RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 11 May 1885)

THE DUKE OE ARGYLL,

who had given Notice to call the attention of the House to the Circular Despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Russian Representatives abroad, dated 21st November 1864, said: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of calling the 110 attention of the House to a document of very great and curious interest which is much too little known generally in this country. Indeed, I find upon inquiry that there are a great many noble Lords who do not know where to see it or where to find it; and, therefore, with the permission of the House, I shall change my Notice to one moving that the document be reprinted and circulated among the Members of the House. It was printed in the Indian Blue Book, No. 2, Central Asia, 1873. Very few persons appear to take any notice of it, and when it was taken notice of in publications of great authority, it was, in my opinion, entirely misrepresented. And yet, so important is that document, that I will venture to say that, within the four corners of that one Paper, you will find laid down by the Russian Government every one of the principles and axioms of policy on which they have acted during the last 15 or 20 years, and which have now brought us to the present circumstances of grave importance. Before calling your attention to this Paper, I wish to say a few words to explain my purpose in doing so. It is only a fortnight to-day since the Prime Minister addressed to the other House of Parliament a speech which was universally taken as portending a very grave event—namely, the suspension of amicable relations with one of the greatest Powers of Europe. When I read that speech I confess I could not help saying to myself—Here we are once more in the rapids of another Crimean War, and this time without a single ally in Europe, and with a great many European faces turned towards us with an expression of angry suspicion. I rejoice most sincerely that by the efforts of my noble Friend (Earl Granville) and his Colleagues that danger at least appears for the present to be turned away. I hope we may take the announcement made by my noble Friend to-night as portending, on the contrary, that, so far as that particular incident is concerned, which was the immediate danger a fortnight ago, the danger is greatly mitigated, if not averted; but my noble Friend will fully admit that the grave differences which were in question between England and Russia three weeks ago still weigh and press on the public mind. Well, my Lords, that is not the only point on which 111 anxiety as to foreign affairs exists. The question of Egypt is full of danger for the pacific relations of the Great Powers of the world; but my noble Friend promised in a few days a statement on that question. What I wish to point out to the House is that there is in the country generally, on all sides of politics, a sense of dissatisfaction, if not of alarm. "We are not sure how far peace has been secured by the concessions which have been made. What, then, is the condition of our affairs at home, when such is the state of the public mind about foreign affairs? We are about to enter upon a great General Election under entirely new conditions as regards the constituencies of this country. I do not wish to make any forecast as to the effect of the new democracy upon the foreign policy of this country; but this I must say—that democracies are not generally of an eminently pacific character. They are not, perhaps, so inclined to undertake wars for ambition as great conquering Sovereigns; but, on the other hand, they are more apt to get into war out of mere sentiment and emotion. My Lords, I cannot help pointing out to the House how rapidly this element of emotion is increasing in its influence upon our foreign affairs. It is impossible to have followed the course which has been taken by my noble Friend below me (Earl Granville) on the Egyptian Question—he will pardon me for saying so—without feeling that it has been largely influenced by the Press, and by the predominant feeling expressed in the Press of the popular mind. They have advanced with the wave of passion, and they have retreated when there has been a loud and popular agitation; and I am afraid from what I have heard that I shall have to express my deep regret at the further retreat which they are now about to make in their Egyptian policy. There are, my Lords, many more instances of this emotional effect on the foreign policy of this country, the increasing influence of the Press and of the electric telegraph. We feel it in our private life, the electric telegraph makes ns sit by the beds of our dying friends, in war we hear the groans of the wounded, we see the vultures feeding on the dead, and in diplomacy, so great is the power of the Press in interviewing prominent men in different countries of the world that we hear the irritated wranglings of 112 the most secret diplomacy. My Lords, under these circumstances, going to new constituencies, it seems to be the duty of public men that they should keep their heads cool, and give to the public of their best, in respect of their superior knowledge and information upon the facts of history which are telling on the present. That is the reason why I desire to direct the attention of your Lordships to this most important public document, as bearing in a most important degree upon our understanding of the motives and policy of the Russian Government. Let me look, in the first place, to the speeches which have been made on behalf of the Conservative Party. I look to some of the most powerful and able speeches made by my noble Friend the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) upon the condition in which we now are; and I rejoice to see that my noble Friend gave no indication of any approval of a war for the mere sake of a strip of desert on the confines of Afghanistan, or of a war against one of the greatest Powers of Europe on account of an accidental affair of outposts. On the contrary, the gist and tenour of his speech was this—that the dangers of a war arising from these comparatively small points was a danger due to the mismanagement of Her Majesty's Advisers. That is an argument which is perfectly fair to maintain, and on which I am not going to express any opinion now. We have not got the Papers before us. We do not know how it is that it is an affair of outposts, neither do we know from what train of circumstances it rose to such a dangerous point. I now pass, my Lords, from my noble Friend the noble Marquess opposite, who is the Leader of the Conservative Party, to look to another quarter. I would remind your Lordships of an anecdote which is told of the late Earl of Beaconsfield. On one occasion he was met going up to the Gallery of the House of Commons, and was asked by a friend—"What brings your Lordship here to-night?" He said—"I have come to look at the Fourth Party." I hope I may be allowed, now and then, to go and listen to and look at the Fourth Party; and I am bound to say that some speeches lately made by the Leader of that Party are speeches of great eloquence and of very considerable power, and I, for one, rejoice to see any addition to the eloquence and power which 113 we have in Parliament. Well, my Lords, he made a speech the other day with regard to our situation as to public affairs, in which there was a very strong opinion expressed with regard to the conduct of Russia in her advance in Central Asia. I rejoice that he also, in unison with the noble Marquess opposite, expressed not not only indifference, but positive ridicule and contempt, at the idea of a war which was to be waged for the mere sake of a strip of territory between Herat and Morv, or for a mere affair of outposts between two Armies. But then he proceeded to draw a tremendous arraignment against Russia for her deceit and treachery in connection with her advance in Central Asia. Now, in his narrative, my firm conviction is that the noble Lord did not draw his information from first sources. The literature on the subject is enormous. Books and pamphlets without) number have been written representing the treachery of Russia in her course throughout Asia, some of them by persons of eminence and distinction, and those are, no doubt, the sources from which the noble Lord has drawn his information. The gist of the noble Lord's observations was that all the advances of Russia in Asia had been in violation of the most solemn promises given over and over again to the Great Powers of Europe, and especially to ourselves. "Well, my Lords, I do not know that I should have noticed these observations at all in your Lordships' House had it not been that the noble Marquess opposite alluded to them, and said that he believed that the noble Lord's representation of facts could not be controverted.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

That is not my opinion. The fact of Russia having advanced by these steps is, of course, an historical fact within the knowledge of all of us; but these facts are strung together by relative statements with regard to the assurances of Russia; and if my noble Friend means that those statements are unimpeachable then I cannot agree with him, for I think that I shall prove they are not only not unimpeachable, but wrong from beginning to end. I rest my case almost entirely on the particular document for which I have moved. I direct attention 114 to this subject on account of the very strong language that has been used, because I think when we are appealing to the public of this country at the time of a General Election, whatever may be our dangers from Russia, public opinion should not be excited by language clearly exaggerated. After all, we shall have to live with Russia as one of the great family of European nations. I do not suppose that anyone will be so extravagant as to affirm that we are never, under any circumstances, to make Treaties with that country. The noble Lord talks of deceit and treachery. These are his words— He did not hesitate to say that of all the treachery and duplicity of which examples could be found in the annals of diplomacy and international intercourse none could exceed theirs for blackness and perfidy. I wish to prove to your Lordships that this is a completely erroneous interpretation of the facts of the case in regard to the advances of Russia in Central Asia. I think I shall show that I do not disavow the special doctrine which is held by my noble Friend opposite and the head of the Fourth Party—namely, that we ought not to trust for the safety of India to the promises of Russia. With that I entirely agree; but I support the doctrine, as I shall show, upon other grounds and for other reasons. In the meantime, I shall strive to prove that Russia cannot be justly charged with the perfidy and bad faith laid to her door. Let me remind the House of the occasion when this document was issued. Your Lordships will remember that during the first half of the present century the advances of Russia, which were very great and very formidable, were advances chiefly against Persia and Turkey. During the middle of the century there was a pause; but in 1863 Russia resumed her great march in Central Asia. That was the occasion when she issued this document. I believe it was intended to be a secret document. It was an instruction to her Ambassadors at all the Courts of Europe as to the language which they should hold in the event of questions being asked of them or erroneous ideas being spread in regard to her Asiatic policy. I believe the publication of the document was, in the first instance, due to accident. However, it was published. It lays down the doctrine that— 115 That Russia in Central Asia is in the same position as all civilized States in contact with savage and nomad tribes, with no fixed social organization. The writers illustrate what they mean by examples, which I do not think are, all of them, very pertinent. They call attention to the relations of the United States towards the American tribes, to the case of Holland and her Colonies, to the case of France in Algeria, and, with a touch of irony, to the case of England and India. The second doctrine laid down is this— That in all such cases the civilized State is forced to exercise a certain ascendancy. I hope your Lordships will observe the beautiful delicacy of this expression; and then it goes on to a little broader language, and explains— That when these tribes commit raids or pillage, they must be reduced to more or less perfect subjugation. That is a considerable advance on the previous paragraph. The next proposition is this— That these tribes, when civilized, become, in their turn, exposed to the depredations of robber tribes further on, who must then be subjected to the same process. The fifth proposition is this, and it is a very important one—namely— That when robber tribes have been punished, and the expedition has been withdrawn, the lesson which they have been taught is soon forgotten, and the withdrawal is by them ascribed to weakness. I need not point out the conclusion drawn from that, that where the robber tribes are punished the expedition should take hold of their country and should not be withdrawn. The secret is this— That all nomad tribes are bad neighbours' and that agricultural and commercial populations attached to the soil are more advanced social organizations, and are more capable of being dealt with in peaceful relations. This is a description which takes in every one of the Khanates of Central Asia. Then I come to No. 7, and I especially beg attention to a proposition so many years ago announced to the Powers of Europe— That, consequently, our frontier line ought to swallow up the former, and stop short of the limits of the latter. Thus, the States to be swallowed up are all those that are comparatively unorganized; and it is left to the Russian Chancellerie to say what States are or 116 are not sufficiently organized. All these Khanates, then, were to be swallowed up. The document proceeds to lay down that these general statements are to be used by way of explanation if questions are asked or credence is given to erroneous ideas. That is important, because it shows that these propositions were provided for the purpose of being given as information, and not as promises or pledges. The document only contained the language that was to be held by the Russian Ambassadors if they were asked inconvenient questions. And, lastly, the ninth proposition is this— That in the pursuit of this policy, and in the fulfilment of these principles, and putting into practice these axioms, the Imperial Government, in pursuing this task, takes as its guide the interest of Russia —not the sentiment of tenderness or jealousy of other States— believing at the same time that it is promoting the interests of humanity and civilization. I confess that when I read this Paper it was inconceivable to me how all these accusations could be brought against Russia with regard to her subsequent advances; and yet I find that so distinguished a man as Sir Henry Rawlinson has originated this charge of perfidy and bad faith, and I have very little doubt that Lord Randolph Churchill took his information from that source. But there is nothing like going to first authorities, and one seldom does so without finding that they have been wrongly represented. The blindness of European statesmen in misrepresenting this document as they have done reminds me of an anecdote which was told, I think, in the Memoirs of Lord Cockburn, when the Scottish Judges were famous for their curious sayings, littered in the broadest vernacular. A lawyer was pleading on behalf of his client that he was an uneducated and stupid man, and the Judge interrupted him with the remark—"The law takes no cogneesance o' stupeedity." Now, on this occasion I cannot either propound the doctrine of stupidity to account for the blindness to which I have referred, because it has been shared by the ablest men. Well, this document pretends that in the Khanate of Khokand had been found the conditions necessary to enable the Russians to stop at the point which they had then reached. The document says that the 117 advance which had been made put the Russians in the immediate neighbourhood of Khokand, and continues— We find ourselves there in the presence of of a more solid, more compact, and better organized social State, fixing for us a geographical position at which we must stop. How, that is the sentence which is alone quoted by those who differ from me upon this question; but what follows? Why, the document goes on to explain what this "must" means, and it means only that to go further would involve serious sacrifices and contests with more important Powers. Having shown your Lordships that this document laid down principles applying to all these Central Asian Dependencies, I now wish to call attention to the completeness with which those principles apply to the more recent advances of Russia on Khiva and Merv. My Lords, there is no denying that the tribes of the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara are essentially robber tribes. If your Lordships look at one of the works of Sir Henry Rawlinson, you will see that he mentions especially that one of the most vital blows given to Khiva was that, by the subjection of certain tribes outside the Border, they lost the large revenue hitherto derived from their slave market. The same observation applies to Merv. The Correspondent of The Standard with the Staff of Sir Peter Lumsden gives the most distinct and emphatic testimony that the country, until the Russian conquests, had been wholly deserted because the peasantry had been unable to cultivate the fields, and that already—the Russian conquest of Merv not having been accomplished for much more than 12 months—cultivation is rapidly extending wherever it is possible to have irrigation along those desert sands. The principles laid down in the despatch of 1864 apply closely to every one of the advances made by Russia from her position at that time. Those advances have been very remarkable. Between 1861 and 1869 Russia seized first of all Tchemkend, then Tashkend, then Khokand, all in the upper valley of the Jaxartes, and very soon she crossed the mountain range which separates the head waters of the Jaxartes from the rivers beyond. She got hold of Samarkand. She had Bokhara at her feet, and once this happened, she became, what the French 118 call, limi trophe with the Afghan people. It was in the middle of this great course of conquest, which brought Russia from the shores of the Sea of Aral to the head waters of the Jaxartes, and the rivers which flow from Samarkand and Bokhara, that I had the honour of going to the India Office. One of the first things I did was to ask for the last expression of opinion given by my Predecessor in Office—Sir Stafford Northcote—in which I found the following words, which I quote, not for polemical, but for historical purposes. In answer to a despatch from the Government of Sir John Lawrence, directing the attention of the India Office to these advances on the part of Russia, Sir Stafford Northcote replied in these terms:— On this point Her Majesty's Governmen see no reason for any uneasiness or any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making, in Central Asia appear to be the natural result of the situation in which she finds herself placed. My Lords, nothing is more remarkable than the fact that circumstances happening at one moment will excite the whole country, and the same circumstances happening at another moment will produce no impression whatever. What I want to point out is that Conservatives and Liberals both, up to the year of which I now speak—up to the outbreak of the Eastern War in Europe—wore comparatively indifferent, and expressed themselves indifferent, to those advances of Russia through the deserts of Central Asia. I believe that it is entirely owing to accidental circumstances that the agitation has become so great. But now that Russia has advanced—as I think, on the whole, by legitimate steps—to Merv, we are in a new political position, and we must take a new departure. We must look round to our new position; and without making unjust accusations against Russia, we must remember that we are responsible for the safety of India against a possible quarrel with one of the greatest Powers in the world; and, whether we can trust her or not, we are bound to consider the case of war, and to defend India by every means in our power. There is one great comfort I find with regard to these advances of Russia—namely, that our own annexations during that period have been far larger, far richer, far more important, far more warlike, in 119 the populations we have subdued. About five years ago I took the trouble to go closely into the question, and I will tell the House the result at which I then arrived, though recently I had not the opportunity of verifying it. Within the last 45 years we have annexed and included in our Indian Empire territories and populations representing 13,000,000 of human souls. Some of the people so included are among the most warlike of the populations of India; they are the very core now of our Native Army; and, through the genius and influence mainly of the two Lawrences, they are among the most faithful of all the tributary races. Compare this series of annexation with the annexations of Russia. Her advance has, indeed, been enormous; but it has been over enormous wastes of deserts and sand, sand with here and there an occasional oasis. When you hear a man like Sir Henry Rawlinson, and others who have travelled in the East, talking of the extraordinary fertility and resources of this, that, and the other small oasis, you can only account for the impression they have partly by the historical memory of time long past, when these places were the seats of a teeming population and a great military Empire, and partly because these men have almost all travelled on camels and on horseback through long stretches of desert sand, and having suddenly come on an oasis, they see a long tract of country full of gardens and wonderful melons—pumpkins as big as this House—and they exclaim—"There never was such a country as this." Just think of that one Province of India called Oude, with its 40,000,000 of people, and containing a great deal of the richest soil in the world. Think also that of all our annexations in India we have the riches in the South, and the martial populations in the North. If we cannot show a good face against Russia under these conditions, the sceptre will have deserved to have passed from us. The received estimate of the total population between the Caspian and Merv, annexed by Russia, is less than 1,000,000; and I very much doubt whether, including the tribe3 of the rich and well-watered valleys of the head waters of the Jaxartes, and those of Samarkand and Khokand, the whole Russian population in Central Asia comes to 10,000,000, which is less than the popu- 120 lation of a Province of Lower Bengal. That is a comforting consideration, and one that ought to be soothing to the public mind, and prevent—