SECOND READING. (Hansard, 3 July 1884)

§ LORD COLERIDGE

said, he desired to call attention to the 7th, 8th, and 18th clauses of the Bill. He thought that one great defect, as he ventured to think, in the Judicature Act had been the immense multiplication of appeals in the Division over which he had the honour to preside—that part of the High Court which dealt with the Common Law of the country. In 1876 he took the trouble to obtain a Return of the total number of appeals from the Chancery Courts in five years, and also the number of appeals in the Common Law Courts during the same period. From 1871 to 1875 the total number of appeals from the Chancery Courts was 1,012; the total number of appeals from the Common Law Courts during the same period was 245. He thought that was a very striking difference. From 1877 to 1882 the appeals from the Chancery Division increased to 1,379; while those from the Common Law Courts rose to 1,296. Thus it appeared that, while the Chancery appeals had risen from 1,012 to 1,379, the Common Law appeals had risen from 245 to 1,296. Those were very striking figures. He, as Attorney General, was, it was true, in a great degree responsible for the Judicature Act; but the other two persons who were mainly responsible were his noble and learned Friend now on the Woolsack and the late Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, who was at the time Solicitor General. The Lord Chancellor and the then Solicitor General were persons of enormous experience in the Chancery Courts; but they had not much experience of the practice at Common Law. He, on the other hand, knew very little of the Chancery Courts. He thought he was wrong in not foreseeing that what was good for the Chancery Division, would not work as well for the Common Law Division, and that the general power of appeal which was given under 1859 the Judicature Act would have most mischievous effects in the latter Courts, In the Court of Chancery the states were usually much larger, the facts were more complicated, and the whole matter generally gave far more occasion for an appeal than did the cases with which the Common Law Courts had to deal. Appeals in Common Law cases now often took place in cases where the amount at stake was exceedingly small; and it, therefore, frequently happened that the costs formed by far the larger part of that which the losing part had to pay. He was informed by some leading solicitors whom he had questioned that since the Judicature Act the costs in Common Law cases had, at least, doubled. They had, therefore, to deal with the fact that appeals had in these cases multiplied fourfold, and that there had been an enormous increase in the costs. The principle of limiting the right of appeal was one that was already in existence. It applied to County Court cases and Quarter Sessions cases, criminal cases, and cases from the Revising Barristers. The fact had been recognized that a multiplication of appeals often amounted to a practical defeat of justice. Practically, the limitation of appeal proposed by the Bill would apply almost entirely to Common Law cases. If it was not carried into effect, the present arrears would become greater than they were now, and more Judges would have to be created; the distinction of classes of Judges would be aggravated; and it would become more and more difficult to get the first men of the country to take the position of Judges of First Instance. The only other matter he had to deal with was that of patronage; and with reference to that he only desired to say that, although he knew patronage was very safe in the hands of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, it was for their Lordships to consider whether it was a wise and desirable thing to take away the patronage from the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Bolls, and to place it in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. In referring to that subject, he wished it to be understood that he did not do so from any personal motive, as he himself would not be affected.