RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 19 March 1885)

§ THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,
who had the following Notice on the Paper:— To resolve That considering the loss of life and treasure that has been incurred by thi8 country in Egypt, any arrangements with the Powers, either political or financial, which may tend to impair or diminish the influence of England in the administration of that country, such as the acceptance of any form of loan to the Egyptian Treasury under a joint guarantee of the Powers, would be unacceptable to this House, said, that although they were expecting Papers on the subject, upon which there would be a full discussion in their Lordships' House, it still appeared to him that there were certain features connected with the financial arrangements in regard to Egypt upon which a few preliminary remarks might with advantage be made. The discussion had been too long deferred, and it seemed to him that all they had now to expect was not only a foregone conclusion but an arrangement of a disastrous nature. At the time when the Dual Control had been established, the peculiar circumstances which had arisen in Egypt had rendered it necessary to make some arrangement for the financial condition of Egypt. He thought he might say that, although the Dual Control had been fortuitous in its origin, in the opinion of many persons who understood the subject, it had been extremely successful in many of its objects. Egypt was not a country isolated, like Turkey from European affairs, but one possessing every species of interest and trade of every description. By the abolition of that Dual Control they had alienated France and given a stimulus to Prince Bismarck to adopt a European policy which was likely to bring about considerable difficulties. The late M. Gambetta was a firm believer in an alliance between England and France on Egyptian affairs, and it was at his desire that the Joint Note was addressed to Egypt by those two Powers. That Note meant that England and France were trustees for the arrangement between the European Powers and the Khedive, and that M. Gambetta would put his foot down and maintain that arrangement. But M. Gambetta went out of Office and was suc- 1673 ceeded by M. de Freycinet, who reversed the policy of his Predecessor. Things were then allowed to drift until the mutiny of the Egyptian Colonels broke out. Then a Conference was held; and, during the middle of its deliberations, to the astonishment of Europe as well as of the Liberal Party in England, Mr. Gladstone's Government decided to bombard Alexandria. He did not say that that bombardment was not forced upon them; but France refused to join with them in the enterprize which resulted in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. The abolition of the Dual Control dated from the time when the Khedive, at the instigation of Her Majesty's Government, issued a Decree annulling that Control; and from that moment they alienated the sympathies of the French people, which had hitherto been with them in their operations in Egypt. The French people became fully alive to the mistake made by M. de Freycinet, which they felt practically threw Egypt into the hands of England. They might have been prepared for the abolition of the Dual Control, but they were not prepared to accept the way in which it was effected, still less to accept the doctrine of repudiation which was afterwards proclaimed. He would not dwell on the series of disasters which ended in the betrayal and death of our hero and Envoy. Her Majesty's Government had wasted their treasure and sacrificed the lives of their fellow-countrymen, and they were going to impose enormous burdens on the British taxpayers; and in return they had gained nothing but discredit abroad and the disapproval of the English people. The financial arrangements now contemplated would, he believed, be looked upon as the culmination of that history of disgrace. From the day that they made themselves the patron of the Khedive, both in the eyes of the Mussulman and the European world, they became responsible for the whole administration of Egypt. But it had been the object of Her Majesty's Ministers to hold out to the European Powers that the Khedive was acting on his own initiative, and was not necessarily inspired by the British Government. The policy which allowed matters in the Soudan to drift from the date of the disaster to Hicks Pasha's Army down to the death of General Gordon was the same as that which had allowed affairs 1674 in Egypt Proper to drift from the disregard of the claims of the sufferers in Alexandria down to the hopeless surrender of all the positions that they originally took up. If the Government had really understood and recognized the responsibility they were undertaking when they sent Lord Dufferin on his mission to Egypt, they would have instructed him to advise the Khedive to issue some formal Decree or assurance that the foreign bondholders' claims would be met. Their Lordships would remember that during the last two years the Radical Press and Radical orators had expatiated on the rapacity of the bondholders and the unfortunate condition of the fellaheen. But the folly of the Government had been shown in lending a ready ear to the cry of that Party. They were ready to assent to the abolition of the Law of Liquidation. So long as the Dual Control lasted they had the sympathy of the French people, who were prepared to work with them so long as they considered them their co-trustees. Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to go to the logical result which the abolition of the Dual Control involved—they were not prepared to annex Egypt, nor to propose any scheme for remodelling the National Debt of Egypt under the guarantee of the British Government at a reduced rate of interest, thereby relieving the Revenue from the difficulty in which it was placed. Her Majesty's Government said they would not undertake the responsibility of managing the finances of Egypt, but they would try by diplomatic means to induce the Powers to consent to some modified scheme of liquidation. With that view they proposed a Conference; and their Lordships knew what took place during that Conference. Their Lordships were debarred from discussing the question, on the ground that it would be extremely inopportune and inconvenient for them to do so pending its deliberations; and, owing to the late period of the Session, no opportunity afterwards presented itself for raising such a discussion. The Conference came to an untimely end, and nothing could be more instructive than to read the paragraphs of the Protocol indicating what passed between the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary and M. Waddington. If the Government had accepted the method suggested by the First Lord of 1675 the Admiralty, they would have been in a better position than that which they now occupied. The character of Lord Northbrook's Report was well known. The Government had stated that Egypt was not able to pay its debts. The Powers thought she could. But it was said that Lord Northbrook advised no reduction of the claims of the bondholders. That view was displeasing to the Government.

§ EARL GRANVILLE
May I ask the noble Duke whence he has derived all this intimate knowledge of these affairs?

§ THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH
said, that if the noble Earl had read the public papers, especially The Times, he would see that what he had said was substantially accurate. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had yesterday stated that it was proposed that the loan should be subject to an International Guarantee. The right hon. Gentleman said that we had not asked for such a Guarantee, and that no right of interference with our administration was granted thereby to the Powers. He could not understand what the Guarantee meant, unless it meant that we had, immediately after Tel-el-Kebir, taken up a strong position and undertaken to deal with not only the military, but also the political and financial position. But ever since that period we had practically done nothing at all. We had abandoned one position after another. What was the sacrifice asked in the new proposals from the bondholders? It was only 5 per cent reduction for two years, and that was to be paid back if there was a surplus. But that concession only amounted to £200,000 a-year. Was it worth while to make an alteration in the Law of Liquidation for so small an advantage? Then there was to be a suspension of the Sinking Fund. But by good administration, by taxing the notables, and other means, sufficient might be raised to make up that advantage. Notwithstanding all the sacrifices we had made, we should get nothing out of them, and had in the meantime covered ourselves with indelible disgrace. What would be the feeling of our Administrators in Egypt when they saw themselves placed in a subsidiary position to other Powers; what would be the feeling of the English people when they saw their Army of Occupation doing the work of bum-bailiffs 1676 —when we were obliged to use the kourbash on people whom the Prime Minister had stated to be overtaxed; what would be the feeling of our soldiers who would have to fight a campaign next autumn, of the British taxpayer, of those who had lost their relatives in that unhappy war, when England woke up and realized that the Government had abandoned every advantage, receded from every position, and landed the country in disgrace, as regarded not only the past but the future also?

§ EARL GRANVILLE
My Lords, I own that when I came down to this House I did not expect the noble Duke to go on with his Motion. The Motion implies a Vote of Censure, to a certain degree of a hypothetical character. I hope the noble Duke will not think it want of courtesy, or want of appreciation of the ability with which he has stated his own views, that I do not think it desirable that I should give an answer to the noble Duke. At our last meeting the noble Marquess asked how far we had arrived at an agreement with the other Powers on this question. I stated that a preliminary Declaration had been signed on that day, and that we expected to sign the Articles of Convention yesterday. The noble Marquess very properly requested an early distribution of Papers. I met that with the assurance that they should be distributed as soon as possible. I laid some Papers on the Table today. I believe other Papers will be presented almost immediately. The Declaration and Convention will be distributed to your Lordships to-morrow, and other Papers at the end of this week or certainly at the beginning of the next. In these circumstances, I think it is most unusual to proceed with a Vote of Censure on the Government. I do not say it is unfair to myself and my Colleagues, who would have rather an advantage, as we should argue having a knowledge of these Papers, of which your Lordships are perfectly ignorant. I think it 1677 unfair to the noble Duke himself, who has made a Motion entirely directed against an International Guarantee of the loan, the proposition contained in which I think I shall be able entirely to controvert. The noble Duke's speech has ranged all over the Egyptian history—what Mr. Gladstone said about the Dual Control, the bombardment of Alexandria, and all the subjects which have been so often discussed. He has said hardly one sentence in regard to the Vote of Censure which he has presented, I rather think, on his own authority. Therefore, I must beg to be excused from discussing his Motion at this moment; but I wish your Lordships to understand that we are most ready to meet the discussion which the noble Marquess has promised shall come on at an early day.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having announced that the Papers with, reference to Egypt will be distributed at an early date, it is undoubtedly more in accordance with our practice and obviously more convenient that we should not now go fully into the circumstances to which those Papers refer. I, however, understood the noble Duke in the course of his speech to say he did not consider that this was to be a conclusive discussion of the matter, but that he rather wished to dispose of the preliminary chapter of this long and complicated history, with the view of dealing with the precise matter of his Motion on a future occasion. I do not know the views of the noble Duke, but I should not recommend him to press his Motion on the present occasion. It is obviously almost impossible for us to deal with the character of the engagements entered into by the noble Earl till the precise words of them are before us. I do not agree with the noble Earl that the noble Duke has repeated all the charges made against Her Majesty's Government, because in many respects I thought the noble Duke showed greater knowledge of the subject than has been shown before by others, and that he opened up in some respects new fields of discussion, especially in regard to the question how far the attitude of this country towards France has been affected by the policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued since the Egyptian Question arose. This is a 1678 very interesting question, and I believe that although there are very obvious grounds for reticence it has never been dealt with so thoroughly as other parts of the Egyptian Question. But I quite agree with the noble Earl that this and all other matters had better be deferred to a period when we shall have the Papers in our hands and are able to express an opinion upon them. I heard with some dismay—if I may make use of so irregular an observation—that this matter is to be discussed in the other House of Parliament almost immediately. I could have hoped that we should have some time to consider the matter before dealing with it; and I think there is an additional ground for claiming such indulgence on the part of the Government, as it has not been owing to any laches of ours that a discussion did not take place at an earlier period, but rather it was owing to one of the most remarkable scenes in Parliamentary history; and I would invoke the presiding genius of Mr. Goschen to act again on the feelings of Her Majesty's Government and to urge them not to press forward this important and difficult question for discussion at too early a period, as this is one of the most momentous questions which has occupied the attention of Parliament for many years.

§ THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,
having asked the noble Earl whether he would place on the Table full details of the Report made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, intimated his willingness to withdraw the Motion.