MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

HL Deb 10 March 1884 vol 285 cc958-1014

THE EARL OF LYTTON

, in rising to move for Papers showing what communications had passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, about Merv and Afghanistan since the year 1881, said My Lords, I rise to ask your Lordships to agree to the Motion of which I have given Notice. But I do not bring forward this Motion with any sanguine expectation of expediting the distribution of the Papers promised us by Her Majesty's Government. I am told that for those Papers we shall still have to wait an indefinite time; and my main object is to call attention to the position in which, meanwhile, we are placed by the announcement, made to us more than a fortnight ago by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), that the Emperor of Russia has accepted the unconditional surrender and allegiance of the Merv Turcoman tribes. I understand that the noble Earl has not yet had time to consider fully the important despatches from St. Petersburg to which he then referred; and I can well believe that he is not prepared, nor do I think we can fairly expect him to be prepared, to state to us definitely, and in precise detail, the course which Her Majesty's Government propose to adopt in consequence of the event he has announced to us; and in consequence also of the importance attached by them, in the Papers last laid before us, to the prevention of that event which they have nevertheless failed to prevent. But, to some extent, the matter has already been discussed in the other House of Parliament, and I presume that the view taken of it by the noble Earl will not greatly or materially differ from that which was then indicated the right by hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) in regard to the course of action now contemplated by Her Majesty's Government. Now, I am not going to weary your Lordships with many details or quotations from the numerous official documents and speeches which have been written and spoken upon this subject. I shall endeavour to describe, as briefly as I can, the manner in which I conceive that Russia's possession of Merv must inevitably affect our position in India, and to state the reasons why it appears to me impossible to accept, with any degree of satisfaction, the sketch of future policy which has been put forward in "another place" by the President of the Local Government Board, and will, I suppose, be again put forward by the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-night. I shall also have something to say as to the course which, in my judgment, ought to have been taken, and which I think ought now to be taken, so far as the policy of the present Government has left open to us any means of taking it; but, in the first place, your Lordships will, I trust, allow me to make one or two observations upon the situation of the territory and the character of the population which have thus been added to the Asiatic Dominions of Russia in the vicinity of our own, and in the closest possible proximity with that State which we have hitherto been accustomed to regard as the natural barrier between the two. My Lords, Merv is a district of ill-defined dimensions, lying between two rivers—the Murghab and the Heri-Rud, or Tejend. These two rivers, after running parallel to each other for about 70 miles, ultimately lose themselves in the great Turcoman desert. The so-called cities of this district are mud huts, and are in ruins; and the importance of the district lies entirely in the fact that, although it is surrounded on all sides by sandy deserts, it is itself a region of extraordinary fertility, placed precisely at that point where the two main roads from Russia to Afghanistan intersect each other. One of them is the road through Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian, to Herat; and the other is the road from Tashkend, through Bokhara, across the Oxus, in the same direction. So much for the district. As for the popu- lation, it consists, as your Lordships are well aware, of some of the rudest, but, at the same time, the most warlike tribes of Central Asia—born fighting men and born horsemen, who, if disciplined and equipped by a European military Power, cannot fail to furnish that Power with a numerous and splendid irregular Cavalry. The ruins which represent the City of Merv itself are about 230 or 240 miles distant from Herat. How far the Merv district extends in the same direction it is difficult to say; because, in countries of this character, all boundaries are necessarily vague and undefined, or, rather, it would be more correct to say that they are defined, from time to time, by the comparative military force of those who live upon opposite sides of them. Prom Herat, which is at present in Afghanistan, Afghan territory stretches towards Merv, and the Merv oasis stretches towards Afghanistan. The boundary between them, if anything that can be called a boundary exists at all, is wholly uncertain; but it is a significant fact that the latest official Russian maps put the South-Eastern extremity of the Merv district at about 25 miles from Herat, and the distance from Maimena would, I believe, be much the same. The effect, therefore, of the unconditional submission of the Merv Turcomans to Russia is that, according to Russian computation, the Russian Frontier now becomes practically contiguous with the Frontiers of Afghanistan, and this contact takes place at the weakest point of the Afghan Frontier; for neither the present Ameer of Cabul, nor his Predecessor, has ever been able to establish his authority firmly at Herat. Now, I request your Lordships to consider for a moment what this fact really means; how it is related to the views repeatedly expressed by the most distinguished English and Indian statesmen of all parties and all schools, respecting the conditions necessary to the security of our Indian Frontier; and what light is thrown by it upon the policy which has been, and is being, pursued, as also upon that which ought to be pursued in that matter. Up to the present moment, in all controversies about Indian Frontier policy, one fundamental principle has been invariably admitted and maintained on all sides, and I do not suppose it will be disavowed to-night by any Member of Her Ma- jesty's Government. It is that the free access of Russia to Afghanistan, and her close intercourse with the Afghan Government, must necessarily be highly dangerous to our power in India. And the reason why it would be dangerous is, that it would enable Russia to stir up the Afghans against us, whenever she had any strong motive for so doing, and through the Afghans to exert a very disturbing influence even over some of the Native States of India itself. I might cite a long list of eminent Liberal statesmen, some of them dead, some of them now before me, and of distinguished Indian administrators, including Lord Lawrence, who have all emphatically affirmed this principle. But I will only now observe that this remarkable consensus of experienced opinion is not merely theoretical. It has been powerfully confirmed by recent experience; for, on a late occasion, when Russia had cause to fear war with England in the West, her first thought, her first instinctive act, was, naturally enough, to intrigue against us in Asia, and to do this through Afghanistan. I am aware that there are some principles cherished by former Liberal Cabinets which, in the name of a more advanced Liberalism, have been discarded by Her Majesty's present Ministers. But if they have discarded this principle also, at least they have never avowed their rejection of it. On the contrary, they have repeatedly informed us that the very corner-stone of the Central Asian policy still is, as it has been for the last 15 years, an understanding with Russia based on the acknowledgment elicited from her Government by Lord Clarendon, "that Afghanistan is entirely outside the sphere of her influence." So far, then, there is no difference of opinion—at least, I presume there is none. We are all agreed that Afghanistan should stand between us and Russia, and that Russian influence ought, if possible, to be excluded from Afghanistan. But when we come to consider how this desirable end is to be attained, we are at once confronted with two different and conflicting views on the subject. What has now taken place at Merv throws considerable light upon the relative efficacy of these views in the past, and I therefore think it may be some guide to us in the consideration of what ought to be done for the future. My Lords, the Ministerial view, so far as it can be gathered from the exposition of it lately given in "another place," appears to be now much the same as it has always been. According to this view, the only barrier against the advance of Russian influence is to be found in Afghanistan itself. Let Afghanistan, it is said, be strong, united, independent, and friendly to England, and then the Afghans will naturally resist the approaches of Russia, maintain our interests, and remain impenetrable to her influence. If we confine our own action to subsidizing the Ameers of Cabul, and refrain from seeking any intercourse between their subjects and ours, this happy result, it is believed, will come about of its own accord. As for anything further, all we can properly do in the matter is to make diplomatic representations to Russia, to obtain from her acknowledgments—such, for instance, as the one elicited by Lord Clarendon, that Afghanistan is outside the sphere of her influence—and then, from time to time, to claim from her a renewed observance of those acknowledgments. That appears to be the view still cherished by Her Majesty's Government. The other view, a very different one, which was acted on during my tenure of Office in India, is that Russia's steady advance towards Afghanistan and our own frontier, and the ultimate extension of her influence into Afghanistan, are the natural and inevitable result of her position in Central Asia, and that, that being so, it is therefore puerile, pitiful, and even vexatious to be continually endeavouring to try and coax, or wheedle, or extort from her reluctant pledges on this subject, which, from the very nature of her position, she is powerless to keep. And here let me interpose one word as to the character of Russia's position in Central Asia. Her mission there has been described as a civilizing mission; and, as far as it goes, I think this description of it is quite correct. Whenever and wherever a barbarous population is brought under the control of a strong civilized Power, the interests of civilization are advanced. But all civilized interests are not identical. If they were, there could never be such a thing as war between civilized Powers; and, therefore, this, of itself, does not necessarily prevent the territorial aggrandizement of such a Power being also advanced at the expense of its civilized neighbours. What we have to take care of is, that the interests of Russian civilization in Central Asia are not advanced in a manner detrimental to the interests of our own civilization in India. And unless we have some guarantees about this much stronger than verbal understandings which we cannot conveniently enforce, the result will undoubtedly constitute a real and serious danger to us. That being the case, and all diplomatic assurances to the contrary being absolutely worthless, the only manly and sensible thing for us to do is to take up, as opportunity may serve, such a position, both political and military, as will enable us to regard with due equanimity the increasing speed of her inevitable advance towards our frontiers. It follows from this view of our position and duties that to suppose either that there is at the present moment, or that there is the smallest prospect of there being within any assignable time, such a thing as a strong, united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan, which can be safely trusted to serve in our hour of need as a self-acting barrier against Russia, is a supposition which has absolutely no foundation in fact, and which, for that reason, ought not to be made the basis of our policy. Now, my Lords, the first of these two policies has been carried out, without opposition and without deviation, for by far the greater portion of the last 14 or 15 years. And it has been applied with absolutely no qualification during the last four or five years. For a very short time during my own connection with the Government of India, the second and different policy was adopted. But this alternative policy was not only condemned, it was also reversed, and nearly all the results of it undone by the present Government and by my Successor in the government of India. I shall not, however, trouble the House with many remarks upon this part of the matter; but I must ask leave to compare shortly the practical results of these two ways of dealing with it. It would be easy for me to multiply quotations from despatches and speeches of all sorts, showing the importance attached by many distinguished persons to the condition that Merv should not become a Russian Possession; and it would probably be a task requiring even less research to quote a series of declarations by the Russian Government, all of them calculated to lead anyone who reads them to the belief that Russia had no intention of taking possession of Merv; but I think it would be a sheer waste of time to travel with this object over all the published Papers, which bring down the story of our Central Asian diplomacy to the year 1881. I will only remind the House that an explicit declaration to that effect was made to Lord Dufferin by the Emperor of Russia; for I suppose it will not be denied—I presume, indeed, that it will be insisted upon by the noble Earl and his Colleagues—that this declaration, together with the assurances which preceded and followed it, produced upon their minds the effect which it was calculated to produce, and which it was no doubt intended to produce; and that it left them perfectly satisfied that they had nothing to apprehend from any Russian designs upon Merv. It is, in fact, essential to any possible justification of their policy that they should be able to tell us, as no doubt they will tell us, that they attached the greatest possible importance to such assurances, and that they placed implicit reliance upon them; for, however unwise of them it may have been to do this, yet, if they did not do it, they have absolutely no excuse for having done nothing else. It would be impossible to characterize their total neglect of the important national interests committed to their charge, in making no provision for what has now occurred, if they were not sincere in their erroneous belief that there was no chance of its occurrence. If they were not dupes they were deceivers. But I do not refer to these incidents for the purpose of denouncing Russian bad faith, or finding fault with Russian ambition. I have nothing whatever to do with Russian morality, and I think it is not the business of any English politician to concern himself about it. I believe I am one of those who have been denounced by the present Cabinet and its Party organs as a Russophobe—which appears to be, in their opinion, one of the most opprobrious epithets that can be applied to a public man; but I am no more a Russophobe than I am a Russophil, and I can assure the House that from me it will not hear this evening a single harsh word upon the conduct of the Russian Government, or upon that of its military authorities. If I notice these Russian pledges, it is only to point out how worthless all such pledges must necessarily be when they are given by a Power situated as Russia is situated in Central Asia. It may be that, when you come to look closely into these pledges, you will find that in all of them Russian statesmen have managed to devise loopholes which will just save the Government that slips through them from the charge of direct falsehood or deliberate bad faith. But that is a question I do not care to discuss. I regard it as a problem in casuistry which has no practical interest. It is very possible that, in every one of these instances, an ingenious casuist may be able to find some such subterfuge or saving clause; but whether he could or could not do so is really of no importance. What is important—and we are inexcusable if we disregard it—is the fact that the whole history of our diplomacy about Merv has added one more to the many illustrations supplied by the general history of the world that diplomatic assurances are of no practical value when they run counter to permanent and well-ascertained national interests, or to deeply-seated national tendencies and passions. To anyone who has watched the course of events in Central Asia—to anyone who knows how, in that country, civilized and uncivilized Powers fray each other, so to speak, at the edges—to anyone who remembers how enter prizing Russian Generals, acting at a distance from St. Petersburg, have invariably been able to commit a possibly reluctant Sovereign to their own projects and proceedings—the conclusion that England and Russia are destined sooner or later to be practically conterminous in Asia must, I think, appear as certain as that water will run downhill when the way is free to it. And to suppose that the most solemn promises will arrest this process is as idle as it was to imagine that the Treaty which closed the Crimean War would exclude the Russian Fleet from the Black Sea one single day later than Russia's first favourable opportunity for breaking through or setting aside the provisions of that Treaty. All that, in such cases, diplomatic assurances can do, is to make those who give them look roguish, and those who require and accept them look foolish. Diplomatic duties will not allow an Ambassador to cross-examine a foreign Minister as if he were a witness come to prove a fraudulent alibi at the Old Bailey. The promises or pledges thus obtained can afterwards be easily explained away; and, whether they are or are not explained away, it really matters very little, for in any case they can always be broken at last. My Lords, the game of diplomacy—and I have had something to do with it—has always seemed to me like trying to tie the hands of a juggler with rotten cords. The man who is tied can generally slip out of the knots, and if he cannot slip out of the knots, he has no difficulty in breaking the cords. I dare say some of your Lordships may happen to have witnessed a very popular performance by Messrs. Maskelyne and Cooke. It has been repeated over and over again for many years; and yet, on each occasion of its repetition, the public are as much surprised as if such a thing had never happened before, and could never happen again. This performance is called—"A Dark Séance; or the Cabinet Trick." It consists of a limited number of gentlemen—who have never before been so closely connected with each other—getting into a cabinet, where they are apparently bound fast to a certain position, under securities of great seeming stringency. Then, for a while, the light is excluded from the cabinet. The public is not allowed to pry into its secrets. And, shortly afterwards, it is discovered that the occupants of the cabinet have contrived, somehow or other, to shift their position by getting rid of all the securities that bound them. In the same way it appears to me that the political performances of the present Cabinet, which have led up to the present situation, might not be unfairly described as a series of dark séances, each of which, as soon as the light is turned on it, reveals a bewildering change of attitude, accompanied by the mysterious and wholly unexplained disappearance of some trusted national security; and the chief wonder of which is that, after they have been repeated, they still create the same feeling of amazement. Now, in the present case, the securities we have been told to rely upon are two. First come the assurances of a friendly Russia, and then the arms of a free, independent, and united Afghanistan. The Russians are to promise not to have anything to do with the Afghans; and the Afghans are to be in such a position that, if the Russians break this promise, they, the Afghans, can and will—with, perhaps, a little cheap assistance from us—punish the Russians for breaking their promise, and immediately drive them away. Now, I quite agree that a free, independent, united, and friendly Afghanistan would be for us the best of all possible protections against the advance of Russia. My objection to our exclusive reliance on this security is simply that the security does not exist, and that there is not the slightest reason to suppose it will come into existence within any ascertainable time. Let me ask the House to consider the different terms which are used in describing this security. Afghanistan, we are told, will be a firm barrier against Russia, if it is free, if it is independent, if it is united, if it is friendly to England. Well, as for the freedom of Afghanistan, that country certainly is, and it seems likely long to continue, as free as any country can possibly be made by the total absence of all law and of every sort of settled institution. It is free in the sense that each Afghan is practically free to do or own what he pleases at the expense of his neighbours. His neighbours are similarly free to do the same at his expense. And this condition renders such freedom a burden instead of a privilege to the individual, a curse instead of a blessing to the country. Well, then, let us next examine what constitutes the independence and the union of that country. Practically speaking, Afghanistan is, as it ever has been, nothing more than a loose agglomeration of independent tribes, over whom the Ameer, for the time being, exercises by sheer military force just so much authority as the strength of that force, or the fear of the cruelty he may be able to exercise by its means, may enable him to exert. But there is no permanent settled union, no national homogeneity, not oven any tribal sympathy between Cabul, Herat, and Candahar, to say nothing of less conspicuous sub-divisions of the country. In a word, there is absolutely nothing which can be regarded as a national incorporation of the various Afghan Provinces into a single body capable of united action, and there is no probability that such a body will ever exist. My Lords, you may talk as you please of a united and independent Afghanistan; but the very phrase is contradictory. The near approach to independence of each other which obtains between the different Afghan tribes and cities is practically inconsistent with their efficient union; and any such union would destroy the only independence they value. As to the friendliness of Afghanistan, I will only say that I fear this is also, for all practical purposes, equally chimerical; and, if we trust only to that, I am afraid the time will soon arrive when we shall regret having done so. To all Asiatics, Russia's attitude and policy are much more intelligible than our own. They inspire fear, but they also inspire confidence. Russia is an aggressive Power. She can at any moment offer to the Afghans more than we can, for she can offer to them the plunder of India. England has long since reached the limits of her Empire, and cannot offer to the Afghans anything they care to have; unless, indeed, we were to offer to their Ruler for the time being an offensive and defensive alliance, which would practically put it in his power to embroil us with Russia whenever he pleased. For these reasons, my Lords, I look upon the security of a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan as equivalent to the security of Russian pledges. The two securities, each of them by itself, and both of them taken together, are absolutely worthless. But on this point I wish to guard myself against being misunderstood. I certainly do not believe that Afghanistan, if left to itself, can ever be united, as well as independent, or that it can ever be a purely self-acting barrier between us and Russia. But I am far from saying that the relations between England and Afghanistan might not have been such as to make the Afghan Kingdom a real barrier, resting on foundations laid in time by our own prescience and energy. I believe that that might have been effected in 1873, when the late Ameer of Cabul was seriously alarmed by the advance of Russia. He then urged on our attention the dangers to which, in his opinion, both Afghanistan and India would be exposed by her advance to the very point at which her power is now permanently established, and he implored us to make at once practical provision, based on definite written engagements with him, for his protection against those dangers. Unfortunately, however, the Viceroy of India was then instructed to put him off with assurances that no such dangers existed, and that there was no occasion for us to afford him the only sort of protection which appeared to him of any use. I do not wish to revive extinct controversies. But I shall never cease to believe that when the Government then ridiculed the fears, and rejected the overtures of Shere Ali, it necessarily threw him into the arms of Russia, and forfeited our last chance of really erecting in Afghanistan that barrier on which it would now be insanity for us to place any reliance, because, in fact, no such barrier exists. But then it may be said—"After all, what probability is there that Russia will now interfere in Afghanistan; and what can it matter to us if she does interfere? "My Lords, I think that, in part, I have already answered this question. But I cannot too emphatically insist upon the fact, which plainly stares us in the face, that if the Russian Frontier is now conterminous, or all but conterminous, with the Afghan Frontier at its weakest point, Russia must interfere in Afghanistan. She will be compelled to interfere in Afghanistan. She will have both the right and the obligation to do so; and, therefore, whatever new policy Her Majesty's Government may now adopt in reference to this altered state of things, the old assumption that Afghanistan is outside the sphere of Russian influence can no longer be entertained as the basis of that policy. As matters now stand, you might as well try to keep the influence of Russia from penetrating into Afghanistan as to prevent the wind from blowing through an empty keyhole. This is the one supremely important fact on which I wish to fix the attention of the House. We are bound to bear in mind that in that part of the world every man is a soldier and a nomad. The most paltry incident, the most petty ambition, may produce disturbances, capable at any moment of growing into civil war and revolution. You may as well expect Northern and Western Afghanistan to remain out of the sphere of the influence legitimately belonging to any civilized Power who is mistress of the Merv oasis, as you might expect Candahar and Cabul to be beyond the influence of such a Power if it were established at Herat. The strength of this natural and in- evitable influence it is difficult, of course, to measure. It must vary from time to time; it must depend on the nature of events. But it is already great enough to render credible the rumours lately current that the Ameer feels so strong an objection to being placed between the upper and the nether millstone, that he is not at all unlikely to abdicate and retire into private life, unless he can obtain from us enormous subsidies and far-reaching promises, which it would, in my opinion, be most unwise to give him. The new state of things created by Russia's acquisition of the Merv oasis amounts practically to this—Russia has thereby acquired the means and incurred the necessity of intermeddling how and when she pleases in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and in a manner which we have practically no power either to prevent or control. For whatever she may please to regard as our good behaviour towards her she has obtained efficient material guarantees, while for her good behaviour to us we have no such guarantees; for neither diplomatic assurances on her part, nor any independent efforts which can reasonably be expected from the Afghans, will afford us the smallest security against the danger to which we shall stand exposed if Russia, whenever it suits her policy to do so, should bring to bear against British India the cupidity of the Afghans, enforced and supported, by all the nomad Cavalry of the deserts of Central Asia. The very least of the immediate consequences of this serious change in our situation is, that you will henceforth be compelled, if you abide by your duties, to make a considerable permanent increase in the number of English troops you keep in India, and that will put a new and serious heavy drain upon the financial as well as the military resources of both India and the Empire. Such is the state of things to which the policy, or rather the impolicy, and the improvidence of the present Government have reduced us. Let me now turn to that other policy which was commenced a short time ago, continued under great difficulties for but a very few years, renounced in 1880, and reversed in 1881. That policy was based upon the principle I have already described. It accepted, as an inevitable fact, the worthlessness of Russian assurances, and the chimerical character of a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan, capable of serving as a self-acting barrier between us and Russia. An Afghanistan, united in its dependence on the organized protection of England, would no doubt have placed us in a position involving great responsibilities; but the responsibilities would, I conceive, have been more than compensated by the practical advantages. That position, however, was no longer open to us, owing to the policy of our Predecessors, which had rejected the chance and destroyed the conditions of it. We therefore considered that our only solid security against the natural consequences of a Russian advance must be found in a position both military and political, which, whenever the inevitable meeting should take place between the two great nations in Central Asia, would enable us to accept it without undignified trepidation. The House need not be afraid that I am going to inflict upon it any discussion about the Afghan War. But, be the merits and causes of that war what they may, one thing is certain—its result not only left us in possession of Candahar; it also left us pledged to the inhabitants of that town and district not to allow them to pass again under the rule of Cabul. And this was not all. The policy pursued in Beloochistan by the late Government of India—a policy which at the time was condemned by noble Lords opposite almost as severely as they condemned the Afghan War itself—secured to us three several advantages. That policy gave us, first of all, the command of the Bolan Pass; it gave us, secondly, the possession of the fort of Quetta; and it gave us, thirdly, in the Khan of Khelat, an ally who showed himself faithful to us in very trying circumstances, and who could therefore be trusted. These minor points of our much-abused policy—these three incomplete results of it—are the only ones not irretrievably surrendered by our Successors. And I believe it was with great difficulty that the noble Marquess the Governor General of India (the Marquess of Ripon) was induced to retain them, in reluctant compliance with the strong remonstrances of the officers of his own Government, and the people of Beloochistan themselves. But what has been the practical result of sparing even thus much of the policy so severely censured some years ago by Her Majesty's present Ministers? I accept the account given of it by the President of the Local Government Board. This is what Sir Charles W. Dilke said of it the other day— I think I can only inform the House further that we stand in a stronger position towards Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and in a more satisfactory position on the North-Western Frontier of Afghanistan, than we have probably ever stood in time past. We have now, by the wish of the people of the country, formally taken over the Government of Quetta, and a formal arrangement has been made. My Lords, it was not in a hostile manner to the people of Beloochistan, nor was it without their absolute approval and support—indeed, their earnest entreaty—that the late Government of India decided on that occupation of Quetta for which it was censured by the present Government. The statement of the President "of the Local Government Board continues thus— The friendliness of the people of Beloochistan now gives us entire control of the Bolan Pass, and that road is now perfectly assured, and is likely to remain tranquil."—(3 Hansard, [284] 1770.) I believe this statement to be as true as it is important. But it is equally true that, had it not been for the policy which the late Government was at the time so severely censured for adopting, we should at this moment have had no garrison at Quetta, no friendly relations with the people of Beloochistan, and no command over the Bolan Pass. On that point I have yet another word to say. Since the time when noble Lords opposite were in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, they have learnt a little from experience. I have no doubt they are learning more every day; but their education is not yet complete. They may not believe it, but I must tell them what is undoubtedly believed by their own authorities in Beloochistan, that had they kept faith with the people of Candahar, as they have been persuaded to keep faith with the people of Quetta—had they continued our protective occupation of that town and district, instead of handing them over to Cabul—we should now be established at Candahar just as securely as we are established at Quetta, and with just as absolute an approval and support on the part of the population concerned. The railway which we began to Candahar might by this time have been completed, and what would then have been our position at this moment? With a strong British force at Candahar, and its communications with the Indus fully secured, we might have laughed at any talk of danger, or even inconvenience, from Russia's occupation of Merv; and we could have viewed with undisturbed equanimity an event which is now again, we are told, to be the subject of abortive and humiliating communication with the Russian Government. For it would be impossible for an enemy, whether European or Afghan, to lay regular siege to Quetta, and equally impossible for him to march through the passes into India, leaving Quetta held by a British force in his rear. My Lords, it is certainly remarkable that the very persons who blamed us for going to Quetta and blamed us for going to Candahar—the very persons who gave up Candahar, and who, as one of their arguments for giving it up, put forward the remark that if we kept Candahar we might thereby give Russia a pretext for advancing upon Merv, should now be consoling themselves, and trying to console us, for Russia having taken permanent possession of Merv, by the reflection that we have still got possession of Quetta and control over the Bolan Pass. I cannot help saying that to them and their policy we owe just as little thanks for the possession of Quetta as we do for the abandonment of Candahar. And here I come at last to the most serious and important question of all. The policy of the present Government having drifted us into the position I have described, what ought now to be done in order to diminish the acknowledged weakness and to mitigate the prospective danger of that position? Upon this question Her Majesty's Government have hitherto been singularly reticent and mysterious—so reticent that, in order to obtain any indication of their present intentions, we can only turn to their previous utterances; and these, I suppose, we may assume to be trustworthy sources of enlightenment, as in other matters they are never tired of assuring us that their policy is neither inconsistent nor vacillating; that it has never changed; and that, having on former occasions explained it so clearly, they are under no obligations to explain it again. I shall, therefore, make no apology for reading, on a matter of such supreme importance, a remarkable statement of the steps recommended eight years ago, as those which ought to be taken in the present emergency, by the noble Earl who is now First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook). That noble Earl was then Viceroy of India, and in a Government of India despatch, addressed by him in 1875 to my noble Friend the noble Marquess behind me (the Marquess of Salisbury), he made these remarkable recommendations, which, I am bound to say, are very explicit as to what should be done if Russia were to take possession of Merv— We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turcoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan; and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier. We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises."—[Afghanistan, 1878, p.p. 134–5.] I do not know whether these words represent the present opinion of the noble Earl, or the present intentions of that consistent and unvacillating Cabinet of which he is so influential a Member. I have no hesitation, however, in expressing my own regretful conviction that the steps recommended by the noble Earl are now impracticable. If taken now, they would be taken too late, and if taken too late they would be of no advantage; they would give no security, and they would add to our danger. If the noble Earl was of opinion that those steps ought to be taken in an emergency foreseen by all but himself and his Colleagues—the annexation of Merv by Russia—he ought to have prepared the way for taking them when he had the opportunity of doing so. I should like to learn from the noble Earl, in the course of this evening, how he would propose to protect a British Resident at Herat, more than 600 miles away from the nearest railway communication with India, more than 500 miles away from the nearest British garrison, and in the midst of a lawless and turbulent population? I should like to know how he would practically fulfil the engagements of his proposed Treaty for the protection of Herat, when he and his Colleagues have not even ventured to keep a force at Candahar? An expedition to Herat would now virtually be an expedition from the Indus. It would be exceedingly costly and difficult. It would require an enormous force. That force would be completely isolated from its base; and its communication in the rear would be not only imperfect, but very dangerous. My Lords, I know not what steps, either in this direction or in any other, may have been under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government during the last three weeks; but, looking at the invariable results of their policy during the last three months in almost every part of the world, I must confess that it has often occurred to me that there is one step which might be taken—I will not say effectively, but at least very appropriately and characteristically—by the present Government. That step would be to create at once a new Department of the Foreign Office and a new Department of the War Office devoted to the careful preparation of measures to be taken only when too late. I have no doubt that these two Departments would be the busiest in Downing Street, and that they would absorb a large proportion of the funds annually voted by Parliament for the maintenance of interests depending on the management of our foreign and military affairs. I fully recognize, however, and have no wish to minimize, the extreme difficulty of the position in which Her Majesty's Ministers are placed, and in which, through their policy, all of us are placed in regard to the present state of affairs in Central Asia. Perhaps we should be too sanguine if we expected that the Ministers who have got us into that position will tell us to-night how they intend to get us out of it; but it will at least be some satisfaction if their language is such as to show that the real difficulties and the real facts of the situation are no longer deliberately ignored, and that they are at last seriously recognized in a practical spirit by those who must bear, in a very special degree, the responsibility of practically dealing with them. The extent to which this situation fundamentally differs from the state of things which preceded it may be plainly stated in a very few words. In the first place, whereas, up to the present moment, it has been agreed all round that Afghanistan must remain outside the sphere of Russia's legitimate influence, events have now brought that country unavoidably within the sphere of such influence. In the next place, whereas a united, independent, and friendly Afghanistan would, be the best barrier between England and Russia in Central Asia, the plain fact is that the constituent parts of that country cannot be united unless they cease to be independent; and that, in the present state of things, it is equally impossible to unite them in any serious dependence upon England; while, as for their future friendship, Russia can now hold out to it inducements infinitely greater than any which it is in our own power to offer. Lastly, my Lords, whereas a military position might have been taken up, and actually was taken up, which, if retained, would have rendered us justified in viewing the advance of Russia with comparative indifference, by far the most important part of that position has been abandoned, and it is difficult to see how it can now be regained. On the other hand, the less important part of that position still remains to us; and that, so far as I see, is the single consolatory reflection upon which our minds can rest in reviewing the state of things which has been brought about and the anxious position in which we have been placed by the policy of the present Government. The noble Earl concluded by moving for the Papers of which he had given Notice. Moved, "That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty for Papers showing what communications have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, about Merv and Afghanistan, since the year 1881."—(The Earl of Lytton.)

THE DUCK OF ARGYLL

My Lords, I hope it will not be inconvenient to the House, nor altogether unfavourable to the important discussion which has been raised, if I venture to intervene between the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Lytton) and the answer which will be made by Her Majesty's Government to the noble Earl, who has made, as he always does, a very eloquent and able speech. In many parts of that speech I, for one, fully concur; but I must express my regret that the noble Earl should have thought it well to treat the subject so much with reference to the details of a past controversy which most of us may have forgotten. The House will hear nothing from me to-night which may lead noble Lords to enter into this debate in a Party spirit. It is my desire to raise it to a somewhat higher level than that of mere Party, and I would ask the House, in this new point of departure in the history of Russian advances in Central Asia, to consider what are the consequences of this advance, and what is the policy we ought to pursue. And I think, my Lords, we may enter upon this discussion under peculiarly favourable circumstances. A few years ago it would have seemed incredible that such an event as Russia taking possession of Merv should have occurred, and that so little public excitement should have been raised upon the subject. If it had happened a few years ago every paper would, have been ringing with it; and I doubt very much whether any Government could have withstood the pressure which public feeling would have raised against them in reference to this act of the Russian Government. And yet the news is now received, I do not say without some feeling of misgiving, but certainly with no feeling of alarm, and very little feeling of irritation. How does this come about? Partly, I think, it is due to the fact that the public mind in England cannot be excited to a high point on foreign politics, except as to particular transactions in one portion of the world. The public mind is engrossed, and justly engrossed, with our difficult and dangerous position elsewhere, in Egypt; but I trust that the calmness with which the annexation of Merv has been received is due also to the calmer temper and the more just appreciation of the real importance of such an event as this. Let me recall the attention of the House for a few minutes to the history of this great subject of the advance of Russia in the East. During the last half-century eminent men have been directing attention to the gigantic strides of Russia; but, in former years, almost all those strides were made at the expense of the two Empires of Turkey and Persia. It was not until 1864 that Russia began those great advances in Central Asia which have so often alarmed Anglo-Indian statesmen. In that year Prince Gortchakoff issued a celebrated Circular despatch to all the Courts of Europe, explaining the conduct and designs of Russia in regard to Central Asia. Somehow, I hardly know how, that despatch was accepted as a reassuring one. It was so spoken of by Sir Henry Rawlinson; but, looking into its terms, instead of being in reality reassuring, it contained announcements of principles and intentions which were nothing short of a declaration of war against all the Khanates of Central Asia, for they amounted to this—that Russia would not tolerate robber States in her neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, the Khanates of Central Asia were "robber States," for they lived by robbery, man stealing, and slave stealing. The second announcement made in this reassuring despatch was that when a robber State was to be punished, it was not sufficient to occupy their territory by a temporary possession, but they must be finally subdued. And, lastly, there was a distinct intimation on the part of Russia that, in the whole of the matter, she would be governed, not by reclamations of other States, but by her own interests and her own honour. The principles embodied in that despatch were those on which Russia has consistently acted ever since; and I say that if statesmen in Europe and England had looked closely at it and read between the lines they would have seen the inevitable effect of the operation of the principles laid down. As Sir Henry Rawlinson had stated, the ink was scarcely dry with which it was written before the advance began, and in the five years between the beginning of 1864 and the end of 1868, Russia had actually conquered and annexed the whole of the vast territory which stretches from the Ural to the head waters of the Jaxartes. Russia finally conquered Samarcand, and that position commands Bokhara, which is a very important point. With regard to it, the noble Earl, in his speech, implied that, for the first time, Russia would touch Afghanistan in becoming possessed of Merv. That is a complete mistake. In having possession of Bokhara she was already a coterminous Power with Afghanistan. When I first went to the India Office I found that Lord Lawrence had directed the attention of Mr. Disraeli's Government to the advances made by Russia, and intimated that the time had probably come for some understanding with that Power on the subject. This proposition was dealt with in a despatch, dated December 26, 1867, by Sir Stafford Northcote, who said— Upon this point Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to he the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer, Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the proceedings of Russia or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do."—[Afghanistan (1878), pp. 25–6.] That was the opinion of my Predecessor in Office at the time with regard to the advance of Russia in Central Asia, which brought that Power up to the borders of Afghanistan. When, under the threats of noble Lords opposite, Russia began to prepare for war in the East, it is well known that one of the principal columns which Russia prepared was prepared on the basis of Bokhara. It is, therefore, clear that, on that basis and at that time, she had become a Power capable of doing a serious danger to us in India. Do let us remember who were the public men in England who held power during the five years I have mentioned. It so happened that there was a very rapid succession of Cabinets. First there was Lord Palmerston's, then Lord Russell's and the Earl of Derby's, and, lastly, Mr. Disraeli's Government. Now, I think I may assume that up to that point opinion was clearly united. I never doubted for a moment that it would be very wise and expedient to have political Agents in the principal towns of Afghanistan, if those Agents could be received with goodwill by the people; and I think there was nothing unreasonable in the desire to get reliable information in that way if it could be done. But I decline to follow the noble Earl in the attack on my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (the Earl of Northbrook) and myself who was then Secretary of State. That question has been argued in Parliament and has been decided in Parliament, and I wish to go on to another question and try to establish some unity of feeling in regard to it. What is the position which we have got to now? The advances of Russia in those five years were upon what may be called the upper line of attack—I mean of possible attack on India—the line of advance along the Oxus and Jaxartes; and the whole of these two valleys were practically subject to Russia. It has always been considered by those who have looked carefully into this matter that if ever there be an invasion of India by Russia it will not be mainly from Bokhara, but from the Caspian base and through Persia. I believe that no great expeditionary force capable of troubling us in India can advance to our Frontier without the material aid and assistance of Persia. The real alarm that has always been felt in regard to Merv is that there would be an advance of Russia towards the Persian boundary. The pressure of Russia would be exercised on Persia, and not on Afghanistan. I listened carefully to the speech of the noble Earl opposite to-night. He began by saying that he would give the House an idea of what importance Merv was. I wanted to know more about the matter than most people do know. What are the resources of Merv, and what is its geographical position? I have heard one description given of it by the noble Earl that I believe is accurate. The noble Earl says it is an oasis surrounded on all sides by desert; it is a mere green spot in the midst of one of the most hideous deserts in all Asia. But, in order to give us a truer description and a clearer idea of the great importance of Merv, the noble Earl said it was on the way between two great routes to the North. He did not, however, give us any idea of the population of Merv. We know that, at a very ancient period of history, it was the capital of a powerful and flourishing State; and it is just possible that, if it comes under a civilized Power, and immense works of irrigation are executed, it might again be the seat of a teeming population. But now, even while admitting my own ignorance as regards the subject, I doubt if Merv could turn out anything like 10,000 men. If the noble Earl can contradict that, he knows more of its present population than I do. But, whatever it may be, we have lately had the letters of newspaper correspondents and other travellers, and we know that it is a place capable of great fertility, producing melons of very great size. That does not tell us much as to the military power it is capable of giving to Russia; but Merv is a mere spot, an oasis surrounded by deserts; and as to the roads of which the noble Earl speaks to the North, I have read the account given by a military writer who took the route to the North near Charjui, to the nearest ford on the Oxus; and his description of a march of 230 or 240 miles gives you the idea that it is one of the most wretched and dangerous deserts in Central Asia, the water, where water is to be found, and that only at great distances, being of the very bitterest kind. It is, I think, perfectly certain that if Russia ever invaded India, she would never send an army, or even a detachment from the Oxus through Merv. I believe that Russian advance of a serious kind must come through the fertile districts of Persia; it must come by Meshed and Sarakhs, and have the resources of that country at its command. I am not prepared to say that, at some future time, such an expedition may not be taken. All I say is, that it must be done with the complicity and with the resources of the Persian Government, and that our best agency should be established in Persia. I believe that all the objects aimed at by the late Government in seeking to establish Agents in Afghanistan will be better accomplished by having a good Minister established at the Court of Teheran, and Agents at Meshed and other places in Persia. Another point in regard to Merv the noble Earl took care not to mention. I do not know, however, that he had any object in concealing it, because his theory—a very reasonable one—is that the advance of Russia is inevitable, and that all her promises are so much waste paper—so much wasted breath. I believe them to be so. All that I want the House to understand clearly is, that no charge of breach of faith or of any absolute promise can be brought against Russia in this matter. I speak for myself—I do not speak for the Government—but some years ago, when I looked very carefully into the matter, I found not one single Russian promise, so-called, that was not so fortified—and especially that celebrated despatch of Prince Gortchakoff's to which I have referred—by contingencies, that they would have a perfect right, if those contingencies arose, to go forward whenever they pleased. As to Merv, the noble Earl forgot to mention that of all the robber hordes in Central Asia the Merv Turcomans are about the most bloodthirsty and the very worst. I am told that when Sir John M'Neill was Minister in Persia, for many years he had constant appeals addressed to him as to the rescue of captive Persian and Russian subjects who had been kidnapped by these Turcoman hordes. Russia, therefore, has had a positive grievance in this—that the commerce of Central Asia could not be conducted so long as these people were not subdued. I must say, with all my determination—as strong as that of any other person can be—to maintain our Indian Empire, it is against my conscience, against my belief of the truth, to say that the safety of our Indian Empire depends upon maintaining this robber horde at Merv. I have, myself, for many years read language of constant remonstrance which has been addressed to the Russian Government on the subject of Central Asia. Some of that language was addressed to them by the noble Earl the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby), in despatches giving distinct warning to Russia, not so much on the noble Earl's own behalf, as on account of the susceptibilities of the people of this country, to the effect that any advance of Russia in that region would be considered as alarming, and as calculated to create difficulties in the relations between the two Powers. I frankly confess that I have gone the length of feeling that that language was language which it was not worthy of this country to address to Russia. In the first place, I did not believe in the danger; and, in the second place, I did not believe in the justice of those remonstrances. I have thought that, in the natural course of events, Russia must compel the Turcomans to give up their kidnapping and marauding pursuits, which are their only means of living, and that that would mean nothing less than the subjection of the country to Russia. I watched very closely the speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Lytton) to learn what he himself would have done in the present circumstances; whether he would have threatened Russia with the wrath of England, or made serious menaces which he might not have been able to carry out; but the noble Earl most carefully avoided committing himself to any resolution on the point. Let me read to the House the opinion on this point of a very distinguished man, no less than Sir Bartle Frere, and I cannot mention his name without expressing the deep sorrow with which we all have heard of his serious illness. I do not know if there is any man in public life with whose opinions I have more widely differed than Sir Bartle Frere; but I have sat with him in council, I have read his despatches, I have observed his public career, and this I will say—that I know no abler man, no abler public servant, no man with a more extended knowledge, and, above all—for this is what we value our Indian officers for—I never met a man who had more of the courage of his opinions, and who was more able or willing to assume the responsibility that his opinions might involve, and I trust that he will soon be restored to health. Well, here is the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere, who, as your Lordships know, was an advocate of what is called a forward policy in India. He says— As for making an advance upon Merv by Russia a casus belli, I do not think the proposal will stand examination. The place is nothing to us except as a step towards Herat and Cabul, and it is not a necessary step to either; but to prohibit the Russians from taking it might, in the event of their regarding our prohibition, force them to turn it, and thus delay for some time the extermination of hordes of robbers and man-stealers, whose intervention between us and Russia must ever be a fruitful source of misunderstanding. But the Russians will not, or, more correctly speaking, they cannot, stop; they cannot regard any mere threats or prohibitions of ours of that kind. What, in those circumstances, ought to be the policy of this country? The noble Earl spoke as if the traditional policy that had existed for a long time—that of maintaining an independent Afghanistan—was now out of the question. I have not seen the despatches that have lately come with respect to the state of Afghanistan; but I do not think it is impossible to restore Afghanistan to a sufficient degree of strength to be a very good bulwark against Russia. It is a difficult country to enter, and, as we found the other day in the war, it is a country peopled with most gallant tribes, who, on several occasions, gave our troops—the most disciplined troops in Europe—almost enough to do to combat with them. I do not despair of our traditional policy; but if the Afghans are alarmed at the progress of Russia, if they should change their minds in respect of receiving officers at Cabul and Herat, I see nothing to prevent the Government adopting such a policy. If the Government are clear that Russia is making for Persia along the Merv oasis, or in any other direction, with a view to making that country either wholly or in part the basis of military operations, we shall then be entirely in a new position, and able to take our own measures in Afghanistan. But, my Lords, this I will say—that although, in my estimation, the war waged by noble Lords opposite was not, in the circumstances, a just war, yet I am not prepared to say that it has been wholly without some good effect. My Lords, there is no use disguising the fact that the power of England in the East is a great power. It is well that the half-civilized tribes of that part of the world should know that we are their masters, and that when we like to take a country like Afghanistan with the resources of our civilization, we can do it without any serious sacrifice to our resources. And, my Lords, this is the reason—to touch for a moment upon another subject—this is the reason why I cannot sympathize with some of the language which has been held by some noble Lords on this side of the House in regard to what has been called the massacres which have lately taken place in Northern Africa on the Nile. My Lords, it is a matter of great moment to the civilized world—whatever may be the policy of the present Government—that these Mahomedans in Africa should know that we can and will beat them. Depend upon it, we may admire their gallantry as much as we please—and no man can admire their gallantry more than I do—but, nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent with that admiration that we should wish to defeat them. We have defeated them, and they have learned a lesson they will not forget. Whatever may be the future policy of this Government or any other future Government in Afghanistan, it is not by any means an unimportant circumstance that we have had a successful campaign against them. Now, I am not going to dictate to the Government, or even to suggest to them the course they should take in relation to this matter. Whatever that course may be, there is one thing which I earnestly urge upon the Government, and it is this—that they shall not go to Russia and ask for new assurances. I quite agree with the noble Earl opposite that it is not a dignified attitude, and, however sincere the Cabinet of St. Petersburg may be in giving its promises, which is quite possible, that Cabinet has not the power always to control events, so as to be able to fulfil them. Therefore, the promises given are not worth the breath with which they are spoken. Whatever may be the policy, let it be independent of them. There may, however, be negotiations between us and Russia in regard to limitations of territory. That is the legitimate thing, and the proposition now made by the noble Earl may or may not be true as a general doctrine; but we have promised her independence to Afghanistan, and I trust that we shall never break that promise, unless Afghanistan commits an act of treachery against us. That is the only ground—and it is a sufficient one—on which I would respect the independence of Afghanistan. Now, my Lords, I hope the House will not think that I have spoken in a spirit either of what the noble Earl would call a Russophobe or a Russophil. I do not know why anyone should suspect me of being a Russophil. I have the honour—and a great honour I deem it—of being one of the very few survivors of the Cabinet which fought the Crimean War. Unlike many other Members of the Liberal Party, who are never tired of denouncing that war as either a great folly or a great crime, I have never been ashamed of the part which the English Government took on that occasion. We did not fight for the resurrection of Turkey. I, for one, never would. We fought for the great principle that, whatever the fate of Turkey might be, it was not to rest in the hands of Russia, but it was a question to be decided by Europe—not by Russia, not by secret Treaties and Conventions, giving her the power to do what she pleases when she pleases. That was the principle for which we fought, and it is the principle which I, for one, should be ready to fight for again. But, my Lords, as regards Central Asia, I have had this feeling—that Russia is there, at least, as a civilizing Power. The noble Earl opposite, in his speech, admitted that there is no other Power which can reduce these robber tribes. There is no other Power that can rescue and raise that great region of the world, the source and origin of our own race, from the misery and the degradation which has long afflicted it; and, although, as compared with us, and as regards Europe, Russia is not a civilized Power, in that country she is. But, my Lords, when I come to contemplate such an event as the possible invasion of British India by Russia, then again I turn round and say that such an event would be almost as wretched an event to anticipate as any that had ever happened in history; in fact, a Russian invasion of England would be almost as bad. Such an event would destroy the civilization which we have established in that part of the world, and also the Empire of which we are justly proud. I have to say, in conclusion, that whatever be the measures the Government may take for securing our Indian Frontier, they will receive the hearty support of the united people of this country.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

My Lords, I shall not detain the House any length of time by commenting upon the speech of the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll), with a great part of which I concur. I understand the noble Duke to advance the argument that England should show herself prepared to defend India, and not to be deterred from making whatever preparations may be necessary to secure it from Russian ambition. I am not going to contemplate that as a very near process, nor as one that Russia has in contemplation. I look upon the question of the advances of Russia in Central Asia mainly from the point of view of the effect it will produce on the people of India in weakening the Government there, and giving the impression that England is a receding Power, and Russia an advancing Power. Nor am I disposed to forget that some such feeling has been created in the Indian mind. I do not lay great stress upon the Indian Press; but this I do say—that already, in taking up this sub- ject, the newspaper Press has made numberless attacks on British power, and it is said that the British power is waning before the advancing power of Russia. Sir Bartle Frere used stronger language than any used by the noble Duke. He stated that it was inevitable that Russia should advance until she met with some impassable barrier, or until she came in contact with some Power whom she had reason to fear, and who might become conterminous with that Power, taking under its Government the tribes then on the Russian Frontier. One thing is obviously necessary—if Afghanistan is to be protected from Russia, and if Afghanistan is indispensable for the purposes of our defence as regards India, we cannot leave that country in such a position as will enable her to send her Border Tribes into Russian territory. If we consider that the Borders of Afghanistan are to be made practically the Borderland of Russia, and that the internal affairs of Afghanistan are not to be interfered with, it becomes an absolute necessity that, either by force, or in other ways, England should take upon herself the restriction of the Frontier Tribes over which she exercises control from becoming an invading Power against Russia, and so bring Russia nearer to ourselves. I am not going on this occasion to follow the consideration of what took place formerly. It is no use at this time to refer to the past, because at this moment we really want some sort of knowledge as to what is going on. Merv may be the unimportant place which the noble Duke opposite has described it to be at present; but no one knows how strong it may not be made from a strategical point of view in the hands of Russia. The fact that it has once been a great city shows that, at least, under a civilizing Power, it may suffice to maintain a very considerable force. Now that Russia has come to the weak point of the Afghan Frontier, she has, by their recent submission, relieved herself from the pressure of the Turcoman Tribes which could have been brought against her. Irrespective of the line of march that Russia may adopt in the face of an invasion of India, she has, by subduing these tribes, made herself safe on the North from any danger which could have arisen. I quite agree with my noble Friend (the Earl of Lytton) that an independent Afghanistan has become almost an impossibility. Although it was so to some extent and for a short period under Dost Mahomed, it never existed in the the time of Shere Ali; and Abdurrahman at the present moment is not strong. I speak, of course, with great diffidence as to his position, because since 1881 we are almost without Papers; and I shall, therefore, press the noble Earl opposite that we should be, as early as possible, furnished with full information as to what has taken place since we withdrew from Afghanistan and left Abdurrahman with a sort of Sovereignty over the country. I also agree with the noble Duke opposite that all we do must be done with reliance on the right hand of England alone. If Russian promises are made, they must be thrust aside as of no consequence, bearing in mind that Russia is pushed forward by inevitable circumstances over which she has no control up to a certain point, where, I am afraid, she must come into collision with England. That point once attained, there will be no other means of restraining her advance but such force as we may possess.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, I quite agree with a great deal that has been said by the noble Duke and the noble Viscount. I agree that it is essential, in dealing with the very grave and difficult question regarding our position in Afghanistan, that we should take an independent line, relying on ourselves, and not merely on any assurances which we may obtain from any Foreign Powers. Without wishing to say anything derogatory of a Power with whom we are on friendly terms, I cannot say that I have ever thought we ought to rest much on the assurances we have received. It has been truly pointed out that Russia is pushed forward by a variety of reasons; and, whether we receive assurances or not, we should, in directing our policy, look at facts and accommodate ourselves to them, and not to what Foreign Powers may say. I do not, however, go quite so far as the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton), who said diplomatic communications were perfectly useless. I cannot go so far as that, because, especially between civilized Powers, there must be, from time to time, understandings and communications with regard to matters of common interest, and we have reasonable ground for expecting that those communications will be of a certain weight at the time in disclosing to us the policy which a friendly Government intends to pursue. That is a very different matter from placing reliance on those communications in the sense of neglecting measures of precaution which our own interests require, which would he certainly most imprudent. But now in regard to what has taken place at Merv. I have certainly never been what is called a Russophobe; but, on the other hand, I have never been one of those who can regard with indifference the advance of Russia in Asia, and for this reason—not because it indicates an intention on her part to undertake a great invasion of India, but because I believe that the approach of a great Power near our Empire in India must have a disturbing effect on our position in Asia. It is impossible that it should be otherwise. It may not be a hostile approach, and it may ultimately have no injurious effect, but reflection upon the position which we hold and which Russia holds in Asia will show that an advance which brings these two great Empires into contact is an event of considerable interest and importance. The noble Earl who opened this discussion naturally recurred to the past, and I must refer to some of the observations which he made. He spoke of the policy of relying on the assurances of Russia; and, secondly, of the policy which consisted in the maintenance of a friendly and an independent Afghanistan which might be a barrier to Russia. Those were the two alternatives he brought before us. Now, as to the first, I think I have said enough. There is no great difference of opinion between us. As regards the second point we differ entirely. I am quite sure that the policy which he pursued would have rendered it still more difficult than it was to set up the strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan of which we used to hear a great deal. But I admit that the proceedings of the noble Earl have not had all the injurious effects that might have been expected from them. It has been said that Abdurrahman is a Ruler so weak that he exercises no real authority in Afghanistan. Now, from the communications that reach me, I am able to state that that is a very exaggerated view. To say that Abdurrahman is as strong a Ruler as Dost Mahomed would be absurd; but he exercises strong authority over a considerable part of Afghanistan, and a certain authority over the whole of it. Our communications with Abdurrahman are such as to show that he is animated by very friendly feelings towards us. The noble Earl's (the Earl of Lytton's) policy was one very intelligible and very ingenious. It was that of destroying entirely this strong; and united Afghanistan; it was to occupy Candahar with British troops, and then Herat was to be given over to Persia. Now, of all the devices I ever heard of for facilitating the advance of Russia towards India I never heard of one more calculated to do so than the handing of Herat over to Persia. If that had been adopted you would practically have brought Russia into very dangerous contact with the Afghan territories nearer India, and certainly would never have attained the object you have in view—the strengthening of India against Russia. When we came into Office we gave up Candahar, and I think that was a wise policy. Why so? Because if we had retained possession of Candahar we should have had an unfriendly Afghanistan, and an unfriendly Afghanistan would greatly increase our difficulties in that quarter; and the cardinal point in the policy to be pursued is, in my opinion, to secure Afghanistan being on friendly terms. To occupy Candahar was to take the course most likely to prevent the possibility of our having a real friendly alliance with Afghanistan. The present Government, therefore, on coming into Office retired from Candahar. Lord Hartington, my Predecessor at the India Office, at the same time, recognized that Afghanistan was a country over which we must exercise a certain amount of influence and control, and we gave an engagement to Abdurrahman that if he were attacked England would assist him in his defence. That is a very important engagement. It was, in substance, the same as the promise given to Shere Ali by my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook). Now, of course, we are perfectly aware that under the present circumstances it is necessary that we should draw into closer relations with Afghanistan; in fact, that is the essential result of Russia coming near to her; and what is most important in the assump- tion by the Russians of Merv is that they will now be in immediate contact with the frontier of Afghanistan on the North-West. That undoubtedly renders it necessary that we should have closer relations with Afghanistan, and that we should continue to exercise that control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan we now exercise; so that, as the noble Viscount pointed out, we should be in a position to prevent quarrels arising between Afghanistan and its neighbours which might give rise to any serious results to ourselves. The noble Earl who brought the subject forward spoke rather slightingly of diplomatic relations. Now, although I do not say you should lay too much stress on diplomatic assurances, I think that some diplomatic understanding was necessary. The noble Earl said that Afghanistan could not he out of the sphere of Russian influence. Of course, Russia must exercise a certain influence in Afghanistan; but what we mean by Afghanistan being out of the sphere of Russian influence is that they are not to exercise any direct diplomatic pressure upon Afghanistan. The main basis of our whole policy in that country, and the basis of the policy of successive Governments, is that Afghanistan is regarded as being outside the sphere of Russian influence, and it is not merely the danger of Russian encroachment, but the obligations we are under as to Afghanistan, which render it necessary that there should be a friendly Afghanistan acting under our influence, and, to a certain extent, in these matters by our directions. Another point to which the noble Earl alluded was what he called the total destruction of his policy with the exception of one part of it—namely, the occupation of Quetta, which, although it was loudly condemned at the time, was afterwards adopted. I remember that there was a very loud condemnation of the occupation of Candahar, and that doubts were expressed as to the occupation of Quetta—doubts expressed by persons of great experience in Indian affairs. But the Government came to the conclusion that, on the whole, weighing the matter on all sides, it was desirable to occupy Quetta, and having so decided they took further steps. They thought it was desirable that one portion at Quetta should be placed on a more stable footing, and negotiations have taken place between the Indian Government and the Khan of Khelat which have resulted in the administration of Quetta and the Bolan Pass being entirely handed over to us. Then the noble Earl referred to the discontinuance of the construction of a railway from Sibi to Quetta. Well, that is a matter which depends upon a variety of considerations; and although the railway to Sibi was completed four years ago, it was not thought expedient at that time that it should be continued to Quetta. The time has, however, now come when the matter must be reconsidered; for, having fixed ourselves at Quetta, it naturally follows that we should give the necessary protection to our garrison there by means of railway communication. Now, my Lords, the noble Viscount who spoke last asked what we intended to do, and that probably is a point the House may feel the most anxiety upon. It is very obvious that, as we are at present in communication with the Russian Government, I am not in a position to say much; but this I think I may say—that we are perfectly sensible that, looking to our communications in Afghanistan and to the approach of Russia to our actual frontier, it will be necessary to have some definite and clear demarcation of what is Afghanistan and what is the Russian line of frontier. That is a point which we are well aware must be settled, and before this occupation of Merv took place Her Majesty's Government had been in communication with the Ameer, with the view of collecting information and preparing for the ultimate dealing with the question. At the same time, as the noble Earl must be aware, it is a subject of very great difficulty. He himself has alluded to the country on the North-West Frontier, and knows how difficult it is to draw a line with perfect satisfaction. I hold that it would be a complete mistake for the Government of this country or the Government of India not to look at the whole of this question together, or to forget that, although the line of approach of Russia from the side of Persia may be an event which more immediately requires our attention, yet that there are other lines of approach, and that, without in the least implying apprehension of an invasion, the approach of the two Powers to one another must necessitate further communication in regard to their position with regard to those regions. My Lords, these are matters which are fully present to our attention; but I gather with satisfaction, from what has been said on both sides of the House, that however we may dislike the advance of Russia towards India, we do not think there is any cause for alarm. It is perfectly competent for us to deal with the matter after our own fashion without consulting the views of any other Power, and in such a way as to make it understood in India that while we do not apprehend any such event as an attack by Russia on India, we are perfectly prepared to take those measures which may be necessary to make our frontier in India one which, I believe, will be as strong and unassailable as any other land frontier in the world.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

My Lords, I must express the disappointment which I feel at much that has fallen from the noble Earl who has just sat down. The noble Earl's speech has left your Lordships just as much in ignorance of the policy of the Government as you were at the beginning. He bestowed most of his attention upon what I may call the ancient history of this matter, and steadily avoided the point upon which the attention of the House is mainly concentrated. The noble Duke opposite, from whom we have heard a very interesting and able speech, disbelieves in any danger, and, to a great extent, justifies Russia in her subjugation of the Turcoman Tribes around Merv. Now, whatever nations do in fulfilment of what they hold to be their inevitable destiny, we are entitled to look to their assurances formally, clearly, and unequivocally given. A great Power like Russia should not give deliberate assurances of that kind, and then, almost before the ink in which they are written is dry, endeavour to find some excuse for casting them to the winds. It would be easy to weary the House by reading the numerous assurances given by Russian Ministers, Statesmen, and Ambassadors, explaining her specific intentions with regard to Merv. There are even Imperial declarations on the subject. In 1875 the noble Earl the present Colonial Secretary warned Count Schouvaloff about the approach of Russia near Merv, and received from him in reply satisfactory assurances. In 1876 Prince Gortchakoff assured Lord Augustus Loftus that the Russians had no intention of moving upon Merv. In 1879 a similar disclaimer was given by the Russian Ambassador in London to my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Salisbury). In that same year the Emperor of Russia, in a personal interview with Lord Dufferin at St. Peters burg, gave him an assurance that the English were unreasonably alarmed, and that no movement upon Merv was intended. These were as distinct and emphatic assurances as one honourable man can give to another. But they were not all. In 1879 Lord Dufferin, receiving from the Russian Minister at St. Petersburg what amounted to a qualification of the assurances that had been given, protested, and satisfying assurances were thereupon again given. In 1881 a letter was shown by the Russian Ambassador to the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs containing an intimation that possibly some temporary occupation of Merv might be desirable. The noble Earl protested against the suggestion as an English Minister was bound to do, and in March of that year further assurances were given that nothing whatever was intended. Thus, year after year you have had successive remonstrances and protests on the part of the English Government as to the intentions of the Russian Government, and year after year you have had the most distinct assurances that your wishes would be respected. But what has happened since 1881? From time to time various Members of both Houses of Parliament have questioned the Government on the subject of the Russian advance towards Merv. I could read a whole string of Questions which prove this at all events—that great anxiety has been felt, and that there has been a prevalent desire to know the true state of things. In March, 1881, Sir Charles W. Dilke, on being asked whether he would telegraph to Herat to ascertain the truth of the rumour that Russian troops were at Merv, replied that the investigation of the rumour was not worth the expense of a telegram. That answer, I think, shows that the Government were extremely apathetic and indifferent. Later on the same Question was again put to Sir Charles W. Dilke. He replied—"The Government have no reason to suppose that the Russian troops are now at Merv;" and on being asked whether he would telegraph for information, he said—"No." Thus we obtained no information from the Government, although we now know that all this time movements in the direction of Merv were going on. Now, what really is the value or importance of Merv? The Russian Government have somewhere been good enough to say that they have changed their opinion about the importance of that place, and that it is of less value than they supposed it to be. But in this House there is a general acknowledgment of its importance. My noble Friend who began this discussion referred to the ancient importance of Merv. It was once a town great in Oriental learning, in wealth, civilization, and population. We read in some old historians that the population was stated to be as high as 1,000,000. This, at least, is certain—that Merv was a rich, cultivated, and populous city. And the old conditions which made Merv rich and populous exist at present. These conditions are two—a fertile soil and an abundance of water. My noble Friend the noble Duke spoke of it as a mere oasis surrounded with deserts, and consequently valuable only in itself, and furnishing no base of operations in a military point of view. I would not set my judgment against that of my noble Friend; but my impression, derived from recent travels and inquiries, is that there is an oasis on three sides, and that on the Southwestern side is a very fertile grass tract, where military operations can be carried on. Though the noble Duke put down the population at the modest estimate of 10,000, I believe that everyone who really knows the country would put the numbers at much more. We know that the population are capable of rendering effective service as irregular horse, and when brought under discipline may render all the services which a military Power may require of them. These tribes have been driven back upon Afghanistan, and the occupation of Merv by Russia distinctly threatens Herat as well as the independence of Persia. If that be a truer estimate of the value of Merv, what are the consequences which may be expected from its annexation? For we must bear in mind that while, on one occasion, the Russian Government threatened a temporary occupation, not one word has been spoken now which implies that the occupation is other than permanent. The Rulers of India in former times held that Merv was the key of Herat, and that Herat was the key of India. The most serious point of all is that, by the annexation of Merv, Russia and England are distinctly brought into political contact. They are the only two great Powers in that part of the world. Once you cut away the neutral zone, be the course what it may, whether the two Governments be friendly or unfriendly, rivalry in various particulars must grow up. Rivalry there must be between the two nations. In every Eastern town, bazaar, and village, wherever England and Russia are known, there will be all that reckless political competition, so to speak, which grows up from the very necessity of the case. There were parts of the speech of the noble Duke which seemed to favour the theory that it was well that we should become conterminous with a civilized Power. I was glad that the noble Earl who spoke for the Government did not lend his voice to that view. The noble Duke said that Russia was a civilized Power, that she would spread civilization, and that wherever civilization spread it must be for the advantage of the world. I do not believe in the doctrine of the noble Duke. The experience of Europe and of the whole world is adverse to it. Conterminous borders are no guarantee for the friendship of States. Are France and Germany the better friends because their borders are conterminous? Are Franco and Italy? Are Germany and Russia? And what reason is there to expect that when our borders are conterminous with those of Russia our relations with Russia will be better? The only result, as far as we are concerned, is that the military burdens of India must be increased. One other point. We hoped to have heard some statement of what the policy of Her Majesty's Government must be in circumstances which the noble Earl admitted to be very grave. The noble Duke said that we should not ask any further assurances from Russia. My Lords, what is the use of assurances when they are not worth the paper on which they are written? The noble Earl said that Her Majesty's Government, at all events, are prepared to deal calmly with the question in their usual fashion. What does their usual fashion mean?

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I did not say "in our usual fashion." I do not think I spoke of fashion. I may have said that we should deal with it without passion.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

I did not so understand the noble Earl. But what is the policy which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue? The noble Earl said that they would draw closer our relations with Afghanistan. Does that mean very much what was the policy of my noble Friends behind me, or does it mean something very different? He said we ought to take up a strong position.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I never said that we meant to take up a strong position.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

At all events, that we were so to arrange our relations with Afghanistan that Russia should not consider that Afghanistan came within the range of her influence. The Government, I think, should either take up a strong material position, or so speak to Russia that there might be no mistake whatever as to their meaning. Lord Lawrence, who was satisfied of the dangers of the gradual approaches and perpetual annexations on the part of Russia, held that it was incumbent upon the Government of England to draw a particular line, and that if such line were overpassed a casus belli would be established. Whatever policy we now adopt, let it for once be firm and consistent, instead of a policy oscillating to and fro, and which is hot at one time and cold at another. The result of the vacillation that has hitherto been shown by the Government is that they cannot speak out with the plainness and vigour with which they ought to speak. On the other hand, the Russian Government are encouraged by this seeming indifference to make further annexations and to mistake the indifference of a small section of politicians for the indifference of the whole country; and at the last moment we shall awake to find that the dream resolves itself into some most terrible and bloody reality.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken has assumed that there has been vacillation in the policy of the Government in respect to Central Asia. Now, I can recollect a striking instance of vacillation with respect to the policy of this country in regard to Central Asia, and that was when the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) talked one day of "large maps," and then suddenly changed his opinion and policy and pursued a directly opposite line. The policy of Her Majesty's Government, far from being vacillating, has been consistent, clear, and intelligible. Sir Lepel Griffin, who was charged by the Government of India with the conduct of negotiations with Abdurrahman, addressed that Prince in August, 1880, when he was placed on the Throne of Afghanistan, to the following effect:— The British Government admits no right of interference by Foreign Powers within Afghanistan. Later on, in the other House, on a very important occasion, when the policy of the Government in withdrawing Her Majesty's Forces from Candahar was discussed, the Marquess of Hartington said that— The present Government have admitted as plainly as any other that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan is a matter to them of vital importance, and that they do not intend to permit interference by any Foreign Powers with the internal and external affairs of Afghanistan. Nothing, I think, could be more clear or more precise than the declarations which Her Majesty's Government have made of their determination to prevent foreign interference with Afghanistan; and on every occasion the Russian Government have admitted that Afghanistan was beyond the sphere of the influence which they consider they have a right to exercise in Central Asia. While I quite agree with the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that in some respects the subjugation of the Turcomans of Merv to Russia will be of advantage to the civilization, peace, and comfort of that part of the world—because I know they have been the greatest stealers of men in the whole of the vast area of Central Asia, and have supplied the slave markets for the whole country—while I cannot regret that they have come under the Sovereignty of a Power sufficiently strong to prevent the terrible devastation of Persian Khorassan by these Turcomans, I must, at the same time, express my regret, looking at the matter from a political point of view, that the Russian dominion has extended so far as Merv. But my reasons are not quite the same as those of noble Lords opposite. I do not believe in the great strategical value of Merv, and I consider that no geographical limit will prevent Russia from exercising influence in Afghanistan if she should wish to do so. Besides, Bokhara, a country under the control of Russia already, adjoins Afghanistan. I do not, therefore, believe that the extension of the Russian dominion to Merv is to be regretted on the ground that it will give Russia greater power of exercising influence than she had before. But I regret the acceptance of the Sovereignty of Merv by Russia, because it may probably lead to disturbances and dissensions between the Turcomans of Merv, who are now Russian subjects, and the people of Afghanistan, which may cause unpleasant transactions between Russia and Afghanistan. Mainly on that account the possession of Merv by Russia has always been deprecated by the Government of India, and has always been looked upon by the Rulers of Afghanistan with apprehension. I am one of those who think that the negotiations which were carried on for many years between Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff, and other eminent statesmen, and which had for their object the maintenance of a wide margin between the Possessions of England and Russia in the East, were wise. In Europe no evils arise from great Empires being conterminous; but the case is very different in the East, where the subjects of both Powers are not of their own nationality, and where there must be greater difficulty from the nature of things in settling any small differences than there can be in Europe. Moreover, the local agents on the spot are not always under the same control and subject to the same influences as in Europe. I, therefore, regret that the time has now come when, practically, the English and Russian Empires in Asia must be considered as conterminous. I can state shortly how I consider that this has occurred. In 1878 the condition of affairs between this country and Russia was exceedingly critical. The Reserves were called out, our Fleet was sent to the Dardanelles, and troops from India were sent to Cyprus. In the spring of that year we were on the verge of a war with Russia. At that time General Kauffman unwisely despatched a Mission to Cabul. That led to the war between England and Afghanistan; and the result was, undoubtedly, a great diplomatic defeat to the Russian Government. The Russian Mission was obliged to leave Cabul; Shere Ali Khan, to whom it had been sent, was driven ignominiously from his country; and when he appealed to Russia for assistance, the Russians were unable to assist him. It was about that time that the first really serious movement took place along the Northern Frontier of Persia, and General Lomakin advanced in the direction of Merv. We had in Afghanistan our misfortunes, among them being the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the repulse at Maiwand. The Russians, too, had their misfortunes. General Lomakin was defeated; but afterwards, in 1881, General Skobeleff defeated the Turcomans in a great battle, and, in fact, established Russian authority over the Tekke Turcomans, which carried with it almost inevitably the assumption of Sovereignty at Merv. Russia, in my opinion, has during all these years been impelled forward to acquire an expensive, and, to my mind, very useless territory; we, on the other hand, have spent some £20,000,000 in Afghanistan; and, as far as I am able to judge, the condition of affairs in Afghanistan is certainly no better than it was before. That is my way of accounting for the present condition of affairs; and these mistakes made by England and by Russia are the reasons why the wise provisions contemplated by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff could not be maintained, and we have at present to accept the inevitable. My noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) does not seem altogether to have understood the explanation given by the Secretary of State for India respecting the policy of the Government. The general lines of that policy are surely clear enough—namely, that we maintain the resolution which we have expressed in no ambiguous terms, that it is our business to see that there is no foreign interference with Afghanistan; and, moreover, that, under the present circumstances, it is necessary that there should be some more clear demarcation of the frontier between Russian territory at Merv and Afghanistan than now exists, with the view of preventing the difficulties which are not unlikely to arise from the Russian Turcomans and the Turcomans under the rule of the Ameer of Afghanistan being conterminous. It would not be reasonable to ask the Government, so short a time after the news arrived, and before they have been able to communicate with the Viceroy of India, to enter into further explanations regarding the manner in which the relations between England and Afghanistan may be strengthened and made more intimate. But the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton), who succeeded me in the Office of Governor General of India, has asked me whether a recommendation, which the Government of India made in 1875, expresses the policy which Her Majesty's Government now maintain in this respect, and he read a paragraph from the despatch in which that recommendation was expressed. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read, it again. It is as follows:— Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would he produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turcoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan; and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier."—[Afghanistan, 1878, pp. 134–5.] That opinion was given nine years ago, and it was given before the events took place which are well known to your Lordships, when the noble Earl opposite succeeded me as Viceroy; and if I am asked whether the recommendations we then made can be carried out now, I must know somewhat more than I now do about the present position of Afghanistan. It is a question that can only be answered by the Viceroy, after obtaining the best information that he can obtain of the disposition of the Ameer of Cabul. The warning which the Government of India gave to the noble Marquess opposite, when he was Secretary of State for India, contained in the very despatch from which the noble Earl has quoted, against a course which was calculated to alienate the Ameer Shere Ali, and in all probability to bring on a war between England and Afghanistan, was not taken. No attention was paid to it by the noble Marquess, or the noble Earl, and the warning came true. By their policy they brought on the war. They nearly dissolved Afghanistan into its first elements again; and the noble Earl asks me whether I would now carry out a recommendation which was given in circumstances entirely different from those existing at present, and when he and the noble Marquess who sits by his side have, by their action, prevented the circumstances from remaining the same. I agree with the opinion expressed by the noble Duke behind me as to the establishment of British Agents in Afghanistan. I have no objection to the location of British Agents at Herat, or in other parts of Afghanistan, upon one condition—that is, that they shall go with the full concurrence of the Ruler of the country, and go as friends, and not be looked upon as enemies and spies. That was the advice which we gave to the noble Marquess, but which he did not act upon. I do not agree with the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton) that a British Agent would run any serious risk at Herat. There have been British Agents in Herat before; they have remained there for some time, and they came to no harm. I consider that if a British Agent even now were placed at Herat with the full consent and at the wish of the Ruler of Afghanistan, he would not be in a position of greater risk than Englishmen often occupy in different parts of the world. It would be a great advantage to have an English Resident at Herat, because he would be on the spot when any differences arose between the Turcoman tribes of Afghanistan and of Merv, and, therefore, would be able to settle them. My Lords, I regretted to hear the noble Earl disagree with the general opinion entertained of the value of a strong Afghanistan between Russia and India. I understood the noble Earl to take the view that it was no use our making any representations to Russia in respect of her progress towards Merv; that the idea of having a strong and independent Afghanistan was altogether a fallacy; and that we ought to take up a military and political position which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

Afghanistan never can be, and never has been, independent.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

It comes to very nearly the same thing—namely, that Afghanistan cannot be united and independent. I do not think the opinion of the noble Earl is borne out by the history of Afghanistan. At the present time the Ruler of Afghanistan appears to me, as far as I can judge, to have governed his country with energy and ability, and to have made quite as much progress as could have been expected in the time in establishing his authority over the whole country. The noble Earl doubts whether he can establish his authority over the country. I think Abdurrahman is in no worse position than his Predecessor, Shere Ali, who established his authority over the whole of Afghanistan, including Herat and the outlying parts. For many years his father, Dost Mahomed, did the same thing; and, therefore, I say that history is opposed to the contention of the noble Earl. The noble Earl said that the position he wished to take up had been taken up before he left India—I mean the position which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia, and he complained that his policy had been reversed by the present Government and my noble Friend (Lord Ripon) who succeeded him as Viceroy. I was perfectly astonished to hear that statement, and I waited to see what proof the noble Earl had to bring forward. I waited, moreover, to see in what point my noble Friend and the present Government had altered the policy which he carried out while he was Governor General. What was the position in which the noble Earl left Afghanistan? The position of Afghanistan was this. The policy of the Conservative Government was— To hand over Herat to Persia, to separate Western and Southern Afghanistan—that is to say, Herat and Candahar—from Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, composed of Turkistan and Cabul-cum-Jellalabad.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

What is the noble Earl reading from?

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I will satisfy the noble Marquess in a moment if he will only have a little patience. They proposed to make Northern and Eastern Afghanistan over to any strong Ruler who might be found. Candahar had been already erected into a separate State, granted as a hereditary possession of Wali Shere Ali Khan, while Herat was destined for Persia. The Persian negotiations fell through, and the idea was naturally not revived when the Liberals took Office.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

What is the quotation from?

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I will satisfy the noble Marquess in a moment. The noble Earl in his speech threw out, as I understood it, some accusation against Lord Ripon or the Government that some breach of faith had been committed by the evacuation of Candahar. What were the real circumstances of the case? While the Conservative Government were in power a declaration was made at Cabul— That the British Government had no intention of occupying permanently or annexing Candahar, and our withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reiterated and solemn professions and assurances of the Government of India to the Chiefs and people of Cabul. We could not have remained without a breach of public faith. My Lords, the words which I have read to the House were written by a gentleman of the highest reputation in the Indian Civil Service, and who was actually the officer employed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Lytton) to carry out these negotiations with Abdurrahman—Sir Lepel Griffin. There is no man in existence who is so entirely competent to express a clear opinion as to what the position of affairs was in Afghanistan as left by the noble Earl opposite. The words which I have read to the House were written, as I have said, by Sir Lepel Griffin, in a letter addressed to The Times on March 15, 1883. Now, I think I have, at any rate, protected my noble Friend (Lord Ripon) from the attack made upon him by the noble Earl. I ask the noble Earl what was this very beautiful condition of affairs which he left in Afghanistan, and which would enable us to look with perfect equanimity at the advance of Russia? I cannot understand what hallucination came over the noble Earl which led him to suppose that he left such a condition of affairs, and that the Government of Lord Ripon had amused themselves by destroying this beautiful fabric and substituting something else in its place. The noble Earl took great credit to himself for the Beloochistan proceedings. I think he might have said something of a most distinguished public servant, Sir Robert Sandeman, to whom I feel the main credit for the success of the Beloochistan policy is due. The noble Earl, so far as I understood him, seemed to think that something entirely new and extraordinary had been done in Beloochistan. It is not at all the case. The noble Earl knows that, as regards Beloochistan, we had a Treaty made years ago, which gave us power to occupy any position there which we considered necessary. The occupation of Quetta, therefore, was authorized by Treaty; and, in point of fact, the Beloochistan policy was, to a considerable extent, initiated before the noble Earl went to India. Until after the recent war, I myself was against the occupation of Quetta as a military station, because it is so far from the Indus. But circumstances after the last Afghan War greatly changed. It would have been difficult for us to have withdrawn from Quetta, in consequence of the arrangements we had made with the Afghan tribes in its neighbourhood. I, therefore, have come to the conclusion, with many others, that, whatever objections there may have previously been, it is desirable to maintain a force at Quetta, rather than to alter the arrangements made with the neighbouring tribes. I wish to say that, for my part, I consider the idea of a Russian invasion of India to be a mere bugbear. I agree with the view expressed by one of the most distinguished of our Governor Generals of India—Lord Dalhousie—who, after discussing all the possibilities of such an invasion and the great physical difficulties in its way, said— All I can say is that, if the Russians should try to invade India, I wish that I might he Governor General of India at the time. I think that in discussing this question we are apt to run away with the idea that there is some real danger to be apprehended by Russia's advance to Merv. But that the possession of a few mud hovels in the desert should menace the power of England in India is to me an idea which cannot for a single moment be entertained by anyone with a knowledge of the relative power of the two countries, the distances to be passed, the resources of the Indian Empire, and the loyalty of the Queen's Indian subjects. I think the discussions in this House and in the other House have been satisfactory, because they have shown that, however much we may differ as to the past, we are all agreed that the absence of foreign interference in Afghanistan is a matter of great importance, and that in any policy which Her Majesty's Government may pursue to obviate the inconveniences—I will not call them dangers—of Russia's extension of Sovereignty to Merv, we shall have the support of both sides of the House.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, the noble Earl, in the course of his remarks, expressed his assent to the suggestion of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that we should not thrash over the controversies that have taken place in this House with respect to past Indian policy; but that good precept which he laid down he certainly did not follow. He gave us very little information as to the future policy of the Government; and very little information as to the immediate past; but it seems to me as if his whole contribution to this debate consisted of all the dirt which he could pick out of past controversies to fling at his opponents. My Lords, in this task his memory has, I fear, somewhat failed him. He revived a number of charges, one of which was that I had expressed my belief in the improbability of a Russian advance to Merv a few days before orders were given for the advance of the British troops to Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the observations I made in this House, in answer to a noble Lord opposite (Lord De Mauley), expressing my disbelief in Russia's march to Merv, were made in 1877; while the military advance into Afghanistan took place at the end of 1879, in consequence of the presence of the Russian Ambassador at Cabul. And I will observe, in passing, that my scepticism as to the probability of a military advance at that time by Russia to Merv was entirely justified by the subsequent course of events, for it has not been by a military advance that Merv has come under the domination of Russia, but by other means. The noble Earl has also revived the old charge that the war of 1879 was due to the impression produced on Shere Ali's mind by a request made by my noble Friend that he would admit an English Minister to his capital.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I did not say that.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Does the noble Earl say he did not declare that that war in Afghanistan was due to the policy of my noble Friend, which he opposed? There was not a shred of proof for this. The noble Earl must know very well that Shere Ali was alienated before that time from the Government—that he refused to receive a British officer from Yarkund on account of the attitude that had been adopted towards him. He knows that Shere Ali refused the subsidy which the noble Earl offered him. It is a matter of notoriety that the commencement of Shere Ali's alienation was due to the feeble and nerveless policy of the noble Earl in 1873. When, in that year, Shere Ali besought from the noble Earl a distinct declaration on the attitude of the British Government in respect to the advance of the Russian Government he could not obtain any satisfactory assurance. From that day it is well known that the alienation of Shere Ali commenced, and I believe that statement is confirmed by General Roberts, who reported that he himself, when in Cabul, found the general impression among the Afghans was that the alienation which ultimately caused the war in 1879 was produced by the refusal of the noble Earl to give him the required assurances of support in 1873. The noble Earl says that the orders he gave Sir Robert Sandeman to settle some disputes in Beloochistan were the commencement of the occupation of Quetta, to which now, as a sheet-anchor of safety, Her Majesty's Government are clinging. But the noble Earl must be perfectly aware that if it had been proposed to him at the time to occupy Quetta, he would have rejected the idea with the utmost abhorrence. Quetta was occupied two years later by my noble Friend (the Earl of Lytton), and it was then made the matter of vehement protest in this House by Lord Lawrence, supported by the noble Earl. The Government of the noble Earl, when he was in India, never gave the slightest indication of any desire to occupy Quetta; and when it was occupied by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, noble Lords opposite vigorously opposed and condemned it. My Lords, had it not been that I found it necessary to dissipate these charges of the noble Earl, I should not have desired to take any part in this debate, because the subject has been thoroughly and completely dealt with by noble Lords on this side of the House who have preceded me. I will only observe that the information that we have obtained from the Government to-night is of an enigmatical and insufficient character. We are told that the relations must be drawn closer between England and Afghanistan, and that the foreign relations of the Ameer must be placed under the control of the English Government.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

They are now under its control.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Then there is all the less novelty in the information we have received. But we are not told how these relations are to be controlled—whether the influence is to be moral or physical. And I should like to ask the noble Earl to consider this—that it is not the foreign policy of the Ameer that really furnishes the danger of the future. My noble Friend has pointed out that Russia has been urged on by a force which she cannot resist in this course of annexation which has ended in Merv. I do not imagine that that force which has pushed her thus far forward will necessarily stop there now. It is as true now as when the despatch of 1864 was written that Russia cannot bear dens of robbers on her frontiers. She will still have dens of robbers upon her frontiers at Merv. She will have a tumultuous and disturbing population, subject to no authority, bound by no law, who, if not restrained, will be perpetually committing outrages which will give to Russia a motive, or an appearance of motive, every bit as fair as that on which she has hither to gone for advancing a step further in order to punish and control them. And I want to know how you are to so arrange your relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan that that danger will cease to exist? There was another point which I thought unsatisfactory in the speech of the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley). He appeared to me, as did the noble Earl who has just sat down, to think exclusively of strategic considerations. I believe that the great fault of our policy with the Afghans and the Turcomans—a fault which, I am bound to say, I do not think is exclusively confined to one side of the House—is that we have been too much led by European modes of thought and methods of warfare, and have paid too little regard to the peculiar circumstances of the East. In Europe, if the strategic position is sound, everything is safe; but it is not so in the East. There is an impalpable power which we know very little of, and which we are obliged to describe by the unmeaning French word prestige—an impalpable influence which stretches like a shadow before the frontier of every Power, and in proportion as that prestige is great or small—in proportion as the range of shadow is long or short—it will spread forward its true dominion far beyond the exact space that its arms embrace. Your frontier may be as strong as you please; your fortresses may be as impregnable as you please; but if the prestige of the Power coming against you is greater than your own, it will penetrate through that barrier; it will undermine your sway; it will dissolve the loyalty and patriotism of those you rule, where loyalty and patriotism do not mean what they do here, and you will find that your fortresses will dissolve and crumble under you, and that you are overthrown by the desertion of those who readily fly to the Power they believe to be stronger than yourself It is true that Eastern nations fight with arms; but they also fight with the reputation of strength. Russia has gained Merv, not because she has taken it, but because the Turcomans, looking at Russia advancing and England retreating, said—"England is nothing, and we will pay our submission to Russia." Have you not noticed as a strange circumstance that the capture of Merv has taken place when our fortunes in Egypt are at the lowest, when our credit is being sullied, and our resources are being strained? Do you imagine that there are no other populations similar to those of Merv, and that the same reasoning will not arise in other Asiatic places? If you look merely to strategy, and neglect what is popularly described as prestige, the tale which was told of Merv will in due time be related of Herat. I dare say there will be no military expedition—it, perhaps, will not be necessary for Russia to beleaguer the walls of Herat or to open her entrenchments; but if the impression spreads in Western Afghanistan that we are the retreating and Russia the advancing Power, and if they gather from our recent action the melan- choly inference that England, under her present mode of Government cannot be counted upon for any vigorous or tenacious resistance, they will not wait to be besieged or attacked—they will simply carry their submission as the Turcomans have done to the White Czar, in whose prowess they believe. That is the great danger I see in our policy to India. We are simply looking at the strategic considerations, and imagine that if they are cared for all will be safe. But if it should so happen that any Viceroy should occupy the position which Lord Dalhousie was said to desire—of being the Viceroy of India when the Russian invasion takes place—what he would have to contend with would not be a direct attack of the Russian Army coming through the Khyber and Bolan Passes. It would be the undermining of his strength in India by the production of intrigues and rebellions among the Natives of India, the gradual weakening of the respect for the English arms, disaffection towards the English Raj, and the gradual crumbling away of our resources before Russia has struck a blow against our frontier. That is the real danger we have to fear; that is why it is a matter of life and death to us that Afghanistan should be kept clear not only of Russian soldiers, but of Russian influence and intrigue. That is why this acquisition of Merv must not be put aside by platitudes about the advantage of having a humane instead of an inhuman Power upon the borders of Afghanistan, or with the consolation that Merv is not on the route to anywhere particular. The event must be looked on in a graver light than that. It is the gravest that has happened with respect to our Empire in the East, and I feel sure that the English people will exact a heavy responsibility from Her Majesty's Government unless they approach the question with a due sense of the terrible magnitude of the interests surrounding it.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I can quite understand that the noble Marquess has been, much nettled, as he seems to have been at the remarks of the noble Earl on the subject of the past war in Afghanistan. He must feel regret, when he calmly reflects upon what passed at that time, upon the millions that have been spent and the anarchy which has been produced in Afghanistan, and above all on the lesson taught to Russia, which I do not believe dreamed of such a Quixotic enterprize as trying to take India from us, but was convinced by the impulsive action of the noble Marquess that whenever Russia has a quarrel with us she can stir up that sort of irritation, and create that sort of panic, to which the noble Marquess yielded when he went into that most unjust and unnecessary war. I quite admit that the noble Earl the ex-Viceroy, in introducing this question, laid down a very charming scheme in the debate to-night. He said we had better avoid the past and confine ourselves to the present and future. Nothing, I think, could be more sensible or admirable; but hardly a minute had elapsed before the noble Earl proceeded to make a very natural attempt to define his own policy, and began to attack the policy of his Predecessor and Successor. The noble Viscount spoke shortly, without one word in support of the views of the noble Earl. The noble Marquess has made strong invectives against us; but he has entirely declined to reply to that pointed question which the noble Earl (the Earl of Kimberley) had put to him, and which was to describe what was the strong military and political position which the noble Earl left behind him in Afghanistan at the end of his Vice-royalty. On the other hand, the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) differed entirely from the late Viceroy, and said he knew what those assurances of Russia were; that they were worth nothing; and that he did not blame Russia for making them. He was indignant with me because I did not listen to the very long list of extracts from the Blue Book which he read, with which I happen to be already acquainted. I entirely agree with my noble Friend the Secretary of State for India that it is perfectly impossible to adopt a particular course with regard to another country if you are not to have diplomatic relations; but I quite admit the general tenour of the extracts which the noble Earl read—or rather repeated—to the House. They certainly give the notion that there was no intention on the part of Russia of taking Merv. I admit, however, that there are always in them reservations, and that the Russian Government and the Russian Emperor did not give up their liberty of action for all times and under all cir- cumstances. I am bound to say that I do not think that I was the dupe of any representation about Merv; but I never assured the House and the public that it was perfectly impossible that Russia would advance. My Lords, I certainly think it is a reason of complaint that when two countries are in friendly communication with each other on one subject, and the assurance of one is always more or less in one direction, although unexpected circumstances may arise—though I cannot imagine that any such unexpected circumstances have arisen with regard to the Merv Chiefs—that we should suddenly find that the annexation of Merv is a fait accompli, without any previous communication to ourselves. The noble Earl the ex-Viceroy promised, in the beginning of his speech, that he would tell us what we ought to do. While the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) dreaded proximity, the late Viceroy took the contrary line, and argued that as Russia advances we should advance as rapidly as we can. The noble Earl's argument was, in fact, that the two countries should be in close proximity. The noble Marquess takes a higher line. His views are Oriental, in contradistinction, as he says, to our Western ideas; he says the business of a country like this is not to be concerned about strategy, but about the fanciful impressions you may produce. My Lords, I believe for the defence of India that strategy wisely considered and calmly acted upon is more valuable than attempts to influence in any false way the imagination of an Oriental people. My Lords, my noble Friend so fully stated the general principles upon which we proposed to act that I cannot add anything to what he has said. He wisely abstained from stating the exact mode in which we should try to strengthen our relations with Afghanistan; but, on the other hand, he pointed out that some clear and distinct definition of the frontier between Russia and Persia on the side of Afghanistan was of the greatest importance to the carrying out of the general principles on which we propose to act. The noble Earl opposite twitted us, saying that for three weeks we had been unable to determine what we should say to Russia. The noble Earl is, however, wrong, because it so happens that I have been in communication with the Russian Ambassa- dor here, and I have sent despatches to St. Petersburg. But I cannot help feeling very strongly that if the noble Marquess and the noble Earl had sometimes taken three weeks to consider a new policy before adopting it, if they had sometimes resisted the first impulse of the moment, this country would have been saved great and unnecessary evils. Papers on the subject to which the noble Earl has drawn attention will be presented as soon as possible. They will not include the Correspondence now going on with Russia; but they will include all the documents up to a very recent date.

LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA

My Lords, I should consider it criminal on my part if I were to remain a silent witness on this occasion, because I was thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances connected with the negotiations with the Ameer Shere Ali previous to Lord Lytton's arrival in India, and I consider that he was fully justified in making war on Shere Ali. The Ameer was alienated by our refusal to accord to him the Treaty which he desired. I do not say that we ought to have made the Treaty, or that anything we could have given him would have satisfied him finally; but I maintain that his refusal to admit our officers into his country, and his reception of a Russian Agent at Cabul, his secret correspondence with the Russians at Turkistan, and his concealed military preparations on so extensive a scale as was discovered, showed that Shere Ali had become an enemy, and that the noble Earl the late Viceroy of India was thoroughly justified in making war on him. The occupation of Quetta was looked upon by many Members of this House with great alarm at the time; but the subsequent information fully justifies it. During the Siege of Lucknow, a part of our troops occupied a garden surrounded with a high wall; it was, however, so commanded by musketry from the houses around, that no one could ascertain what the enemy were doing outside until they blew in a part of the wall, which we had immediately to barricade. We then mined under the foundations of the wall, and emerged during the night on the outside, where we made an outwork as a post of observation, which was our Quetta, and enabled us to see what the enemy were doing. Had Her Majesty's Government retained Candahar and given the Ameer Abdurrahman the same subsidy that they give him now, we should have satisfied him, and have been in a better position to support him than we are at present, and should have secured a valuable and loyal Province. Now that we are told that Russia is conterminous with Afghanistan, and as we are bound to support the Ameer of Afghanistan against external aggression, we ought to define clearly the limits of that country, and to determine at what exact point it would be our duty to assist the Ameer against an external enemy. I sincerely trust that the Government will complete our railway system along the Indus, which is necessary for the defence of India.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

said, that as the Government had promised to distribute the Papers, he was willing to withdraw his Motion.

EARL GRANVILLE

The Motion, as far as concerns some part of the Papers, is agreed to.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

c1014
1. HABITUAL CRIMINALS ACT AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.] 31 words