THE EARL OF CARNARVONMy Lords, I rise to inquire in what position the negotiations with regard to the proposed Conference on the financial affairs of Egypt now stand; and to move for a copy of the invitation to the Conference addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the various Powers, and I should have liked to have added to the Motion the words, "And the answers received from the different Powers." I have observed, 1458 from the ordinary channels of information, that an answer was made in "another place" to my right hon. Friend (Mr. Bourke) that it was wholly inconsistent with the practice of Parliament to lay these answers on the Table before they had been received. If that be so, and if that be the practice of Her Majesty's Government, I have nothing to say. At the same time, I think it right to call attention to one rather singular incident in these transactions, because I notice that on the 1st of May, when a Question on this subject was put to the Prime Minister, he was reported to have said that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to hold a Conference had been accepted by the Powers; whereas on May 2nd, when he was asked whether he would produce these answers, he said—"We are not accustomed to produce the answers of Foreign Powers before they are received." There is a certain difference between these statements, and I do not know how to reconcile them. I am at a loss to understand whether it is that the Government object to produce these answers at all, or whether they object to produce them before they are received. If they have been received, as, according to the statement of the Prime Minister, they seem to have been, I trust there will be no objection to produce them; if they have not been received, I must leave the noble Earl to explain how the Prime Minister was able to state on the 2nd of May that the proposals had been accepted. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has on several occasions lately taken me to task for various things I have said, or have been supposed to have said. A few days ago he described me as a severe critic of Her Majesty's Government, and the remarks I made seem to have pressed rather hard. Last night, again, in answer to a very simple Question which I ventured to put, and which had no reference to Her Majesty's Government, he said that I claimed a monopoly of knowledge on a particular subject. I have no doubt it was inconvenient to Her Majesty's Government to be asked Questions as to the progress of this Conference. Of them it would be much more true to say that they had claimed a monopoly of knowledge to themselves, our knowledge having been extracted from the Papers to which I refer. But, at the same time, the remedy 1459 is in their own hands. If they would deal a little more frankly with us, and take Parliament a little more into their confidence in matters of this kind, Questions such as I am about to put would be less frequent, and the speeches concerning them would be more brief. I think, in the circumstances, we should fail in our duty if we hesitated to put Questions which the supreme urgency of the case seem to me to warrant. There are two questions which are at this moment directly before the public mind—one is the position of General Gordon, and the other is of this financial Conference. I do not wish to say a word with regard to General Gordon—that is a separate question. What I desire to call attention to is the position and progress of business with regard to this financial Conference. It is a most important question, and one which goes far beyond the hour, and it is most important that Parliament should have a clear understanding as to the bases of the Conference. In the morning papers yesterday there appeared a Memorandum which purported to be the invitation sent by Her Majesty's Government to the Powers. The text of the invitation was not given; but I think it is not too much to ask the Government to give Parliament, not only the Memorandum, but the text of the invitation in an authoritative form. And here I cannot but say that we owe a very great debt to the public Press, in that, but for them, we should have been absolutely in the dark as to the condition in which affairs were. I am not going to discuss the figures or statements in that Memorandum. It is sufficient for my purpose to say—if I gathered it rightly—that the Memorandum set forth that the present deficits, accumulated during the last three years, amount to the enormous sum of £8,000,000 sterling, and that there is a deficit during the current year of £500,000 more. These figures come to something not far short of bankruptcy; and it is on that ground, as I understand it, that the Conference is to meet. Upon the very threshold, so to speak, of that Conference, I must take the opportunity of saying that I feel the greatest doubt as to the expediency of calling the Conference together at all. It is meant, so far as we can understand it, to effect a change in the Law of Liquidation; but that law was not passed 1460 through the agency of airy International Conference, but by an International Commission, and in the ordinary course of diplomatic communications. In regard to this the old legal maxim holds that the same power which ties the knot may also undo the knot. But there is a, perhaps, more serious objection than that to which I have referred. It is impossible not to question in one's own mind what the prospects of success are in summoning such a Conference. I cannot see how it is possible that the Powers there assembled will agree to a proposal without obtaining from Her Majesty's Government a security which I do not think it is in their power to give. What I mean is, supposing that Her Majesty's Government make a request for some concession on the ground of these enormous deficits—which, as I have said, amount almost to a state of bankruptcy—must not the answer be, what security is there that next year, or the following year, there will not be a recurrence of these deficits? What security can the Government give, what answer can they possibly make to such an objection? The only possible security would be a re-establishment of order, on which a general confidence would follow; but that security does not exist at the present time. That confidence has broken down and gone to pieces under the administration of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, and it is impossible not to ask Her Majesty's Government how that security is to be provided. Then, further, how can any reasonable person suppose it possible that you could limit the debate in this proposed Conference to mere questions of finance? Finance means one of two things—retrenchment or taxation; and then comes the question—Retrenchment in what, or taxation of what? Retrenchment in what particular Department? Taxation on what particular class? Finance, in this instance, means opening up the whole administration of the Government of Egypt; and I am, therefore, totally at a loss to know how you can bring the Representatives of the various Powers to discuss the finance of the country without trespassing upon the question of general policy. Her Majesty's Government have already, by implication, admitted that nothing would be more dangerous, or more compromising to the interests of England in Egypt, than to 1461 discuss the whole question of policy and administration in an International Conference, and that, in fact, it might amount to opening a door which you can scarcely hope to close again. This very Memorandum to which I have referred, and which, I presume, I may quote, is an illustration of what I mean, because in one part of it it is stated that, although there has been an. enormous deficit, the Khedive has spent £500,000 sterling for the recovery of the Soudan. This last point brings in the question of policy, in that the burden is shifted most unwisely—and, as I think, injudiciously—from the shoulders of Her Majesty's Government to those of the Khedive. As to the recovery of the Soudan, I will say nothing beyond expressing the opinion that a single word from Downing Street would have stopped the march of Colonel Hicks and all the subsequent disasters that followed it. It is said that the Government have secured the assent of all the Powers to the Conference, and I sincerely hope it is so, for nothing would give me greater satisfaction than to have that knowledge; but I must own that there are very few signs of that happy concurrence and concord. As far as the Foreign Press is concerned, I must say that it is almost entirely opposed to any proposal for Foreign Powers to take part in this Conference. Certainly the news that we have seen this morning that Russia has taken advantage of this occasion to annex Sarakhs, which has been hinted at before, does not improve the situation; and if the report be true it only shows the value of the sympathy and co-operation of Russia. We are now, in fact, reaping, in a great measure, the results of a very impulsive Prime Minister. We are reaping those results in the hostility—the patent, manifest hostility of the Porte, and possibly the coldness of Germany. There is a great deal more that might be said on this subject. I have simply stated, from my point of view, the very obvious reasons which have induced me to doubt greatly the political wisdom or the public expediency of the Conference at the present time. But if that Conference is to be held, it is very important to know what the terms and basis of it are. I see numberless difficulties, and what is much worse, a great many dangers ahead. There may be opinions and engagements to which we may be com- 1462 mitted, and which will be dangerous hereafter. Again, I say that, under these circumstances, what we desire is to have light thrown upon this question. We have been too long in the dark, and it is very desirable that the Government should give us some general knowledge of the state of the case. I think it is extremely likely that the noble Earl opposite will tell me that I am premature in asking for this information, and that I am embarrassing the Government in asking for it. Well, I am really afraid there is no alternative. According to him, either I am too early or too late. The Conference at this moment has not met, and it is for that reason that I propose this Question. I know, if the Conference were sitting, the noble Earl would tell me it was contrary to precedent to express an opinion while negotiations were in progress. Therefore, I am on the horns of a dilemma. I must ask the Question now, or not at all. Under these circumstances, I press for the information, feeling that I am performing a public duty in doing so.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I own I was a little surprised when I saw the Notice of this Question on the Paper. I thought one of the objects of the noble Earl was to make a personal explanation, and to explain what he had said on two former occasions, on which he said I was entirely mistaken. I really do not think that I did make a mistake. The noble Earl's speech with reference to which he said I had made a mistake was as to the deportation of convicts by the French to Australia, which was brought forward on two occasions by my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Rosebery). What was the language on both these occasions of the noble Earl? He said that he really wished the Government would understand the importance of the question, and he assured us that the Australians were very much excited on the subject. He went on in this sort of way, and said that really he must press upon the Government that they ought to make diplomatic representations to France upon the subject. I appeal to your Lordships—is it likely we are ignorant of all these things? And when he gave us this lecture, was it entirely out of place for me to remonstrate against his assuming a monopoly of the knowledge that this was an important question? The noble Earl made 1463 very great fun of what he considers to be a difference of answer of mine from one given by Mr. Gladstone in "another place." Considering the hundreds, almost thousands, of Questions and answers, I cannot always undertake to give an explanation of an answer that was given; but I must say that, in this instance, the reply is a very obvious one—namely, that the two answers were perfectly compatible. I said here, and Mr. Gladstone stated in the other House, that answers had been received upon this Egyptian Conference Question of an affirmatory character. When asked to produce these answers, amongst the many reasons which may be stated, I think there is a very strong objection against doing so. But there is also this fact. The answers we had received were not written answers at all, but mere oral communications. That, I think, rather disposes of the alleged difference in the answers which have been given. Then the noble Earl goes on to refer to the objects of the Conference, and he says he cannot understand why we are to have a Conference. I am not going to argue the case with the noble Earl; but I may say this much—that when the Powers of Europe have an international right, and you wish to interfere with that international right, I do not think that the idea of consulting with them on the subject is perfectly monstrous. The noble Earl then went on to say that they must have information on the subject, and that they had suffered enormously from our reticence. I have a sort of recollection of a reticence on the part of the Government we succeeded. I think for nearly 18 months the public and the two Houses of Parliament were not aware of a great change of policy and all sorts of intentions with regard to Afghanistan, and yet the noble Earl objects to our keeping our own counsel even for a week or two. The noble Earl says he has a right to ask all these things. I deny it. We have heard lately of several new departures on the part of the Conservative Party with regard to policy. It appears to me that the noble Earl wants to bring about another great change of policy, which is this—to transfer to Parliament the negotiations with Foreign Powers. Now, it may be that the noble Earl only intends that the House of Lords should take the position which constitutionally the Senate 1464 of the United States has a right to take; but you may depend upon it that if we were to take away from the Crown the conduct of negotiations, there is another place that would not be slow in following our example. I must decline, and I cannot conceive anybody blaming me for declining, to enter into explanations with regard to negotiations which are at this moment actually going on.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I think the noble Earl shows undue susceptibility when he is indignant with us because we press upon him the importance of the serious questions which occupy the public mind at the present time. He should remember a little of the recent history of his own Government. It has been a history of long inaction and neglect, broken only by those spells of activity which have been brought about by the interference of Parliament. The policy of the Government has been bad enough; but it would have been twice or three times as bad as it has been if it had not been for the pressure which has been applied in this and the other House to induce the Government to attempt to cope with the great public dangers which their negligence has brought upon them. I think my noble Friend is quite justified in sounding a warning note with respect to this Conference. Whatever the rights of the Crown may be with respect to negotiations and the communication of its intentions to Parliament, we at least have the right to criticize, and it is a right we are bound to exercise when we think great public evils are impending. I confess that the reticence of the noble Earl fills me with some alarm. I am sure he is too good a tactician to adopt it if he could avoid it with safety to his own objects. I cannot believe that he would be so reserved if there were no other intention but to alter something of the Expenditure or something of the Revenue of the Viceroyalty of Egypt. If it were only an intention to correct something in the Law of Liquidation, to allow some Revenue to be applied to a purpose which had not previously been permitted, it would be so simple a matter, so free from any dangers, that I am sure the noble Earl would himself have come down at an earlier date and have told us something of the intentions which the Government entertained. There must be intentions with respect to this Conference 1465 of a far more wide-reaching character, involving far more delicate questions and far more dangerous issues. The Conference is beset with many difficulties. I do not know, when the noble Earl talks of the duty of consulting other Powers when you wish to modify an international right, that he intends that doctrine to be rigorously applied. Is he going to apply it in all its integrity to Turkey? Turkey is not only one of the Great Powers, and admitted to the Concert of Europe by the Treaty of Paris; but Turkey has a special claim to be heard in the disposal of Egyptian questions. It is especially necessary to appeal to Turkey upon the question of finance. If you intend to ask for outside authorization the first step you must take in order to smooth, the path of your finance is to raise a loan; and raising a loan is positively prohibited by the Firman which makes the title of the present Khedive to his Throne. If you are to consult other Powers, as the noble Earl says, whenever you intend to interfere with matters on which they have international right, the first Power that should be consulted, and from whom consent should be obtained, is the Empire of Turkey. But that is not all. The Law of Liquidation does not impose the consent of the four or five Powers known as the Great Powers. It does not concern their interests alone. It is a law having for its object the protection of the individual interests of creditors belonging to various nationalities, and those nationalities are not only belonging to the Great Powers. There are Sweden, Spain, Greece, and other Powers. Is this Conference to contain them all? If it does not contain them all, how will its structure be conformable to the dogma which the noble Earl has just laid down, that when you interfere with the international rights of other Powers you are bound to consult them? My Lords, the evil which I dread, and which I believe many men in this country dread, when we heard of this Conference, is, that it will not be concerned with finance alone; that by hook or by crook the whole question of Egypt will be brought upon the Council Table, that the position which this country possesses in Egypt will be made dependent upon the assent and arbitrament of the Powers who sit around this Council Table, and that it will be under the cover of the European Concert that 1466 Her Majesty's Government will extricate themselves, with little honour, from the embarrassments in which their policy has involved them. My Lords, if that is the object with which the Conference is summoned, or if that is the object which is contemplated, it is one of the most dangerous to the British interests that any Minister has ever devised, because it proposes nothing less than the sacrifice of that position which we have obtained in Egypt out of regard to British interests, and which, without sacrificing British interests, we cannot abandon. I am not going to speak of the past, or of the Dual Control. It was an arrangement which answered, I believe, admirably whilst it existed; and with reference to its death, there is that difference of opinion which often occurs with respect to an individual's death. His friends think that his life might have been saved, and the friends of the doctor hold an opposite opinion. In my opinion, the Dual Control died by reason of the unskilful treatment with which it met; but I cannot expect noble Lords on the opposite Bench to agree with me. The point on which they will agree with me is that it is dead beyond recall. Well, what I want to. insist upon is that the issue of this Conference, if it touches anything beyond finance, cannot be a revival of anything approaching to the Dual Control, or anything in which France should be our only partner. If anything touching the Government of Egypt comes out of this Council it will be a multiple control; and a more complete device for insuring permanent anarchy, for paralyzing the power of England in Egypt, and compromising all the interests she seeks to guard, it would be impossible to conceive. My Lords, there is no instance of International Government ever having produced anything but evil. I earnestly trust that, though the noble Earl will not tell us precisely what the aims of this Conference are, he will banish the possibility of such an issue from his plans and from his mind. At all events, I am convinced that any result of this Conference which shall leave the action of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt less free than it is now will be condemned by the people of this country. You cannot hand over the Government of Egypt to other hands than your own for the present. Having destroyed all that is strong and vigorous in Egyptian institu- 1467 tions, you cannot leave it to the anarchy you have brought upon it. You must work out for yourselves, by your own strength, the difficulties upon which you have entered, the problem you have yourselves by your conduct laid down; and I earnestly hope this Conference will not be made a screen for escaping from the responsibilities you have incurred.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYThe noble Lords who are in Opposition have a great advantage over us, because they know they can make speeches which, from the nature of the case, we cannot even attempt to answer. I rise merely for the purpose of saying that, while we feel bound not to reply, it is a new and peculiar mode of advancing the Public Business in the interests of the country for the noble Marquess, after he has been told it is impossible to give any information, to get up and make such a speech as he has just delivered. It is very easy for noble Lords opposite, after they have been told that it is for the public; interest that Questions should not be answered, to get up and say—"Oh, just what we thought; you have some dark design." That, I repeat, is a very easy but not very admirable mode of procedure, or the most calculated to advance the Business of the House.