The noble Viscount has given us a conspicuous proof in the speech he has delivered that the question can be so treated. I shall not trouble the House at any length upon the subject of the Russian advances, because they have been so fully explained by the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Argyll). But, at this juncture, I cannot help throwing back my memory to a period 30 years ago, when I had the honour to represent this country at St. Petersburg, and when I had many discussions with Prince Gortchakoff upon this subject. It now strikes me as very remarkable what an immense change has taken place in the whole of the affairs of Central Asia since that period. Such conversations as I had with Prince Gortchakoff at that time related to positions which really seemed then to be so distant from our Indian Empire, that they formed matter for interesting conversation rather than matter of political importance and real anxiety. At the same time, as long ago as in 1856–7, the question of a neutral zone was mooted between myself and Prince Gortchakoff. The noble Viscount was quite correct in saying that it was an entire mistake to suppose that the Government of this country contemplated for one moment, or at any time, that Afghanistan was to be a neutral zone. It has always been, and still is, a cardinal point of our policy, that Afghanistan is to be outside the sphere of Russian influence, and within the sphere of our influence. The question of the neutral zone, which is now entirely put aside, referred to territories further North. With regard to the causes which have impelled Russia forward, there is no doubt that the general principles laid down in the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff correctly described the motive of the policy of the Russian Government; and the Prince, I remember, described to me, in language very similar to that which he wrote many years before in his Circular, what had impelled the Russians in their first conquests in this direction. That being the policy which Russia had adopted, partly through necessity and partly, perhaps, from design, and largely, no doubt, in consequence of the ambition of its officers, the noble Viscount justly observes that there must come a time when that continual advance must find some check. Now, the noble Viscount seemed to think that there might have been on the part of previous Governments a certain amount of blindness with regard to Russia, or a desire to put off the evil day. That desire, I suppose, is common to Governments as well as to individuals, and it may have had a certain part in the policy pursued. But I think there were better reasons than that. It is sometimes unwise to go to a distance in order to meet dangers before they arrive in our vicinity. We saw a conspicuous instance of the danger of such a policy in our first war in Afghanistan. That war was waged long before the necessity for such interference. We were undoubtedly excited prematurely by the appearance of Russia at a great distance, and we plunged ourselves into difficulties, the results of which are still felt and which have greatly prejudiced our whole relations with Afghanistan. That was the mistake made by seeing the danger at a remote distance, and endeavouring to meet it by action which was premature. Of course, it is a matter of judgment and opinion as to when the exact moment of action should have been, and what were the precise measures which it would have been wise to adopt. It is obvious, however, that it is essential for our safety in India that our defensive position should not be too far from our base. We have a frontier extending many hundreds of miles, and it is essential that we should not put ourselves in a position where we should have to defend ourselves at a point far removed from our base. If we did we should have to contend with difficulties which are obvious even to the civilian. The noble Duke behind me came to a conclusion which is precisely the conclusion which I must say I have come to myself. It is not one which I have arrived at to-day; because, many years ago, I discussed the subject with Lord Lawrence, and urged that we should require an armed frontier for India, whenever the Russians approached within touch of that country. It is impossible that we can any longer believe, or have the satisfaction of knowing, that we are in what I may call an insular position in India. We are no longer in that position; and, as my noble Friend behind me justly observed, it is our duty to accept the new situation, and to prepare ourselves speedily to deal with it. The noble Viscount opposite spoke of the indisposition there had been to respond to the advice of such men as Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle Frere. I may think that they took somewhat too alarmist a view; but I have always thought there was too much indifference to the fact that Russia was approaching India, and to the change in the position of our Indian Empire which would gradually make us a Continental nation, with all the dangers and difficulties inseparable from the situation. To deal with the new situation, it was necessary to make a beginning of our defensive operations; and I requested my noble Friend behind me (the Marquess of Ripon), when Viceroy, to prepare a careful plan of defence, on the best military authority in India, relating to the frontier, extending from Pshawur to the Indus Valley Railway, with an estimate of the probable expense. Such a plan has been prepared, and has been submitted to my Council, which has, your Lordships know, control in matters of finance; the project has been approved, and authority has been given for the expenditure of a sum of £5,000,000 on frontier railways and military roads, including the Quetta Railway, which will cost something like £2,000,000 of that sum. I must not be understood as limiting the expenditure to £5,000,000; but that, it is estimated, will be the least sum required for the railways and military roads which the best military authorities have declared to be essential; and it may be found, on further examination, that further works will have to be undertaken. I think it is a matter, and I know that Lord Dufferin thinks it is a matter, for serious consideration, whether there should not be strong fortresses on that line so as to give our Army support. If it be thought that these fortresses are necessary, there ought, of course, to be no unreasonable delay in constructing them. It is our plain duty to get the best military advice that we can, and to act upon that advice without precipitation or alarm, or undue haste, but seriously to take in hand the thorough construction of such a frontier as may calm the public mind in India, as well as in this country. It is essential that the public mind in India should not be disturbed on this subject, but that they should feel that the Government have taken all the measures that are requisite for the safety of our Empire there, and that, having taken them, we can afford to abide the result. My own view is that we ought to be in such a position that we are prepared not only for the most favourable, but also for the least favourable, circumstances, and base our plans of defence upon that. For example, I consider that our frontier defences ought to be such as that we can defend ourselves if Afghanistan is unfriendly to us. If Afghanistan is friendly, and with good policy I think it may be and ought to be friendly, it is, of course, a great advantage. But it is a country which is very loosely held by its Rulers, and it is impossible to tell, in the course of time, what circumstances might arise, and we might unfortunately find Afghanistan not so friendly as we could wish. In that case, our defence might have to be based on a strictly defensive system within our own lines. But we ought to be also in a position to take the offensive if need be. One thing is certain—that we ought not to found our policy on the notion that we should construct a frontier line in Central Asia, for which this country would be entirely responsible, several hundreds of miles distant from India. Of course, by an alliance with the Afghans, we must undertake a considerable responsibility for their frontier; and we hope that a satisfactory frontier line will be drawn between Russian and Afghan territory. It may eventually be necessary that some of our officers should be permanently stationed on that frontier; and at the present moment, as your Lordships are aware, two British officers are actually in Herat with the full consent and desire of the Ameer. That, of itself, shows what a good state of feeling now exists between the Ameer and ourselves, and that on his part no obstacles will be interposed in the way of any arrangement which may be desirable. The schemes which are put forward to the effect that we should make Herat a great Indian fortress, to be held by British and Indian troops at a great distance from our frontier, and among a population not under our direct influence, would involve us in great and serious dangers; but, on the other hand, we shall take steps to strengthen the Ameer's position at Herat, and to put the fortifications there in a condition to afford a reasonable amount of security. That is a very different thing from making Herat an English frontier fortress. I thank the House for the attention with which it has listened to me, and I trust, my Lords, that this discussion will not be without advantage, when it is seen that, notwithstanding our political contests and differences on other points, on the question of the defence of India against all comers and the maintenance of our Indian Empire, there is an entire agreement and an absolute unanimity among all Parties in this country.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, there has been so much in the speeches which have been delivered, in which all your Lordships must agree, that it might perhaps seem superfluous to continue this debate; and I do not wish to go again over the ground which has been so well traversed by my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Argyll) and my noble Friend behind me (Viscount Cranbrook), or to add to the sentiments which I could not hope to express in language half so good as they have employed. But there are one or two matters which have been stated from the Bench opposite to-night which, without departing from the pacific line on which this debate has been projected by the noble Duke, and to which I think he has on the whole faithfully adhered, I cannot let pass without some observation. And the first observation I wish to make is one which, but for the respect I have for the Order of the House, I should have made at an earlier period in reply to the noble Earl the Leader of the House (Earl Granville), as to the proper conduct of an Opposition in a crisis such as the present. I do not wish, after what has happened, to go into contentious matters; but the noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which we cannot permit to pass unnoticed—namely, that it is the duty of an Opposition not to canvass or condemn the conduct of the Government, if, by so doing, it should have the effect of discouraging our friends and allies in other parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to. The noble Earl must remember that, if we are of opinion that the course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government has mismanaged, that faults are being committed, and dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil. Our absolute Sovereign is the people of this country; and it is they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief that is going on. If we do not appeal to them, we can appeal to no one; if they do not interfere, no one can interfere. You have a form of government in many points of view purely democratic, and you must take it with the incidents that naturally adhere to it, and one of those incidents is publicity of deliberation. The authority which decides, in the first instance, is the Cabinet, and it decides in secret, and it is right in maintaining that secrecy to the utmost. But the authority to which you must appeal from the Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in the open field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal fully and frankly with all the subjects which must form the basis of their determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback, as far as it goes, to popular government; but it is a drawback which you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communication between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it, and may be adversely affected by it. You might as well say you would allow a trial to go wrong, because the counsel hesitated to tell the jury the whole truth as it appeared to him, lest someone outside should be offended or discouraged by the language used. I, therefore, demur entirely to the general Constitutional doctrine which I understood the noble Earl to lay down. I do not wish to enter into the particular application of it to this topic, because that would be transgressing the limits that we have laid down for ourselves in this debate. But I think that the noble Duke's argument showed an undue prepossession in favour of Russia in regard to the promises which she has made. The promises which she made on the subject of Khiva, on the subject of Merv, on the subject of the advance on the Caspian shore, were, according to the noble Duke, not promises of that categorical character that you can say that an absolute Convention or Treaty had been broken, but they were, I think, promises by which a man in private life would hold himself bound; and that if Russia has not held herself bound, it was not due to the fact that the promises were not in themselves important, but that Russia has found herself overborne by those forces of necessity to which frequent reference has been made in the course of this debate. I do not believe that the despatch written by Prince Gortchakoff in the year 1864 has taken the life and meaning out of all the promises which Russia has since 1864 again and again made. You cannot hold that doctrine concerning them all. The only other observation I would desire to make is as to the important speech of the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for India (the Earl of Kimberley). With the sentiments which inspired that speech I absolutely agree. We all feel that the defence of India, whether in justice to England or to India, is a vital matter on which no shortcomings can be allowed. But I regretted to hear the limits which it seemed to me that the noble Earl fixed to that defence. He spoke of fortresses at Peshawur, and on the line of the Indus. Is the defence of India to be carried no further than that?

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I mentioned Peshawur and the Indus as an indication of the general line to be defended. But, of course, there is Quetta, and I by no means intended to bind myself to those limits.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am glad to have been the means of eliciting that correction, because I think it will tend to remove many misapprehensions. My belief is that, if such a state of things arose as the noble Earl seemed to foreshadow—namely, that of a hostile Power in possession of the mountains overlooking the Valley of the Indus, and we in fortresses along the Indus to resist them—such a state of things would reduce us to the most serious difficulty and peril in India. India must be defended beyond the mountains; but what is the precise point at which the defence shall take place, it is not fitting for us, in an Assembly of civilians like this, to affirm. I agree with the noble Earl the Secretary of State for India, that the prospect of defending Herat by British troops is not one which seems to the British nonmilitary mind very attractive, or very feasible. It may always be possible for us, with assistance in the shape of arms and officers, to assist the Ameer in defending that place himself; but to occupy it and defend it ourselves, I confess, seems to me a dangerous undertaking. But it is a long distance from Herat to the Valley of the Indus, and there are places—Quetta, the Khojak Pass, and Candahar, in that part of the country—somewhere among which will be found in future the place destined to be the only satisfactory centre of the defensive works which we must erect to sustain our power. I hope we shall do all we can to conciliate that power and keep the Ameer of Afghanistan with tie, and to help him to the utmost of our power to defend his country, while, at the same time, defending India; but do not let the desire of his friendship lead us into either of those two mistakes, either in making ourselves responsible for any of the excesses which the wild tribes under his control may commit upon his Western Frontier, nor, on the other hand, can we make any susceptibilities which any Afghan Ruler may feel a reason for abstaining from defending, and defending adequately, those positions we may consider absolutely necessary for the strength of our own position. I believe that the Government are now—I wish they had done it earlier—pursuing the right way. They are making the Railway. All our experience of modern times has shown how hard it is to sustain an Army upon communications conducted merely by camels and other beasts of burden. We have felt this want bitterly in Africa, and we have also felt it in Asia. We ought to push our Railway as far forward as we can with reference to the position of the country and the possibility of guarding it; because it is with the Railway that our communications with our base can be most usefully made. Otherwise, any operations we may undertake will be very critical. The business for the present is to urge forward the Railway, and when that has reached a certain degree of advancement, I sincerely hope the Indian Government will devote itself to the business of making strong our position above the mountains; and when it undertakes that task, let no desire to put off the evil day, let no desire to balance the Budget, let no desire to respect the susceptibilities of the tribes around us prevent it from giving security to that vast frontier, which will prevent for ever the possibility of our having to fight in the plains of India itself.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

Of course, your Lordships will see that it is impossible for me to enter into the details of military plans. I seem, however, to have been misunderstood in what I have already said; and in order to avoid misapprehension I should like to repeat that though, perchance, Quetta, with the Pisheen Valley, may be regarded as the outworks of our defence, they must by no means be sup- posed to represent the entire scope of our operations. These are matters, however, which must be fully considered; and it is for the Military Authorities to say precisely where should be the different portions of the defence, and what amount of strength should be given to it.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I think it is not superfluous if I presume to thank, not only on the part of my Colleagues, but, I think, on the part of the whole House, my noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) for having given us an opportunity for this debate. It is one of the most important and valuable discussions I have heard for a long time in this House. Not only has it been admirable, but I believe not one word has escaped from anyone this evening disrespectful or unconciliatory with regard to Russia. On the other hand, it has been of immense value in showing, from their frankness, that all Parties are unanimous as to the reasons which exist for the necessity of defending India at all hazards—reasons which Russia herself would be the first to admit as being perfectly right in a spirited nation to undertake. The tone between the two Parties exhibited this evening with regard to this question is one which I believe will have a most important, almost a vital influence in India itself in encouraging that country to know that she may be sure of the united efforts of this country to defend it from any danger which may really arise. I have only one word to say as to the Constitutional doctrine of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury). I agree with him in the general doctrine that it is the duty of the Opposition jealously to observe the conduct of the Government, to criticize it when criticism is deserving, to turn it out if it is necessary to do so, in order to stop a harmful system of policy. The only thing that I did was to protest against—and I think rightly to protest—the contention whether it is judicious, in moments when the Government is hopeful of a perfectly peaceful solution of a complicated subject, that a tone should be adopted not quite the tone adopted this evening by the Leaders of the Opposition, without the facts in their possession, and that they should take a view damaging excessively the position of the Government as representing the coun- try, and representing them as humiliated before another country, because both sides have made some concessions in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding.

Motion (on Question) agreed to.