§ EARL STANHOPE, in whose name the following Notice stood upon the Paper:—
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—1. "Whether the negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government relative to Egypt are concluded; and whether, before submitting those proposals to the other Great Powers, or before entering into a Conference, they will state to the House the nature of those negotiations.1725'2. Whether Her Majesty's Government have agreed with France to a limit of the occupation of Egypt?'said, in rising to make inquiry respecting the approaching Conference, or, rather, as to the preliminary negotiations which have taken place, I am actuated solely by considerations of the grave position in which I believe this country finds itself placed. It is in no Party spirit that I put the Question to the noble Earl; nor have I the slightest desire to touch upon matters which cannot at present be divulged. But, my Lords, I, and the majority of your Lordships, are in complete official ignorance as to the precise nature of the negotiations which have taken place between this country and France. Now, from Questions put to the Government in "another place" before the Holidays, and from their extreme reticence—nay, even refusal to give an answer to those Questions—I may assume that the following is the actual present position of affairs with regard to the Conference negotiations. In a Circular Letter, dated April 19 last, addressed to the Courts of Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburg, Her Majesty's Government proposed the assembling of a Conference in London or Constantinople, and invited their presence and assistance, to consider whether any change was necessary in the Law of Liquidation of Egyptian finances. Four of the Great Powers, we are informed, have agreed to this proposal; but France, while agreeing in principle, wished, first, to make a certain exchange of views as to our position in Egypt. We are also informed that friendly communications have been going on between the two countries; but it is rumoured, and it has not been officially contradicted, that France wished to fix a term to the British occupation of Egypt, and that the English Government suggested five years, but that they have since agreed to shorten that term, to two or three years. It is also rumoured that the propriety of establishing an international audit of Egyptian finance is under the consideration of both Governments. Since your Lordships last met the matter may have been already concluded, so little have the Government taken Parliament and the country into their confidence. For these reasons I want, if possible, to gain some information from the Government. At 1726 first we were told that the Conference would be strictly limited to the consideration, of the Law of Liquidation; and the Prime Minister said that, if any other matter was brought forward, it would be tantamount to convening a fresh Conference; but now we are informed that, when the negotiations going on with France arrive at a result, that result is to be communicated to the Powers before being communicated to Parliament. Really, my Lords, this seems rather a strong and arbitrary proceeding. Now, I wish to touch briefly on two points, which I will endeavour to put clearly and concisely to the House. First, as to our actual position in respect to the Government of Egypt; and, secondly, as to the dangers of a Multiple Control, and of fixing a short term for our occupation of Egypt. It will be in the recollection of the House that, though Her Majesty's present Advisers at first acquiesced in the Dual Control in Egypt, they afterwards strongly condemned it, and even when it had ceased to exist said it was the cause of all the difficulties in Egypt. So recently as the 12th of February, in "another place," the Prime Minister found great fault with the Dual Control; yet now, forsooth, he is going to make matters easier by the institution of a six-barrelled Control! Let me refer back two years. Then, a Conference of the Powers was convened at Constantinople, at the invitation of the Government, to consider the Egyptian Question, and met on June 23. In the course of its meetings the Arabi rebellion broke out; and before Turkish troops could proceed to Egypt, our Fleet bombarded and destroyed the Forts of Alexandria on July 12, France declining to interfere. After that a military expedition, undertaken and controlled solely by England, was despatched, and, after a very short but decisive fight, the rebels were completely routed, and so were all remnants of Egyptian Government. Then what followed? On the 3rd of January, 1883, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed a Letter to the five Great Powers detailing all that had taken place. Among other things, that Letter endorsed the policy proposed by Egypt for the abolition of the Dual Control, and recommended the appointment of a single European Financial Adviser. This the Powers agreed 1727 to; and, for all practical purposes, England received a mandate from Europe to quiet and pacify the country. Now, what has taken place since then? Our great diplomatist, Lord Dufferin, drew up a brand new Constitution for Egypt; and we arranged, or acquiesced in the arrangement—which is much the same thing—that Mr. Edgar Vincent should be Financial Adviser; that Sir Evelyn Wood should form and discipline a Native Army; that General Baker Pasha should organize a Native gendarmerie, and that Mr. Clifford Lloyd should establish an urban police. At the opening of the Session on the 12th of February, the Prime Minister and the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) congratulated themselves, and took especial pains to point out how many reforms the Government had introduced into Egypt, how new tribunals had been formed, new Judges had been appointed, prison reforms had been made, and a general house tax had been agreed to. Can it be said, then, that we have not made every attempt to govern Egypt, and that we are not the governing Power there at this moment? Judging from all that has passed, I think it can hardly be doubted. Alas! my Lords, all these reforms exist, to a great degree, on paper, or, at any rate, for so long a time only as we shall remain in Egypt. Now all will be changed and destroyed, as a Multiple Control is to be proposed in Conference. I may be told that an international audit is a very different thing from a Multiple Control; but he who pays controls, and if the purse strings are held by an International Board, that Board will practically control the future policy of Egypt. Lately a French paper said that the object of a multiple audit was "not merely to pay, but to settle what should be done in Egypt;" and I do not think that this country will, for one moment, be blinded as to the real meaning of an international audit of finances. Settle what changes are required in the Law of Liquidation if you like—though many of ns would prefer no Conference at all—but do not hand over to a mixed tribunal the paramount interest now exercised by England. I object, after such a large expenditure of money and so much shedding of blood, to Egypt being handed over to a Multiple Control. The serious dangers and disadvantages 1728 attending a Multiple Control are too obvious to require much explanation. First and foremost, this country would be absolutely deprived of the standing and power which she has justly obtained in Egypt. That power would be swept away, and there would be general confusion in Egypt. Where would be the result of the expenditure of so much money and the loss of so much life? Alexandria has been destroyed, Egypt has been placed hopelessly in debt, and 20,000 Egyptians and Arabs have been sent to their graves in. our struggles to found a solid form of government. My Lords, we, who hold j high the honour of this country, want to see a prosperous end and a happier state of affairs established before we retreat or "skedaddle" out of Egypt. Now, we are hated by every class in Egypt, and, unfortunately, not only hated, but despised. My Lords, let us try and live down this ill-feeling, by showing what security and good government can do in the future; not by turning our backs and refusing all responsibility just at a time that responsibility is most needed. If we have a Multiple Control, what about safeguarding our road to India? Is that a matter of no moment? We had a terrible Indian Mutiny 27 years ago. Suppose we had another such disastrous trial, and Russia sided against us, how should we find ourselves if the Canal were closed against our ships? Would it be no disadvantage to us, in case any part of our Eastern Empire was jeopardized, that we had to ask leave of the Great Powers to pass through the Suez Canal? Russia has this year added Merv and Sarakhs to her Empire, and is within striking distance of India. We have lately been remarkable only for giving up everything when a difficulty arose, or for being always too late in meeting those difficulties. It used to be a proud boast that an Englishman never knew when he was beaten. It has remained to the present Government to reverse all this, and to show how soon and how readily an Englishman can be beaten. Another reason, and a great drawback against a Multiple Control, seems to me to be that it may cause an apple of discord to be thrown into European Councils. No two European countries have exactly the same interests, and all the Great Powers are naturally jealous of one another. Which Power is to exercise the chief control? The 1729 old fable is still true—"La raison du plus fort eat toujours la meilleure!" England has a vastly preponderating interest in Egypt, both on account of the great number of English ships which pass through the Canal—over 80 per cent of all the tonnage using the Canal being English—and also because of our great interests in the East, and our possession of India. Are we, in Egyptian affairs, only to have an equal share with five other Powers? If we are deputed to manage under a Joint Control, and only to share and share alike, we should not be able to move our little finger without the consent of another Conference of the Powers whose interests are very different and very inferior to our own. Then, as to fixing the terms of our occupation of Egypt. The very fact of doing so must tie the hands of our officials; the very fact that, at a particular time, no matter what has happened, we shall leave the country, will encourage agitation, and render all prospect of settlement hopeless. Undoubtedly, also, some other Power would step in to carry out what we have failed to establish—namely, a good form of government. But it is England that has been spending blood and treasure to put an end to anarchy and disorder; and England is bound, in honour, to carry out her work to a successful issue. Are we who govern the vast Provinces constituting the Empire of India, and who boast of the beneficence of our rule, to confess that we have tried to govern Egypt and have failed, and that we have, therefore, to call in the assistance of other European Powers? Then, as to our Army. Is the English Army to act as a "maid of all work," and to be under the management of this Joint Control; or, is the English Army to act as an Egyptian collector of taxes, in order to obtain the payment of the interest due to the Egyptian bondholders? I can conceive no more humiliating position for the Army of this country to be placed in, or of the extreme unpopularity of either proposal. I thought it hardly respectful to the House to make this inquiry without giving my reasons for doing so. Let it not be said that this Government, or any Government of England, is unable to govern aconquered country, and, is therefore, obliged to appeal to the aid of Europe to assist it in the task. That, however, is what certain foreign journals now 1730 say of us. Before it is too late, before further dishonour is thrown on the action of England, I implore the Government to confide in the wisdom of Parliament and in the good sense and right judgment of the people of this country. I beg to ask the Question of which I have given Notice.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, in answer to my noble Friend (Earl Stanhope), I have to remind him that on the last day before the Recess I repeated to the House that we were communicating with France on the subject of Egypt, and that if we found that our views respecting it were in agreement, we should then consult the Powers, and inform the House and Parliament before the Conference. The noble Earl gave Notice of a Question for to-day; and I stated that I could hold out no hopes of my being able to answer the Question to-day, and that is the case now. And although very great progress has been made in our communications with France, I can only say this—that we can only hope to be able to give a perfectly full statement to Parliament in the course of next week. The noble Earl said that it was an arbitrary thing for us to communicate with the Powers before informing Parliament what we were going to do. I am not aware, however, that there is anything arbitrary or unusual in that course. The noble Earl says that he has not spoken as a Party man. I venture to appeal to him—I should not have the courage to appeal to those who describe the Government as "imbecile "—but I venture to appeal to him, as one professing to have no Party feeling, to say whether it would not be better for noble Lords to reserve an opinion upon the course which Her Majesty's Government have taken until the full statement we have promised is before them with all the circumstances of the case. I may add that I see no danger in such a course, because it is clear that that full statement will enable Parliament to take action to prevent the country being committed to any course of policy which Her Majesty's Government may intend to adopt.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe last statement of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), if I understand it aright, is the most important which we have yet received from his lips. I understand that he has given a 1731 pledge that this country shall not be irrevocably committed to any course with respect to Egypt until time has been given to Parliament to express its opinion. That I understand to be a plain pledge, and one which, had he given it some time back, would have saved us very much anxiety. It is a pledge which, I confess, I now receive with the greatest satisfaction; and I certainly shall not do anything to alloy that satisfaction by criticizing a policy of which we do not, as yet, know the full details, and which we know now, on the highest authority, we shall have the fullest opportunity of discussing before it is too late.