HL Deb 23 June 1884 vol 289 cc1043-59
EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I rise for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made on my behalf last week. Your Lordships are already aware that in consequence of the bad state of Egyptian finance, owing to the burning of Alexandria by the troops of Arabi, owing to the cholera, and to the great expense in the Soudan, aggravated by the fall in the price of almost everything which Egypt produces, Her Majesty's Government came to the opinion that it was absolutely necessary to change the Law of Liquidation. They proposed to the Powers to meet in Conference to consider what should be done in regard to that change. Your Lordships are aware that Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia accepted the invitations. Prance accepted the invitation in principle, but desired to have an exchange of views before formally acceding to the proposal. I will now state to your Lordships what is the result of that exchange of views. I am afraid that it will be rather wearisome to your Lordships; but I think that the best way that I can state the result is to read to your Lordships two despatches that are to be found in the Papers that we are presenting to-night. On June 15, M. Waddington sent to us a despatch of which the following is a translation: — London, June 15, 1884. M. le Comte,—In our interview of yesterday we arrived at a complete agreement on all the preliminary questions raised by the proposal contained in your Excellency's circular despatch, dated the 19th of April last. The moment has therefore arrived to record in writing the terms of this agreement. In his despatch of the 29th of April, of which a copy was delivered to you by Count d'Aubigny, M. Ferry, after accepting- in principle the proposal of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, added the following considerations:—'The very character of this proposal indicates that the modifications upon which the Powers will have to deliberate involve the examination of certain questions connected with the Law of Liquidation which it is impossible not to take into account. Hence the French Government hopes that the Ministers of the Queen will not refuse to allow of these questions being made the object of a preliminary exchange of views, which is indispensable in order to determine accurately the mandate of the Conference and to insure the (successful) result of its labours.' The ex- change of views proposed by M. Ferry having been accepted by your Lordship, I hastened in our first interview on this subject on the 2nd of May clearly to determine the ground which the Government of the Republic intended to take as their standpoint from the commencement of our negotiations. It was of importance, in the first place, to remove two ideas, two prejudices, widely spread in the English Press, relative to the re-establishment of the condominium and to the alleged military projects of France in Egypt. Consequently I declared to you that the French Government had no idea whatsoever of furthering the re-establishment of the Anglo-French Control in Egypt. No doubt we retain the conviction that this control produced, while it lasted, good and salutary effects, and that under its influence Egypt was tranquil and its finances prosperous. But we are fully aware of the reasons which at the present time necessitate the rejection of any idea of a return to a system which events have overthrown. The condominium is dead, and we have no idea of rescusitating it. It is solely from the point of view of the collective interests of Europe, and of the share therein which we legitimately represent, that we shall henceforth consider Egyptian affairs. The other misunderstanding which it was expedient to remove had reference to the intention which English opinion has often attributed to us to substitute a French occupation for the English occupation at the date of the recall of their troops by the Government of Her Majesty. I declared to you that the Government of the Republic was ready to give the most formal engagements on this point. This determination was inspired by the confidence we have that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate on their side to confirm distinctly the solemn declarations made by them on repeated occasions that they would do nothing to prejudice in any way the international situation in Egypt secured by the treaties and firmans, and would evacuate the country when order should be re-established. There would thus be, as it were, between the two Governments a synallagmatic engagement, embracing on the part of England a provision for evacuation at a fixed period, which could not be prolonged without a fresh consultation of the Powers, and on the part of France a formal engagement not to proceed, in any case, to an armed intervention in the Delta of the Nile without a previous understanding with England. After explaining the views of my Government on these two very important points, I pointed out to your Lordship that it would be just to stipulate in the interest of the creditors of Egypt, from whom you were going, perhaps, to demand great sacrifices, for certain guarantees calculated to insure the good management of Egyptian finance, and to prevent disorder in the administration, which might speedily bring about fresh embarrassments. Moreover, the future and the prosperity of the whole of Egypt depend on the wise and upright management of its finances, and the precautions which may be adopted for this object will be a source of strength for its government and, at the same time, a check upon it. You thought that it would be possible to find these guarantees in the extension of the attributions and power of the Commission of the Debt; an institution which has already worked for several years to the general satisfaction, and on which the principal Powers interested have each a representative. I replied that such was also the idea of the French Government. While taking note of my declarations, you were good enough to add that you were authorized by Mr. Gladstone and by your colleagues to tell me that they were very sensible of the friendly manner in which the communication had been made on our side; that they appreciated the disinterested character of the assurances which I had been charged to give you; and that they shared with the Government of the Republic the conviction that the good administration of Egypt was an object of general interest for Europe. In the interviews which followed, you, in your turn, developed the views of Her Majesty's Government, and you explained in concert with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in what manner and to what degree you thought it possible to meet the views of the French Government. I now beg you, therefore, to be good enough yourself to draw up in their definitive shape the proposals which you addressed to me in the name of your Government. Accept, &c., (Signed) "WADDINGTON. My answer was sent on the next day— Foreign Office, June 16, 1884. M. 1'Ambassadeur,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th instant, relative to the preliminary understanding desired by your Government before accepting the proposal of a Conference to discuss the financial position of Egypt. Your Excellency states in that note the assurances and explanations which your Government are ready to give with regard to Egypt, and you request to be informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the questions thus raised. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the importance of the declarations made by your Excellency on behalf of the French Government. The formal abandonment of any idea of re-establishing the condominium, and the assurances for the future that French troops would not enter Egypt without the consent of this country, have rendered practicable and greatly facilitated a full and frank exchange of views. Her Majesty's Government are glad to find that the two Governments are agreed as to the interests which Europe has in the good government and prosperity of Egypt. Nothing shows more clearly the views of Her Majesty's Government on that point than the circular which I addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at the Courts of the Great Powers on the 3rd of January, 1883. That despatch was written three months after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir had enabled the British forces to enter into occupation of Egypt. It was submitted to the Parliament of this country, and was communicated to the Powers and to the Sublime Porto. It met with general acquiescence. In it the statement was made that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of withdrawing the British forces as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority would admit of it. To that declaration Her Majesty's Government have adhered and still adhere. It was with regret that they found that circumstances interfered with the progress of the measures taken with a view to that withdrawal; and it is equally matter of regret to them to feel that the time is not yet come when, with due regard to peace and order in Egypt, the English force could be taken away. There is some difficulty in stating a fixed date for such withdrawal, inasmuch as any period so stated may prove in the event to be too long or too short. But Her Majesty's Government, in order to remove any doubt of their policy in this matter, and in view of the declarations made by France, are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk of peace and order. They believe that there ought to be a reasonable hope of establishing during a period of three years and a-half the necessary guarantees for an order of things in Egypt which shall be satisfactory. But if this, unfortunately, should prove not to be the case, and if the British Government were then of opinion that some prolongation of the occupation would be necessary, it is not to be supposed that the European Powers would join in objecting to a measure required by the safety of Egypt, an interest which is common in different degrees to all. Her Majesty's Government readily acknowledge the importance for the well-being of Egypt that her finances should be managed in a sound and economical manner. It was for this purpose that in 1876 the Anglo-French Control was originally established. The Goschen-Joubert arrangement gave to the English Controller of Receipts a preponderating position over that of the French Controller, whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the Treasury; but on both of the Controllers important administrative functions were conferred. The Dual Control, as finally instituted in 1879, differed in two important points from the original Control of 1876. The English Controller was no longer intrusted with duties of a more important nature than those performed by his French colleague, and although the powers of investigation conferred on these two officers were limited to financial matters, at the same time the fact that they had a right to be present at the meeting of the Council of Ministers virtually gave to them the right of interference in all questions connected with the administration of the country. They were no longer, as before, purely financial officers. Important political functions were conferred on them. It is unnecessary to dwell on the advantages or the disadvantages and dangers of this system which has now been formally abandoned by the French as well as by the Egyptian and British Governments. It will be readily acknowledged that as long as Great Britain has to bear the burden and responsibility of the military occupation of Egypt it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to admit such interference with either the administration or the political government of that country as was allotted to the Anglo-French Control under either of the above arrangements; and Her Majesty's Government do not think that it would he wise or practical after the withdrawal of the British troops to renew any such system to be worked by a greater or lesser number of foreigners not under the authority of the Egyptian Government. But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not in any way interfere with the position which England should occupy in Egypt, and that it would he an advantage in itself that a limited extension should be given to the power of the Commission of the Caisse de la Dette Publique. Her Majesty's Government are ready to propose to the Powers that within a year of an alteration of the Law of Liquidation being brought into force the functions of the Caisse de la Dette Publique should be extended in the following manner:—The Commissioners of the Caisse would be consulted when the Budget for each year, commencing with that for 1886, is in course of preparation. The Budget would be based as far as possible on the provisions of the normal Budget, which Her Majesty's Government propose to exhibit to the Conference, due allowance being made for any altered circumstances of the country. The Budget for each year being so prepared, in consultation with the Commissioners, the latter would be empowered to veto during the year any proposed expenditure which would produce an excess on the Budget, except in cases of such emergency involving peril to peace and order. This power of veto would also apply to expenditure under the Budget of 1885, although that Budget would not have been settled in consultation with the Commissioners. After the withdrawal of the British troops the Caisse would have, in addition, the power of revenue inspection, so as to insure that the whole of the revenue really reaches the Treasury instead of being diverted to other purposes on its way. The President of the Caisse would be an Englishman. Her Majesty's Government will, at or before the expiration of the English occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium, and will make propositions with regard to the Suez Canal in conformity with those contained in my circular despatch of the 3rd of January, 1883. Her Majesty's Government received with satisfaction your Excellency's statement that these proposals are acceptable to France. I have to add that all the arrangements above described are subject to the satisfactory settlement of the financial arrangements which will be proposed by Her Majesty's Government to the Conference. I have, &c., (Signed) GRANVILLE. There is another despatch to M. Waddington. I do not think it necessary to read it to your Lordships, though I am quite ready to do so if your Lordships should wish. It is a despatch which is only a recapitulation of my statement—I admit in a more methodical form—and I think it would be, perhaps, wearisome to your Lordships if I were to read it now; but I am entirely at your Lordships' disposal if you wish me to do so. Your Lordships will remark there are five points raised in this Correspondence. The first is, the formal declaration of the French Government of the abandonment of any idea of reviving the condominium, and the engagement not to send French troops into Egypt, either before our withdrawal or for the future, without the consent of this country. M. Waddington might have gone further, for this principle has certainly been stated in many speeches both in and out of Parliament; and I think the noble Marquess, both in Parliament and certainly in a recent attack on Her Majesty's Government, stated in most distinct terms that a certain Power on our withdrawal would enter Egypt, and that there could be no doubt who that Power would be. Now, although I never thought it certain or even probable that the French would take this very grave step, yet I entirely agree with the noble Marquess that there is such a possibility, and this possibility is one that would create very great difficulties with regard to any plan of evacuation. The noble Marquess's argument might apply just as much to an evacuation 10 or 20 years hence as to an evacuation one or two years hence. This declaration on the part of the French Government removes this difficulty from our acting on our own policy; and this, as I stated in our despatch, greatly facilitates the way for a full and frank interchange of views with the French Government. My Lords, the next question is, that of our having consented to fix a date for the evacuation of Egypt. I think it was the noble Earl opposite who stated the other day that the report was incredible that we should have consented to any such thing, I cannot help remembering that from time to time we have been very much pressed by the opponents of the Government to fix a date for the evacuation, founded upon the idea that it would give us a greater hold upon the country. I think it will be within the recollection of your Lordships that, as far as military occupations of friendly countries are concerned, there always has been an inclination on the part of the occupying Power to seek for reasons for delaying the cessation of the occupation longer than seemed to others to be necessary, and proved to be the case after the result was known. I could mention, seve- ral cases, but I will merely speak of one — namely, when Lord Dufferin and Baron Gros went on a mission to Syria. Ten thousand troops were sent there for six months; but at the end of six months the French Government thought there was danger of disorder occurring if they retired, and they stayed on month after month; and it was only by diplomatic pressure, chiefly on the part of this country, that at last they were withdrawn 10 months after the time. Napoleon III. was then at the zenith of his power; and I am not aware that at that time there was any complaint raised or suggested that by yielding in that manner to a friendly representation from a friendly Power any insult was suffered or any injury was done to the honour or dignity of France. There is one point which I cannot entirely put out of sight. Up to this time the greatest confidence has been shown in the assurances and words of Her Majesty's Government. Austria and Italy have frequently repeated the confidence they felt in the pledges given by us; and the German Government, certainly not in the least jealous of any position we might have in Egypt, yet in the most friendly and useful way, more than once inculcated on the Porte the expediency of trusting to the assurances we had so formally made. When these despatches are discussed, I hope one answer will be given to the following point. Sixteen months ago we were debating in both Houses of Parliament Addresses in reply to the Queen's Speech, and in both Houses the Leaders of the Conservative Party made a complaint so similar that it appears to have been previously concerted—that there was nothing in the Speech to show when the troops were to be withdrawn. Now, if it were so wrong in us not to declare, four months after our occupation, gratuitously and without any condition, the precise date on which we were to leave the country, I cannot see how it can be wrong now for us, in return for such a very important and unusual declaration as that made by the French Government, and that most important proviso which I have read to your Lordships, to fix a date for coming out. My Lords, the next question is, what answer we gave to the not very unnatural question of the French Government as to what security would be given at the time when we were making application to the Powers for the good and economical management of Egyptian finance from the present time. The noble Earl said, the other day, that he who holds the purse-strings directs the policy. I have not a word to say against that maxim. I cannot equally agree with the noble Earl when he went on to say that all systems of financial control and audit have exactly the same effect. In this country the Chancellor of the Exchequer is theoretically omnipotent over the Estimates presented by each Department of the State. Of course, the great check upon him is an appeal to the Cabinet, and the ultima ratio of the resignation of the Head of the Department. Well, there is not the slightest doubt that the Treasury does exercise a very useful influence over the administration of this country by its audit check; but as to the Auditor General, he has not the slightest weight in regard to the policy of the country. What is quite clear is that, between these two extremes, there are to be found checks, wise and useful, in the financial sense, without being an interference with the political and administrative government of the country. Now, my Lords, Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in this country about seven weeks ago. He had long and important conversations with myself and other Members of Her Majesty's Government. One of the first questions was naturally the pressing one of finance; and on this he speaks with great authority, not only as a successful Minister of Finance, but as one who has combined the post of Controller under the dual system and that of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Representative under most difficult circumstances at Cairo. Now, the opinion of Sir Evelyn Baring, given to me before I had any sort of communication with M. Waddington on that question, was that it was very desirable, in the interests of the Egyptians and ourselves, while no interference with politics or administration should be allowed, that the Powers of the Caisse de la Dette Publique should be extended to a certain degree. I do not pretend to understand finance, and I do not intend to speak upon it; but I am assured that the powers given to the Caisse are of a practical character, and I believe that the opportunity of consulting the Commission of the Caisse, although they will have no votes and no power to decide, will strengthen our hands in checking unnecessary expenditure, and that the power of putting a veto on any expenditure in excess of the aggregate amount of the Budget will exercise a strong stimulus in favour of economy, and strengthen our hands in that direction. This does not appear to be an unreasonable amount of security to offer to the Powers who are called upon to agree to some sacrifice on the part of their subjects. It must be remembered, too, that this Commission is not a body entirely foreign to ourselves, for on it we have not only a member, but it is agreed, as far as France is concerned, that that member is to preside over the meetings. There is another subject which your Lordships will perceive that I have noticed in my despatch to M. Waddington, where I made an announcement which is hardly strictly connected with the matter in hand, and on which we received no requests for explanation on the part of the French Government. But we thought it a favourable moment for declaring our views on the subject to the Powers, and it was undoubtedly satisfactory to us to find that France was ready to endorse our opinions, which we also hope will not be unacceptable to others. It was the announcement that it was our intention, not now, and certainly not at the Conference, but either before or at the time of the evacuation, to propose the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the principles which have been applied to Belgium, and also the adoption of that plan with regard to the Suez Canal which is contained in the Circular of 3rd of January, 1883. I do not think it necessary at this time to go into a discussion of the advantages of the neutralization of Egypt; and, with regard to the Suez Canal, I have only to say that, in the autumn of 1882, a very strong Committee was appointed to consider that question. There were Ministers, Heads of Departments, soldiers, sailors, and engineers on that Committee, and they were unanimously of opinion that the neutralization of the Suez Canal would be a detriment to the interests of this country, while the plan described in the Circular of January 3, 1883, would be of great use. This we recommended, and the Cabinet gave their sanction to it, thinking that it was sound in principle and advantageous to us without being detrimental to others; and it was communicated to the Powers. No objection was made by any Power; and, at all events, a step has been gained by the present formal adhesion of the French to our plan. Your Lordships will also remark that if, as I trust will not be the case, for it would be a great disaster to all concerned—that if we do not arrive in Conference at a satisfactory settlement of the financial question, we shall entirely regain our liberty of action, and we must consider the position in which we shall be placed. My Lords, I can say with truth that this interchange of views has been conducted on both sides in a spirit of conciliation and moderation, and, I believe, at the same time with a due regard to the respective interests of the two countries. I hope it will be found that other Powers do not object to what we have done; and I ground this expectation very much on the fact that the main principle upon which this agreement is based is a cordial acknowledgment that the Powers of Europe have in different degree an interest in the welfare of Egypt. I am afraid it will not be well accepted by those in this country who conscientiously think that a country is not bound by its pledges in an equally binding' manner as an individual is. It will not be pleasing to those who think that the country may take any temporary advantage in regard to them that it may think best for itself. It will not be pleasing to those who really wish for annexation under the disguise of a permanent Protectorate such as we exercise in India over some of the Indian Principalities, and who think such a plan both desirable and easy to carry out. I have been told that what Englishmen have done Englishmen can do, and I agree, within certain limits, to that proposition. I know that Englishmen in the interior of India, separated from Europe and from Europeans, and acting under a despotic Government by whom they are hardly controlled, and not being at all controlled by the Government at home, have, with the help of Native Ministers, very satisfactorily conducted the government of such countries. But I venture to think that the case of Egypt is absolutely dissimilar. Just consider the vicinity of Egypt to Europe, and the very large population of other Nationalities in Egypt, many of them far exceeding the English resi- dents in number. Remember the international institutions that have been established—institutions financial, judicial, industrial, and administrative. He-member that all these populations are most active and zealous in representing what seems to them the principal interests of their particular Nationalities. I do not think it is altogether immaterial to remember that there are newspaper correspondents of almost every nation established there. Remembering these things, I feel that the difficulties of a permanent Protectorate would be great indeed; but I cannot hope that the course which we have pursued in these communications will be acceptable to those who wish for annexation more or less disguised. My Lords, I venture to think that all those who do agree with what has lately been said by an ex-Ambassador with great force as to the immense strength of England over all the world in the perfect confidence felt in that which she has said; who agree with that Conservative Government, who during the great Napoleonic War were in full possession of Egypt and did not keep it; and who agree with Lord Palmerston in his repudiation, and with Lord Beacons-field in his still stronger repudiation, of the idea that the possession of Egypt could be an advantage to this country — I think that those who agree in those opinions, and who besides consider that it is not desirable for this country to give examples to be followed by and to justify others in a policy of encroachment and annexation, will think the course we have pursued has not been injurious to the interests, to the honour, or to the dignity of this country.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

; My Lords, we have met to consider a matter of such gravity, and dealing with instruments so complicated in their character, that I should not at a moment's notice venture to express any formal or advised opinion upon the proposals which the noble Earl has laid upon the Table. I will not conceal from your Lordships that at the first blush they do not reassure me. They seem to contain much that is perilous to the interests of this country, and full of menace to the future peace of the world. But before I undertake either to meet some of the arguments which the noble Earl has raised, or to examine the detailed proposals which he has submitted, naturally I should wish to see them in print, and I do so the more because it is evident to me that the language in which the despatch is couched has been very carefully considered and polished again and again. All the difficult points appear to be covered by a studied ambiguity of language, which may be a convenient mode of evading present difficulties, but which will certainly not make the future more peaceful or more secure. There is the burning question of what is to be done supposing that at the end of three years we find the circumstances are not such as to permit of our evacuation. The language of the noble Earl's despatch seems to leave it in doubt by what machinery we are to submit—as I understand we are to submit—our wishes to the Powers, and leaves in doubt this question, Of how many of the Powers must we have the consent in order to justify us in remaining in Egypt? Again, there is that other burning question of the jurisdictions and functions of this new Multiple Control. My noble and learned Friend (Earl Cairns) said the other night—and it is a matter which anyone who has studied history knows — that he who has the power of the purse has power over the whole, and that our policy must be subordinated to financial considerations. But the language in which the Caisse is authorized or empowered to veto the particular articles of the Budget is again couched in language of studied ambiguity. Studied ambiguity means future controversy, and from that future controversy may spring consequences dangerous to the peace of the world. Again, the whole of this arrangement, so carefully elaborated, evades the main ground on which the whole of the negotiations were undertaken—it does not touch the financial portion, which was the question which led England to approach Foreign Powers. I do not understand on what ground, for the sake of what, for what considerations we have made these promises to France. We have got absolutely nothing: in return. But they are made dependent on the future deliberations of the Powers of Europe, before which proposals as to finance, as to the advances which, we are told, are to be made by England, and as to the limitation to be put upon the interest guaranteed to the foreign bondholders—proposals of which the form and dimensions are at present wholly unknown to us, and do not seem to have been clearly defined to the minds of the negotiators. It is on the reception that these proposals may meet with, not only from France, but from the other Powers of Europe, that will depend whether the whole of the labour of the last three weeks shall not be entirely thrown away, and whether these negotiations shall have any fruit at all. It does not seem to me, in. spite of the toil through which the negotiators have gone, that we have approached, by any perceptible space, to a definite solution of the controversy and discussion which England herself, without, I must say, any very pressing necessity, has brought on. But I will not discuss the matter farther now, and I will close with one question. I will ask the noble Earl whether there are any other engagements between England and France, especially whether there is any undertaking on the part of France to give us any other consideration than that shown in this statement for the concessions made by England?

EARL GRANVILLE

was understood to say that there was no formal engagement between the two countries with respect to financial matters; but that Her Majesty's Government certainly expected a continuance of the same friendly disposition on the part of France.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Have any financial proposals with respect to Egypt, or the limitation of the interest of the Debt, been made by France?

EARL GRANVILLE

The French Government and ourselves have agreed that it would not be respectful to other Powers that we should discuss financial arrangements preliminary to communication with the Foreign Powers, and their entrance into the Conference.

EARL STANHOPE

said, he had a Question on the Paper which had been answered by the noble Earl—namely, as to whether the Suez Canal was to be neutralized? As far as he could gather from the full but guarded explanation of the noble Earl, much more than this was to be conceded, and Egypt Proper was to be neutralized, and all that England had gained in return was the abolition of the condominium. He understood, however, that this was already dead and gone at the beginning of our occupation, and that the Dual Control was at an end at the time. It was true that France did not openly assent to this; but surely silence in such a matter implied consent? There was another point on which they would be very glad to have some information, and that was as to the loan of £8,000,000, which it was understood on good authority was to be guaranteed by this country to Egypt. He had seen by this morning's French journals that Her Majesty's Government had made proposals to all the Foreign Powers upon the financial affairs of Egypt, and yet Parliament was kept in absolute ignorance of them, and was not, it appeared, to be enlightened upon them until Foreign Governments had been consulted. This was in direct opposition to the pledges given by Her Majesty's Government of giving full information to Parliament, and not merely presenting meagre despatches. As to the neutralization of the Suez Canal, after what had happened he had hoped that Her Majesty's Government would have allowed the question to remain open for further consideration. Here was the highway to India, which might be barred against us at any moment. Independently of so important an Imperial interest in that undertaking, we had very great financial considerations at stake. The £4,000,000 sterling expended in the purchase of the Canal shares now amounted to £10,000,000. As to the Conference, he had understood that the first meeting was to take place on Saturday next. Were the Government to sanction its assembling before Parliament and the country had had an opportunity of considering the Papers which had just been issued? He sincerely hoped that the Government would be able to contradict such a hasty proceeding taking place.

EARL CAIRNS

I think the noble Earl scarcely apprehended the nature of the Question put by the noble Marquess —so I gather from his answer. What we think it desirable to know is this. We have before us certain terms agreed upon between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France. The noble Earl referred also to several other matters, such as questions of finance. My noble Friend desires to know from the noble Earl whether there are any agreements between the Governments of England and France on this subject of finance? The noble Earl says it would not be courteous to the other Powers to have a discussion of terms not stated or made known to them. I do not wish to enter into the question whether there should be any discussion or not, or whether, having made one arrangement with the cognizance of the other Powers, it would be discourteous to them to make another agreement; but what we do wish to know is this. Will the noble Earl inform us, as a matter of fact, whether there is any agreement, or any other understanding, formal or informal, with the Government of France as to the financial arrangements to which the Government have agreed?

EARL GRANVILLE

I thought I had made myself clear. There are certainly things about finance submitted to France, such as a change in regard to the Commission of the Caisse; but there is no formal agreement whatever with regard to finance.

EARL CAIRNS

Is there any informal agreement?

EARL GRANVILLE

There is no informal agreement.

EARL CAIRNS

Any engagement?

EARL GRANVILLE

There is no engagement. There are changes in the Law of Liquidation and in the Caisse. The changes in regard to the Caisse are clearly changes in the Law of Liquidation. But except what appears in the despatch which I have read there is no engagement with France on the subject.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Is there an understanding as to the lowering of interest?

EARL GRANVILLE

Noble Lords opposite are trying by a series of Questions to induce me to state what the financial scheme is which we are about to submit to the Conference. That I must firmly decline to do. The answer I have already given is the obvious answer to the Question?

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE

said, that he thought the noble Earl was acting very discourteously to the House. The question of finance was so intimately mixed up with the Law of Liquidation that a change in the one must necessarily affect the other. He understood that the Government were going to propose a loan of £8,000,000 in order that the interest might be reduced. I think in such a case the House is perfectly justified in asking for assurances.

EARL GRANVILLE

It is, no doubt, a fact that there may be no indiscretion whatever in the Question, but there may be very great indiscretion in the answer.

THE EARL OF JERSEY

said, it seemed to him that the noble Earl had succeeded in taking England into the Conference with one hand tied behind its back. The noble Earl told them in the beginning of his speech that it was a great point to gain promises from France. He could not help recollecting that the noble Earl had had some experience of the promises of Foreign Powers. There have been some Russian, promises, for instance, which had not been fulfilled; and he did not know that there was any reason to think that the Egyptian promises of France would be kept any better. As far as he could gather, the English troops were to remain in Egypt to secure order in that country for three and a-half years, and at the end of that time Egypt was to be given over to all the harpies of Europe to get as much money out of it as they could. Yet this country was to be bound to abdicate her position. He protested very strongly against an agreement which gave us no security whatever, and which, in the long run, might prove disastrous to this country. The only consolation was that if Her Majesty's Government remained in Office and mismanaged the affairs of Egypt, as they had during the last two or three years, the Powers of Europe would be glad to see them remain there.

LORD INCHIQUIN

Do the Government say that there has been no formal or informal agreement between this country and France on the question of finance?

EARL GRANVILLE

The Question has already been put twice by the noble Marquess, and once by the noble and learned Lord opposite, and has been answered.

THE EARL OF MILLTOWN

Will the noble Earl tell us whether the Englishman who is to preside over the Caisse is to have a casting vote? If he has not, I do not see what great advantage has been gained.

EARL GRANVILLE

We shall certainly propose that he shall have a casting vote, as we consider it as most important.

EARL STANHOPE

asked whether the Conference would meet on Saturday?

EARL GRANVILLE

I am not perfectly certain; but I feel pretty sure that it will do so.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY

I understand that Her Majesty's Government have submitted the terms of their agreement with the French Government to various Powers of Europe, and that these terms will not be submitted to Parliament until they have received the replies of the Powers. I wish to ask whether any replies have been received from the Powers with regard to that agreement; and, if so, from what Powers?

EARL GRANVILLE

We have had some communications from Austria and Italy on the subject; but no final reply has been received.