Lords Sitting of 13 November 1884

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Representation of the People* (5).
Committee—Report—Justices' Jurisdiction* (2); Law of Evidence Amendment* (3).

NEW PEER.
Marmaduke Francis Baron Herries in the peerage of Scotland, having been created Baron Herries of Carlaverock Castle in the county of Dumfries and of Everingham in the East Riding of the county of York—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—ADJOURNMENT.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK (for Earl GRANVILLE)stated that, as there was no Business on the Paper for tomorrow, it was proposed to adjourn at the rising of the House to-day until Monday.

ARMY AND NAVY—DEFENCE OF COLONIAL POSSESSIONS—THE CORRESPONDENCE—OBSERVATIONS.
THE EARL OF CARNARVON, in rising to call attention to the Correspondence concerning the defence of Colonial Possessions and garrisons abroad in reference to the recommendations made to Her Majesty's Government by the Royal Commission appointed to report upon British Possessions and commerce abroad, said: My Lords, I have thought it right to call the attention of your Lordships' House to this very important matter, which has recently attracted a good deal of the attention of the public; and I hope my justification for entering upon the subject may be found in the fact that, as Chairman of the Royal Commission appointed for the defence of our foreign stations, I may speak both for myself and, to a certain extent, also for my Colleagues on this question. That Commission, my Lords, was appointed in September, 1879. It presented its first Report in September, 1881; its second Report early in 1882; and its last Report in July, 1882. Since then I cannot accuse myself of having allowed the subject to sleep in silence. During the time, I have twice or three times pressed it upon the attention of my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook), and, I think, of other Members of Her Majesty's Government, and in May of last year, in public, I earnestly urged upon Her Majesty's Government the risk of any further delay, and the great importance of dealing with this question. My Lords, I hardly know what course I should have taken but for the appearance, a few weeks since, of a short Parliamentary Paper, in which it was proposed to expend a certain sum of money upon the fortification of British coaling stations abroad. I must say I should have been guilty, I think, of a breach of public trust if, as Chairman of that Commission, I did not for my own part, at all events, disclaim all responsibility for the proposals now made in this Treasury Paper, and if I did not say that, in my humble opinion, the estimate of work to be done is really wholly below the needs of the case, and, in one word, illusory. In approaching the subject, my Lords, I am beset by two difficulties; the first of which is that within the last few hours, I may say, a second Paper

1535
upon the same subject has been laid before the House. Through the courtesy of my noble Friend opposite, I was allowed a sight of it yesterday, and, therefore, though I have not had time to examine it very carefully, having time only for a cursory perusal, I think I am generally aware of the modifications it introduces. That Paper is very embarrassing to me in dealing with this question. In the first place, it involves a considerable change, I am willing to admit an important change, in one respect, but one that I cannot look upon as important in another respect. That Paper makes an important change; because it contains a public retractation by the Treasury of the extraordinary doctrine which they had laid down in the first Paper, and by which Her Majesty's Government were at that time apparently governed. Since the first Paper was published, the War Office remonstrated against the Treasury view on the point; and, thanks to that romonstrance, and thanks, I am bound to say, to a great extent, to public criticism, the Treasury have seen that they could not possibly stand by the ground they originally took up. In order to make myself clear, I had better, I think, point out to the House, in a few words, what is the substance of these two Papers. The first Paper, which has been for many weeks before the public, begins with a letter from the War Office to the Colonial Office of the 19th of March. It is, therefore, some months old, and contains, first of all, an estimate from the Inspector General of Fortifications of works and harbours which it is proposed to execute in certain stations and in certain cases there given. My Lords, these stations are Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Jamaica, and St. Lucia, and the Inspector General estimates for the works in these different cases £560,000, and for the armaments £331,000, or a total of £891,000. In the next place, it will be seen from the official Correspondence that the estimate is based upon the Reports of 1881 and 1882, and assumes to represent the views of the Commission, who suggested that Singapore and Hong Kong should be at once fortified, and they said that Simon's Bay was a matter of the first consideration. Now, my Lords, as the Corre-
1536
spondence proceeds, the War Office first suggests Singapore and Hong Kong as two points to be fortified, and subsequently Simon's Bay enters into their view, as also does Aden; while I am sorry to say that Singapore and the Cape practically disappear. The Correspondence then winds up by the Treasury agreeing that Aden, Singapore, and Hong Kong should be brought in at a cost of £345,000 out of the £891,000 originally proposed, naming, at the same time, no time for the completion of those works, and in a most remarkable sentence proposing to postpone the completion of the armaments—"As no expenditure need be incurred for them until the works have been completed." At present, I make no comments upon this. The second Paper, which has only within the last few hours been laid upon the Table, is a very remarkable comment upon that I have just quoted. It commences with a letter from the War Office on the 1st of November, which proposes certain modifications in the original estimate; first of all, a general increase on the whole sum of £18,000. The first proposal was £891,000; their proposal is now £909,000. But there is a special increase in the Vote for Armaments, and that special increase amounts to no less than £117,000. But, my Lords, that increase is purchased by a reduction of £97,000 upon the works, the first proposal for the works being £560,000, and the second £463,000, showing a reduction of £97,000. The War Office then proceeds to recommend that the armaments should be postponed until the completion of the works, and further proposes to deal with many more stations than was originally intended, including Aden, Trincomalee, Singapore, Hong Kong, Simon's Bay, and Table Bay. They further propose that the work should be completed within the space of three years, and the whole Correspondence is wound up by the remarkable retractation by the Treasury of the doctrine they had originally advanced that the armaments should be postponed until the completion of the works. That is the state of the case as it is before the public in these two very important Parliamentary Papers. As I said before, there is a certain improvement effected by the second Paper—that of the increase of armaments; and I re-

1537
joice, for my own part, that the Treasury have become so amenable to public criticism; and I should rejoice still more if this were but the first of several steps taken in the same direction. My second difficulty, however, is a far greater one, and it is this—the Commission over which I had the honour to preside was of a strictly confidential nature; and evidence was given to us on the distinct understanding that it should never be published, and a great deal we ourselves stated and recommended was also of the same character. At the same time, I find it extremely difficult to discuss a Parliamentary Paper such as this without alluding to the views which the Commission held. It seems to me that it would have been very fair had I been allowed to give simply what I may call the corresponding and comparative figures to those given by the Government—for instance, that where the Government, the War Office, or the Treasury recommended a certain sum—say £100,000, I should have been at liberty to say that, in that same case, the Commission stated that £200,000 or £300,000 ought to be expended. I cannot see that any unfairness or injury whatever would have accrued to the Public Service by such a course. But my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty appealed to me the other night not to use one single figure out of that Report, and to treat the Report from first to last as an absolute secret. I earnestly hope that my noble Friend and other Cabinet Ministers are themselves as careful as they can be in their custody of these confidential Papers; for it has been my fortune several times to become aware of Papers of the highest importance, both on military, naval, and foreign affairs, having found their way somehow or other into the possession of foreign Governments. I do not know where the fault has been; but I know that matters of extreme, of the most vital, importance have been allowed to leak out and found their way into other hands. I think it would have been fair had I been allowed to make a comparative statement on this occasion; but I am not, and when the Report of a Commission is confidential, and when the Government asks one to treat the document as secret, one is bound to accept that view, and I do accept it; but in arguing this case I am greatly fettered and restrained, and I shall find it very
1538
difficult indeed to make my case clear, dealing, as I shall be obliged to do, with generalities, instead of with the few explicit figures which would have made it absolutely certain. With these explanations, I will proceed to the subject in hand. First of all, I observe that, as regards the dates of this Correspondence, some comments have been made out-of-doors. There was a long delay between March 19, when the first letter was written, and August 12, when the last was written, if it be the last. But the great fault that I find in respect to chronology is in this — that three precious years have been allowed to go by since the first Report of the Commissioners was presented to the Government, and that two years have been allowed to pass since the presentation of the last Report. Now, one word as to the order in which these stations are taken. In the first Paper Aden, Singapore, and Hong Kong were the three stations chosen for these works, and in the second Paper Ceylon (Trincomalee) is added, and Simon's Bay. I could say something about the choice of Trincomalee; but I will leave that matter to the responsibility of my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty and his Colleagues. So two stations have been added, Trincomalee and Simon's Bay. The place which one would think would be the very first point to be defended was ignored in the first Paper. The Commissioners said that the defence of the Cape was of essential, vital, and primary importance; but now that has been put in a great measure aside, and if the First Lord of the Admiralty will refer to the Reports that were issued, he will appreciate the weight of my remarks. Let me remind your Lordships what the Cape really is to us, for that is of the highest importance in the consideration of this question. First of all, it is the alternative route to the Suez route; and, more than that, it will be the only route to our Eastern Possessions if the Suez route should ever be blocked, and he would be a very bold man, indeed, who did not contemplate the contingency of that route being blocked should a European war arise. Secondly, we have to consider how very large a stake we have commercially in that route. Five years ago, the commerce that went round and touched the Cape was represented by £90,000,000 yearly, while

1539
that which went through the Suez Canal was represented by £65,000,000. The commerce that might have to pass the Cape in time of war might amount to £200,000,000. Now, in the last Parliamentary Paper, it is proposed to fortify Simon's Bay alone, and no mention is made of Table Bay. But the two places are so dependent on each other that it is impossible to defend the one without fortifying the other, and to fortify Simon's Bay without fortifying Table Bay also would be to leave your back door open to the foe, and to have only half the fortifications which you ought to have. This has never been controverted or denied. It is said in this Paper that the interests which we have at the Cape are confined to Simon's Bay, and that at Table Bay there are only Colonial interests. That is a most extraordinary statement. It is also alleged in this Paper that you may leave the fortification of Table Bay to the Colonial Government; but anyone who knows the views of the Colonial Government knows that it is idle to think that the Cape Government will undertake this task. They will co-operate with you by giving valuable land and spending a very considerable sum of money; but anything more than that we cannot expect from them, nor do I think we have a right to expect more. Having disposed of the question as it affects the Cape, in order to illustrate the way in which this subject has been treated by the Treasury, I now proceed to the consideration of the subject generally. What is it we have to defend? The question must be considered under four separate heads—1, Ten great Colonies; 2, ten small Colonies; 3, the trade which is afloat; and, 4, coaling stations and Imperial stations generally. As regards our great Colonies, we need do very little indeed. Australia has set an excellent example, which we need do very well to follow, their public-spirited and generous expenditure of public money having, I trust, placed Melbourne and Sydney in a position of almost confident security. Therefore, the case of these great Colonies need not now be discussed. As regards our smaller Colonies, they are defensible so long as we maintain the supremacy of the sea, and no longer. As regards the trade afloat, it was calculated, four or five years ago—and I have no doubt that the figures have increased—that
1540
£900,000,000 sterling represented the commerce of this country which crossed the seas; beyond that, we were the great carrying Power of the world, £650,000,000 representing the commerce which was afloat in one single year. Now, I come to the question of Imperial and coaling stations. In time of peace the Admiralty have about 50 stations upon which they can depend for coaling; but of these the greater number are in foreign countries, and I need not remind your Lordships that, in time of war, coaling stations belonging to belligerents or neutrals would be shut against us. There remain the four great stations, which I may call the maritime quadrilateral of England—namely, Gibraltar and Malta in the Mediterranean, and Bermuda and Halifax on the other side of the world. Those four great stations have, for many years past, been the special care of Her Majesty's Government. They were remitted to the Commission; but about a year and a-half after we had commenced our investigations they were withdrawn from our cognizance, and, therefore, it is impossible for me to express any opinion with respect to them. But I do say, when Her Majesty's Government removed those four stations, which formed a maritime quadrilateral, from our cognizance, they assumed a very weighty responsibility, and are bound all the more to account for and take all necessary steps for their defence. I hope and trust that the defences are adequate to any occasion that may arise. I have my own views upon it; but the responsibility rests with the Government, and with them alone. There remains, after this deduction, something like 16 or 17 coaling stations abroad, some of greater, some of less consequence in time of war. Now, what is the value of those stations? because out-of-doors I very often notice a most singular ignorance on the subject. Those stations I hold to be vital to us in time of war. Steam has revolutionized all the conditions of modern warfare, especially in ships of war. My noble Friend knows very well that coal is the life and soul of modern ships of war, though the amount of coal a war ship can carry is comparatively small; and coal is to a modern ship of war what sails were to a wooden three-decker in the time of Nelson. If you allow your

1541
ships to be deprived of coal, they will lie useless on the water. In the old days, the wooden ships might be repaired by the ships' carpenters after a general action; but your iron ships must go to places where there are docks and means by which they can be properly repaired. At the principal of those coaling stations there are those facilities which would enable the refitting to be undertaken. But it is perfectly necessary to defend those places; and if you leave them exposed, you leave them to be taken possession of by the enemy. It will not do to defend them merely by ships of war; because if ships of war are to watch over the coaling stations in which those valuable stores are deposited, they are tied to particular points of the coast, and they cannot operate generally with effect against the enemy. But, with the coaling stations themselves out of danger, the ships themselves would be set free for defensive purposes elsewhere. It is necessary, as this Report states, to defend your coaling stations against the heaviest guns and artillery; you cannot have very slight works, because, during the last few years, the calibre of the guns has so much increased that you must now count on ships with 6 inches or 8 inches of armour; and this, at lowest, involves both a considerable increase in the solidity of the works and the range of the guns. I have seen it stated of late that an alternative is to be found in the increase of the Navy. That is a total mistake, and would, not by any means meet the case, for the reasons I have already stated. There must be places properly fortified and guarded, at which our vessels can refit and recoal; and to double or even treble the Navy would not be an adequate substitute for properly defended coaling stations. Therefore it is for the Government to determine what the number of those different stations should be, and then adequately provide for their defence. England has, undoubtedly, more and better stations abroad than any other great European Power. How if those stations are undefended? Instead of being a source of strength in time of war, they become a distinct source of weakness. I shall wind up this part of the case by reminding your Lordships that upon that question depends, not only the keeping afloat of Her Majesty's
1542
Navy, but the whole maintenance of the trade of this country; and, inasmuch as the life of this country is commerce, our national existence itself may, in time of war, be said to depend on the number of our well-defended stations. Now I come to the proposals which Her Majesty's Government and the Treasury have made. I cannot compare these proposals with the recommendations which the Commission made. And here arises one of the great difficulties under which I labour. I must not contrast the proposals which the Government make with those of the Commission; but I may surely give this as my opinion—that the scheme ought to be a whole and complete scheme, and by that I mean that there should be works both by land and sea. I may observe, in passing, that I am at a loss to understand whether, in this estimate of the War Office, it is land works or sea works that are meant, or whether both are included. I hope my noble Friend when he speaks will throw some light on this subject. Sea works or land works ought to be supplemented by mines and torpedoes and other defences of that kind. The one would be useless without the other. I now come to the question of expenditure. The land and the sea works and the other separate matters dealt with in the first Parliamentary Paper fall very much below what I consider satisfactory. If I were to say that they ought at least to be doubled, I should not be going at all beyond truth. It must be remembered that there is no provision made for those supplementary items to which I have just alluded. I read the other day a speech made by Sir Thomas Brassey, in which he dealt with the question of the Navy. Sir Thomas Brassey was one of the original Members of the Commission, and I wish very much that he had remained to the end upon it. His loss was a great loss to us, and it was still greater as he was removed at the time when we came to consider the subject as a whole. Sir Thomas Brassey, speaking lately for the Government, used these words—
"The protecting of our coaling stations is another matter of urgency, and the correspondence lately published will show that the Government are alive to the requirements of the Empire, and have made proper arrangements for the commencement of the work."
When I come to contrast these words of

1543
Sir Thomas Brassey with the proposals it will be seen that there is a great hiatus. Take the first Paper. The Treasury is the governing spirit in the matter, and therefore I must speak of the Paper as the Treasury Paper. The Treasury allow for the expenditure £891,000—I consider that sum of £891,000 to be far below the requirements of the case. The next step, and it is a very ingenious one, is to reduce the sum of £891,000 to £345,000. How is that done? It is done by striking out the majority of the places that are to be fortified, and naming Aden, the Straits, and Hong Kong, as being the most urgent. No doubt, those three places are extremely important stations; but, unless the Government have before their eyes the danger of an Eastern War, I do not think that they are the most important. In the order of priority I do not see what there is to justify the Government in assuming that those stations are the most important. The fact is they are the richest, and larger local contributions can be obtained from them than from other places. But the Estimate is subject to a further reduction. The £345,000 is brought down to £150,000 by the separation of local and Imperial charges. The local charges are set down at £195,000, and the Imperialat £150,000. That is not all. The sum of £150,000, again, by a most ingenious process of arithmetic, is reduced to £47,000, the division being—armaments, £103,750; works, £47,000. The Treasury then wind up by postponing the armaments until the works are completed, and by informing us that the Indian Government had undertaken to advance the £47,000, or something like that sum. Thus they say that little, if any, charge will fall on the Army Votes this year; and it will be certainly unnecessary to present a Supplementary Estimate this Session. I have come to this conclusion—that, whatever the expenses of the Government in this matter may be on paper, in practice they will be found to be nil. This shows the spirit in which the whole of the proposal is conceived, and what vital injury will be done to the country if the Treasury are allowed to overrule and overbear the action of those Governors who were responsible for the safety of the country abroad. Let me say on that point that the Commissioners framed their estimates upon the lowest
1544
possible scale; and my own feelings, and that of some of my Colleagues, was that if we erred it was in recommending an insufficient sum for the defence of these places. Let me explain how we arrived at our estimates. We framed them, first of all, upon data supplied to us from the Inspector General's office, and from the War Office and the Admiralty. We subjected it to the closest scrutiny, and sent out the estimates to be verified by local Committees on the spot. We also sent out most experienced naval and military officers to test the accuracy of the estimates. I should like to know upon what data the Treasury, the War Office, and the Admiralty are proceeding in this case, and how the different views of the War Office three years ago and at present are reconciled? In the next place, the Commission endeavoured to look at the scheme as a whole; but this scheme which is now before us is conceived in as narrow and Departmental a spirit as any I have yet seen. We rescued many separate questions from the Departmental mode of treatment; and, for the first time, we obtained a certain concentration of official knowledge and communication. It was my earnest hope that that state of things would continue, and that some means would be adopted to prevent the terrible difficulty which arises from each Office corresponding separately and distinctly with one another. To my deep regret and sorrow, such has not been the case, and I see from this Paper that you are working under a most unsatisfactory system. I am satisfied in my own mind that until some such system as I have indicated is adopted this country will hardly be in the position in which it ought to be as regards naval matters. The word "garrisons" is mentioned in the title of this Parliamentary Paper; but it is the beginning and the end, for we hear nothing further about garrisons. With regard to this part of the question, the Commission recommended concentration of troops, and I hoped and believed that that part of our recommendations would be carried out; but I am bound to say that, in my humble opinion, the existing garrisons in some parts of the world are inadequate, though, no doubt, much has been done by means of local contributions and local levies, but I have not heard that they have been sufficient. Of one thing I am sure, and that is, that this question of

1545
garrisons cannot be separated from the question of fortifications. It is useless to build fortifications unless we have the men to man them; and I quite admit the extreme difficulty of the question of garrisons. Still, I appeal to those who knew the subject best, whether it is not one that must be faced by any Government, and in time of war would be such that some remedy must be found? I come now to the question of armaments, which may be considered from three points of view—numbers, the weight of guns, and the cost. If I can trust to the first of these Parliamentary Papers for the original proposals of the Government as to armaments, I can only say they are like the works—singularly insufficient, and below the mark. I find that, while the number of intermediate and light guns was somewhat below that which it should have been, the real deficiency occurred in the class of heavy guns, and I need not point out that in time of war it is upon the heavy guns that you must depend in the fortifications. In the second Paper the item is more satisfactory; but at the same time, as far as I can judge, the Estimate is too low. I am very much afraid that the guns on which you depend are very much in arrear. You have to provide for the Navy, for home fortifications, and for foreign stations. The Navy is not yet supplied, and on the home fortifications many of the guns are of an old type, and are useless. The real difficulty is, as I apprehend—and it is well that Parliament should know it—that we have not got plant adequate to turn out the number of guns we need. We are dependent upon Sir Joseph Whitworth for the steel required for the heavier guns, and I believe the best gunpowder we now use is imported from Germany, and is produced by a process which is a secret and a monopoly. Can anything be more anomalous than that this country should be in such a position? Some guns can be manufactured in a year, and some require three years, so that the average time required is about two years. Therefore, taking one thing with another, and that as the time required, it is extraordinary that the Treasury actually propose to defer dealing with the armaments until the works are completed. If the Treasury think we could turn out the guns we should want, if a war broke out, one
1546
can only marvel at their holding such an opinion. There are many proposals, subsidiary to those to which I have alluded, which the Commissioners thought it their bounden duty to bring under the attention of the Government, and I hope that they have had a somewhat larger consideration than others in the Inspector General's Office. May I call to mind the composition of that Commission? It was composed of very representative men. We examined witnesses of every class and kind—the highest military, naval, commercial, and scientific authorities, including the illustrious Duke at the head of the Army, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the highest military and naval officers. There was not a single branch of knowledge, science, or information, that could be brought to bear on the question that was not appealed to in the course of the inquiry. We sat for three years; we did not shrink from any amount of work; and we only discharged our consciences in saying anything which was calculated to awaken anxiety in the minds of the Government. Therefore, it is with regret that I see the outcome in the Treasury Letter. I know what the Treasury is. No doubt, it is a valuable Office in restricting extravagance and keeping accounts; but it has no special knowledge on questions of this kind. If the responsible Heads of a great Department like the Navy allow the Treasury to come in and overbear their deliberate judgment by mere arithmetical considerations they incur a great responsibility. The position seems to me to be by no means satisfactory. On the one hand, we have, first of all, these four great fortresses to which I have alluded. I hope they are adequately and fully defended. We have 16 or 17 others that are very inadequately defended, or not defended at all. We have inadequate garrisons. We have, at many points, no works worth speaking of. We have no guns worth speaking of. Our lines of commercial steamers are not duly guarded; and we have no security that in time of war our food supply will be safe. There is everything which, under a few adverse conditions, might easily lead to a great national disaster. On the other hand, what are the proposals with which this state of things is met? The coaling stations are dismissed. There is no provision made for barracks, or for any of

1547
the essential secondary supplements of the existing works, which, in my opinion, are much below efficiency. Even the armaments to be provided will be still below the mark. It is impossible not to feel extremely anxious that the Government should not, in a case of this kind, be influenced by considerations of parsimony, and should not hesitate to look the facts in the face. I have no wish to say a work to produce a panic. The proof of that is, that, for three years since the Report of this Commission was presented, I have waited patiently, giving only a few occasional indications of my opinion to my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Northbrook), and to the Government generally. I hope I have said nothing from a Party point of view. I should scorn to initiate a discussion on a question of this sort on Party lines. It is my conscientious belief that I have said less than the case really requires. I, for one, refuse all further responsibility in this matter. I personally wash my hands of whatever liability there may be attaching to me or any other Member of the Commission, as regards the Government not acting on our recommendations. I have spoken my mind fairly and fully; not as much so as I could have done, but yet sufficiently for my purpose. My object is to warn the Government and the country that the present state of the defences is inadequate and unsatisfactory, and that when any untoward or unfavourable circumstances occur the greatest and most vital interests of the country may be placed in serious jeopardy.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid, that he wished, as a Member of the Commission, to ask a question which his noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty might, perhaps, find it convenient to answer. He wished to know whether it would be possible to state, or lay on the Table, the detailed calculations or Papers to show on what data the estimates of the Inspector General of Fortifications were based? He was bound to say, without quoting the figures, that there was a great margin of difference between the calculations of the Commission and those of the Inspector General; and he entertained doubts as to the correctness of the calculations of the Inspector General. These doubts were strengthened by the fact that when the Report of the Inspector General was
1548
submitted to the Director of Artillery, he found a deficiency of more than £100,000 in the estimates for armaments. For himself and for the other Members of the Commission, he could say that they had prepared their estimate with the greatest care, and that they had been extremely anxious to avoid anything like extravagance; but if the Inspector General's estimates were, as he could not help thinking they were, insufficient, it would be a great misfortune to the country, if these works were undertaken with an insufficient consideration of all points required for the public interest.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, I can assure the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) that I quite appreciate the interest he takes in this question. No man has a greater right than he has to take an interest in it, and to bring it under the notice of your Lordships. He presided with great ability over the Royal Commission to which he has referred; and, besides that, his position in this House would be a sufficient reason why your Lordships should listen to any observations he might wish to offer. I hope your Lordships will understand, at the outset, that I quite agree with a great deal of what the noble Earl has said, and particularly with regard to the value of fortifications for the defence of our coaling stations in different parts of the world. No one can fill the position of First Lord of the Admiralty without being aware that, of all the measures that could be taken by this country for its defence in time of war, none can be more urgent than the defence of our coaling stations. It is the measure which, of all others, would strengthen our naval force, for the obvious reason that, if the coaling stations are left unprotected, we should, have to provide for their defence by ships of war which, if they were fortified, could be employed in offensive operations. But it must be remembered that these defences are not intended as defences against any possible attack by an armed squadron of large force, but as sufficient defences against cruisers and such forms of attack as might be reasonably expected. These coaling stations are situated in different parts of the world. We should have notice of the despatch of anything like a powerful attack by an expedition against them, and it would be

1549
met by a counter-expedition by ourselves. Therefore, it is not against such attacks as these that coaling stations are to be protected. I wish to assure your Lordships that I quite agree in all that my noble Friend has said—as I agree with him in many other things he said—about the importance of the subject he has brought forward. But I admit that I heard my noble Friend's speech with some disappointment; because, although we may differ as to the amount to be spent on the protection of our coaling stations, I hoped that instead of his making a condemnatory speech, he would have, at least, given us a little encouragement by expressing some satisfaction with the intentions of the Government as shown in these Papers. The Government are determined to proceed at once with the fortification of these coaling stations in such a manner as they consider to be adequate and proper. I am sorry, therefore, that I cannot get even the slightest encouragement from my noble Friend when we are really taking up this question, and that I have only to reply to adverse criticism. I wish to reassure my noble Friend on one point. It seems to me that he is quite right in saying, as I understand the matter, that he, like the Chairman of any other Commission, is only responsible for the Report which the Commission has made. We do not attribute to my noble Friend any responsibility for the proposals of the Government. The responsibility rests on us alone, and not on the Members of the Commission, and we do not shrink from it. With respect to my noble Friend's inability to quote the figures or other particulars of the Report, I would say that, when a Report is of an absolutely confidential character, it would be a dangerous practice to say that this or that part of it may be quoted. I think, therefore, that my noble Friend has exercised a wise discretion in abstaining from quoting any figures given by the Royal Commission. But when he expresses regret that he was not able so to do, I might retort that I had equal cause for regret, for if he had quoted any figures I might have quoted others as against him, in order to show that the estimates of the Government were sufficient, so that I think in the matter of figures my noble Friend and myself are in the same position. There is another matter in my noble Friend's speech to which I am
1550
inclined to take exception, and that is the way in which he attributed to the Treasury everything vicious in the conduct of this question. Those who occupy a position like that which I have the honour to hold are inclined, of course, occasionally to look upon the Treasury as natural enemies, as we are often desirous of spending a great deal of money which the country cannot afford. But my noble Friend is entirely mistaken in this case in speaking of the Treasury as overbearing the Military and Naval Departments. As a matter of fact, the Treasury has done all that it has been asked to do. The proposals for the defence of these stations were not inaugurated by the Treasury, but by the War Department. There was, no doubt, a letter from the Treasury, suggesting that the estimates for armaments might be postponed until the works were completed. But when the Treasury received a letter from the War Office, explaining that such a course could not be followed, the Treasury at once gave way and conceded the point. In fact, the Treasury have agreed to all the proposals put before them by the War Office with respect to these defences without making any difficulty. I am not one of those who take up a strong attitude against the Treasury. Some restraint is needful on the great spending Departments; and if proposals for expenditure were not carefully examined by an independent body like the Treasury, we might be landed year by year in unnecessary extravagance. My noble Friend has very properly explained the manner in which the Commission of which he was Chairman obtained its information. There was nothing secret in that. I quite agree, also, in the description of my noble Friend of the manner in which the Commission did this work. Having concluded its labours, it was the duty of the War Office to examine the Report, and it was referred to the Inspector General of Fortifications, who examined the proposals with great care, and, with the assistance of the Local Authorities, the conclusions at which he arrived were submitted to a Standing Committee, termed the Defence Committee, whose duty it is to examine and report upon all such proposals; and I think that the same confidence is due to the opinion of that Committee which my noble Friend claims for the work of

1551
the Commission. I cannot agree with my noble Friend in the remarks he has made about that Committee. I do not know why my noble Friend should depreciate that Departmental Committee, and speak in disparaging terms of it. It was composed of men who possessed the greatest knowledge of the subject, and I do not see why the term "Departmental" should be used of them as a slight, when they were dealing with a matter with which their whole professional education qualified them to deal.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he was afraid the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) had misunderstood him. He had not spoken in disrespectful terms of the Members of that Committee, but had said that the estimate seemed to have been conceived in a narrow Departmental spirit.
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I did not in the least misunderstand my noble Friend. The estimate was, in my opinion, properly framed in that Departmental spirit—that is to say, the professional knowledge of competent officers—which my noble Friend depreciates. The estimate of the Inspector General of Fortifications was fortified by the assistance of a naval officer of great experience, and to be worth anything it must necessarily be so. If my noble Friend will look at the first page of the Correspondence laid on the Table, he will see that the recommendations of the Inspector General of Fortifications were approved by the Defence Committee, which was under the Presidency of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief. I cannot see why my noble Friend should criticize the spirit in which the estimate was framed with the approval of a body of men who were more competent to express an opinion on the subject than any men in the Empire. The noble Earl has indulged in some very unfriendly criticisms of these proposals; but from whom do they emanate? From a Committee of which the illustrious Duke was President, and among the Members of which were Sir Cooper Key and Lord Wolseley. These are the "Departmental" gentlemen whose proposals he has so severely criticized. I have communicated with Sir Cooper Key on this subject, and I am authorized by him to say that he entirely agrees with these recommendations generally; but, in accordance with the practice of the Com-
1552
mittee, each particular plan will be brought before them in detail before it is finally adopted. These proposals come forth endorsed with the approval of this most influential Committee; and I think they are deserving of somewhat more respect than the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) has paid them to-night. This, after all, is a question of authority; and if I thought the noble Earl was more likely to be right than the Inspector General of Fortifications and the Defence Committee I should bow to his authority; but, much as I respect his opinion, I must give greater deference to that of the qualified and responsible persons I have named. I now come to some questions which the noble Earl dwelt on with respect to these proposals. He asked whether these fortifications were to be of a nature directed against an attack from the land or from the sea? To that I answer that they are to be sea works. No provision, it is true, is made in these proposals for submarine mines; but that is not because we have overlooked this point. We think that, the cost not being very great, the cost for submarine mines ought to be taken in the Estimates for each year. Everything cannot appear on the Estimate which is confined to works and armaments; therefore, torpedo boats are unprovided for in these proposals; but their importance has not been forgotten. So it is with the minor coaling stations, on which, however, an expenditure of £200,000 will be made. The noble Earl has referred to the importance of fortifying the Cape station at Simon's Bay. I entirely agree with him on this point. In fact, I think that of all our coaling stations it is in the first category of importance; and, therefore, provision has been made for proceeding with the defences of Simon's Bay at once. I was sorry to hear the noble Earl saying that the defence of Simon's Bay is impossible without the defence of Table Bay. That is a point upon which he will find the general current of professional opinion opposed to him. The noble Earl is, I think, under some misapprehension. The Government have deliberately determined not to fortify the stations against the attack of a large fleet and army, but merely against isolated cruisers; and the reason is this—that in time of war there would be ample warning if an army was to be de-

1553
spatched, and such an expedition would be met by a counter-expedition on our part. The only thing I regret in the noble Earl's speech is the discouragement he gave the Cape Government in the defence of Table Bay. On this point he was very hard on the Treasury; but the Treasury had nothing to do with this matter as to Table Bay. I regard Simon's Bay, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Aden as our four most important coaling stations; and I am glad to say that the works at Aden and Hong Kong are already in progress, and the guns for Aden have been already ordered; so that it is a mistake to suppose that nothing has been done. With respect to the armaments, the noble Earl must, I think, be under a misconception if he thinks that their power has been reduced by the substitution of lighter guns. The policy of the scheme under consideration is opposed to light armaments. By the scheme now before your Lordships, these coaling stations will be provided with better guns than they could have obtained at the time of the Report of the Royal Commission. Year by year improvements are made in the manufacture of guns, and these stations will now be provided with guns capable of piercing 17-inch armour plates; whereas the guns proposed by the Commission would only have pierced 14 inches. The noble Earl is under an entire mistake if he supposes that the armament proposed for the works is a light armament. It is true that this is the year 1884, and that a considerable interval has elapsed since the Report of the Royal Commission. But this is a matter involving the country in a large expenditure, which cannot be lightly undertaken, and which no Government would be right in undertaking without full and cautious inquiry. It has, no doubt, taken some time to arrive at a conclusion, and to formulate its proposals; but the delay has not been without advantage, for we can now place on these works, at the different stations, better guns than we could have obtained some years ago. Although there has been some delay in commencing the works, yet, when finished, they will be more powerful and better able to fulfil the objects in view than if they had been commenced a few years ago. As far as those of the Government who have had this matter in hand are concerned, they
1554
have always regarded the Report of the Commission over which my noble Friend presided with the greatest interest, and they are under great obligations to the Members of the Commission for the manner in which their work was done. I am only somewhat disappointed to find that, when we are acting, as we think, upon the lines of the Report of that Commission, the encouragement my noble Friend has given us to-night is rather more scanty than he might have offered us. In answer to the question of my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Camperdown), I have only to say that I should very much prefer to show him the details of the proposals in private than to lay them on the Table of the House.
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, as Chairman of the Defence Committee referred to, I feel called upon to support what has been said by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook). Like him, I am not allowed to make comparisons in detail; but I do say, in general terms, that before these works were undertaken they were brought before the Committee of which I am Chairman. The details were founded on the basis of the recommendations of the Royal Commission; and, from the fact that a considerable period has elapsed since the Report of the Commission, and that great changes in the power of guns had taken place during that period, we found we could not only accomplish the object in view in a modified form, but no less efficiently than was originally proposed. The plans have accordingly been considerably modified since these recommendations were made; but, as the noble Earl has said, though the guns are fewer in number, they are more powerful in effect, and the Committee considered that that was of very great advantage. At the same time, they thought there was a possibility of getting the work done at a less costly rate. What was recommended by the Royal Commission, presided over by the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon), has really been carried out in the form now suggested by the Government. I can only say that I rejoice that these proposals are being carried out, and I apprehend that the works now proposed are only an instalment of what is to be done to carry out the complete scheme. I take it for granted that these are only a por-

1555
tion of the recommendations, and that it is the intention to proceed with all the proposed works. They cannot be carried out with equal facility at once, and therefore the most important points are now brought before the public; and I believe that is a clear proof that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out to the fullest extent in their power the recommendations of the Royal Commission. One point to which I must just allude is the expenditure on the works and the expenditure on the armaments. I am bound to say that the noble Earl was fully justified in saying that there is no use in the works and armaments if there are no men to put behind them; and I am quite sure the noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty will agree with me in thinking that the Navy is considered as the essential element of the power which we possess, and that it will be found that more men are required to defend these works than we have now available. But sailors cannot be spared for this duty, and therefore soldiers are required to defend the works. I am bound to make this remark, because I believe that without adequate garrisons these defence works will not be of that value which I should attach to them if properly manned.
LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALAsaid, he would point out to their Lordships that unless mechanical guns were provided with an efficient repairing staff to keep them in order they would be useless, as the slightest check put them out of order. As His Royal Highness had said, the best armaments being useless without garrisons, the construction of barracks in a safe position sufficiently near should always accompany the construction of these defensive works. He did not think too much importance could be attached to the defence of the Cape, because if anything should obstruct the passage of the Suez Canal—and no one could say that it might not be obstructed—they knew that by the means of their fast steamers they had the power of making the passage by the Cape nearly as quickly as by the Canal. He attached as great importance to the fortifications of Table Bay as of Simon's Bay. He knew the country between the two places, and that there was no serious difficulty in passing from one place to the other. He well remembered the
1556
late Sir Bartle Frere describing the alarm awakened in some Members of the Cape Government at being told by some Russian Commanders of men-of-war how easy it would be to land a party and carry them off to sea, or levy a heavy contribution. With reference to the other places mentioned, he also attached great importance to the fortification of Aden, because it was possible, though not probable, that the Suez Canal might fall into other hands; and in the event of such a contingency taking place it would be very satisfactory to find Aden in a thoroughly good state of defence. He would also recommend that Kurrachee and Bombay should be kept in view by the Government of India and properly fortified. The connection of the detached rocks in front of Kurrachee would be the means of making it one of the finest harbours in the world, capable of holding the whole Fleet of Great Britain.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, it did not appear that the Government were prepared to proceed in this matter with anything like the vigour and energy that was required, and much time had been taken up in mere correspondence between the Departments. It was impossible to command the sea, if we had an insufficient Fleet, and it was impossible to hold our Possessions abroad without an Army. The present establishment of the Army was altogether too low for the various duties demanded from it. He feared that each Minister who came into Office was more anxious to reduce the Estimates than strengthen the defences of the country. The country would not be satisfied with mere Ministerial explanations across the Table of the House. They had great responsibilities; and although an increase in their armaments might add 2d. or 3d. to the Income Tax, the national safety was of more importance than a narrow economy. That increase was, of course, a most disagreeable thing; but it was preferable to the risk of national disgrace.

ARMY AND NAVY—DEFENCE OF COLONIAL POSSESSIONS—THE CORRESPONDENCE—OBSERVATIONS.

  REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL.
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Tuesday next (The Earl of Kimberley). (No. 5.)
  House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.