Lords Sitting of 23 June 1884

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— National Debt (Conversion of Stock) (145); Union Officers' Superannuation (Ireland) * (146).
Second Reading—Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 4)* (119); Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 9)* (120); Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 10)* (121); Electric Lighting Provisional Order (No. 3) * (122); Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Orders (Labourers Act) * (123); Local Government (Ireland) Provisional Orders (Waterworks)* (124); Fisheries (Ireland)* (77).
Royal Assent—Consolidated Fund (No. 2) [47 & 48 Vict. c. 15]; Married Women's Property Act (1882) Amendment [47 & 48 Vict. c. 14]; Bankruptcy Frauds and Disabilities (Scotland) [47 & 48 Vict. c. 16]; Metropolitan Police [47 & 48 Vict. c. 17]; Gas Provisional Orders [47 & 48 Vict. c. xxxix]; Land Drainage Provisional Orders 47 & 48 Vict. c. xl]; Water Provisional Orders [47 & 48 Vict. c. xl]; Electric Lighting Provisional Order (No. 2) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xlii]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xliii]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 2) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xliv]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 3) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xlv]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 5) [47 & 48 1 Vict. c. xlvi]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 6) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xlvii]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 7) [47 & 48 Vict. c. xlviii]; Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 8) [47 &

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48 Vict. c. xlix]; Commons Regulation Provisional Order [47 & amp; 48 Vict. c. 1]; Gas Provisional Orders (No. 2) [47 & amp; 48 Vict. c. li].

EGYPT—THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE.

  MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made on my behalf last week. Your Lordships are already aware that in consequence of the bad state of Egyptian finance, owing to the burning of Alexandria by the troops of Arabi, owing to the cholera, and to the great expense in the Soudan, aggravated by the fall in the price of almost everything which Egypt produces, Her Majesty's Government came to the opinion that it was absolutely necessary to change the Law of Liquidation. They proposed to the Powers to meet in Conference to consider what should be done in regard to that change. Your Lordships are aware that Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia accepted the invitations. Prance accepted the invitation in principle, but desired to have an exchange of views before formally acceding to the proposal. I will now state to your Lordships what is the result of that exchange of views. I am afraid that it will be rather wearisome to your Lordships; but I think that the best way that I can state the result is to read to your Lordships two despatches that are to be found in the Papers that we are presenting to-night. On June 15, M. Waddington sent to us a despatch of which the following is a translation: —
  "London, June 15, 1884.
  "M. le Comte,—In our interview of yesterday we arrived at a complete agreement on all the preliminary questions raised by the proposal contained in your Excellency's circular despatch, dated the 19th of April last. The moment has therefore arrived to record in writing the terms of this agreement. In his despatch of the 29th of April, of which a copy was delivered to you by Count d'Aubigny, M. Ferry, after accepting- in principle the proposal of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, added the following considerations:—'The very character of this proposal indicates that the modifications upon which the Powers will have to deliberate involve the examination of certain questions connected with the Law of Liquidation which it is impossible not to take into account. Hence the French Government hopes that the Ministers of the Queen will not refuse to allow of these questions being made the object of a preliminary exchange of views, which is indispensable in order to determine accurately the mandate of the Conference and to insure the (successful) result of its labours.' The ex-
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  change of views proposed by M. Ferry having been accepted by your Lordship, I hastened in our first interview on this subject on the 2nd of May clearly to determine the ground which the Government of the Republic intended to take as their standpoint from the commencement of our negotiations. It was of importance, in the first place, to remove two ideas, two prejudices, widely spread in the English Press, relative to the re-establishment of the condominium and to the alleged military projects of France in Egypt. Consequently I declared to you that the French Government had no idea whatsoever of furthering the re-establishment of the Anglo-French Control in Egypt. No doubt we retain the conviction that this control produced, while it lasted, good and salutary effects, and that under its influence Egypt was tranquil and its finances prosperous. But we are fully aware of the reasons which at the present time necessitate the rejection of any idea of a return to a system which events have overthrown. The condominium is dead, and we have no idea of rescusitating it. It is solely from the point of view of the collective interests of Europe, and of the share therein which we legitimately represent, that we shall henceforth consider Egyptian affairs. The other misunderstanding which it was expedient to remove had reference to the intention which English opinion has often attributed to us to substitute a French occupation for the English occupation at the date of the recall of their troops by the Government of Her Majesty. I declared to you that the Government of the Republic was ready to give the most formal engagements on this point. This determination was inspired by the confidence we have that Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate on their side to confirm distinctly the solemn declarations made by them on repeated occasions that they would do nothing to prejudice in any way the international situation in Egypt secured by the treaties and firmans, and would evacuate the country when order should be re-established. There would thus be, as it were, between the two Governments a synallagmatic engagement, embracing on the part of England a provision for evacuation at a fixed period, which could not be prolonged without a fresh consultation of the Powers, and on the part of France a formal engagement not to proceed, in any case, to an armed intervention in the Delta of the Nile without a previous understanding with England. After explaining the views of my Government on these two very important points, I pointed out to your Lordship that it would be just to stipulate in the interest of the creditors of Egypt, from whom you were going, perhaps, to demand great sacrifices, for certain guarantees calculated to insure the good management of Egyptian finance, and to prevent disorder in the administration, which might speedily bring about fresh embarrassments. Moreover, the future and the prosperity of the whole of Egypt depend on the wise and upright management of its finances, and the precautions which may be adopted for this object will be a source of strength for its government and, at the same time, a check upon it. You thought that it would be possible to find these guarantees in the extension of the attributions and power of the Commission of the Debt; an institution

  1045
  which has already worked for several years to the general satisfaction, and on which the principal Powers interested have each a representative. I replied that such was also the idea of the French Government. While taking note of my declarations, you were good enough to add that you were authorized by Mr. Gladstone and by your colleagues to tell me that they were very sensible of the friendly manner in which the communication had been made on our side; that they appreciated the disinterested character of the assurances which I had been charged to give you; and that they shared with the Government of the Republic the conviction that the good administration of Egypt was an object of general interest for Europe. In the interviews which followed, you, in your turn, developed the views of Her Majesty's Government, and you explained in concert with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in what manner and to what degree you thought it possible to meet the views of the French Government. I now beg you, therefore, to be good enough yourself to draw up in their definitive shape the proposals which you addressed to me in the name of your Government.
  "Accept, &c.,
  (Signed) "WADDINGTON."
  My answer was sent on the next day—
  "Foreign Office, June 16, 1884.
  "M. 1'Ambassadeur,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th instant, relative to the preliminary understanding desired by your Government before accepting the proposal of a Conference to discuss the financial position of Egypt. Your Excellency states in that note the assurances and explanations which your Government are ready to give with regard to Egypt, and you request to be informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the questions thus raised. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the importance of the declarations made by your Excellency on behalf of the French Government. The formal abandonment of any idea of re-establishing the condominium, and the assurances for the future that French troops would not enter Egypt without the consent of this country, have rendered practicable and greatly facilitated a full and frank exchange of views. Her Majesty's Government are glad to find that the two Governments are agreed as to the interests which Europe has in the good government and prosperity of Egypt. Nothing shows more clearly the views of Her Majesty's Government on that point than the circular which I addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives at the Courts of the Great Powers on the 3rd of January, 1883. That despatch was written three months after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir had enabled the British forces to enter into occupation of Egypt. It was submitted to the Parliament of this country, and was communicated to the Powers and to the Sublime Porto. It met with general acquiescence. In it the statement was made that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of withdrawing the British forces as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of
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  the Khedive's authority would admit of it. To that declaration Her Majesty's Government have adhered and still adhere. It was with regret that they found that circumstances interfered with the progress of the measures taken with a view to that withdrawal; and it is equally matter of regret to them to feel that the time is not yet come when, with due regard to peace and order in Egypt, the English force could be taken away. There is some difficulty in stating a fixed date for such withdrawal, inasmuch as any period so stated may prove in the event to be too long or too short. But Her Majesty's Government, in order to remove any doubt of their policy in this matter, and in view of the declarations made by France, are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk of peace and order. They believe that there ought to be a reasonable hope of establishing during a period of three years and a-half the necessary guarantees for an order of things in Egypt which shall be satisfactory. But if this, unfortunately, should prove not to be the case, and if the British Government were then of opinion that some prolongation of the occupation would be necessary, it is not to be supposed that the European Powers would join in objecting to a measure required by the safety of Egypt, an interest which is common in different degrees to all. Her Majesty's Government readily acknowledge the importance for the well-being of Egypt that her finances should be managed in a sound and economical manner. It was for this purpose that in 1876 the Anglo-French Control was originally established. The Goschen-Joubert arrangement gave to the English Controller of Receipts a preponderating position over that of the French Controller, whose duty it was to audit the accounts of the Treasury; but on both of the Controllers important administrative functions were conferred. The Dual Control, as finally instituted in 1879, differed in two important points from the original Control of 1876. The English Controller was no longer intrusted with duties of a more important nature than those performed by his French colleague, and although the powers of investigation conferred on these two officers were limited to financial matters, at the same time the fact that they had a right to be present at the meeting of the Council of Ministers virtually gave to them the right of interference in all questions connected with the administration of the country. They were no longer, as before, purely financial officers. Important political functions were conferred on them. It is unnecessary to dwell on the advantages or the disadvantages and dangers of this system which has now been formally abandoned by the French as well as by the Egyptian and British Governments. It will be readily acknowledged that as long as Great Britain has to bear the burden and responsibility of the military occupation of Egypt it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to admit such interference with either the administration or the political government of that country as was allotted to the Anglo-French Control under either of the above arrangements; and Her Majesty's Government do not think that it would he wise or practical after

  1047
  the withdrawal of the British troops to renew any such system to be worked by a greater or lesser number of foreigners not under the authority of the Egyptian Government. But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not in any way interfere with the position which England should occupy in Egypt, and that it would he an advantage in itself that a limited extension should be given to the power of the Commission of the Caisse de la Dette Publique. Her Majesty's Government are ready to propose to the Powers that within a year of an alteration of the Law of Liquidation being brought into force the functions of the Caisse de la Dette Publique should be extended in the following manner:—The Commissioners of the Caisse would be consulted when the Budget for each year, commencing with that for 1886, is in course of preparation. The Budget would be based as far as possible on the provisions of the normal Budget, which Her Majesty's Government propose to exhibit to the Conference, due allowance being made for any altered circumstances of the country. The Budget for each year being so prepared, in consultation with the Commissioners, the latter would be empowered to veto during the year any proposed expenditure which would produce an excess on the Budget, except in cases of such emergency involving peril to peace and order. This power of veto would also apply to expenditure under the Budget of 1885, although that Budget would not have been settled in consultation with the Commissioners. After the withdrawal of the British troops the Caisse would have, in addition, the power of revenue inspection, so as to insure that the whole of the revenue really reaches the Treasury instead of being diverted to other purposes on its way. The President of the Caisse would be an Englishman. Her Majesty's Government will, at or before the expiration of the English occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium, and will make propositions with regard to the Suez Canal in conformity with those contained in my circular despatch of the 3rd of January, 1883. Her Majesty's Government received with satisfaction your Excellency's statement that these proposals are acceptable to France. I have to add that all the arrangements above described are subject to the satisfactory settlement of the financial arrangements which will be proposed by Her Majesty's Government to the Conference.
  "I have, &c.,
  "(Signed) GRANVILLE."
  There is another despatch to M. Waddington. I do not think it necessary to read it to your Lordships, though I am quite ready to do so if your Lordships should wish. It is a despatch which is only a recapitulation of my statement—I admit in a more methodical form—and I think it would be, perhaps, wearisome to your Lordships if I were to read it now; but I am entirely at your Lordships' disposal if you wish
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  me to do so. Your Lordships will remark there are five points raised in this Correspondence. The first is, the formal declaration of the French Government of the abandonment of any idea of reviving the condominium, and the engagement not to send French troops into Egypt, either before our withdrawal or for the future, without the consent of this country. M. Waddington might have gone further, for this principle has certainly been stated in many speeches both in and out of Parliament; and I think the noble Marquess, both in Parliament and certainly in a recent attack on Her Majesty's Government, stated in most distinct terms that a certain Power on our withdrawal would enter Egypt, and that there could be no doubt who that Power would be. Now, although I never thought it certain or even probable that the French would take this very grave step, yet I entirely agree with the noble Marquess that there is such a possibility, and this possibility is one that would create very great difficulties with regard to any plan of evacuation. The noble Marquess's argument might apply just as much to an evacuation 10 or 20 years hence as to an evacuation one or two years hence. This declaration on the part of the French Government removes this difficulty from our acting on our own policy; and this, as I stated in our despatch, greatly facilitates the way for a full and frank interchange of views with the French Government. My Lords, the next question is, that of our having consented to fix a date for the evacuation of Egypt. I think it was the noble Earl opposite who stated the other day that the report was incredible that we should have consented to any such thing, I cannot help remembering that from time to time we have been very much pressed by the opponents of the Government to fix a date for the evacuation, founded upon the idea that it would give us a greater hold upon the country. I think it will be within the recollection of your Lordships that, as far as military occupations of friendly countries are concerned, there always has been an inclination on the part of the occupying Power to seek for reasons for delaying the cessation of the occupation longer than seemed to others to be necessary, and proved to be the case after the result was known. I could mention, seve-

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  ral cases, but I will merely speak of one — namely, when Lord Dufferin and Baron Gros went on a mission to Syria. Ten thousand troops were sent there for six months; but at the end of six months the French Government thought there was danger of disorder occurring if they retired, and they stayed on month after month; and it was only by diplomatic pressure, chiefly on the part of this country, that at last they were withdrawn 10 months after the time. Napoleon III. was then at the zenith of his power; and I am not aware that at that time there was any complaint raised or suggested that by yielding in that manner to a friendly representation from a friendly Power any insult was suffered or any injury was done to the honour or dignity of France. There is one point which I cannot entirely put out of sight. Up to this time the greatest confidence has been shown in the assurances and words of Her Majesty's Government. Austria and Italy have frequently repeated the confidence they felt in the pledges given by us; and the German Government, certainly not in the least jealous of any position we might have in Egypt, yet in the most friendly and useful way, more than once inculcated on the Porte the expediency of trusting to the assurances we had so formally made. When these despatches are discussed, I hope one answer will be given to the following point. Sixteen months ago we were debating in both Houses of Parliament Addresses in reply to the Queen's Speech, and in both Houses the Leaders of the Conservative Party made a complaint so similar that it appears to have been previously concerted—that there was nothing in the Speech to show when the troops were to be withdrawn. Now, if it were so wrong in us not to declare, four months after our occupation, gratuitously and without any condition, the precise date on which we were to leave the country, I cannot see how it can be wrong now for us, in return for such a very important and unusual declaration as that made by the French Government, and that most important proviso which I have read to your Lordships, to fix a date for coming out. My Lords, the next question is, what answer we gave to the not very unnatural question of the French Government as to what security would be given at the time when we were making
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  application to the Powers for the good and economical management of Egyptian finance from the present time. The noble Earl said, the other day, that he who holds the purse-strings directs the policy. I have not a word to say against that maxim. I cannot equally agree with the noble Earl when he went on to say that all systems of financial control and audit have exactly the same effect. In this country the Chancellor of the Exchequer is theoretically omnipotent over the Estimates presented by each Department of the State. Of course, the great check upon him is an appeal to the Cabinet, and the ultima ratio of the resignation of the Head of the Department. Well, there is not the slightest doubt that the Treasury does exercise a very useful influence over the administration of this country by its audit check; but as to the Auditor General, he has not the slightest weight in regard to the policy of the country. What is quite clear is that, between these two extremes, there are to be found checks, wise and useful, in the financial sense, without being an interference with the political and administrative government of the country. Now, my Lords, Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in this country about seven weeks ago. He had long and important conversations with myself and other Members of Her Majesty's Government. One of the first questions was naturally the pressing one of finance; and on this he speaks with great authority, not only as a successful Minister of Finance, but as one who has combined the post of Controller under the dual system and that of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Representative under most difficult circumstances at Cairo. Now, the opinion of Sir Evelyn Baring, given to me before I had any sort of communication with M. Waddington on that question, was that it was very desirable, in the interests of the Egyptians and ourselves, while no interference with politics or administration should be allowed, that the Powers of the Caisse de la Dette Publique should be extended to a certain degree. I do not pretend to understand finance, and I do not intend to speak upon it; but I am assured that the powers given to the Caisse are of a practical character, and I believe that the opportunity of consulting the Commission of the Caisse, although they will have no votes and no power to decide, will

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  strengthen our hands in checking unnecessary expenditure, and that the power of putting a veto on any expenditure in excess of the aggregate amount of the Budget will exercise a strong stimulus in favour of economy, and strengthen our hands in that direction. This does not appear to be an unreasonable amount of security to offer to the Powers who are called upon to agree to some sacrifice on the part of their subjects. It must be remembered, too, that this Commission is not a body entirely foreign to ourselves, for on it we have not only a member, but it is agreed, as far as France is concerned, that that member is to preside over the meetings. There is another subject which your Lordships will perceive that I have noticed in my despatch to M. Waddington, where I made an announcement which is hardly strictly connected with the matter in hand, and on which we received no requests for explanation on the part of the French Government. But we thought it a favourable moment for declaring our views on the subject to the Powers, and it was undoubtedly satisfactory to us to find that France was ready to endorse our opinions, which we also hope will not be unacceptable to others. It was the announcement that it was our intention, not now, and certainly not at the Conference, but either before or at the time of the evacuation, to propose the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the principles which have been applied to Belgium, and also the adoption of that plan with regard to the Suez Canal which is contained in the Circular of 3rd of January, 1883. I do not think it necessary at this time to go into a discussion of the advantages of the neutralization of Egypt; and, with regard to the Suez Canal, I have only to say that, in the autumn of 1882, a very strong Committee was appointed to consider that question. There were Ministers, Heads of Departments, soldiers, sailors, and engineers on that Committee, and they were unanimously of opinion that the neutralization of the Suez Canal would be a detriment to the interests of this country, while the plan described in the Circular of January 3, 1883, would be of great use. This we recommended, and the Cabinet gave their sanction to it, thinking that it was sound in principle and advantageous to us without being detrimental to others;
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  and it was communicated to the Powers. No objection was made by any Power; and, at all events, a step has been gained by the present formal adhesion of the French to our plan. Your Lordships will also remark that if, as I trust will not be the case, for it would be a great disaster to all concerned—that if we do not arrive in Conference at a satisfactory settlement of the financial question, we shall entirely regain our liberty of action, and we must consider the position in which we shall be placed. My Lords, I can say with truth that this interchange of views has been conducted on both sides in a spirit of conciliation and moderation, and, I believe, at the same time with a due regard to the respective interests of the two countries. I hope it will be found that other Powers do not object to what we have done; and I ground this expectation very much on the fact that the main principle upon which this agreement is based is a cordial acknowledgment that the Powers of Europe have in different degree an interest in the welfare of Egypt. I am afraid it will not be well accepted by those in this country who conscientiously think that a country is not bound by its pledges in an equally binding' manner as an individual is. It will not be pleasing to those who think that the country may take any temporary advantage in regard to them that it may think best for itself. It will not be pleasing to those who really wish for annexation under the disguise of a permanent Protectorate such as we exercise in India over some of the Indian Principalities, and who think such a plan both desirable and easy to carry out. I have been told that what Englishmen have done Englishmen can do, and I agree, within certain limits, to that proposition. I know that Englishmen in the interior of India, separated from Europe and from Europeans, and acting under a despotic Government by whom they are hardly controlled, and not being at all controlled by the Government at home, have, with the help of Native Ministers, very satisfactorily conducted the government of such countries. But I venture to think that the case of Egypt is absolutely dissimilar. Just consider the vicinity of Egypt to Europe, and the very large population of other Nationalities in Egypt, many of them far exceeding the English resi-

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  dents in number. Remember the international institutions that have been established—institutions financial, judicial, industrial, and administrative. He-member that all these populations are most active and zealous in representing what seems to them the principal interests of their particular Nationalities. I do not think it is altogether immaterial to remember that there are newspaper correspondents of almost every nation established there. Remembering these things, I feel that the difficulties of a permanent Protectorate would be great indeed; but I cannot hope that the course which we have pursued in these communications will be acceptable to those who wish for annexation more or less disguised. My Lords, I venture to think that all those who do agree with what has lately been said by an ex-Ambassador with great force as to the immense strength of England over all the world in the perfect confidence felt in that which she has said; who agree with that Conservative Government, who during the great Napoleonic War were in full possession of Egypt and did not keep it; and who agree with Lord Palmerston in his repudiation, and with Lord Beacons-field in his still stronger repudiation, of the idea that the possession of Egypt could be an advantage to this country — I think that those who agree in those opinions, and who besides consider that it is not desirable for this country to give examples to be followed by and to justify others in a policy of encroachment and annexation, will think the course we have pursued has not been injurious to the interests, to the honour, or to the dignity of this country.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY; My Lords, we have met to consider a matter of such gravity, and dealing with instruments so complicated in their character, that I should not at a moment's notice venture to express any formal or advised opinion upon the proposals which the noble Earl has laid upon the Table. I will not conceal from your Lordships that at the first blush they do not reassure me. They seem to contain much that is perilous to the interests of this country, and full of menace to the future peace of the world. But before I undertake either to meet some of the arguments which the noble Earl has raised, or to examine the detailed proposals which he has submitted,
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  naturally I should wish to see them in print, and I do so the more because it is evident to me that the language in which the despatch is couched has been very carefully considered and polished again and again. All the difficult points appear to be covered by a studied ambiguity of language, which may be a convenient mode of evading present difficulties, but which will certainly not make the future more peaceful or more secure. There is the burning question of what is to be done supposing that at the end of three years we find the circumstances are not such as to permit of our evacuation. The language of the noble Earl's despatch seems to leave it in doubt by what machinery we are to submit—as I understand we are to submit—our wishes to the Powers, and leaves in doubt this question, Of how many of the Powers must we have the consent in order to justify us in remaining in Egypt? Again, there is that other burning question of the jurisdictions and functions of this new Multiple Control. My noble and learned Friend (Earl Cairns) said the other night—and it is a matter which anyone who has studied history knows — that he who has the power of the purse has power over the whole, and that our policy must be subordinated to financial considerations. But the language in which the Caisse is authorized or empowered to veto the particular articles of the Budget is again couched in language of studied ambiguity. Studied ambiguity means future controversy, and from that future controversy may spring consequences dangerous to the peace of the world. Again, the whole of this arrangement, so carefully elaborated, evades the main ground on which the whole of the negotiations were undertaken—it does not touch the financial portion, which was the question which led England to approach Foreign Powers. I do not understand on what ground, for the sake of what, for what considerations we have made these promises to France. We have got absolutely nothing: in return. But they are made dependent on the future deliberations of the Powers of Europe, before which proposals as to finance, as to the advances which, we are told, are to be made by England, and as to the limitation to be put upon the interest guaranteed to the foreign bondholders—proposals of which the form and dimensions are at present

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  wholly unknown to us, and do not seem to have been clearly defined to the minds of the negotiators. It is on the reception that these proposals may meet with, not only from France, but from the other Powers of Europe, that will depend whether the whole of the labour of the last three weeks shall not be entirely thrown away, and whether these negotiations shall have any fruit at all. It does not seem to me, in. spite of the toil through which the negotiators have gone, that we have approached, by any perceptible space, to a definite solution of the controversy and discussion which England herself, without, I must say, any very pressing necessity, has brought on. But I will not discuss the matter farther now, and I will close with one question. I will ask the noble Earl whether there are any other engagements between England and France, especially whether there is any undertaking on the part of France to give us any other consideration than that shown in this statement for the concessions made by England?
  EARL GRANVILLEwas understood to say that there was no formal engagement between the two countries with respect to financial matters; but that Her Majesty's Government certainly expected a continuance of the same friendly disposition on the part of France.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Have any financial proposals with respect to Egypt, or the limitation of the interest of the Debt, been made by France?
  EARL GRANVILLE: The French Government and ourselves have agreed that it would not be respectful to other Powers that we should discuss financial arrangements preliminary to communication with the Foreign Powers, and their entrance into the Conference.
  EARL STANHOPEsaid, he had a Question on the Paper which had been answered by the noble Earl—namely, as to whether the Suez Canal was to be neutralized? As far as he could gather from the full but guarded explanation of the noble Earl, much more than this was to be conceded, and Egypt Proper was to be neutralized, and all that England had gained in return was the abolition of the condominium. He understood, however, that this was already dead and gone at the beginning of our occupation, and that the Dual Control was at an end
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  at the time. It was true that France did not openly assent to this; but surely silence in such a matter implied consent? There was another point on which they would be very glad to have some information, and that was as to the loan of £8,000,000, which it was understood on good authority was to be guaranteed by this country to Egypt. He had seen by this morning's French journals that Her Majesty's Government had made proposals to all the Foreign Powers upon the financial affairs of Egypt, and yet Parliament was kept in absolute ignorance of them, and was not, it appeared, to be enlightened upon them until Foreign Governments had been consulted. This was in direct opposition to the pledges given by Her Majesty's Government of giving full information to Parliament, and not merely presenting meagre despatches. As to the neutralization of the Suez Canal, after what had happened he had hoped that Her Majesty's Government would have allowed the question to remain open for further consideration. Here was the highway to India, which might be barred against us at any moment. Independently of so important an Imperial interest in that undertaking, we had very great financial considerations at stake. The £4,000,000 sterling expended in the purchase of the Canal shares now amounted to £10,000,000. As to the Conference, he had understood that the first meeting was to take place on Saturday next. Were the Government to sanction its assembling before Parliament and the country had had an opportunity of considering the Papers which had just been issued? He sincerely hoped that the Government would be able to contradict such a hasty proceeding taking place.
  EARL CAIRNS: I think the noble Earl scarcely apprehended the nature of the Question put by the noble Marquess —so I gather from his answer. What we think it desirable to know is this. We have before us certain terms agreed upon between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France. The noble Earl referred also to several other matters, such as questions of finance. My noble Friend desires to know from the noble Earl whether there are any agreements between the Governments of England and France on this subject of finance? The noble Earl says

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  it would not be courteous to the other Powers to have a discussion of terms not stated or made known to them. I do not wish to enter into the question whether there should be any discussion or not, or whether, having made one arrangement with the cognizance of the other Powers, it would be discourteous to them to make another agreement; but what we do wish to know is this. Will the noble Earl inform us, as a matter of fact, whether there is any agreement, or any other understanding, formal or informal, with the Government of France as to the financial arrangements to which the Government have agreed?
  EARL GRANVILLE: I thought I had made myself clear. There are certainly things about finance submitted to France, such as a change in regard to the Commission of the Caisse; but there is no formal agreement whatever with regard to finance.
  EARL CAIRNS: Is there any informal agreement?
  EARL GRANVILLE: There is no informal agreement.
  EARL CAIRNS: Any engagement?
  EARL GRANVILLE: There is no engagement. There are changes in the Law of Liquidation and in the Caisse. The changes in regard to the Caisse are clearly changes in the Law of Liquidation. But except what appears in the despatch which I have read there is no engagement with France on the subject.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is there an understanding as to the lowering of interest?
  EARL GRANVILLE: Noble Lords opposite are trying by a series of Questions to induce me to state what the financial scheme is which we are about to submit to the Conference. That I must firmly decline to do. The answer I have already given is the obvious answer to the Question?
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, that he thought the noble Earl was acting very discourteously to the House. The question of finance was so intimately mixed up with the Law of Liquidation that a change in the one must necessarily affect the other. He understood that the Government were going to propose a loan of £8,000,000 in order that the interest might be reduced. I think in such a case the House
  1058
  is perfectly justified in asking for assurances.
  EARL GRANVILLE: It is, no doubt, a fact that there may be no indiscretion whatever in the Question, but there may be very great indiscretion in the answer.
  THE EARL OF JERSEYsaid, it seemed to him that the noble Earl had succeeded in taking England into the Conference with one hand tied behind its back. The noble Earl told them in the beginning of his speech that it was a great point to gain promises from France. He could not help recollecting that the noble Earl had had some experience of the promises of Foreign Powers. There have been some Russian, promises, for instance, which had not been fulfilled; and he did not know that there was any reason to think that the Egyptian promises of France would be kept any better. As far as he could gather, the English troops were to remain in Egypt to secure order in that country for three and a-half years, and at the end of that time Egypt was to be given over to all the harpies of Europe to get as much money out of it as they could. Yet this country was to be bound to abdicate her position. He protested very strongly against an agreement which gave us no security whatever, and which, in the long run, might prove disastrous to this country. The only consolation was that if Her Majesty's Government remained in Office and mismanaged the affairs of Egypt, as they had during the last two or three years, the Powers of Europe would be glad to see them remain there.
  LORD INCHIQUIN: Do the Government say that there has been no formal or informal agreement between this country and France on the question of finance?
  EARL GRANVILLE: The Question has already been put twice by the noble Marquess, and once by the noble and learned Lord opposite, and has been answered.
  THE EARL OF MILLTOWN: Will the noble Earl tell us whether the Englishman who is to preside over the Caisse is to have a casting vote? If he has not, I do not see what great advantage has been gained.
  EARL GRANVILLE: We shall certainly propose that he shall have a casting vote, as we consider it as most important.
  EARL STANHOPEasked whether the Conference would meet on Saturday?
  EARL GRANVILLE: I am not perfectly certain; but I feel pretty sure that it will do so.
  THE EARL OF ROSEBERY: I understand that Her Majesty's Government have submitted the terms of their agreement with the French Government to various Powers of Europe, and that these terms will not be submitted to Parliament until they have received the replies of the Powers. I wish to ask whether any replies have been received from the Powers with regard to that agreement; and, if so, from what Powers?
  EARL GRANVILLE: We have had some communications from Austria and Italy on the subject; but no final reply has been received.

FISHERIES (IRELAND) BILL.—(No. 77.)
(The Marquess of Waterford.)
FISHERIES (IRELAND) BILL.—(No. 77.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORD, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, the subject was one of considerable importance to Ireland. At the time of the famine in 1822 a sum of £8,000 was invested in the Three-and-a-Half per Cents for the benefit of the Irish people. To that sum was added £5,000 sent from London, and subscriptions amounting to £2,000, making a total of £ 15,000. The money was invested for the purpose of encouraging coast fishery and the manufacture of linen and worsted for the peasantry. In time it was found that the manufacture of linen and worsted had to be abandoned, and the whole of the fund was then applied to the improvement of the fisheries of Ireland. The Trustees of the fund, believing that the Government could administer the money better than they were able to, came to the conclusion in 1879 to hand over the fund to the Board of Works. They proposed that the money should be administered in the same manner as the Reproductive Loan Fund, which had been doing much good in Ireland. That Reproductive Loan Fund, curiously enough, was the outcome of another Famine Relief Fund, and it applied to certain counties; but it did not apply to Waterford, Wexford, Wicklow, Dublin,
  1060
  Louth, Down, Antrim, and Donegal. He, therefore, asked their Lordships to approve of the transfer of the fund of 1822 to the Board of Works, in order that it might be administered for the benefit of the counties he had named. The Government in 1879 could not see their way to take over the money; but they had now, he believed, agreed to do so, and it was for the purpose of transferring the sum from the Trustees to the Board of Works that he asked their Lordships to read the Bill a second time. The Trustees suggested that their Secretary, after the transfer had been made, should have the position of a first-class Civil Service clerk; but the Government had declined to give him that position. Under the Bill, however, ample provision would be made for the Secretary, as it was proposed to make him over a sum of £500. The expenses in connection with the administration of the fund had been very great. In 1877 the loans granted amounted to £6,367, and the expenses to £743; in 1878, loans, £927, and expenses, £913; in 1879, loans, £2,001, and expenses, £686; in 1880, loans, £2,643, expenses, £611; in 1881, loans, £2,224, and expenses, £748; and in 1882 the expenses reached the enormous sum of £917, while the loans were only £4,125. The expenses during the seven years amounted to 25 per cent of the loans made. Such a state of things showed the necessity for the transfer. He believed the fund would be administered by the Government at far loss expense. Last year their Lordships agreed to pass a Bill for the improvement of harbours in Ireland, and this Bill proposed to benefit the fishermen by enabling them to get boats and tackle. The fund would be of immense advantage to Ireland, and their Lordships would be doing a great service to a most deserving class of men by reading the Bill a second time. He moved that the Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a." — (The Marquess of Waterford.)
  In reply to Lord HARLECH,
  THE MARQUESS OF WATERFORDsaid, the Reproductive Loan Fund applied to certain counties, and the fund with which the Bill dealt applied to the counties which he had named. He did not propose to interfere with the Reproductive Loan Fund.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

METROPOLITAN RAILWAY (PARK RAILWAY AND PARLIAMENT STREET IMPROVEMENT) BILL.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD LAMINGTONasked Her Majesty's Government, now that the Preamble of the Parks Bill had not been proved, what course they intended to take respecting the improvement of Parliament Street? He hoped the Government would inform the House whether they proposed to take any action in the matter, or whether they had decided to wait for some private Company to come forward and carry out a great Metropolitan improvement.
  LORD SUDELEY: In reply to the noble Lord, I have to say that since the Preamble of the Parks Bill was thrown out, sufficient time has not elapsed to enable the Government to come to any decision as to what further steps should be taken in order to have the widening of Parliament Street carried out. It is perfectly clear that it is an improvement which must be made sooner or later; but while the Government are willing to afford every facility, and will take care that for the present none of their land on the Great George Street site is disposed of facing the street, they look upon it as purely of the nature of a Metropolitan improvement. Last autumn the First Commissioner of Works endeavoured to persuade the Metropolitan Board of Works to undertake the duty, and on behalf of the Government offered every facility for the sale of land on the Great George Street site, so that by setting back the street and obtaining new frontages the outlay would be recouped. The Metropolitan Board of Works did not then see their way to carry out the proposal; but it is possible they may now reconsider it. The noble Lord has made some very sarcastic remarks to the effect that the Office of Works were doing absolutely nothing. He must, I think, have forgotten the considerable improvements which have been already carried out, and the fact that the new War Office and new Admiralty are about to be erected. The nine competitors, whose plans were selected out of those of 129 competitors, have sent in their detailed
  1062
  plans for final competition; and it is hoped that before very long a commencement will be made in the erection of these buildings. The noble Lord must remember that he was Chairman of a Committee on this subject some years ago, and that after sitting some time, so great were their difficulties that they were unable to make any definite recommendation, and very little was carried out for four or five years afterwards. As regards Westminster Hall, the First Commissioner has already obtained the plans from the architect he consulted; and he hopes to make a statement on the subject before the close of the Session.

ARMY (AUXILIARY FORCES)—YEOMANRY RIOTS AT LICHFIELD.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD, who had the following Notice on the Paper: —
  "To ask the Under Secretary of State for the War Department for information respecting the court of inquiry held in Lichfield to inquire into certain proceedings connected with the yeomanry in that city; particularly as to the constitution of the court and the matters to which the inquiry extended,"
  said, that after the announcement made in "another place "of the intention to hold a further inquiry into the matter, and being privately informed that a Commission to conduct that inquiry would meet on the following day, he thought it would be more courteous to all parties concerned to postpone the Question. He earnestly trusted the result of the inquiry would be such as to render his Question altogether unnecessary.

PUBLIC MEETINGS (IRELAND) — NATIONALIST AND LOYALIST MEETINGS IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD BRABOURNErose to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether, in prohibiting the meetings in the North of Ireland of persons desiring to protest against the alleged disloyal sentiments of the so-called Nationalist Party, the Government desired it to be understood that such persons should rather meet at the same time and place as the Nationalists, move Amendments to their Resolutions, and test the real opinions of the people, or whether they simply

  1063
  wished it to be made known that to hold Loyalist opinions was henceforth to be a disqualification for the exercise of the ordinary rights of citizenship in Ireland? The noble Lord said he understood from private as well as from public sources that the excitement and irritation among the loyal population of Ulster could hardly be exaggerated. They had been restrained from overt action by wise and prudent advice; and it was infinitely to their credit and honour that during the recent visit of the Lord Lieutenant to Belfast, although smarting under a sense of intolerable injustice and wrong, inflicted upon them by the Executive Government, they had not allowed their feelings to diminish by one jot or one tittle the respect they felt to be due to the Representative of their Sovereign. Men who could so control themselves deserved the consideration they would receive from this House, even though they had failed to obtain it from the Government. As we were rapidly approaching the period of certain celebrations, which annually assembled the men of Ulster, under conditions sufficiently exciting in themselves, it was desirable, if not imperatively necessary, that there should be some authoritative statement which might explain, and if possible justify, the action of the Government, and allay the excitement that action, had produced. Let their Lordships consider the case as if they were historians dealing with the records of a past age. There was a Party in Ireland which called itself "Nationalist." Some persons might justify the title, whilst others would think that it could only be conferred upon the principle of lucus a non lucendo, and that no Party had done such damage to the nation which it assumed to represent. It was a Party which desired to deprive Ireland of her share in the glory and traditions of the Empire, and to tear her from friendly union with the sister countries of England and Scotland, and it ought to be designated the Party of isolation. The Leaders of this Party were the natural heirs and successors of the Land League, of which the Prime Minister had said that crime dogged its steps with fatal and painful precision, that its Leaders preached the doctrine of public plunder, and that the Party desired to march through rapine to the disintegration, and dismemberment of
  1064
  the Empire. Whether or no this Party was accurately described by the Prime Minister, it was beyond all doubt that at the meetings which it had held in Ireland, language had been held which bordered on sedition, England had been spoken of as an alien country, separation from England had been spoken of as the only panacea for every evil of Ireland, and doctrines were preached which would be tolerated in no other civilized country in the world. Nevertheless, unhappily for Ireland, in three out of the four of her Provinces this Party could with justice claim a majority; but in Ulster loyal principles had taken deep root. Men knew too well the advantages of the connection between the two countries to advocate a separation which could only be injurious to both, and the demagogue and sham patriot found his trade a failure. In vain was the Nationalist net spread in sight of the Ulster bird, although they adopted a different tone from that which they employed in Munster and Connaught, and talked, not of driving the Protestant garrison out, but of freeing the tenant from the yoke of the landlord. The loyalty of Ulster had not even been affected by the legislation of the Government; they, indeed, had forced through a Parliament imperfectly acquainted with its coming results a measure which dislocated the whole framework of society in Ireland, shook the foundations of property, robbed landlords of 25 per cont of the value of their estates, and encouraged every tenant to covet his neighbour's goods. In spite of all this, the landlords and tenants of Ulster remained united by the tie of loyalty in a common bond of union against disloyalty and crime. Ulster stuck in the throat of the so-called Nationalist Party; as long as it remained impregnable, it was impossible to boast that the whole of Ireland was on their side; therefore, it must be gained at all hazards; meetings must be held, with the concomitants of drums and banners, and other incentives to eloquence, so that it might appear to the world that in Ulster also the sympathy of the people was with the Party of isolation. In these circumstances, what were the Loyalists to do? They had, indeed, received advice from one, to whose authority every respect was due. The Prime Minister, speaking at Leeds, and allud-

  1065
  ing to the evils following the Land League, had said—
  "What would happen in this country if schemes of this kind were to go forth, and to become in any degree dangerous to the public peace? Why, what would happen would he this—that vast multitudes of loyal citizens would array themselves in support and in aid of the officers of the law. But no such thing is heard of, unhappily, in Ireland. I hope there will be a change in that respect. I am sure it is necessary."
  Well, the Loyaliats of Ulster acted on that advice, and assembled in support of law and order. The Loyalists called counter-meetings; if both were forbidden the Nationalists would be checkmated; if both were allowed the Nationalist demonstration would not be accepted as the true voice of Ulster. The invasion of Ulster failed; but the Government, some of whose Members had an unhappy sympathy with rebellion, whether in South Africa or Ireland, could not permit the triumph of loyalty, and the meetings of the Loyalists were forbidden. He could not understand the policy of the Government. It would have been intelligible if they had stopped the meetings of both Parties, so as to prevent collisions; or if they had stopped meetings of persons who had previously indulged in language of a seditious character. But the Government permitted and protected the Nationalist meetings, while it stopped the counter-meetings of those who were united in defence of law and order, because they were likely to be inconvenient to the Party of separation and sedition. It was as if a police authority, because there were thieves about, was to shut up and handcuff all the policemen; or as if a shepherd, because he knew a wolf was about to enter the fold, was to chain up all his watch-dogs in their kennel. He could not conceive any course which was more likely to give greater encouragement to disloyalty, and greater discouragement to law and order. The reason he put this Question to the Government was because he thought it ought to be known what they really wished the Loyalists to do. In England there was a recognized manner of dealing with disputed questions. We called public meetings, resolutions and amendments were moved, the opinion of the meeting taken, and people went quietly home. But he (Lord Brabourne) had always understood that this method of
  1066
  proceeding was unsuited to the warmer temperament of the Celtic population. If it were adopted, he was told that moral suasion might degenerate into physical conflict. But this might not be the opinion of the Government, or, being their opinion, they might think the time had come when the relative strength of Parties, moral or physical, had better be tried in open public meeting. It was impossible to know what the Government might think on the holding of public meetings, because their ideas were strange, and their ways were mysterious. But if this was their view of the case, it was only fair that the Loyalists should be told the reason why their separate counter-meetings were discouraged, and, moreover, that they should have the assurance that the military and police would not be called in to protect the preachers of public plunder. If the Loyalists of Ireland were not to meet because they were loyal in support of their principles, and that at a time when their principles were hourly called into question and menaced, then he thought the people of Ireland as well as the people of England would wish to know the reason why. During the last week he had often wondered what would be the answer he should receive. His noble Friend might meet him, as he had met him before, with the polite insinuation that he knew nothing about Ireland. He (Lord Brabourne) would retort by anticipation that it would be well for Ireland if his noble Friend had known less, or, at least, had legislated less, about her. His noble Friend had for years been the trusted adviser of Liberal Governments upon Irish matters. His supposed knowledge of Irish affairs, his high character and abilities, and those amiable qualities which had endeared him to so large a circle of friends, had all combined to give him great influence in directing legislation for Ireland. The courage of the Prime Minister had been supplemented, sustained, and supported by the knowledge of his noble Friend, and so it had come about that these two men, each with the best possible intentions, had brought legislative evils upon Ireland which it would take, centuries to undo. Then his noble Friend might take refuge beneath Lord Spencer's mantle, and complain that he (Lord Brabourne) was attacking his adminis-

  1067
  tration of Irish affairs. On the contrary, he gave the greatest credit to Lord Spencer's general conduct of affairs. He gave him so much credit that he did not believe that this particular act was of Lord Spencer's own conception and suggestion. But if men kept bad company they sometimes suffered for it, and the general excellence of Lord Spencer's administration must not deter thorn from the criticism of a particular error. Anyhow, he (Lord Brabourne) hoped his noble Friend would not attempt to answer him by eloquent platitudes upon the right of public meeting. The right of public meeting was, doubtless, a valuable right; but in what sense was it valuable if in any given district they only allowed people to assemble who were of one particular opinion? In that case, it was not so much a right which, they were conferring or allowing in these people as it was a wrong to all the other people in the district, who might hold different views, who might be in a large majority, and whom they thus compelled to allow a false impression to go abroad as to the feelings of their locality. And how were they to prevent Loyalists from attending and overpowering the seditious meetings which they were so anxious to protect? Were the people of Ulster to go about labelled? Were Loyalists to be earmarked, so that the watchful myrmidons of the law might be sure that no one who was not an enemy of the law might attend the law-protected meetings at which the law was to be denounced? The thing would really be laughable if it were not so deplorably serious in its nature. He thought the time had come when the Government ought to speak out on this matter. He hoped they would not use any language indicating a distinction between the Catholic and the Protestant party. Catholics, qua Catholics, were as loyal as Protestants. There was nothing whatever of a religious difference in this matter. A great portion of Ireland was, unfortunately, divided into two camps, the Loyalists and those who were not loyal. The people of Ireland understood that very well, and the people of England were beginning to understand it too. He should be sorry if Her Majesty's Government were the last to appreciate that fact. They had arrived at a time when loyalty and loyal men ought to be supported; and if the Government did not take this view the
  1068
  more openly they declared their opinion the better.
  LORD DE ROSsaid, as a resident landlord in Ulster, he begged their Lordships' permission to say a few words on the subject now before the House. He thought it could hardly be denied that the Loyalists of Ulster had received great provocation and unjust treatment at the hands of Her Majesty's Government during; the last three years. Meetings had been held in various parts of the Province, under the auspices of the Land League at first, and latterly presided over by persons calling themselves "Nationalists," which had propounded the doctrines of Repeal of the Union and abolition of the landlord class. These meetings were not taken very much notice of at first by the "persons described as Orangemen and Loyalists"—to use the words of the Lord Lieutenant's Proclamation—beyond certain remonstrances on behalf of some of the local magistrates in the districts where they were announced to be held. In January, 1881, some of the local magistrates at Downpatrick and its vicinity distinctly called the attention of the then Chief Secretary to some of the resolutions which were to be moved at a meeting to be held at that place, presided over by that eloquent, but unprincipled man, Michael Davitt, and which they considered of a revolutionary character. The only reply vouchsafed to their remonstrance was, that the Executive would take care that there should be no breach of the peace. No breach of the peace had been anticipated; but that which was feared did, to a certain extent, take place—namely, the people's minds were disturbed and poisoned by the doctrines enunciated at that meeting; and, in his opinion, a great change came over the tenantry in that part of the country from that date. The happy relationship which had hitherto existed between landlord and tenant assumed a different form, and a spirit of dissatisfaction had been introduced. Since that period several meetings in Ulster had been announced of a seditious character, and they were only prevented by counter-meetings organized by the Orangemen and Loyalists, when both meetings had been prohibited; in fact, the Orangemen and Loyalists had been the means of doing that which the Government ought to have done in the first instance. No-

  1069
  body objected to meetings of a legitimate character being held; but these meetings distinctly advocated principles of rebellion and separation from British rule. The last meeting, held at Newry on Sunday, June 1, pretty clearly illustrated the nature of these meetings; and it was not only acknowledged, but encouraged by the action of Her Majesty's Government. He would briefly allude to some of the resolutions which were passed at that meeting—
  "That here exercising one of the first rights of the people, freedom of public meetings and speech, we declare that we owe no thanks, and we give none, to the vacillating, unprincipled Whig Government, which, under the dictation of a pack of Orange landlords and their hired retainers, filched away our rights, and which has now at the eleventh hour, through the action of the men of Newry, been compelled in despair to abandon their unconstitutional conduct and strive to steer 'an even keel.' That self-government is our inalienable right as a nation; and, therefore, in accordance with that ancient and Constitutional right, we claim the privilege of managing Irish affairs by Irishmen on Irish soil, and that no concession short of this shall ever satisfy the demands of the Irish people. That the only hope for the country, as far as the English Parliament are concerned, lies in the active policy of the Irish Parliamentary Party. This policy we endorse, and to that Party we attribute any recent beneficial legislation; and we earnestly trust that at the next election, whether fought under the present or under an extended franchise, the leader of the Irish race, Mr. Parnell, will be supported by an earnest band of loyal, well-trained, and trusted Irishmen. That landlordism as an institution must be rooted out of this country, and that Ireland will not enjoy peace or prosperity until we have the land for the people."
  Now, he asked, was it to be expected that the loyal men of Ulster were to calmly sit still and take no action whatever, while such pernicious seeds were being sown broadcast throughout their loyal and prosperous Province? Surely it must be admitted that great forbearance had been shown by the loyal men of Newry and Belfast during the past three weeks in circumstances of very great excitement and provocation which deserved the greatest praise. Their Lordships could hardly conceive the amount of irritation and excitement which prevailed in the Northern Province when the letter to Lord Arthur Hill had been promulgated. The Loyalists naturally conceived that they were completely thrown over by the action of Her Majesty's Government, and it was only by reason of great exertions on the part of the more moderate Party that
  1070
  the Lord Lieutenant was accorded a respectful reception in Belfast, because it was no easy task to persuade the people that Lord Spencer visited Belfast as the Representative of the Queen, and not in a political capacity. He ventured to hope that the loyal conduct of the Orangemen and Loyalists in Ulster would receive the support and command the sympathies of their brethren on this side of the Channel.
  VISCOUNT POWERSCOURTpointed out that the Lord Lieutenant had not prohibited all meetings. He had prohibited the holding of a second and counter-meeting at the same place as the one previously summoned. The noble Lord had denounced the Land Act; but the Land Act was a distinct recognition of the tenant's property, which was never recognized by law before.
  LORD CARLINGFORD (Lord PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL)said, he did not remember the particular circumstances regarding some of the meetings to which the noble Lord opposite (Lord de Ros) had referred; but the noble Lord appeared to be under an incorrect impression as to the powers of the Lord Lieutenant and the Irish Government under the Crimes Act. The Lord Lieutenant had not power to prohibit all public meetings. The noble Lord spoke as if he thought that the Lord Lieutenant had an absolute discretion in the matter. The Lord Lieutenant's power in this respect was very carefully limited, even by this Act, which gave such exceptional powers to the Irish Executive. The Lord Lieutenant's power was limited by these words—" To prohibit any meeting which he has reason to believe is dangerous to the public peace or public safety." These powers had been cautiously but firmly used. The noble Lord on the Cross Benches (Lord Brabourne) had alluded to the Land Act and the condition of Ulster with regard to it. But he did not seem to have an inkling of the fact that the loyal men of Ulster were those whose minds had been most set upon obtaining the Land Act. The desire of the rest of the tenantry of Ireland for great reforms in their tenure, which he believed had urgently needed reform, was weakened and disguised by the agitation which fixed their minds on political and revolutionary objects. But the men of Ulster, who were attached to the Union,

  1071
  had no revolutionary or political objects. Their whole minds had been set on getting; a reform in the Land Laws. It might be well if the noble Lord grasped that fact. The noble Lord made no allusion to the Lord Lieutenant's letter in which he stilted the policy that he intended to follow in respect to meetings and counter meetings. The noble Lord had apparently not read that letter, which was at the root of the whole matter. That letter was not written in connection with the last meeting at Newry. It was written in consequence of what had happened some time before, and the action taken at Newry was taken in defiance and in the teeth of that letter. A meeting was announced to be held, and immediately a counter-demonstration was summoned. The Lord Lieutenant prohibited both these meetings. But he thought it his duty to cause the letter of the Under Secretary to be written in order to give notice to all parties. He did not resolve to prohibit all meetings; but he arrived at the conclusion that when one Party had called a meeting for a certain day at a certain place it was absolutely impossible that, with any regard to the public peace and safety, a second meeting of the opposite Party could be permitted to be held at that place and hour. The Lord Lieutenant had not forgotten the Rosslea meeting and the statement of Lord Rossmore that it was with the greatest difficulty that he and other magistrates prevented their followers from attacking the other meeting. Nor did he forget what took place at Dromore, when such an attack was made, and when a riot took place which led to the death of an unfortunate young man. The Lord Lieutenant did not forget these things; and he was of opinion that these counter-demonstrations could not be tolerated. The only question, therefore, was whether all public meetings ought to be prohibited. In the mind of the Lord Lieutenant undoubtedly the presumption was always in favour of permitting the holding of public meetings if possible. If the Lord Lieutenant had come to the conclusion that any particular meeting was not to be interfered with, and parties were allowed to take means to bring together a great body of adverse persons to the same place and at the same hour, it was quite evident that the responsible
  1072
  discretion of the Lord Lieutenant was at an end. All that the Lord Lieutenant laid down was that when he had given a decision he would not permit any counter-meeting, no matter what Party that meeting represented, to be held for the purpose of opposing the first meeting. That was the whole of what was con-tamed in the letter written by direction of the Lord Lieutenant; and it was in distinct defiance of that announcement that the second or counter-meeting prohibited the other day was to have taken place. The noble Lord on the Cross Benches seemed to think that the Lord Lieutenant was going to deprive the loyal inhabitants of Ulster of the rights of citizenship. He did not know what the noble Lord's views of the loyalty of the Lord Lieutenant were; but if he wanted any light on the subject he would refer him to a speech just made in Belfast. He did not think his noble Friend would succeed in introducing the passions of Ulster into their Lordships' House. It appeared to him deplorable that loyal men should for a moment put themselves in so false a position as the Orangemen had taken up; and he wag not without hope that they were already beginning to see that it was not a position that could be maintained as against the authority and judgment of the Lord Lieutenant. He thought they had shown pretty plainly, by their recent conduct at Belfast, that excitement had at first exaggerated their ideas upon this subject, and blinded them to the true nature of the Lord Lieutenant's action, and that they would soon come to recognize that Lord Spencer had no other object but that of impartially maintaining law and order in Ireland.
  THE DUKE OF ABERCORNsaid, he must complain of the answer of the noble Lord. He thought the noble Lord had rather burked the main Question of the noble Lord on the Cross Benches. As far as he could understand the Question, it was whether, at a public meeting, the Loyalists of Ulster might meet and express their opinions?
  LORD CARLINGFORD (LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL): At a counter-meeting. That is the whole point.
  THE DUKE OF ABERCORNsaid, that not a word had been said by the noble Lord who introduced the subject about counter-meetings. If public meeting meant that one side only was to express

  1073
  its opinion, then public meeting was a farce. He reminded their Lordships that the Land League which the Government had prohibited was now flourishing again under the name of the National League. Inroads were made into the Province of Ulster, and the Loyalists of Ulster had resolved to hold counter-meetings, which would cancel and nullify the detestable doctrines of the Land League, and they felt that their Province was still firm and enthusiastic in its allegiance to the Crown and Constitution. Not only had they been free from sedition, but from the crimes and outrages which had disgraced the rest of Ireland. Ulster was the bright spot of Ireland, and during the period that crime stalked throughout the land, Ulster was the only Province which had kept its hands unstained. But what had been the rewards they had received from the Government? The Nationalists had been protected, and the Loyalists had been forbidden to hold counter-meetings. Their meetings were held for Constitutional purposes; but the Nationalist meetings were held to subvert law and order, and to promote sedition and outrage. The situation was a standing insult to the people of Ulster. In order to prolong their precarious life, the present Government had not hesitated to hand over the Loyalists of Ulster to the same system of crime and outrage which now characterized, unfortunately, the other three Provinces of Ireland. They had in this matter adopted a very unwise and mischievous policy, and had thereby raised up feelings of bitterness and animosity in the North of Ireland which might be most dangerous to the safety of the country, and which would certainly remain for many long years, and which would require a Government with a far greater regard for justice and honesty to eradicate.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he had heard the speech of the noble Duke (the Duke of Abercorn) with regret, not merely because of the matter of it, but on account of the position which he had formerly occupied in Ireland, and on account of the respect in which the noble Duke was justly and generally held, both for his public and private character, and for the moderate line which he had often taken on critical occasions. The noble Duke complained of the answer given by the Lord President to the question of the
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  noble Lord on the Cross Benches, To him, however, the answer that had been given was very intelligible. The question asked was whether the Government, in prohibiting the meetings in the North of Ireland of persons desiring to protest against the alleged disloyal sentiments of the so-called National Party, had certain views? The first answer to that was, that the Government had not prohibited such meetings. The Lord Lieutenant, in the plainest possible words, had distinctly said that their desire had been to permit public meetings to which there was no legal objection; and he had only exercised his power of stopping them when there were no other sufficient means of preserving law and order. That power was conferred upon him by the Act of 1882, which said that he might prohibit any meeting which he had reason to believe would be dangerous to the public peace or the public safety. The Lord Lieutenant also said that in certain circumstances law and order might be threatened by meetings, and that they must then be prohibited; and that such circumstances arose when a counter-demonstration by a Party opposed to those who had called a meeting which the Lord Lieutenant saw no ground for prohibiting was proposed to be held in the same place and on the same day. No one could say that such a mode of holding a counter-demonstration would not have a natural and almost inevitable tendency to a breach of law and order; and, therefore, he could not suppose that the noble Duke was of opinion that such a demonstration ought to be permitted. But the Lord Lieutenant was careful to explain that a counter-demonstration would not be interfered with, provided there were no objection to it on other grounds, if held at a time and place which would not bring hostile bodies into close proximity. If those who called themselves Loyalists, and who, according to his belief, did sincerely intend to be loyal, should hold a meeting to make public their objections to the principles of the so-called Nationalists, and if there should be nothing connected with the meeting indicative of a violation of law and order, the Lord Lieutenant would allow the meeting to be held, and would not allow a counter-demonstration by Nationalists to be held at the same place. Anything more just, fair, and

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  impartial it was impossible to imagine. What another part of the Question of the noble Lord seemed to ignore was, that the Loyalists could hold counter-demonstrations at any proper time and place; it seemed to suggest that the only alternative for them was, either to be silent altogether, or themselves to attend the meeting of their opponents and move resolutions at it. That part of the noble Lord's Question was said not to have been answered; but could anyone suppose it to be seriously intended? He should have thought it clear to everyone who knew anything-either of such matters generally, or of Ireland in particular, that if people who were opposed in views did not wish to break the peace and one another's heads they would not go in great force to the same meeting. Public meetings could hardly be looked upon as calm, deliberative assemblies, governed by such rules as obtained in their Lordships' House. Could such a description be given of them it would be a matter for rejoicing. With respect to the prohibition of the meetings of those who were called Nationalists, the Lord Lieutenant, on whom the responsibility rested, had in each case to determine whether, having regard to the terms of the Act of 1882, they could, or could not, be safely held. First of all, was there anything unlawful announced as the purpose of the meeting? The noble Duke might possibly take ou that subject a different view from the Lord Lieutenant. It was a very grave responsibility to define the precise limits of public discussion on political questions. The Lord Lieutenant had no kind of sympathy with the objects of the Party called Nationalists. He was sure he (the Lord Chancellor) had none, and he doubted whether there was any one of their Lordships who had. But, nevertheless, if no illegal purpose was declared, if the expression of opinions for which no lawyer would say that a man ought to be prosecuted was all the purpose which was announced, then he could not but think that the present Lord Lieutenant judged more correctly than the late Lord Lieutenant when he determined that in acting upon the law of 1882 he would take the legality or illegality of the meetings, not the political opinions likely to be expressed at them, as the test. Then there was the
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  very important question whether a meeting was likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The Lord Lieutenant thought that when he had sufficient powers to prevent the occurrence of any breach of the peace, either at the meeting itself, or as a consequence of it, it was, generally, his duty to rely on them. The law must be applied impartially to both Parties—not to meetings of Nationalists alone, but also to meetings of Orangemen, where there was any chance of possibility of their loading to disturbance. If the Lord Lieutenant thought that Loyalist meetings were not likely to lead to any breach of the peace he would not prohibit them; and on the same principle and for the same reason he ought not to prohibit other meetings not likely to lead to a In-each of the peace. Taking into consideration the circumstances of Ireland, it was a question whether greater good or harm might be done by permitting the expression oven of objectionable opinions within the limits of the law. If that were permitted to one Party it must be permitted to the other. Their Lordships might possibly think that a different rule should be applied to Ulster from that applicable to the rest of Ireland. But this he must say—that the responsibility rested with the Irish Government and with the Lord Lieutenant as its Head. The present Lord Lieutenant and his administration of Ireland for the last two years had received strong and just approval from their Lordships. The policy which was now questioned was Lord Spencer's policy, and no person could seriously believe that Lord Spencer suffered his own judgment to be overruled by others for political objects. Lord Spencer thought the course he had adopted necessary in the discharge of his duty for the preservation of law and order; and the rest of his conduct, which had been so generally approved by their Lordships, entitled him in this matter also to their confidence and their favourable judgment.
  LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEsaid, that the noble and learned Lord strangely forgot what had been the results of the Nationalist meetings, which had deluged Ireland with crime, and induced Parliament to give extraordinary powers to the Government of which he was a Member. The Prime Minister

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  himself had clearly shown how crime and outrage followed in the footsteps of the meetings of these so called Nationalists. The people of Ulster held their meetings only when invaded by men not belonging to Ulster at all, and whose object was to excite the worst feelings. The Loyalists merely said— "You shall not reduce Ulster to the same condition as you have brought the rest of Ireland." It was easy to say that the policy in question was Lord Spencer's policy. The common belief was that it was adopted to catch votes. The Parnellite Party, by voting against the Government, reduced the Government majority to 26, and directly afterwards Lord Spencer was summoned to a Cabinet Council, where the common belief was that he tried to persuade Her Majesty's Government how injurious to Ireland those Nationalist meetings were, but that he was overruled, and that he went back to Ireland with a mandate from the Cabinet that he was to pursue a different policy.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am bound not to reveal Cabinet secrets; but I may say that there is not the least particle of foundation for that statement.
  LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEobserved that it was the common belief in Ireland. Of coarse, they must accept the declaration of the noble and learned Lord; but he certainly should have liked to have been present and heard the discussion on the subject.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he did not think that the subject had been ever mentioned in the Cabinet.
  LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNEsaid, he could only express his surprise that such an important change of policy had not been taken cognizance of by the Cabinet Council, which he thought ought to bestow a little more attention on matters so serious. It was useless for the Government to hold out Lord Spencer as this, that, and the other. He did not think the noble Lord so immaculate a politician as was commonly supposed. He was a very amiable gentleman; but Irishmen could not forget that he was the Lord Lieutenant who gave his sanction to the first Land Act, and that he was a Member of the Cabinet when the second Land Act was passed, and that he did not support the noble Earl (Earl Cowper) and the late Chief Secretary, who went over to Ireland en-
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  tirely unprejudiced, and yet who were compelled to resign. The Government, in dealing with Ireland, thought too much of the votes they could gain there, and too little of the peace and prosperity of his unfortunate country.
  EARL COWPERsaid, bethought that the conduct of the Orangemen of Belfast was worthy of the greatest applause. He could not agree with the noble Lord on the Cross Benches that they really had a very just grievance; but he knew that they thought they had. He knew also how independent they were. When he was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland he paid a visit to Belfast, and was received with the utmost loyalty by the Orangemen; and he could bear testimony to the excellent manner in which they conducted themselves. He might take this opportunity to remark that during the time he represented Her Majesty in Ireland the conduct of the landlords of all classes was very creditable considering the unfortunate position in which they were placed. They all knew that the landlords did not approve of the Land Act as much as some of their Lordships did. It was found absolutely necessary to put a stop to the practice adopted by some landlords of endeavouring by indirect means to get rid of tenants who had a certain right to be on the soil. But many landlords felt injured by the Act, and besides this they were reduced almost to starvation by the general strike against rents, and it was only natural that they should find fault with the Government. He was bound to say that although they abused the Government they did not for some time agitate in their own interests. After a while they did come forward in a very creditable manner and organized meetings in support of law and order. There were many most hopeful meetings organized by landlords before he left Ireland. He did not find fault with them for enlisting the services of the Orangemen. The Orangemen were, of course, responsible in former times for a great deal that was objectionable; but in the present day their chief aim and object was to denounce outrages and to maintain law and order. The Nationalists were, under another form, the Land League, and their going to Ulster placed the Government in a difficult position. It was painful to have to chide our friends and protect our enemies; but he was of

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  opinion that no Executive would have been justified in allowing a body of Nationalists and a body of Orangemen to meet under such circumstances side by side, and he should himself have been inclined to stop both meetings; but the noble Lord (Lord Brabourne) had been well advised not to move a Vote of Censure on the Irish Executive. He certainly, for one, should have opposed such a Vote, on the ground that Lord Spencer must have had reasons for his conduct unknown to the public.
  EARL CAIRNSremarked that up to a certain time Earl Spencer prohibited meetings on both sides when they were announced to be held simultaneously; and he wished very much that that policy had been continued, as it would have given satisfaction in Ireland. He was quite willing to believe that Earl Spencer was placed in a difficult position, and that he acted as he thought best for the country. What he understood by the right of public meeting in this country was the privilege of all who were interested in the subject of the meeting to attend and express their views; but did any sane man think that kind of public meeting could be held in Ireland? Could there be a meeting on a burning question with the free expression of different opinions? The object of a public meeting was not that those who agreed should congratulate each other on their agreement; but it was the expression of divergent views in order to determine those that were predominant. Nothing was more common in the conduct of a movement or agitation in this country than for one Party to challenge another to hold a public meeting, and to test its opinion by resolution or amendment; but it was admitted that such a method of testing public opinion in Ireland was out of the question; if it were adopted there would probably be a free fight at the outset as to who should be chairman, to be renewed on every proposition submitted. Therefore, it was idle to say that these proceedings were in defence of the right of public meeting; they were based on quite a different principle—that of protecting a certain number of individuals who were all agreed, and who did not want any discussion or opposition. As there could not be what we regarded as free and open public meetings, he regretted that the Lord
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  Lieutenant had not taken the course of prohibiting the meetings on both sides.
  THE EARL OF ANNESLEYsaid, he regretted the tone in which the Lord Chancellor had spoken of the noble Duke near him (the Duke of Abercorn), whose position and services ought to have protected him from such an attack. He wished to ask the Government what the Loyalists were to do after the reproaches that were hurled at them by the Prime Minister? Were they to be told that it was not lawful for them to take the only step it was in their power to take — namely, to hold opposition meetings?
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, the noble and learned Earl opposite (Earl Cairns) seemed to be under an extraordinary misconception as to the general character of public meetings on questions on which there existed any considerable excitement in the public mind; as a rule such meetings were demonstrations on the part of one Party or of the other, and disturbers of the meetings were forcibly ejected. From the argument of the noble and learned Earl it would almost follow that Nationalists could not hold a meeting without Orangemen being present, or Orangemen hold a meeting without Nationalists being present. He could understand a state of things in which it might be necessary to prohibit all meetings; but he entirely denied that you were prohibiting public meetings in the true sense of the word because you would not permit the simultaneous gathering at the same place of Parties who were violently opposed. The answer to the question, What were Orangemen to do? was that there was no prohibition of counter-demonstrations at other times and places, and in conditions not likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The notion was preposterous that because Orange meetings and Nationalist meetings could not be held together, at the same time and place, that, therefore, Orangemen were to be precluded from holding as many independent meetings as they wished.
  LORD INCHIQUINsaid, there was reason to be grateful to Lord Spencer for the course he had followed up to a certain point; but what he was doing now was to insist on men being heard whose utterances would not be tolerated in England. This was a repetition of the mistake formerly made in permitting too long the disloyal manifestations

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  of the Land League; and on that point he would say that Mr. Gladstone was entirely wrong in saying that there had been no counter-demonstration of Loyalists, for he himself presided over an influential meeting which protested against the illegal character of the Land League meetings. If the Government had stopped that agitation earlier they might have prevented some of the outrages and murders that followed. What the Lord Lieutenant now said to the disloyal agitators was—"No matter how strong may be the language you use, you must be heard." Lord Spencer had said that these men, no matter how disloyal their opinions might be, should be heard. For his own part, he protested against those meetings being held in any part of Ireland, especially when the opinions which were held by those persons forming the meeting were of such a disloyal character.

  UNION OFFICERS' SUPERANNUATION (IRELAND) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to make better provision for the superannuation of the officers of poor law unions in Ireland—Was presented by The Lord PRESIDENT; read 1a. (No. 146.)
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till to-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.