§ VISCOUNT BURY, in rising to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether England is now at war on the Littoral of the Red Sea, and, if so, with whom; or, if not at war, what is the character of the military operation in which English forces are now engaged? said, he thought, that before he put this Question, he ought first to say one word why the Question which originally stood on the Paper a few days ago was postponed. His Question was framed long before the success of our arms; in fact, the day on which it was put down was the day on which the news of that victory reached this country. Therefore, he could not but feel that to put the Question at that moment, when they had just received such news, would have been open to some misconception, or, at all events, to some suspicion, coming immediately as it did after the victory of General Graham. They could now, however, dismiss that success from their minds for the moment, and ask the Government for definite information with regard to the Red Sea operations. It must not be supposed that he for one moment disapproved of the action that had been fought under General Graham, or that he did not sympathize with the great success he had obtained on that occasion. There was no one in their Lordships' House who could feel more satisfaction on receiving the news of General Graham's victory than he did, and he would say frankly that, in the circumstances, it was quite right to fight that action. They must all rejoice at the credit which the British arms had; but now that the action had been fought, there could be no military plans which would be prejudiced by the answer to be given to his Question. General Graham's expedition could have no military meaning unless it was a part of a greater and consistent whole. What he wanted to know was the plan of which General Graham's action was a part. As to the plan on which it was formed they had no information. Again and again the Government had declined to give satisfactory answers to Questions on this point. The noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) had said that the Government would not consent to answer 616 these interrogations, because they were referred to on the occasion of the Vote of Censure. He would like to ask, whether those who lost a friend in Hicks, and those who knew that the public had lost a valuable servant in Moncrieff, had no right to put these Questions? The country was looking with a greatly increasing interest for some statement by the Government. Now, that no possible harm could be done, was the time to answer these Questions. It was quite true that Tokar was relieved by the expedition; but it was also true that the expedition was unnecessary, or, if necessary, was rendered so only by the dilatory policy of the Government. If action had been taken in due time—if, before the fall of Sinkat, the Government had thrown aside the apathy which had so long marked their conduct in connection with Egyptian affairs—it would have been easy to relieve that garrison without striking a blow. Now 3,000 or 4,000 brave men had been killed, and no one could help feeling regret that it should have been necessary to destroy those noble Blacks who opposed with spears and shields the more civilized appliances of our troops. As he had said, if they read the Report which was made to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and which was received at the Admiralty on January 11, they would see that, taking the start of Osman Digna, it would have been perfectly easy at any time for Her Majesty's Government to have relieved Sinkat and those other garrisons without firing a shot, without sacrificing any of our men, and without causing that enormous carnage which, though glory might be reflected on our arms, was nevertheless, in his opinion, disgraceful to our humanity. Up to the end of October, and even up to December, Osman Digna was a person of small importance, whom Tewfik Pasha had repeatedly defeated. It was only after the death of Consul Moncrieff and the defeat of Baker Pasha's force that the tribes rallied round Osman Digna, or that there was any real army to oppose General Graham. Therefore, at any time before November, if the British Government had only recognized in time the necessity which was incumbent upon them to act firmly in the Soudan, Sinkat and the other garrisons would have been relieved without shedding one drop of blood, and the battle of Teb would not have 617 been necessary, for the necessity of that victory would not have caused the loss to our prestige it had. He said that their Lordships ought to know what the plan of the Government was, and of which the battle of Teb, if it meant anything, was a part. They had no information of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government; but Papers laid before Parliament contained some suggestive hints as to the way in which the Government had looked at matters for some considerable time. Communicating at Walmer with the Italian Minister, the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office (Earl Granville) said that the Government adhered to the intentions which they had publicly announced; but that their policy was necessarily of a somewhat elastic character, and must to a certain extent be guided by circumstances. The noble Earl also said that he had told the Khedive and the Sultan that Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to assist at the proper time in the defence of Egypt from outside attack. Similar statements were made to Count Karolyi and to M. Wadding-ton. His Excellency Musurus Pasha then called upon the noble Earl and made a very remarkable statement on behalf of his Government. Musurus Pasha said that he had received with the liveliest satisfaction the reiterated assurances of the Government of Her Majesty as to their intention to respect fully the rights of the Sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan over Egypt, as well as to a complete and early evacuation of the country by Her Majesty's troops. In fact, all the Governments of Europe were informed that the object of Her Majesty's Government was immediately, or as soon as possible, to withdraw from Egypt. On the other hand, Sir Evelyn Baring in a communication to the Government seemed to point to the fact that some settled policy of one kind or another was an absolute necessity, for he said—
The policy of abandoning the Soudan is to be carried out; the finance of Egypt, which is very bad, is to be regulated.Surely, if the Government were going to carry out all those reforms in Egypt of which we heard, they must stay in Egypt. They could not suppose that if they withdrew the reforms would carry out themselves. Therefore, unless their 618 planned reforms, upon which the Government insisted so much, were a delusion and a sham, they must remain in Egypt. Well, then, he wanted to know what was the policy of the Government? Did they mean to remain in Egypt or did they not? Up to the present time that "elastic policy governed by circumstances," of which the noble Earl spoke, merely meant a helpless and hapless waiting upon events. Surely they had had enough of this waiting on events, and the time was come when the country and Parliament might ask, without being put off by evasive answers, for some more definite pronouncement of the policy of the Government. As far as words went, we still retained the theory of an independent Khedive; but, it would be admitted, we had given it up in practice. No one could read Mr. Clifford Lloyd's Report, which appeared on page 16 of the Papers just presented [Egypt, No. 5 (1884).], without seeing that we were embarked on a series of reforms in Egypt, which rendered it impossible to carry out that policy of withdrawal so constantly enunciated. There was an absolute and radical antagonism between the plans which Mr. Clifford Lloyd tried to put forward and the plans of the Egyptian Government. He would give a crucial instance. Persons who became Christians were thrown into prison on no charge, and the reply of the Egyptian officials was—"We have the right, by Mussulman law, to kill such persons." Three or four lines further on, Mr. Clifford Lloyd said—" Under existing circumstances all this has been changed." That meant that the fundamental law of Egypt had been changed by the action of Ministers sent from this country. That showed that we had undertaken the government of Egypt, and that the Khedive was no longer independent. Therefore, having assumed the government of Egypt, how long were we going to retain it?—notwithstanding the phrase invented by Sir Wilfrid Law-son, followed by the Prime Minister, and repeated by him within the last few days, that we were "to rescue and retire." Such a proposition was entirely and utterly in conflict with the facts of the case. In illustration of the antagonism between those facts and the statements of the Prime Minister and the noble Earl opposite, he would read to the House an extract from a letter which 619 appeared in The Times a few days ago from their Correspondent at Cairo. The Correspondent said—No single measure, down to the increase of the salary of a petty official, is made without reference to Sir Evelyn Baring. The condition of the prisons, the complaints from the interior of alleged frauds, the increase of the cattle murrain, the appointment of sanitary officials, disputes with the police, disputes between officials, the question of a site for the new Custom House, the appointments of schoolmasters, and quarrels with missionaries, all these matters, together with the larger questions of finance, the Domains, the Daira, the Capitulations, irrigation, the debts of the fellaheen, and the formation of municipalities, require the almost daily attention of the hardest worked man in Cairo.Well, having undertaken all those reforms, and having sent out officials from this country, it was absolutely essential that the reforms should be carried out, or else the whole framework of government in Egypt would fall to pieces. How then could Her Majesty's Government talk, as they had done within the last few days, of withdrawing our troops and leaving Egypt in a very short time? What was the state of affairs in the Soudan? With whom, he should like to know, were we at war? We had been engaged in hostilities in Egypt very nearly since the burning of Alexandria, and yet he did not believe that war had ever been declared. He was at a loss to know exactly with whom we were at war. He would like to know whether Turkey had not remonstrated about the position in which we were at present in Egypt? But their Lordships were left without information by Her Majesty's Government, and had to rely on that which came from the daily papers, and that information told them that Turkey had remonstrated. If so, would Her Majesty's Government say to what extent, and in what terms? It had been said that they were not at war; they were merely engaged in military operations; but he must say those military operations had been enduring for a very considerable time, and they bore, in his mind, something very much of the character of war. We had a Fleet at Suakin, we had some of our largest transports there, we had there commissariat stores and ships, and a French Squadron looking on. We had on shore a Naval brigade, an Artillery brigade, and a Cavalry brigade. We had purchased 620 camels at a price which had excited the admiration and wonder of the East, and which, if it had been offered to Osman Digna, would have placed every camel in his army at our disposal. And now we were told that General Gordon had sent for another army, which he said was coining in a few days. And not only that, but we were informed from Khartoum that the Governor General of the Soudan expected that the Slave Trade would settle itself by a rising of the slaves against their masters. General Gordon had anticipated that from the beginning, and no one could look upon such a prospect, or upon the massacres that would ensue, with equanimity. The fact was, it was essential that General Gordon should, before leaving Khartoum, establish some sort of settled government there. Their Lordships have never been informed as to the character of the military operations now going on, although the Government had been asked many times to make a statement upon the subject. What had been the result of the expedition which was sent up the Nile under Colonel Stewart? They had heard that it had returned unsuccessful, and they had a right to ask for information upon that matter. Then they were told the other day that troops were going up the river to Assouan. What was the object of their going there? They had also been told that British troops were to support them a short distance behind. This information they had derived from the public journals, but not a single word did the Government tell the country; and when a question was asked of them, the matter was thrust aside and left unanswered. They did not even know whether the Government were going to hold Khartoum, and there, again, the utterances of Her Majesty's Ministers were extremely uncertain. The other day the Prime Minister stated that they were pledged to withdraw from Khartoum, because it was part of the Soudan. But Suakin was also part of the Soudan. Were they going to withdraw from Suakin, and, if not, how were they going to keep it, and what were they going to do with it? With regard to the Slave Trade, it was all very well to talk of domestic slavery; but a statement had been made that Zebehr Pasha was to govern Khartoum when General Gordon left it. Who was 621 Zebehr Pasha? They all knew that he was the Chief of the Slave Trade, and if he was left to govern in Khartoum what would be the state of affairs throughout the whole of the Soudan? That rising of the slaves, that servile war which they were told General Gordon anticipated, would settle matters certainly, but it would settle them by devastating the whole of the country, and the last state of the slaves would be worse than the first. He would again ask what were the Government going to do with Suakin? He could understand why it was kept if it was to be used for the repression of the Slave Trade; but when the Government declared that slavery throughout the Soudan was to continue, and when they had the capital of that country in the hands of slave-dealers and slave-owners, what was to be done with Suakin? Was it to be a slave export port, and, if not, how could the Government by their officials proclaim the Slave Trade to be continued in Khartoum, and, at the same time, put an end to it in Suakin? It appeared to him that the policy of the Government was doubtful and contradictory, and that it was one that ought, at least, to be accurately described. They had interfered with the Egyptian Government in every way. They had even gone so far as to diminish the pocket money of the Khedive, and yet he was to be independent. The Government had sent out a Fleet and an Army, blood had been shed, and victories had been won, and yet it appeared that they were not at war. Under all those contradictory circumstances, their Lordships, he thought, had a right to demand from Her Majesty's Government a full and clear explanation of the Questions he had put.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Bury) began by making a very long apology for having done what he had a perfect right to do—namely, postpone his Question from Monday to Thursday. He said he thought it necessary to postpone it on account of the news of the victory which came in the morning; but I wonder what effect it would have had on the noble Viscount's Question if we had received an announcement of defeat. When I saw next morning that Notice was given in "another place" of a discussion of the question, I thought, per- 622 haps, that the postponement had something to do with that fact. It is just as convenient for me to answer the Question on Thursday as on Monday; but I think I have a right to complain that when, day after day, Notice of such a Question was given, the noble Viscount should have occupied about five minutes with the Question, and should have made a very long and discursive speech, in which he insisted upon my answering many Questions of which he has given me no Notice whatever. I do not know that the noble Viscount wishes me to answer the Questions of which he has given me no Notice; but I am quite ready to do so. The operations in the Soudan were undertaken for these two purposes—In the first place, they were undertaken for the relief of the garrison of Tokar; and, in the second place, they were undertaken under the obligation we had incurred when we promised the Khedive of Egypt to assist the Egyptian Government in defending the Egyptian ports in the Red Sea. Now, Suakin happens to be one of these ports. Suakin has been menaced for some time by large numbers of insurgents; and I must say I am utterly unable to follow or to make head or tail of the argument, that if we had done something, we could have saved Sinkat without any bloodshed. What earthly reason is there for supposing that we should not have been opposed then as we have been opposed now? And the argument that we could have relieved Sinkat without effusion of blood seems to me to be devoid of reason. Now, if the noble Viscount had profited by the delay in putting his Question, and had referred to any ordinary book on International Law, I think he would have found it laid down, that there is no such thing as perfect war except between two independent States or Nations; whereas, it is described by these writers that there is a state of uncertain war within certain limits as to persons, places, and things; and I imagine there is not the slightest doubt that the operations carried on, and which have been so highly praised by the noble Viscount to-day, and so appreciated by the people of this country, and which, I am happy to say, have excited the warmest admiration on the part of the most competent critic of military action now living in Europe—that these operations were exactly of the second class, that I have described as laid down 623 by International Law. The noble Viscount, entirely departing from his Question, asks when we are to declare our policy with regard to Egypt. My only difficulty is the one which occurred to one of Louis XIV.'s courtiers, who was frequently honoured by the Sovereign asking him at intervals of three months how many children he had. He always answered, "Two;" but, on one occasion, he suddenly went up to "Eight." On the King expressing some surprise, the courtier, bowing to the ground, said he was afraid of boring His Majesty by always saying the same thing. I am really in much the same difficulty. In the debate the other night, I quoted what our policy was declared to be from the very beginning. I quoted the language which had been used to Europe, I quoted Queen's Speeches, I quoted several Ministerial declarations and other diplomatic documents; but the noble Viscount, who says we are so vacillating, now complains of my language to the Powers being always the same. He is very much surprised that I have always given the same sort of answer to different Ambassadors. Would the noble Viscount, if he were at the Foreign Office, think it his duty to give different answers to different Ambassadors for the purpose of varying the entertainment? I venture, notwithstanding my fear of boring your Lordships, to repeat what the declaration of the Government was. It was to this effect—whether using our own language, or, as I ventured to do the other day, adopting the language of the Conservative ex-Secretary of State—that an obligation had been thrown on us by events; that we were occupying Egypt; that we did not mean to annex Egypt; that we did not mean the permanent occupation of Egypt; but that it would be an act of treachery to Egypt, to Europe, and to ourselves if we withdrew our troops before there was a reasonable prospect of establishing a stable and useful Government in Egypt. That is exactly the policy we have declared from the beginning, which we declare now, and which we have declared 15 or 16 times since the opening of the Session. It may be a good policy or a bad one; but, whether it be good or bad, we have declared it and we abide by it. The noble Viscount gave a number of descriptions of what I 624 have said to the Powers. What I said in my Circular to the Powers was this—that as long as we do occupy Egypt we expect our advice on all essential subjects to be followed by the Egyptian Government. Well, that policy was followed in the time of Sir Louis Malet. It was followed in the time of Lord Dufferin; it was followed in the time of Sir Evelyn Baring. Sometimes there might have been omissions, as happens in this country when Departments do not act according to order; but it was always followed until towards the end of Cherif Pasha's administration. On his refusal to take that advice we merely accentuated a little more strongly the principle which we had announced to the Powers, and on which we had acted up to that time. The noble Viscount, in the former debate, made a most sensible and eloquent defence the other day of General Gordon; but he was entirely thrown over by the noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Salisbury). I can only repeat what I have so often said about General Gordon—that there never was an act of greater confidence shown by a Government to an individual than the mission of General Gordon. That confidence may turn out to be misplaced. I sometimes almost think that there is a wish on the part of certain persons that it should tnrn out to be misplaced. But, still, with regard to ourselves, we have had confidence in him, and we hope and believe it will be fully justified. I would remind you that Henry IV. expressed great remorse, and gave a pledge for the future, when he found that one of his best Ministers had been prevented doing that which was for his—the King's—good in consequence of the too strict instructions with which he had hampered him; and I would go much further than he did. I happened to open an interesting book the other day on Chinese literature, and the first thing I found was a sentence attributed to no less a person than Confucius. It was—
If you suspect a man, do not employ him; but if you do employ him, do not suspect him.I cannot help thinking that that maxim is as applicable to an Administration in this country, at this time, as it was a great many thousand years ago with regard to the Administration in China.
LORD WENTWORTHsaid, those who, like himself, repudiated all complicity with any of the acts of fraud and violence committed in Egypt in the name of England, could not remain silent after this fresh shedding of blood, which cried to Heaven for vengeance. They all knew who was responsible for that slaughter. It was not principally the noble Lords on the Treasury Bench. They were merely the zealous servants of a being more potent than themselves. Three weeks ago he (Lord Wentworth) had heard their revered Master discourse, with more than his usual eloquence, on the love of the Soudanese for their country; and, on a later occasion, he read that he had spoken with loathing and abhorrence—even as an imputation—of the odious policy of blood at any price; and this was the man who, at the same time or immediately afterwards, sent forth an expedition, obviously useless for any purpose except to kill those very Soudanese, from whom, when it was a question of catching votes to keep his Government alive, the right hon. Gentleman declared that he and his Khedive claimed no allegiance. As to the pretended rescue of a few persons at Tokar, who were in perfect safety before General Graham's aggression, he had never heard a more paltry plea to excuse a political crime. In consequence of that crime, they had to deplore the loss of many gallant officers and men; and that was not the worst. What was far more lamentable was that they had fallen in such an enterprize. He could not think without horror of the slaughter of the heroic Soudanese, who, with Spartan bravery, had fought in defence of country, liberty, life, honour, religion. Their glorious resistance against a vindictive invasion was the admiration of the world; and the tragic death of thousands of heroes had brought sorrow and indignation to the hearts of those Englishmen who cared for justice and morality among nations. The unspeakable iniquity of that deed had already, in "another place," been proclaimed by a noble-hearted man, whose memorable words and terrible warning last Monday had startled his countrymen in the intoxication of their Belshazzar's banquet of blood. Much might be said as to the possibility of General Gordon perishing by the sword so recklessly drawn, and of the danger 626 of rousing Mussulman resentment all over the world; but great crimes were not to be condemned only when and because unprofitable. If the Government had been inspired by the most crafty wisdom, that would not sanctify such action. It was suggested that the power of England should be used to crush Mussulman fanaticism. He thought it would be better to quell and conquer the evil spirit among ourselves—a spirit of military fanaticism and race antipathy. He believed that Mussulman fanaticism would never have been heard of if it had not been for the conduct of Western disciples of Mammon and Moloch, and the un-Christian spirit of so-called Christians. He understood there were 65,000,000 Mussulmen in India, and if they were once roused into rebellion no military skill, no material resources at the command of Her Majesty, would avail to save our Indian Empire, and great would be its fall. Before very long the Ministers whose hands were now red with the blood of their own men and of Africans, not their enemies, would have to render an account of their stewardship to the people of England, who, he believed, must return against them the verdict—Guilty of these human sacrifices. He left them to their own reflections; but he could not conclude without appealing to the highest of all tribunals, before which none of the daring denials and sophistries of debate could affect that solemn judgment of the whole matter which must be heard by them—perhaps very, very soon—when they met God face to face.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI forgot to answer the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Bury) on one point. He made a reference with regard to Khartoum, and gave an unfavourable account of the position of General Gordon at this time. That unfavourable account has not reached us. Neither is it borne out by the latest intelligence we have received this afternoon, which is to the effect that 1,000 men sent from El Obeid to Khartoum have been attacked and totally defeated by some tribes friendly to General Gordon.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, in rising after the very earnest and striking speech to which we have just listened of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Wentworth), I do not wish to 627 associate myself in any way with the judgment which the noble Lord (Lord Wentworth), in the exercise of an independent discretion, has passed upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government in sending this expedition to the Red Sea. From my point of view, the time to form such a judgment has not arrived. We have not before us the facts in sufficient fulness to enable us to determine whether the lamentable events which have taken place were justified by the causes by which they were brought about. We all deeply lament the terrible slaughter; we must especially lament the slaughter of our own gallant countrymen whom we have sent on this expedition; but whether they fell in a good cause or a bad one—whether it is one of the inevitable sorrows attending the administration of a great Empire like this, or whether the blood of these men does really rest on the head of the Government—I think the moment for expressing our opinion on that point has not yet arrived. I must confess, however, that the somewhat merry speech of the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) has not solved for me many of the difficulties which, the more I consider the policy of the Government, are the more present to my mind, and which I can not help thinking will be present to the minds of those who have to vote and pay the expense which this policy has involved, even if no other motive impels them to a severe scrutiny. The noble Earl, as I understand, places the whole burden of the defence of this expedition on the fact that it was for the relief of Tokar; but is it worth while——
§ EARL GRANVILLEI beg pardon; the noble Marquess has misunderstood me. That is what the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Bury) said; but I say that it was partly to relieve Tokar, and partly to redeem our pledge to the Egyptian Government to help them to defend the Red Sea ports.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWell, I do not know whether even that explanation is at all likely to meet the case. In the first place, the sending of troops to the relief of a place implies that there is some individual to be relieved; but whether it was worth while to shed the blood of 3,000 men for the purpose of relieving a small body of people who did not wish to be relieved, 628 I think is a matter of considerable doubt. If, indeed, this great effort of the Government had been made in time to relieve the unhappy garrison of Sinkat, no one could have questioned or doubted its justice, its humanity, and its wisdom. But made as it was, subject to that curse of procrastination and delay which has been characteristic of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt from the first, I doubt whether the judgment of the country will be favourable to the policy which has been pursued. Was it, as has been suggested, for the purpose of defending Suakin? That, no doubt, was a proper object enough. But have we not advanced much further than in the defence of Suakin? Suakin was not actually attacked. Or was it with the object of repelling any force that may have been brought against it? But there was none, so it was not in repelling any beseiging force that this action took place. On the other hand, if it was merely the neighbourhood of a large body of hostile, armed tribes which justified this expedition and the slaughter that ensued, that condition of things exists still, and I am afraid that similar events, equally lamentable, will have to be brought about until there shall be nobody left alive in the neighbourhood of Suakin who is not favourable to the projects of Her Majesty's Government. I confess that I think it will be very hard, at all events, to bring home to the people of that country what the policy is which Her Majesty's Government are pursuing; to us it appears mysterious and inconsistent. They are called rebels; but, as I understand it, the actual ground on which they stand, as acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government, is their own. The Mahdi, whom they serve, has been clothed by Her Majesty's Government with a robe of honour, and declared to be the Sultan of Kordofan. Though the policy of the Government has been to reserve the ports of the Red Sea, they have reserved no part of the interior of the country; and, therefore, the people who are slaughtered as being rebels are not distinguished in any way from people who are inhabiting their own country and defending their own hearths and homes. How, then, can we be justified in making war upon them? Because of these considerations, and not for the pur- 629 pose of casting the slightest blame on the gallant officers who are employed by this country, I mention these things, with the object of merely pointing out what darkness, inconsistencies, and mystery there is in the policy which the Government are pursuing, and how much ground there was for the Question and the eloquent speech of my noble Friend. But these are not the only mysteries that arise from the exposition which the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has given us. The noble Earl was very eloquent upon General Gordon. He expressed what I hold to be the sound Constitutional view of the relations of the Government and General Gordon. For all that General Gordon does the Government are entirely responsible, and I think it will really clear the discussion and save unnecessary wanderings into irrelevant considerations if I drop the name of General Gordon and say that what has been done by him has been done by the Government. If an officer has been sent into a distant country with which there is no telegraphic communication, the Government might, with some show of fairness, say they were not responsible for each step he decided to take until they had expressed approval of it; but when he is within reach of the telegraphic wire, and when the Government can confer with him at any moment, every word he says and every step he takes is said and taken, not on his own responsibility, but on that of the Government. That being the case, how does the matter stand? How does this extraordinary state of things arise, that while the Government, for the purpose and for no other purpose than that of preventing the Slave Trade, are keeping and holding a portion of the Red Sea, whose unhealthiness is so great that I believe it cannot be held by White troops a little later in the year, they are pursuing an exactly opposite policy at Khartoum, and issuing a mysterious Proclamation in regard to the exact meaning of which there seems to be some doubt, and which has been much canvassed in this House, but as to which the one thing certain is that the Government do not think it advisable to ask General Gordon what it means, and that independent authorities on the Continent of Europe who are acquainted with the subject regard it as 630 being favourable to the Slave Trade—a view which was quite certain to be shared by those to whom it is primarily addressed? Then, what other steps have they taken? If we are to believe the accounts which have been published—and I have every reason to believe they are correct—who is the person that is to replace the Khedive in the government of the Soudan at Khartoum? Why, he is a slave driver—the king of slave drivers—a man stained with every cruelty and every crime that can defile humanity. When I remember the indignation that used some years ago to be poured upon us because the Sultan, over whom we had no authority, employed Chefket Pasha, whose only crime was that he had too severely repressed a rebellion, I confess that I do regard with some surprise the acquiescence of the Government in the appointment of this man, Zebehr Pasha, to the government of the Soudan. But how is it possible that the Natives of Egypt shall believe in the sincerity of a Government in destroying the Slave Trade, when they first issue an ambiguous Proclamation regarding Slavery, and then give power to the man who, of all others, is most associated with that Trade? If we go a little further, the mystery is equally great. The noble Earl spoke in, I think, more distinct language than has yet been done of the fact that the Representative of England had to be consulted in respect of all the circumstances and all the details of Egyptian Government, and, in fact, that the Egyptian Government had to be conducted according to the will of Her Majesty's Government. But he does not seem to have seen that, in admitting this complete control which the English Government have had over the Egyptian Government, he has become altogether responsible for those two disastrous expeditions, for those two terrible slaughters, for all the military arrangements that were made, for the want of caution, for the want of preparation, and for all the disregard of the warnings which led Hicks Pasha and his army, and that of Baker Pasha, with so many officers, to their deaths. I do not think that the tone of hilarity in which the noble Earl undertook his defence is suitable I to the grave circumstances of the case. The policy of the Government is dark, mysterious, and unintelligible. 631 We know that as it proceeds it is marked by blood. We know that it is producing no result, as far as we can see, adequate to the sacrifices we are making; while there is every reason to believe that, under our fostering care, Egypt is bleeding to death. My Lords, I cannot help thinking that, under these circumstances, the noble Earl would better consult the reputation of the Government in which he occupies so distinguished a position by explaining these dark and mysterious contradictions, and by placing before the people of this country a clear, full, and sufficient explanation of a policy which, at present, it is impossible to understand.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he was prepared to admit there was no reason why a Government should not anticipate severe criticism from the Opposition Party as regarded its policy. That had always been the case under our Parliamentary system, and it was a very salutary proceeding. But there ought to be a limit, and the Government had a right to expect, in the case of questions of extreme difficult, such as those involved in our relations with the people of Egypt and the affairs of the Soudan, that even those who were in Opposition to the Government should show some appreciation of the difficulties which affected not only the Government of the day, but the whole country. The Opposition had confined themselves week after week to violent Party attacks upon the Government, taking advantage in every possible manner of the difficulties which beset this country in dealing with the affairs of Egypt. Therefore, he thought, they had reason to complain of the tone of violence which had characterized the discussions they had heard. The noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) said the policy of Her Majesty's Government was dark and mysterious. With regard to the charge of mystery, it was singular that the noble Marquess came to such tremendous conclusions on that policy. Ho, at all events, seemed to have no doubt about it. He said that the policy of the Government was one which led the country to see that that policy had been followed by blood, inextricable disaster, and difficulty. He (the Earl of Kimberley) denied that the policy of the Government was dark and mysterious. It was open and clear. With regard to 632 Suakin the Government had said what their policy was; but the noble Marquess conveniently, in consequence of the correction administered to him by his (the Earl of Kimberley's) noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was going to limit his remarks to the relief of Tokar, because he knew very well that that was a very patent sophism. If ho had looked at the matter fairly, he must have admitted that the relief of Tokar was not the only and primary object of the expedition which was undertaken. He had been told again and again that the Government had given to the Khedive of Egypt their engagement to protect the Red Sea ports. That was an engagement which this country was bound to carry into effect. It was said that the Government had engaged to protect those ports, but that here was a portion of the Soudan which, according to the policy announced, was to be handed over to the inhabitants, and that they were merely attacking people who were defending their own country. It was said that these people were peaceful. He did not think they were. When distinctly informed by English officers that a communication of a peaceful character was to be made to them, they as distinctly replied that they intended to drive the British Force into the sea. How absurd and ridiculous it would be, and how servile should we have become, if, after having undertaken to defend the ports on the Red Sea, the Government were deliberately to say that they would not take any measures necessary for clearing out of the neighbourhood those persons who were threatening our Forces. No one, for a moment, would surely say so. If they were of opinion that war was never justifiable, he could understand it. But if war was justifiable at all, it was so in this instance, when measures were rendered necessary for the defence of a place that was threatened. If they had not taken the necessary steps to clear out that force, their policy would have been both inconsistent and cowardly. It was also impossible to limit operations in the manner suggested. If a place had to be defended, the troops must go to such a distance from that place as was necessary to defend other places that were attacked. If they had acted otherwise, they might have had to keep for months, perhaps for years, a con- 633 siderable garrison in one of the hottest places in the world, waiting until it pleased Osman Digna and his followers to attack. Such a proposition was most absurd. The noble Marquess seemed to view with great apprehension and alarm the possibility of further bloodshed. He (the Earl of Kimberley) was quite ready to admit that there not only might, but probably would be, further bloodshed. The Government had directed General Graham to summon Osman Digna and his followers to disperse, and to take measures to compel them if they did not. It might be that Osman Digna would obey—he hoped he would—but if he did not, the Government had indicated what was to follow—the General commanding would have no alternative but to use force. There was nothing dark or mysterious about that. It was as clear and intelligible as any policy could possibly be. As regards General Gordon, he was very glad that the noble Marquess intended to drop all further mention of him, for he had been considerably struck by the fact that the noble Marquess had never had anything good to say of that gallant officer during the present Session.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI beg pardon. I have expressed the highest admiration of General Gordon.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, that was somewhat singular, for, however high an opinion the noble Marquess might have of General Gordon, he had, at any rate, spoken of every one of General Gordon's acts with the greatest severity. The noble Marquess thought, however, to escape from this by one of the most dangerous doctrines he had ever heard—namely, that when an agent of the Government was at the other end of a telegraph wire he was to have no liberty of action. Everything which the agent said and did was according to the doctrine of the noble Marquess to be dictated by the Government at home from Downing Street. He (the Earl of Kimberley) could not conceive of any system more likely to be followed by disaster than that. He would admit that the telegraph wire did impose new responsibilities on the Government, and that it was a new source of difficulty; but he had always held that there was nothing more dangerous than to push the system of telegraphic communication too far, for, by doing so, 634 they took away all sense of responsibility and of liberty of action on the part of their officials abroad. In the case of a place so distant as the Soudan, they must interfere, if they interfered at all, with very much less knowledge than those upon the spot; and he thought it would have been a great mistake to have taken the entire responsibility on themselves and have dictated to General Gordon everything he should do in regard to affairs about which he must know a great deal more than the Government. He knew that the noble Marquess was not likely to forego any Party advantage; but let them consider the extreme difficulty of General Gordon's position in the Soudan. He would almost have been inclined to think that it was one of such extraordinary difficulty that there might have been some feeling as to the impropriety of passing these criticisms, and that the noble Marquess might have made some allowance for him. They had sent out one single individual, accompanied by one gallant officer—Colonel Stewart—and had imposed upon him an extraordinary task, that of endeavouring to extricate the Egyptian garrisons from the Soudan, and to put an end to the present state of affairs there. Was it possible to conceive an operation of greater difficulty or one in regard to the carrying out of which they must more completely trust the man they employed? It was out of the question for the Government at home to devise the exact measures by which he was to succeed. It was only the peculiar qualities of General Gordon and the peculiar knowledge which he possessed of the country that gave him a chance of success. Now as to General Gordon's Proclamation about slavery. He (the Earl of Kimberley) would yield to no one in his detestation of slavery and the Slave Trade. There was no subject in regard to which there was a stronger feeling on the part of the whole British Nation. There was no subject in regard to which there was a more general concurrence of opinion than that we ought to do everything in our power to suppress slavery. But in the past they had not deemed it necessary to decree that slavery in any country which they came to occupy should immediately cease the instant that occupation took place. His noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) alluded the other night to a small war in which 635 they were engaged during the existence of the late Government, and which resulted in their assuming a Protectorate over three States in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Malacca. In two of those States slavery existed as a domestic institution. Did the Government say that slavery was instantly to cease? No. What they did was this. They said that measures would be taken gradually to put an end to that institution; but it continued for years after, and was still existing when he went to the Colonial Office. In fact, he did not think it had yet altogether ceased. It was therefore obvious that, under certain circumstances, they had allowed domestic slavery to exist in places under our protection. The Gold Coast offered a still stronger instance of this, for there it existed during the whole period of our Protectorate until it was abolished by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) a few years ago. Were they, then, to be called on suddenly to become so squeamish in regard to the Soudan, a country over which they exercised no Protectorate and which was to be evacuated by Egypt, and announce that slavery must cease the moment British occupation began? Was General Gordon to be denounced because he did not interfere with domestic slavery? Why, if the Soudan had been under our own dominion, no Government would have ventured at once to announce that slavery was to be abolished. Were they to throw obstacles in the way of General Gordon by raising up against him the feeling which existed against slavery? That, he maintained, was an unworthy thing to do. It was an attempt to impede him in the performance of his arduous duties. His conduct in the matter was plain, simple, intelligible, and defensible, and needed no excuse. With regard to Zebehr Pasha, the noble Marquess said that he was to be appointed Governor of Khartoum. He saw an announcement in the newspapers, and he said, without making any inquiry—"Oh; you have countenanced slavery, and you have decided to appoint to the Governorship of Khartoum, a man deeply involved in the Slave Trade." How did he know that they had decided anything of the kind? He had no ground whatever for saying either that General Gordon would have a successor, or that he would be Zebehr Pasha or any other 636 man. At any rate, when he learnt that the Government had chosen Zebehr Pasha, it would be time enough to criticize his character. In the meantime he ventured to hope, even at that late hour of the discussion that, while the acts of the Government were subjected to the severest criticism, there might be a due regard for the difficulties in which this country was placed and which would have to be faced by whatever Administration happened to be in Office.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he wished to point out that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) had merely stated that the Government were responsible for the acts of General Gordon, and that was not disputed by Her Majesty's Government. As to General Gordon's Proclamation, assuming the Government's responsibility, it certainly was a horrible thing for Englishmen to be obliged to countenance the existence of slavery in the Soudan; but he was quite willing to admit that, under certain circumstances, General Gordon might have had no other course open to him than that which he pursued. This did not absolve the Government from blame for having allowed the Soudan to get into the condition in which General Gordon found it. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) had stated that if we were to withdraw from Egypt until there was a reasonable chance of a firm and lasting Government being established there, we should be guilty towards this country, Egypt, and Europe. He entirely agreed with that statement. The difference between his views and those of the Government turned on the interpretation of the word "reasonable." He did not intend to travel over the ground of Egyptian affairs again; but would acknowledge that the Government had been consistent in the statements which they had made, but they had been so vague as to leave them in doubt as to what their real policy was. They had said nothing whatever as to their future policy in the Soudan, or, at all events, as to the means they intended to take for carrying it out; and their Lordships wanted more light from them in the matter. They had stated that they had given a pledge to the Khedive to defend the ports of the Bed Sea, and no doubt they had; but he would like to know who would be responsible for 637 protecting them—this country or the Khedive? He desired to point out that not many weeks would elapse before the heat in that part of the world would become intolerable, and heavy rains set in in the mountains. They could not employ White troops for any length of time under such circumstances, and it might be well to know whether Her Majesty's Government proposed utilizing the services of Egyptian or Indian soldiers. Again, there was a great difference between operations conducted against civilized troops and against a horde of Arabs; and, that being so, he must point out that merely to disperse the rebels afforded no reasonable security against their re-assembling on the first opportunity. He thought that Her Majesty's Government might have given the House some indication of the means they intended to take for the protection of those ports; that they might have given the House some idea whether they had a reasonable hope of breaking up the rebel force so completely as to render it impossible that an attack should be made on Suakin; whether they intended to employ Egyptian troops for the purpose; and what their intentions were with regard to the withdrawal of the British troops from the Soudan and from Egypt. He must repeat that this matter seemed to him of immense importance owing to the season of the year; and he could not understand why the Government, even if not inclined to give the country any information about their general policy, should object to give the House and the country any indication of how they intended to carry out their obligations to protect the ports of the littoral of the Red Sea.
THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLYsaid, he was surprised to hear the speech of the noble Earl who had last spoken (the Earl of Dunraven). The tone evinced in that speech was quite unworthy of, and entirely at variance with, the sentiments to be expected of a patriot. After hearing the speeches delivered from the Treasury Bench, ho was surprised that the noble Earl should have condescended to ask such a series of Questions in regard to how military minutiœ and other matters of detail were to be carried out. He did not know who could or would answer them; because, after the declaration of a general policy, the working out of the mili- 638 tary details was left to the General Officers in charge of the expedition. The Government had stated their policy; and it seemed to him that the Questions put by the noble Earl were absurd on the face of them, and Questions which no one having the good of his country at heart would put at the present moment to the Ministry. He (the Marquess of Huntly) had listened for 10 days past to the speeches that had been delivered on this question. The practice was to put a Question to the Government in regard to a single and, perhaps, insignificant point, and then to found, on the reply, all sorts of other Questions involving the whole policy of the Government. He must say that, whatever their views in regard to the policy of the Government, he thought this a very irregular and obnoxious course of procedure. If there was a matter which had been thoroughly thrashed out and become nauseous, it was the question of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt. Every single point that could have been raised bearing upon the Egyptian Question had been raised over and over again, and in his opinion they had all been completely and fully answered by the Members of Her Majesty's Government.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, he did not think the House would follow the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Huntly) in the opinion he had expressed. It must be remembered that the question that had been raised, that of Egypt, was agitating the mind of the whole country at that moment, and the Government did not seem to him to enter upon it with the gravity which it required. They appeared to think that Egypt was in such a state of prosperity in the hands of its present able Governors, that the country ought not to ask any question as to their policy. In his opinion, and he was not singular in holding it, that was not the feeling of most of the thinking people of England, who were deeply interested in the affairs of Egypt. The Government must also remember that their policy in Egypt was being closely watched by the whole of Europe. The other countries of Europe were just as much interested in the pacification of Egypt and the manner in which it was pacified, and as to a decided policy being put forward, as were the 639 people here. The Opposition were simply stating, and, as the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Huntly) thought, with so much impropriety, that they did not think that the mode in which the affairs of Egypt were being conducted was conducive either to the interests of this country or the interests of Europe.
THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLYsaid, he did not speak of the impropriety of challenging the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but of daily putting Questions on particular details and then raising general debates on them.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, the noble Marquess certainly used very strong terms. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) thought he used the word "nauseous," which was a word generally used in regard to smell; and the Opposition certainly did not readily submit to such execration of their really patriotic feelings. They were simply doing what they thought right in asking the Government to state clearly to the country what they meant to do in Egypt. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told them that the policy of the Government was what it had been; but he (the Earl of Hardwicke) wanted to know what that was? He did not wish to make any attack on the Government as to their military action, for he thought it was necessary, and that the troops had valiantly done their duty. He could not, however, call it a glorious victory, for it was to be lamented that our troops should have to fight against such troops as they had fought against, and that there should have been such a fearful slaughter. To his mind, the policy of the Government was only calculated to excite a feeling of wonder; and he would, therefore, most earnestly repeat and impress upon them that what the country desired was that they should make a decided declaration that they meant to govern Egypt, not as a Provisional Government, but by a Protectorate, so long as they had the power to admit of the publication of proclamations in regard to the Slave Trade, and so long, in short, as they exorcised the whole theory of power in Egypt. He thought Europe should be made to understand that that was what was intended, and that the Government should say that they proposed to put Egypt in a state of prosperity, and would not leave the country until that was done.
§ LORD TRUROsaid, some noble Lords considered that the policy of the Government was vague and mysterious, and that it had not been sufficiently declared; but, in his opinion, as he understood it, it was extremely simple. It was, in the first place, the maintenance of the navigation of the Red Sea. It was to establish, if it were possible, a permanent and satisfactory Government for Egypt, and to do so, if possible, while contributing to the freedom of the Soudan. From that policy there had been no deviation. Did anyone believe that the Opposition were really seeking for a declaration of the policy of the Government? He did not understand so; in his opinion they were really asking for details about matters which lay in the womb of time, for an explanation of the conduct of the Government in future circumstances about which nothing was now known. The incessant renewal of Questions of that kind was embarrassing to the Government and preposterous, and might have extremely mischievous effects in regard to the mode of conducting Public Business. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Hardwicke) had referred to the opinion of Foreign Powers; but he (Lord Truro) had never heard of any protest being offered by any Foreign Power as to the course which Her Majesty's Government were taking. We were in Egypt with the consent of the Foreign Powers, therefore it was rather too much to say that the manner in which we were conducting Egyptian affairs was inconsistent with the views entertained by Foreign Powers.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, he had not made that statement.
§ LORD TRURO, continuing, said, that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been declared over and over again, and had been most consistently maintained. It was, therefore, much to be regretted that the Opposition should think it expedient, or wise, in their own interests as the Opposition, to pursue the Government unceasingly with harassing Questions, which must tend not so much to damage the Government as to embarrass the conduct of affairs in Egypt. Nothing but mischief, as he had said, could ensue from their adoption of that course of proceeding.
§ House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.