Lords Sitting of 9 June 1884

MINUTES.
— Sat first in Parliament — The Lord Raglan, after the death of his father.
Took the Oath for the First Time—The Lord Langford.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Royal Military Asylum Chelsea (Transfer) * (114).

PRIVATE AND PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION BILLS.
Ordered, That Standing Orders Nos. 72 and 8'2 be suspended for the remainder of the Session.
PRIVATE BILLS.
Ordered, That the order of the 18th of March last be suspended, and that a statement in the following form be circulated in the case of all Bills to which Standing Order No. 38 applies, not later than the second day after the first reading.—[The Form is then appended.]
PUBLIC MEETINGS (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREsaid, that, seeing that the noble and learned Earl upon the Woolsack was the only Member of the Government in attendance, he would ask him, Whether he would make inquiries of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, as to whether the correspondence between the Lord Lieutenant and Lord Arthur Hill relative to the Nationalist meetings at Newry and the proposed counter - demonstrations could be laid on the Table?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in reply, said, he could not answer the Question without Notice; because it was manifestly one that could only be answered after communication with the Lord Lieutenant. He took it for granted, however, that any Correspondence which had taken place in regard to the matter which had appeared in the newspapers would be laid upon the Table sooner or later.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREgave Notice that he would ask the Question another day.

EGYPT (THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE) —NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  EARL STANHOPE, in whose name the following Notice stood upon the Paper:—
  "To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—1. "Whether the negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government relative to Egypt are concluded; and whether, before submitting those proposals to the other Great Powers, or before entering into a Conference, they will state to the House the nature of those negotiations.

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  " '2. Whether Her Majesty's Government have agreed with France to a limit of the occupation of Egypt?'"
  said, in rising to make inquiry respecting the approaching Conference, or, rather, as to the preliminary negotiations which have taken place, I am actuated solely by considerations of the grave position in which I believe this country finds itself placed. It is in no Party spirit that I put the Question to the noble Earl; nor have I the slightest desire to touch upon matters which cannot at present be divulged. But, my Lords, I, and the majority of your Lordships, are in complete official ignorance as to the precise nature of the negotiations which have taken place between this country and France. Now, from Questions put to the Government in "another place" before the Holidays, and from their extreme reticence—nay, even refusal to give an answer to those Questions—I may assume that the following is the actual present position of affairs with regard to the Conference negotiations. In a Circular Letter, dated April 19 last, addressed to the Courts of Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburg, Her Majesty's Government proposed the assembling of a Conference in London or Constantinople, and invited their presence and assistance, to consider whether any change was necessary in the Law of Liquidation of Egyptian finances. Four of the Great Powers, we are informed, have agreed to this proposal; but France, while agreeing in principle, wished, first, to make a certain exchange of views as to our position in Egypt. We are also informed that friendly communications have been going on between the two countries; but it is rumoured, and it has not been officially contradicted, that France wished to fix a term to the British occupation of Egypt, and that the English Government suggested five years, but that they have since agreed to shorten that term, to two or three years. It is also rumoured that the propriety of establishing an international audit of Egyptian finance is under the consideration of both Governments. Since your Lordships last met the matter may have been already concluded, so little have the Government taken Parliament and the country into their confidence. For these reasons I want, if possible, to gain some information from the Government. At
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  first we were told that the Conference would be strictly limited to the consideration, of the Law of Liquidation; and the Prime Minister said that, if any other matter was brought forward, it would be tantamount to convening a fresh Conference; but now we are informed that, when the negotiations going on with France arrive at a result, that result is to be communicated to the Powers before being communicated to Parliament. Really, my Lords, this seems rather a strong and arbitrary proceeding. Now, I wish to touch briefly on two points, which I will endeavour to put clearly and concisely to the House. First, as to our actual position in respect to the Government of Egypt; and, secondly, as to the dangers of a Multiple Control, and of fixing a short term for our occupation of Egypt. It will be in the recollection of the House that, though Her Majesty's present Advisers at first acquiesced in the Dual Control in Egypt, they afterwards strongly condemned it, and even when it had ceased to exist said it was the cause of all the difficulties in Egypt. So recently as the 12th of February, in "another place," the Prime Minister found great fault with the Dual Control; yet now, forsooth, he is going to make matters easier by the institution of a six-barrelled Control! Let me refer back two years. Then, a Conference of the Powers was convened at Constantinople, at the invitation of the Government, to consider the Egyptian Question, and met on June 23. In the course of its meetings the Arabi rebellion broke out; and before Turkish troops could proceed to Egypt, our Fleet bombarded and destroyed the Forts of Alexandria on July 12, France declining to interfere. After that a military expedition, undertaken and controlled solely by England, was despatched, and, after a very short but decisive fight, the rebels were completely routed, and so were all remnants of Egyptian Government. Then what followed? On the 3rd of January, 1883, the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed a Letter to the five Great Powers detailing all that had taken place. Among other things, that Letter endorsed the policy proposed by Egypt for the abolition of the Dual Control, and recommended the appointment of a single European Financial Adviser. This the Powers agreed

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  to; and, for all practical purposes, England received a mandate from Europe to quiet and pacify the country. Now, what has taken place since then? Our great diplomatist, Lord Dufferin, drew up a brand new Constitution for Egypt; and we arranged, or acquiesced in the arrangement—which is much the same thing—that Mr. Edgar Vincent should be Financial Adviser; that Sir Evelyn Wood should form and discipline a Native Army; that General Baker Pasha should organize a Native gendarmerie, and that Mr. Clifford Lloyd should establish an urban police. At the opening of the Session on the 12th of February, the Prime Minister and the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) congratulated themselves, and took especial pains to point out how many reforms the Government had introduced into Egypt, how new tribunals had been formed, new Judges had been appointed, prison reforms had been made, and a general house tax had been agreed to. Can it be said, then, that we have not made every attempt to govern Egypt, and that we are not the governing Power there at this moment? Judging from all that has passed, I think it can hardly be doubted. Alas! my Lords, all these reforms exist, to a great degree, on paper, or, at any rate, for so long a time only as we shall remain in Egypt. Now all will be changed and destroyed, as a Multiple Control is to be proposed in Conference. I may be told that an international audit is a very different thing from a Multiple Control; but he who pays controls, and if the purse strings are held by an International Board, that Board will practically control the future policy of Egypt. Lately a French paper said that the object of a multiple audit was "not merely to pay, but to settle what should be done in Egypt;" and I do not think that this country will, for one moment, be blinded as to the real meaning of an international audit of finances. Settle what changes are required in the Law of Liquidation if you like—though many of ns would prefer no Conference at all—but do not hand over to a mixed tribunal the paramount interest now exercised by England. I object, after such a large expenditure of money and so much shedding of blood, to Egypt being handed over to a Multiple Control. The serious dangers and disadvantages
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  attending a Multiple Control are too obvious to require much explanation. First and foremost, this country would be absolutely deprived of the standing and power which she has justly obtained in Egypt. That power would be swept away, and there would be general confusion in Egypt. Where would be the result of the expenditure of so much money and the loss of so much life? Alexandria has been destroyed, Egypt has been placed hopelessly in debt, and 20,000 Egyptians and Arabs have been sent to their graves in. our struggles to found a solid form of government. My Lords, we, who hold j high the honour of this country, want to see a prosperous end and a happier state of affairs established before we retreat or "skedaddle" out of Egypt. Now, we are hated by every class in Egypt, and, unfortunately, not only hated, but despised. My Lords, let us try and live down this ill-feeling, by showing what security and good government can do in the future; not by turning our backs and refusing all responsibility just at a time that responsibility is most needed. If we have a Multiple Control, what about safeguarding our road to India? Is that a matter of no moment? We had a terrible Indian Mutiny 27 years ago. Suppose we had another such disastrous trial, and Russia sided against us, how should we find ourselves if the Canal were closed against our ships? Would it be no disadvantage to us, in case any part of our Eastern Empire was jeopardized, that we had to ask leave of the Great Powers to pass through the Suez Canal? Russia has this year added Merv and Sarakhs to her Empire, and is within striking distance of India. We have lately been remarkable only for giving up everything when a difficulty arose, or for being always too late in meeting those difficulties. It used to be a proud boast that an Englishman never knew when he was beaten. It has remained to the present Government to reverse all this, and to show how soon and how readily an Englishman can be beaten. Another reason, and a great drawback against a Multiple Control, seems to me to be that it may cause an apple of discord to be thrown into European Councils. No two European countries have exactly the same interests, and all the Great Powers are naturally jealous of one another. Which Power is to exercise the chief control? The

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  old fable is still true—"La raison du plus fort eat toujours la meilleure!" England has a vastly preponderating interest in Egypt, both on account of the great number of English ships which pass through the Canal—over 80 per cent of all the tonnage using the Canal being English—and also because of our great interests in the East, and our possession of India. Are we, in Egyptian affairs, only to have an equal share with five other Powers? If we are deputed to manage under a Joint Control, and only to share and share alike, we should not be able to move our little finger without the consent of another Conference of the Powers whose interests are very different and very inferior to our own. Then, as to fixing the terms of our occupation of Egypt. The very fact of doing so must tie the hands of our officials; the very fact that, at a particular time, no matter what has happened, we shall leave the country, will encourage agitation, and render all prospect of settlement hopeless. Undoubtedly, also, some other Power would step in to carry out what we have failed to establish—namely, a good form of government. But it is England that has been spending blood and treasure to put an end to anarchy and disorder; and England is bound, in honour, to carry out her work to a successful issue. Are we who govern the vast Provinces constituting the Empire of India, and who boast of the beneficence of our rule, to confess that we have tried to govern Egypt and have failed, and that we have, therefore, to call in the assistance of other European Powers? Then, as to our Army. Is the English Army to act as a "maid of all work," and to be under the management of this Joint Control; or, is the English Army to act as an Egyptian collector of taxes, in order to obtain the payment of the interest due to the Egyptian bondholders? I can conceive no more humiliating position for the Army of this country to be placed in, or of the extreme unpopularity of either proposal. I thought it hardly respectful to the House to make this inquiry without giving my reasons for doing so. Let it not be said that this Government, or any Government of England, is unable to govern aconquered country, and, is therefore, obliged to appeal to the aid of Europe to assist it in the task. That, however, is what certain foreign journals now
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  say of us. Before it is too late, before further dishonour is thrown on the action of England, I implore the Government to confide in the wisdom of Parliament and in the good sense and right judgment of the people of this country. I beg to ask the Question of which I have given Notice.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, in answer to my noble Friend (Earl Stanhope), I have to remind him that on the last day before the Recess I repeated to the House that we were communicating with France on the subject of Egypt, and that if we found that our views respecting it were in agreement, we should then consult the Powers, and inform the House and Parliament before the Conference. The noble Earl gave Notice of a Question for to-day; and I stated that I could hold out no hopes of my being able to answer the Question to-day, and that is the case now. And although very great progress has been made in our communications with France, I can only say this—that we can only hope to be able to give a perfectly full statement to Parliament in the course of next week. The noble Earl said that it was an arbitrary thing for us to communicate with the Powers before informing Parliament what we were going to do. I am not aware, however, that there is anything arbitrary or unusual in that course. The noble Earl says that he has not spoken as a Party man. I venture to appeal to him—I should not have the courage to appeal to those who describe the Government as "imbecile "—but I venture to appeal to him, as one professing to have no Party feeling, to say whether it would not be better for noble Lords to reserve an opinion upon the course which Her Majesty's Government have taken until the full statement we have promised is before them with all the circumstances of the case. I may add that I see no danger in such a course, because it is clear that that full statement will enable Parliament to take action to prevent the country being committed to any course of policy which Her Majesty's Government may intend to adopt.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The last statement of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), if I understand it aright, is the most important which we have yet received from his lips. I understand that he has given a

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  pledge that this country shall not be irrevocably committed to any course with respect to Egypt until time has been given to Parliament to express its opinion. That I understand to be a plain pledge, and one which, had he given it some time back, would have saved us very much anxiety. It is a pledge which, I confess, I now receive with the greatest satisfaction; and I certainly shall not do anything to alloy that satisfaction by criticizing a policy of which we do not, as yet, know the full details, and which we know now, on the highest authority, we shall have the fullest opportunity of discussing before it is too late.

NAVY — CONDITION OF THE IRON CLAD NAVY—CORRESPONDENCE OF SIR THOMAS M. SYMONDS, G.C.B.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  Moved, That there be laid before the House—

  "1. Letter from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thos. M. Symonds, G.C.B., to the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 29th April 1884;

  2. Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty in acknowledgment of the above, dated 2nd May;

  3. Letter from Sir Thos. Symonds to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated 5th May;

  4. Letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty acknowledging the above, dated 9th May."—(The Viscount Sidmouth.)

  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, I should have assented to the Motion of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth) without adding any remarks, if it had not been for an attack made last Wednesday at Devonport by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) upon Her Majesty's Government, regarding the condition of the Navy. The Correspondence between Sir Thomas Symonds and the Board of Admiralty, for which the noble Viscount has moved, refers to this particular subject, and fortunately gives me an opportunity of making some remarks on the subject. In some previous conversations in this House, I must do the noble Viscount the justice to say that he has never treated the condition of the Navy as a Party question. He expressed an opinion that the number of our armour-plated ships of war is not so great as it should be; but he directed his remarks as much to the Predecessors of the present Board of Admiralty as to us; and, in replying to them, I pointed out, what must be apparent to every-
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  one who knows anything of the subject, that the present force of armour-plated ships of war depends, not upon the Admiralty of to-day, but upon the foresight of their Predecessors, for an armour-plated ship of war is hardly ever completed in less than five years. I said that, in my opinion, the state of the case had been much exaggerated, and that the Navy of this country undoubtedly was decidedly superior to any force that was likely to be brought against us; but I indicated that the construction of armour-plated ships of war had not, in my opinion, received the attention it deserved from our Predecessors, and that the present Board of Admiralty had, therefore, very considerably increased the rate of their construction. I supported my statement by figures, and I hoped that I had satisfied your Lordships. Therefore, it was with some surprise that I read the attack of the noble Marquess opposite at Devonport. He had been silent in this House; the attack was made when there was no opportunity for a reply, and at a place where such an attack, coming with his authority on an electioneering campaign, must, of course, tend to prejudice his opponents, and support his own Party. If the attack meant any thing, it meant this—that Conservative statesmen watched the progress of Foreign Navies, and were resolved to maintain the superiority of the British Navy; while Her Majesty's Government were neglectful of this most important duty. My Lords, I can truly say that my wish has been to remove all naval questions from the arena of Party conflict; and the fault is not mine if I have now to speak more plainly on the subject, and to show that the attack of the noble Marquess is not only devoid of foundation, but that the real cause of any apprehensions which have been felt by Sir Thomas Symonds and others regarding the present condition of our force of armour-plated ships of war, arises from the want of foresight of the Government of which the noble Marquess was a distinguished Member, and not from that of Her Majesty's present Government. I have always deprecated comparisons between our Navy afloat and that of any Foreign Power, not only because of the invidious and irritating nature of such comparisons, but because there is great difference of opinion between naval officers as to the merits of different classes of ships. The same

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  objection, however, does not apply to the much, more simple question of a comparison between the numbers of ships laid down. An armour-plated ship cannot be built in a corner unknown to the world; and anyone who takes the pains can ascertain what ships of this kind are laid down by the French Admiralty and by ourselves. The last armour-plated ship laid down by the Board of Admiralty over which Mr. Goschen presided with great advantage to the Public Service was the Inflexible. She was laid down in February, 1874, and I may observe, as an illustration of the time which is sometimes taken to complete these large ships, that she was not finished and ready for sea till 1880. The late Government took Office in 1874, and I will give the House the names, year by year, from that time to the present, of the armour-plated ships laid down by the English and French Admiralties. In 1874 we laid down the Nelson and the Northampton; France none. In 1875 we laid down none; France two, the Fulminant and the Vengeur. In 1867 we laid down two, the Ajax and Agamemnon; France four, the Dévastation, Foudroyant, Bayard, and Turenne. In 1877 we laid down none; France three, the Amiral Duperré, Tonnant, and Furieux. In 1878 we laid down none, but purchased out of the Vote of Credit, in anticipation of war with Russia, four ships, the Neptune, Superb, Bellisle, and Orion. France laid down five, the Duguesclin, Caïman, Terrible, Indomptable, and Requin. In 1879 we laid down three, the Conqueror, Edinburgh, and Colossus; France three, the Amiral Baudin, Formidable, and Vauban. Your Lordships will observe that, during the six years of the late Government, seven armour-plated ships were laid down by us, and four bought out of the Vote of Credit, or 11 in all; while France laid down 17. In order to show that the comparison of numbers is a fair one, I will give the aggregate tonnage of the ships. The 11 English ships measure 85,000 tons, and the 17 French ships 128,000 tons. I must further observe that, when the present Government came into Office, in 1880, we found the Navy Estimates introduced, and no provision made in those Estimates to increase the rate of construction of armour-plated ships. I must supplement this statement by the remark that the activity of the French Admiralty was perfectly
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  legitimate, and that there is no reason to assume it to have been prompted by any hostile feeling towards this country. Many of the armour-plated ships in the French Navy are built of wood, and are rapidly becoming unserviceable. The programme of the French Admiralty to replace them was openly announced, and was founded upon the Report of a Parliamentary Committee, over which M. Gambetta presided. The superiority of the British Navy, I may say, is constantly admitted in French official Reports. I have no wish, in any way, to exaggerate the state of the shipbuilding in 1880. Our previous superiority was great, and our superiority at the time was and now is decisive; but there certainly was a risk that, when the French programme was completed, the margin of our superiority might be unduly diminished. My Lords, I have now, I think, sufficiently explained the real cause of the apprehensions expressed by Sir Thomas Symonds and the noble Viscount opposite, which is that, in the six years from 1874 to 1880, much more vigorous action was taken by the French Admiralty to increase the number of armour-plated ships than was taken by the late Government. But your Lordships will, I am sure, agree with me that this retrospect is of little consequence compared to the account which I have to give of the manner in which the present Board of Admiralty have dealt with this very important part of their duty. We decided, gradually but substantially, to increase the provision made for the construction of armour-plated ships. In 1880, although, as I have before re marked, we found the Navy Estimates already introduced, we were able to make an arrangement by which the progress of the armour-plated ships on the stocks was accelerated; and in the years 1881, 1882, and 1883, we very largely increased the provision for the construction of such ships. Probably, the best way of showing this is to compare the expenditure on the hulls and machinery of such ships year by year. In 1879–80, it was £631,724; in 1880–1, it was £698,798; in 1881–2, it was £949,313; in 1882–3, it was £990,710; and in 1883–4, it was £1,240,700; or, in round numbers, the sum appropriated to armour- plated construction has been doubled. I will now give the names of the ships laid down during the last four years.

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  In 1880, in England, the Collingwood was laid down; in France none. In 1881 we laid down the Impérieuse and Warspite; France, the Hoche. In 1882 we laid down four—the Howe, Rodney, Camperdown, and Benbow; France two —the Neptune and Marceau. In 1883 we laid down the Anson, and France the Magenta. In the four years we have laid down eight ships, and France four. In short, the facts are, that during the six years of the Conservative Government armour-plated ships were laid down by the two nations at the rate of three French to two English, including the ships purchased from the Vote of Credit; and during the last four years at the rate of two English to one French. I do not pretend to explain the reasons for the shipbuilding policy of the late Government, and I have been only forced into making the comparison by the attack made upon us by the noble Marquess at Devonport. I trust that I have proved that Her Majesty's Government are not justly open to such an attack. I should have considered myself unworthy of being at the head of the Board of Admiralty if I had not embraced the earliest opportunity of showing, in a plain and business-like manner, that Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible of their duty to watch the progress of Foreign Navies, and that we have actually taken the measures which we believe to be sufficient to insure the superiority of the Naval Forces of this country.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken (the Earl of Northbrook) has chosen to refer to what he is pleased to call my attack. It is a pity that he is not accurate. The nature of my observations was this. In the course of the luncheon at Devonport—at which I was sitting between two sailors—one my distinguished Friend behind me (Viscount Sidmouth), and the other Captain Price (the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport)—they both expressed considerable apprehension with respect to the state of the Navy; my observation, which was purely hypothetical, was that, unless Her Majesty's Government showed more wisdom in providing a sufficient Navy for the defence of these shores than they had shown in the rest of their policy; if they behaved towards the Navy—["Hear, hear!" and Ministerial laughter.) These are facts, This
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  is what I said—[Renewed cheers and laughter]—this is actually what I said— that if they behaved towards the Navy as they have behaved towards Egypt, and had not treated it any better; in that case I thought there was very considerable ground for apprehension; and I added that I listened to the statement of my noble and hon. and gallant Friends with considerable anxiety. I will not attempt at present—I am not competent—to analyze the figures which the noble Earl has laid upon the Table. I must wait until I have obtained information from others who are more competent than I am before I can arrive at an opinion on such matters. I wish, however, to point out that, in the remarks I made, I was not comparing the action of the Conservatives with the action of the Liberal Administration. If I had done so, I should have laid myself open to the reproach which I think applies to the noble Earl, for he appears to think that, upon the question whether this country is adequately defended, it is sufficient for him to utter a very loud and a very elaborate tu quoque. It is not a question of whether the late Government did or did not provide adequately for the service of the Navy. Before we decide that question it will be necessary, not only to look into the mere figures, but into the position of the political world at the time, the precise political dangers against which it was their duty to guard, and the possible complications which it was incumbent upon them to anticipate. I have no doubt that, upon the whole, allowing for some pacific influences which affected that Government, and have now been transferred to the other side, the verdict of the country as to the conduct of the late Government will be that they did provide adequately for the defence of the country. But whether they did, or did not, it is no answer whatever to the complaint that we are not adequately protected now. Supposing it was found that we were inadequately defended, or that we were overmatched, what kind of consolation would it be to the people whose interests were jeopardized, and whose commerce was ruined, to be told that the Liberal Government had provided so many tons more than the Conservative Government had provided six years ago? My Lords, this sort of reply is no answer at all, Whether the

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  noble Earl can show that the Navy is in a state such as the present condition of foreign affairs requires, in a state such as the prevention of all dangers which may possibly threaten our shores demands—whether he can show that, or not, I must refer now, as I referred at Devonport, to the judgment of the experts who can decide upon that matter. But I do most earnestly protest against the idea that it is any defence against the charge of insufficiently providing for the Public Service to say that some other person at some distant time failed to provide sufficiently.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I do not say that what my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) has said is an absolute defence, but I do say that it is a defence against the noble Marquess. I must remind your Lordships that the noble Marquess was a Member of that Administration, which, as has been shown, was largely responsible for the present state of the Navy. The late Administration did not provide for the building of a sufficient number of iron-clad ships; and the results of that neglect has been left to the present Government as a legacy, and as ships cannot be built in a day, we are bound, in consequence of that neglect, to be for some time at a disadvantage. We stand at this moment, not upon the ships which my noble Friend has laid down, but we are standing, as regards our power, only on those ships which were laid down or in course of completion or completed under the late Government. It is perfectly clear that our answer to the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth), therefore, who complains of the comparative growth of the English Navy as compared with that of France, must necessarily be based on what the Conservative Government had done—in short, the condition of our naval power does not depend on what is being done now, but on what had been done before we came into Office. The case is absolutely clear against the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess says that his remarks were purely hypothetical; but can we conceive anyone in the position of the noble Marquess, in the circumstances, speaking as he has done at Devonport? The noble Marquess said he could not accept the official statement made by the Government; because, I suppose, he
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  rather feared it might be inconsistent with his theory. The coble Marquess said here was a Ministry so craven and cowardly, so insensible to the honour of the country, that official statements were really not sufficient to satisfy him. But the noble Marquess cannot expect that he will blind the eyes of anyone by language of that kind. It is a kind of hypothetical insinuation which, coming from the noble Marquess who occupies a responsible position now, who has occupied a very high position in the Government before this, and who may occupy an even higher position in the next, is a very poor way for him to make an attack upon Her Majesty's Government—namely, by insinuation; and the more especially, as it now appears, that he was totally ignorant of the facts of the case. That attack, however, is of a very grave and plain character, and really means that the Government of the country have neglected the Navy. The noble Marquess now seems to feel disturbed by the facts placed before him, and says that it is an easy way of meeting his facts, to tell him that the Conservative Government neglected their duty. But my noble Friend did not confine himself to that. If he had, he might have been open to the charge brought against him by the noble Marquess—of dealing in tu quoques. My noble Friend, besides pointing out what the late Board of Admiralty had neglected, had shown what the present Board of Admiralty are doing, and has proved that, whereas the former Board had failed to keep pace with the French Navy, the present Board of Admiralty has largely exceeded the French in shipbuilding; and that, taking year by year, there has been an actual amount of ships laid down double that which was laid down in the last year of the Conservative Administration. I say, therefore, that my noble Friend's answer is complete as against the noble Marquess in showing that the late Administration, of which he was a Member, neglected their duty, and in showing the manner in which that duty has been fulfilled by the present, as compared with the late, Administration.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that the course which had been followed by the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) on the present occasion, was one of the

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  most extraordinary that he ever remembered to have been adopted in their Lordships' House. What had happened? His (the Earl of Carnarvon's) noble Friend behind him (Viscount Sidmouth) had put a Motion, and had put it in general terms. The noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty came down to the House, and, without any Notice—
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: There was Notice of the Motion.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, the Motion referred to one subject, the speech of the noble Earl to a totally different question.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: No.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he would put it to their Lordships, whether any reasonable person could have formed the least idea that this attack was going to be made on the last Government? His noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) had made a speech at Devonport upon a most important and grave subject; and what he (the Earl of Carnarvon) complained of, was not that the noble Earl should have come down and given a complete and general denial to what his noble Friend had said, but that he should, without giving any idea as to what he was going to do, make in the most general terms upon a most important and grave subject an attack on the late Government which, if it were to be answered at all would have to be got up beforehand. If the noble Earl had come down and made a general denial of the charges made against the Government of neglect, that would have been fair enough. But it was a totally different thing to come with elaborate statistics to which no reply could possibly be made, and as to which it was impossible for any of their Lordships to refer. That was a most extraordinary proceeding; but the fact was, that the late Government in one set of circumstances laid down a certain amount of shipping, and the present Government in a different set of circumstances laid down a larger amount. How that proved a case of negligence against the late Administration passed his comprehension. The real question which the House had before it was not whether more ships had been laid down by the present or the late Government; it was were we, at the present moment adequately defended in naval matters, or
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  were we not? The old maxim was that the Navy of this country ought to be a match for the Navies of any two other countries. That old maxim was a perfectly sound one, and it had not, so far as he knew, ever been seriously disputed by any competent authority. He did not, however, believe it could be truly asserted that, at the present time, our Navy was a match for any two Navies. Indeed, he should be surprised if the noble Earl himself could get up and say so. From what he knew, it was impossible to resist n feeling of very considerable anxiety. It had been his duty to look into the strength of Foreign Navies, and from What he knew, he had no hesitation in saying that, as compared with them, our Navy was by no means of the strength and adequacy which we could desire. He would do his noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty the justice to admit that he had shown great anxiety to correct defects, and to do the best with the money that was at his command; but he should be surprised if his noble Friend could state that, as compared with foreign nations, he was entirely satisfied with the present condition of our Navy.
  Motion agreed to.

PARLIAMENT—ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE—MOTION.
Moved, "That this House do adjourn till Mondaynext."—(The Earl Granville.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he had no opposition to make to the proposal, provided that the House should have an opportunity of discussing the result of the negotiations with respect to the Conference, and that it was impossible that the noble Earl should be able to make any further explanation before that day. If that were the case, of course, no advantage would come from meeting at an earlier time.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that he had always put himself in the hands of the noble Marquess with respect to the Adjournment. He had done so, when he had proposed an Adjournment for three weeks, and he agreed to the noble Marquess's wish that the House should meet that day. The noble Marquess seemed to be very glad they had met that day, and he (Earl Granville) was also very glad, for reasons which he need not specify. He was entirely in the hands

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of the noble Marquess; but he did not think it was likely he could give any information about the negotiations before next week.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Say Friday.
EARL GRANVILLEconsented.
Motion amended, and agreed to.

PARLIAMENT—ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE—MOTION.

  ROYAL MILITARY ASYLUM CHELSEA (TRANSFER) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for transferring the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings—Was presented by The Lord SUDELEY; read 1a. (No. 114.)
  House adjourned at half past Five o'clock, to Friday next, a quarter past Four o'clock.