Lords Sitting of 2 December 1884

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—Committee—Report—Tramways and Public Companies (Ireland) Act Amendment* (8).
NAVY—STATE OF THE NAVY.

  MOTION FOR A PAPER.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKrose, pursuant to Notice, to move for Returns respecting the ships built and building for Her Majesty's Navy during the last four years; and to make a Statement, said: My Lords, I beg to thank the noble Viscount (Viscount Sidmouth), who has a Motion on the Paper relating to the Navy, for giving me precedence on this occasion. As regards the Statement which I have to make, the natural question which would occur to your Lordships is, why it should be necessary, at this time of year and in this Autumn Session of Parliament, to make any Statement respecting the condition of the Navy. Such Statements are naturally made when the Estimates are laid before Parliament. The announcement that a Statement respecting the Navy would be made in the course of the Autumn Session was given when I happened to be away from England; but I can have no hesitation in saying that it has been the outcome of the general public interest which has been expressed upon questions relating to the Navy which have arisen in the course of the Recess. I am sure that it is right that the Government should take an opportunity, as Parliament is now sitting, to lay before the two Houses what their view on the subject is, and what proposals they have to make in anticipation of the ordinary Estimates of the year. Now, I should like to say what is absolutely the fact—that no one connected with the Admiralty—neither myself, nor Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, the late Secretary to the Admiralty, nor Sir Thomas Brassey, who has worthily succeeded him—ever expressed the least dislike of all the public discussions which have taken place in regard to the state of the Navy. In fact, anyone who is connected with, and responsible for, the condition of the Navy is bound to attend to all public discussions on this subject;
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  and we, and every one of your Lordships, must admit that it is a question above all others which vitally concerns the interest of everyone in this country, and one on which public discussion is right and useful. But, my Lords, I think it is somewhat unfortunate that that discussion has hitherto been conducted naturally and necessarily without any expression of opinion from those who are most responsible for the affairs of the Navy, who must have most knowledge on the subject, and who, I venture to think, are as vitally interested in the condition of the Navy as anyone else in the country can possibly be. My Lords, that is a necessity which could not be avoided. It would have, of course, been quite out of the question that I myself, or any Member of the Board of Admiralty, or any Secretary to the Admiralty, should have entered into the discussion of the public Press as to the state of the Navy. It is in their place in Parliament where those who are responsible for the affairs of the Navy must give utterance to what they have to say on this subject, and nowhere else. I may add that I am exceedingly glad that almost the earliest opportunity that could be taken has been afforded to us to make a Statement on the subject. I would premise one word more—namely, that in speaking on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I can assure your Lordships and all interested in this question throughout the country that we are determined, as far as in us lies, to maintain the naval supremacy of this country in such a manner as we think most advisable for that purpose. I must say, further, that I hope that in the observations which I shall make to-night nobody will be able to say that I have made this question in any way a Party or political question. It certainly would be hard if, just at the time when the Leaders of the two great Parties have, in my opinion, most fortunately and for the advantage of the interests of the country come to an agreement on a most difficult and complicated political question, that with respect to a question which ought never to be held to be a political one at all—namely, the condition of the Navy—we should discuss it in any other way, or with any other object or motive, except to get at the truth, and to come to that conclusion which is most conducive to the interest

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  of the country apart from any Party or personal considerations. Having said that much, I think your Lordships will not quarrel with me if I occupy a very short time in making a Statement, without entering into any elaborate figures, as to the policy of the present Board of Admiralty in respect to shipbuilding during the last four years; because I think that in all discussions we have seen, very naturally, perhaps, that there has been an omission to recognize what the policy of the Board of Admiralty has been, and how much it has done to carry out that policy. In the first place, with regard to the most important element of the naval strength of the country—namely, armour-plated ships—that policy has been stated more than once in both Houses of Parliament. It was stated, for example, very distinctly by my right hon. Friend Mr. Trevelyan, when Secretary to the Admiralty, in the House of Commons in the month of April, 1882. He then explained, in a discussion which took place on the strength of the Navies of England and France, that it was, in the view of the Board of Admiralty, necessary very considerably to increase the rate of construction of armour-plated ships, and that we might have taken one of two courses. In 1880, when the present Board of Admiralty was formed, we might have taken the course of asking the House of Commons for a large Vote for an immediate increase of armour-plated tonnage; but we deliberately declined to take that course. We deliberately preferred to take what we thought was the wiser course of making the increase that we considered necessary gradually and steadily, and not all at one time by a very large expenditure of public money. In carrying out that policy we have deliberately increased the expenditure on the Navy very considerably in the last four years; and we have also, during that time, very largely increased the rate of construction of the armour-plated ships. We increased that rate of construction from something under 8,000 tons per annum to more than 12,000 tons per annum; and that increase, as your Lordships can well understand, has necessarily been accompanied by a considerably increased charge to the public. For those ships year by year become more expensive in their construction. Now, that charge, on the whole, may be put down at not very far from
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  £1,000,000 sterling. If we compare the expenditure of the year 1884–5 with that of the year 1880–1, the first year when the present Board of Admiralty came into Office, that expenditure is divided, in the first place, into the Votes in the Navy Estimates from which the funds are found for the construction of ships. The increase on those Votes is from £3,124,000 in the year 1880–1 to £3,891,000 in the year 1884–5. But there is another expense which is not provided for in the Navy Estimates, but which is equally essential to the construction of ships—namely, the supply of guns for the Navy, for which provision is made in the Army Estimates. The expenditure upon guns, &c., for the Navy has been increased from £300,000 in 1880 to £500,000 in 1884–5, making, on the whole, an increased expenditure upon the construction of ships in the last, as compared with the first, of the four years, of not much under £1,000,000 sterling. My Lords, in carrying out that increase we have been guided by certain general principles. One of those principles has been that we should not be induced, by the existence in the Navies of other nations of armour-clad ships of a gigantic size, to lay down for this country very large ships. We thought, on the whole, that for England it would be better to confine the class of ships that we build to ships of what, in the present day, are considered to be of moderate size. When we come to talk, however, of ships of moderate size, that moderate size means ships of about 10,000 tons, and costing not very far from £750,000 each. We would not embark in the policy which has been adopted, for example, by the Italian Government, of laying down ships of 2,000 and 3,000 tons larger than the class I have mentioned. Another of the principles which we have adopted in our policy of construction has been that we should take money enough to press forward as quickly as possible the ships which we have begun to construct. I have seen adverse criticisms in respect to this; but I am prepared to maintain that during the last four years the construction of armour-plated ships has progressed at a rate as rapid as possible consistently with the economical construction of such ships. We may have been detained in completing ships from circumstances con-

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  nected with their armament which have arisen, as I believe, unavoidably; but in respect of the construction of ships by the Board of Admiralty I say we have supplied money enough to build those ships as economically and as rapidly as possible. Another part of our policy has been, as far as possible, not to multiply types of ships; but, both in respect of economy of construction and of the advantages of manœuvring when ships are acting together, to build them as far as possible of the same type. The ships we have built are of the type generally known as the Admiral; and although as years went on and as improvements advanced some have been designed more powerful than others, still they were ships of the same class. Another principle which we have followed has been that in building this class of ships, and all other classes of ships, we should pay especial attention to the element of speed; and all the ships that we have laid down have been ships of great speed—that is to say, the speed of the ships laid down has been above the average of 16 knots. Having said this much, and shown what has been done and the policy that has been followed during the last four years in respect of armour-plated ships, I do not know whether your Lordships expect me to say anything in respect of the comparisons which many of your Lordships may have seen lately between the armour-plated ships of France and those of England. I have alluded on one or two occasions to this subject. It is naturally one of some delicacy. We are on the best terms with our neighbours. We have no right to make any objection to the increase which France chooses to make in her Navy. On the contrary, I think I have explained in this House on a former occasion that the reason which induced the French Government, more than 10 years ago, to lay down a scheme for the construction with a greater rapidity than ordinary of armour-plated ships was one which must be accepted as natural by anyone who has paid any attention to naval construction here or elsewhere. The fact is, that when the armour-clad ships were first introduced, the French Government continued far longer than we did the practice, which has turned out not to be an economical one, of building ships of
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  wood and plating those ships with iron. It has been found that the ships so built become unserviceable within a limited time. After 20 years it is impossible to calculate that those ships will be of any value as ships of war; whereas ships built of iron or steel appear, so far as I am able to judge at the present time, to be practically indestructible. For example, one of the earliest iron-clads, the Warrior, laid down by Sir John Pakington more than 20 years ago, has been examined; and as far as her hull goes she is, I believe, pretty nearly as good now as she was at the time when she was built. I do not mean in the least to imply that the Warrior is a ship which would be at the present time of any particular value as a fighting ship; but I simply mention this to show the length of time which ships built of iron may last. That is the reason why the French some years ago laid down a programme for increasing the number of their armour-plated ships, and why they have been engaged in endeavouring to carry that programme into execution. Therefore I hope your Lordships will understand that in making any comparison at all it is not with the view of giving an impression that the French Government have been endeavouring to rival us on the sea, a thought which I honestly believe was undreamt of in making their programme. I make it merely because I have read so many such comparisons, and it seems to me that it would be hardly right for me to leave the subject altogether unnoticed. We have seen in those comparisons a great many distinctions drawn between ships of the first class, and ships of the second class, and ships of the third class—distinctions drawn between ships on account of their speed, on account of the armour they carry, and on account of the guns with which they are armed; but there is one thing which your Lordships will have seen for your selveson reading those comparisons—that there is hardly one comparison which coincides with another made two or three days before. Only the other day there was an elaborate comparison made in which it was said, in regard to the English Navy, that nobody would deny that the English was superior to the French Navy in what are called first-class ships; but we read three days ago, I think, a discussion in which a very eminent professional gentleman said one thing was

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  clear—that we were very inferior in first-class ships, but enormously superior in regard to second-class ships. This is one of the comparisons which I have seen; and, of course, those comparisons puzzle very much persons who are not acquainted with the technical details of this interesting question. I am sure that if our best naval officers were asked what should be called a first-class ship they would not agree. That places us in a great difficulty, and I came to the conclusion that it would be better to take the list of ships of the French and English Navies for next year, and to ask my Naval Colleagues at the Board of Admiralty to go through them, and, without reference to any arbitrary classification of first, second, or third class, to see what the general comparison between the ships was. Setting one ship as far as we could against the other, and when we could giving a decided disadvantage to our side, always placing ourselves in the worst position in the comparison, the conclusion we have arrived at is as follows, coming not on my authority, but on the authority of the Board of Admiralty. We made a distinction between the more modern class of ships, and those ships which are usually called obsolete—third-class ships, or whatever they may be called—which are now hardly of a class to be put in comparison with the better class of ships. As far as modern ships go, the comparison comes to this. Taking the more modern ships, there are 30 English of 210,430 tons, and 19 French of 127,828 tons, showing a balance in our favour of 11 ships.
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH: Was that the armoured tonnage?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBOOK: I am speaking only of armour-plated ships. Taking the quasi-obsolete ships, to which we should not attach any great value, there are 16 English of 115,520 tons, and 12 French of 53,066 tons, and there is a balance in our favour of four ships. Taking the whole of the armoured ships together, there are 46 English of 329,550 tons, and 31 French of 180,894 tons. I am not going to make any comments on these comparisons, because the moment we come to make any comments we are apt to land ourselves in a quagmire of technical discussion. I wish, however, to call attention to this fact—that this is the most authentic and best compari-
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  son in regard to the state of the two Navies that I can offer your Lordships, not on my authority, as I said before, but on the authority of the Board of Admiralty.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Do these figures refer to ships building or actually built?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: To ships actually built. During the last four years we have begun two armour-plated ships for every one which the French Government have begun. I must inform your Lordships that during the last few years there has not been any rapid progress or great expenditure of money upon the increase of the French Navy. In 1882 a very material change was made in regard to the money provided for the construction of the French Navy. Whereas up to that time the construction of the Navy was provided for mainly by Votes of Credit, apart from the annual Votes, and therefore from the annual taxation of the country, in that year a change was made, and since that time the construction has been provided for by annual Votes. Without entering into statistics, I may inform your Lordships that I am satisfied, after full inquiry, that our expenditure at the present time on the construction of armour-plated ships is very much larger than the expenditure on the construction of such ships by the French Government; and, so far as I am aware—and I have full opportunities of knowing—there has been no extraordinary activity in regard to construction in the French Navy. There is, therefore, my Lords, no reason for making us suppose that any exertions are being made in that quarter which would of themselves, apart from other circumstances, require large and new expenditure on our part. I have already said in this House, upon a former occasion, that, as regards ships being constructed by the two nations at the present time, there are more ships being constructed at this moment by the French than by ourselves. The number of ships actually launched and being completed is about the same in the two countries. I think there is a balance of one in favour of the French, but that ship is a small one; and the tonnage of ships launched and completed is about the same between the two nations. In regard to ships being constructed, and not yet advanced, there

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  are two more ships being constructed by the French than by ourselves. That is the exact position at the present time. I should like to say one word in defence of the policy pursued by the Board of Admiralty in not having in 1880 asked for a large sum of money and commenced to build a great number of armour-plated ships. My Lords, this is a question on which one learns by experience. I am old enough to remember cases in which Boards of Admiralty have suddenly, and in consequence of the difficulties of the moment, come to the conclusion that they should make a large increase in a particular class of ships, and this has led to a great expenditure of public money, with no advantage to the strength of the Navy. One particular instance, which some of your Lordships may remember, happened in 18–59. I remember it very well. It was not long after the introduction of steam into ships of the line, and it was supposed to be necessary to make a large increase in the steam battle ships of this country. Sailing ships were converted into steamships, and the increase was at once voted by Parliament. I am not finding fault with anyone. There was no difference of opinion among the high authorities of the day; but, unfortunately, the Admiralty did not take sufficient account of the fact that armour-plated ships were beginning to supersede the unprotected ships, and before half the new ships were completed it was found that they were entirely superseded by armour-plated ships. Many of those new wooden ships had to be pulled to pieces, and the remainder had to be converted into very indifferent protected ships. I recall this as an instance to show that it is not usually a safe thing in naval construction, when so many changes are going on, to spend a very large sum of money at any particular time in building any large number of battle ships of a class which may at that time be considered the best. My Lords, I will go further, and ask if in 1880 the Board of Admiralty had laid down 10 ships like the Collingwood—and a very good kind of ship she was—what would now be said by professional men who are acquainted with the present condition of naval warfare? The Collingwood has only 43-ton guns. She is still a very powerful and good ship, and not obsolete; but it is by no means the kind of ship which any
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  naval officer would now recommend to be laid down. That shows the change that has taken place within the last four years. The use of the Gatling guns, of Nordenfeldt guns, and what is known as the quick-firing gun, have given rise to requirements which did enter into the consideration of Naval Constructors at the time the Collingwood was built. Moreover, since that time guns of more than 100 tons have been placed on board line-of-battle ships; and it is now almost impossible to put the heavier guns which are now made on vessels built four years ago. Therefore, I venture to think that we did wisely in gradually and steadily increasing the amount of our tonnage; and that we should not have acted a wise part if we had come down to Parliament with a sensational Statement and asked the country to agree to a large and immediate Vote for the purpose of building a great number of iron-clad ships of the kind that were then considered the best. Having said that much as to what we have done, let me state to your Lordships what we propose to do. We have, or shall have shortly, three "slips" vacant, and we propose to lay down three new ships in place of three ships which have been, or will shortly be, launched. That will be in accordance with our programme of four years ago. We have also laid down a ship—the Benbow—which is being built by contract. That ship will shortly be launched; and we propose also to lay down another to succeed her—that will make four iron-clads in all to be laid down—either at the beginning or in the course of the next financial year. So much in regard to the ships that we intend to lay down. As to those on the stocks, we are making the most rapid progress that is possible. As regard s the class of ship to be laid down the Board of Admiralty have paid the greatest attention; and the subject is so interesting that I will not apologize for giving your Lordships a very slight description of the ship that we propose to lay down. The ship is to be of a little over 10,000 tons, of the same class as the Conqueror, with 18 inches of armour on the side, which, with the backing, will render her equal in defence to any ship afloat; her turret will be armed with two of the heaviest guns put into any ship of the present time—namely,

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  two 110-ton guns, and she will have an 18-ton gun in the stern, and 12 6-inch guns in her after-battery. This battery will be protected by steel three inches thick, with a backing against the fire of the machine guns and the quick-firing guns, which, it is the general opinion, will in the future form, so great an element of destruction in naval warfare. This ship will have a speed of 15½ knots; and I think, my Lords, that this ship, which has been worked out with great care by the very able officers at the Admiralty who design our ships, will be a very valuable addition to the Navy, and will be equal to any armour-clad ship which has been laid down, or which is now being laid down or constructed, by any Power. With regard to the particular design of the other three armour-clad ships it is proposed to construct, I cannot now give any further information. The Board of Admiralty have had several designs before them; and it is a matter of very considerable difficulty to decide between them. There is no reason at the present time to come to any conclusion as to the particular class of ship. All I can say at present is that they will be about the same class as those we have been in the habit of building—that is to say, between 10,000 and 11,000 tons. My Lords, there has been recently a development of a power in respect of naval warfare to which I do not think sufficient attention has been paid in many of the discussions which have lately taken place on the Navy. I speak of the power of torpedoes as used by ships against other ships. Your Lordships may remember that the Board of Admiralty, over which the late Mr. Ward Hunt presided, designed a ship which was called the Polyphemus. This ship was designed to be a ram, and at the same time a torpedo ship, which would be, by reason of the character of her construction, very little vulnerable to the guns of the enemy, having her vitals protected by steel armour. She was to be an answer to some of the large armour-plated ships of other countries, and that was the purpose for which she was built by the late Board of Admiralty. My Lords, that ship was an important experiment. We have paid the greatest attention to the development of her qualities; and I am glad to inform your Lordships that very recently the experiments made as to her fighting qualities in respect to her tor-
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  pedo discharge have been exceedingly successful—so much so that the able officer in charge of the experiments, Captain Wilson, reported to the Admiralty that the experiments should not be continued in her, and that she was a valuable addition to the fighting ships of the Navy. My Lords, in respect to naval warfare, I do not think it becomes the Board of Admiralty in England to be behind, or to follow the example of, other nations; but rather to take the lead in introducing such experiments and such changes as may be likely by their development to increase the naval force of this country; and I think the Board of Admiralty over which Mr. Ward Hunt presided did a very wise thing in building this ship—the Polyphemus—and I will add that, in my opinion and in the opinion of many men conversant with the subject, the experiments made with her are likely to introduce a development of naval force which may, possibly, be not altogether appreciated at the present time. At any rate, we feel most desirous to continue in that direction; and we propose, therefore, to build at once two more ships of a similar class to the Polyphemus—that is to say, ships of the torpedo ram class—strong enough to be valuable as rams, and, at the same time, having a powerful torpedo discharge, and having their vitals so protected as to afford very little mark to the guns of the enemy. These ships will be of about 3,000 tons displacement, rather longer and wider than, but otherwise identical with, the Polyphemus in under-water arrangements, except that there will be no torpedo discharge through the ram itself. They will be sea-going ships, and their estimated speed will be 17½ knots. In respect of the development of torpedo warfare, there is another class of ship which the Admiralty have recently ordered, and of which they are building two at the present time, which may be called torpedo cruisers. They are ships of about 1,400 tons displacement, and are designed to act as auxiliaries to a fleet going into action. They will be of great speed, and will have powerful torpedo armaments. We now propose to build an increased number of this class of vessel—in fact, we propose to build 10 such cruisers. Their value, I believe, is universally admitted by those who have fully discussed the newer classes

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  of ships which will form the Fleets of the future. They will be armed with six 4-ton guns, and, as they will have good coal endurance, they will perform service as cruisers in time of peace, as well as fast armed scouts and torpedo auxiliaries in time of war. Their estimated speed is 16 knots, but I will not mention the cost. None of your Lordships who have considered the condition of the Navy can look altogether with satisfaction upon the class of small ships which we are obliged to employ in different parts of the world. It is absolutely necessary for us to have those ships, and very useful, no doubt, they are; but it would be most desirable to substitute for that class of ships, which necessarily cannot be quite efficient as fighting ships in the present day, ships which will be equally well able to perform the duties they now perform, and be efficient for fighting purposes. In the opinion of the Board of Admiralty, the ships I have described will be able to perform those duties; and, that being so, I cannot conceive a more valuable addition to the Fleet of this country than a number of ships of that class. Besides that class of ship, I must mention the subject of the smaller boats, called torpedo boats. These torpedo boats are divided into two classes—the first-class are those which are not taken on board line-of-battle ships, and which go by their own motive power; and the second class are those which are carried on board line-of-battle ships, and which may be launched when wanted. In the opinion of the Board of Admiralty, the first-class boats, which are of about 120 tons burden, are of very great value for defensive purposes. They are also of great value in warfare which may be carried on within certain limits of the ports at which they may be stationed. But it is impossible to consider these boats as sea-going boats, or, as I believe the technical phrase is, "sea-keeping" boats—that is, boats that can keep at sea, and accompany a fleet in time of war. One of these little boats went the other day to Australia, under the command of a very enter prizing lieutenant in the Navy; and the description he gives of the boat, which was named the Childers, after my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would convince anyone that it would be quite impossible to expect boats of this class to accompany a fleet
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  at sea; and, therefore, they are to be considered valuable mainly as a defensive and not as an offensive weapon, in the sense of being used as such in general maritime warfare. Therefore, I am not ashamed to confess that, in regard to the construction of these boats, we, being the strongest Naval Power in the world, have not paid so much attention to this class as nations that are weaker at sea, such as Germany and Russia. Science is causing constant changes, and the best torpedo boat of this year will not be the best next year. But, my Lords, as we are taking up seriously the fortification of our coaling stations abroad, we propose to make an addition of 30 to the number of first-class torpedo boats. In the opinion of some, no mean authorities on naval construction, the system of torpedo attack will before long be developed in such a way as to permit of the use in naval engagements of ships very much less costly than first-class armour-plated line-of-battle ships. Of course, no ship armed with torpedoes can take the place of an iron-clad in an attack upon fortifications, or in similar work; but, as regards service in the Channel, there are those whose opinions I much respect who think that the class of torpedo ram we propose to build may perform service equal to that performed by some of the armour-plated ships. I come now to a class of ships which the Board of Admiralty have taken very great pains to bring to perfection, and which have received very little notice from those who have discussed this subject out-of-doors. I am speaking of the ship called "the protected cruiser." The late Board of Admiralty, very wisely, just before leaving Office, ordered the construction of three ships, which are known as ships of the Leander class. They possess great speed, and are protected in a measure by a steel deck built over the engines and vitals of the ship. Now, we desired to improve upon that class of ships, and accordingly the able Constructor to the Admiralty designed for us four ships—the Mersey, the Severn, the Thames, and the Forth. These vessels are very fast, and they are protected to a much greater degree than the Leander class. They have a 3-inch steel-protected deck, which is inclined at the sides, so that a shot can only strike it at an angle. Ships of this class may be considered as belted

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  cruisers with a protection of 6 inches of steel. In our opinion, no ships will be superior to them for the protection of our commerce, which is one of the most important objects which must be borne in mind by the Board of Admiralty when framing its policy in regard to construction. Then, under certain circumstances, they will be perfectly well able to cope with some of the inferior classes of ironclad ships. And in any comparison between the fighting ships of England and those of other countries these ships must not be forgotten, although they are not included under the technical heading of armour-plated tonnage. We now propose to go still further, and improve upon the ships of the Mersey class. We propose to build belted cruisers which will not have inclined decks, but armour belts of 10 inches of steel, with which their vitals will be protected. These ships will have a displacement of 5,000 tons, and the weight of their armour will be 1,000 tons. Their water-line will be protected by side armour from end to end. A ship of this class will be armed with torpedoes. She will also be capable of being used as a ram. She will carry two 18-ton guns and 12 4-ton guns, and her speed will be 17 knots. Ships of this class will be perfectly able to contend with the inferior iron-clads of other countries. We propose to build five of this class of ships. To sum up what I have been saying, we propose to lay down four iron-clads, two torpedo rams of 3,000 tons each, five belted cruisers of 5,000tons, 10 scouts of l,400or 1,500 tons, and 30 first-class torpedo boats. The additions we propose to the Navy will involve a cost of about £3,100,000 beyond, and in excess of, the ordinary Estimates for the year. We intend to ask for tenders from shipbuilding firms as soon as possible, as every one of these ships, excepting the torpedo boats, will take more than a year to build. My own impression is that an iron-clad cannot be built in less than four years; but the four that are to be built ought to be completed within five years from the date when they were ordered. Some may, perhaps, be completed more rapidly. I have said that these ships will be obtained by contract. The Board of Admiralty have this year had the advice of a very competent Committee, presided over by noble Friend (the Earl of Ravensworth), on the subject of ship-
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  building by contract. That Committee did not recommend that the rate of shipbuilding in the Dockyards should be diminished; but it was their opinion that when the shipbuilding trade of this country was utilized for the purpose of assisting the Navy, it should be utilized in the way of building rather than of repairing ships. Ships can, in fact, be built by contract economically and efficiently. We are building one of the largest of our iron-clads—the Benbow—by contract now; and the opinion of Mr. Barnaby and the professional advisers of the Admiralty is that the way in which that ship is being constructed, under proper supervision, is such as to satisfy them that we can safely enter into contract for the building of those ships. Now, I am not of opinion that it is desirable to make constant changes in the establishments of the Dockyards. We have been obliged, in order to carry through the increased programme of the last four years, considerably to add to the number of men employed in the Dockyards—I think from 16,000 to 18,000. The Board of Admiralty are not prepared to make any considerable increase in that number. They think it more desirable that the work should go steadily on. The reasons for this decision are entirely professional, based on the best mode of carrying on the work. But if there were no such reasons at the present time, your Lordships would probably agree with me that if we are to spend money on the increase of the Navy, it is desirable, in consequence of the stagnation in the great shipbuilding yards of the country, that the extra expenditure should go, not to add to our permanent staffs, but to increase the work by contract in the private yards. There will be an additional advantage from this course. No one who has had anything to do with the Admiralty can help feeling it is a great advantage that the great shipbuilders should have practice in building ships of war. It is a different class of work from what they are accustomed to; and it is clear that when war breaks out we should look upon the great shipbuilding yards as part of the Naval Establishments—an addition and strength to the resources of the country which must be required if we have a naval war. Therefore it is an additional advantage that ships of different classes should be

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  built in the many different shipbuilding yards of the country, which would thus acquire an experience they do not now possess in constructing the fighting ships of England. My noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) asked me whether the sum of £3,100,000 includes the cost of the armament required for the ships to be built. I wish I could tell your Lordships that it was so, because I am a man of an economical disposition. I mentioned before that the armament of our ships is provided for in the Army, and not in the Navy, Estimates; and I am obliged to state that the carrying out of our programme will require a considerable increase in the Army Estimates, in order to provide the guns for these ships, and the other guns which will be required for the armament of the ships now being built. I could say a good deal upon the subject of guns; but I have already detained the House a long time, and I hope your Lordships will excuse me. But this I will say—that our professional advisers are satisfied with the large guns now built and building for our ships. I cannot think that less than £300,000 for the next five years, together with an additional £100,000 this year, or, in all, £1,600,000, will be necessary, so that a large addition must be made to the Army Estimates for naval guns in that period. But there are other matters connected with the naval defence of the country to which I must now allude. It has been already stated in this House that we shall require £825,000 for the protection of our coaling stations. We had a discussion on this subject not long ago, and therefore it will not be necessary for me to go at any great length into the subject. But I have seen it asked—"What is the use of a Navy if you have to come to Parliament to ask for money for the protection of your ports and coaling stations?" I heard that same argument used many years ago with respect to the protection of our naval ports against sudden attack; and I remember very well that my old master, Mr. Sidney Herbert, gave this answer—"If your Fleets are wanted to protect your Dockyards you might as well have neither Fleets nor Dockyards, because the only use of Fleets of this country is to leave its Dockyards, go out to sea to meet the enemy, and take the offensive." So I answer and say that the ships of this country abroad
  412
  should not be used to protect our coaling stations. If we had a war to-morrow, what would be thought of any Board of Admiralty which incurred the responsibility of leaving one ship hero, another ship there, and another somewhere else to protect the coaling stations, which ought to be able to protect themselves, and to which our ships ought to come for refuge and protection instead of going to protect them? I had myself the other day a letter from a most distinguished officer abroad with respect to two very important coaling stations, stating that if we had a war we should have to keep two armour-plated ships to protect those coaling stations. Therefore, if the coaling stations are not protected the Admiralty would have to keep a force much larger than would otherwise be required. The Government would, therefore, incur a grave responsibility if they were to leave those stations unprotected, when a moderate expenditure might make them perfectly safe instead of being a snare to this country. Accordingly, I cannot listen for a moment to those who say—"What is the use of your ships if they cannot protect the coaling stations abroad?" To sum up, there will be ships built by contract, in addition to the ordinary Estimates, to the amount of £3,100,000; an increased provision for guns in the Army Estimates of £1,600,000; on the protection of coaling stations, £825,000; giving a total of £5,525,000.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNasked how much of the £3,100,000 was for armoured and ho w much for unarmoured ships?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I stated that the £3,100,000 would give the following result—namely, one armour-clad; five protected cruisers, whether you call them armour-clad or not; 10 protected vessels of the scout class, and 30 torpedo boats; but I am not at present prepared to say that the ships that will be ordered to be built by contract shall be of the particular classes I have mentioned. For example, I think it is very probable it may be better to order by contract two, or even three, iron-clads, instead of one, and to build other ships in the Dockyards. What I mean is that this £3,100,000 will produce that number of ships which, whether ordered to be built by contract or not, will add to the strength of the Navy.

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  The sum we have put down as an increase to the Army Estimates for armaments will include an increase of the supply of torpedoes, which at present is hardly sufficient. Taking the proposals as a whole, I think that I may with perfect safety say to the House that if they are carried out the annual production of armour-clad ships will he increased by 2,000 tons, coming to a total of 14,000, instead of 12,000, tons every year. Her Majesty's Government, in "another place," have announced their intention to agree to the appointment, during the next Session of Parliament, of a Committee to inquire into the Naval and Military Expenditure of the country; and these proposals will be referred, as a matter of course, along with the Navy Estimates, to that Committee. There are two other most important questions intimately connected with the naval strength of the country, which are now under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and to which, I think, sufficient attention has not as yet been directed. One is the defence of the commercial harbours of this country. Since the present Government took Office, a Committee was appointed, of which my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Morley) was President, assisted by naval and military officers of distinction, to inquire into the best mode of defending the commercial harbours of this country. That Committee paid great attention to the subject, and made a Report. That Report has been considered by the professional authorities of the War Office; it is now under the consideration of the several Departments concerned, and of Her Majesty's Government. The other important question is, whether it is not necessary, in consequence of the increased power of guns of late years and the changes in that respect, to make some alteration and improvement in the seaward defences of our great military ports at home and abroad—I mean such ports as Portsmouth, Plymouth, Malta, and Gibraltar. That subject has also been under the consideration of my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War; and it is probable that he will have proposals to bring before Her Majesty's Government. To the statement I have just made, I must, therefore, make an important reservation in respect of the proposals of the Government as to additions to the
  414
  Navy. It is impossible to come to a conclusion as to how much or what class of addition to the Navy would be required, if the main responsibility should be placed on the Navy of protecting those ports, which otherwise might be protected by the fortifications. There is no doubt that the question is one of very considerable difficulty. The arguments I used just now, and which, I think, met with the general concurrence of your Lordships in respect of our coaling stations abroad, do not apply with equal force to similar ports at home, where the protection is much easier than at a distance from this country. I do not wish to anticipate the decision of the Government; but I wish to impress upon your Lordships and the public that it is possible further increases may be necessary to the Navy under certain contingencies with respect to these fortifications and defences.
  Moved, "That there be laid before this House, Tabular Statement of the ships laid down by the Board of Admiralty since 1880, and Diagram illustrating the armoured and unarmoured tonnage built in Her Majesty's dockyards and by contract; and the total naval expenditure from 1865–66 to 1883–84 inclusive."—(The Earl of Northbrook.)
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHasked as to the thickness of the armour-plated ships it was proposed to lay down; and whether the proposals of the Admiralty were to be considered dependent upon any Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, or whether they were to be absolute?
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I feel some diffidence in taking part in a discussion which involves so much of technical details; but my excuse must be the interest I take in the subject, and that I think our ships should be commensurate for the protection of our great commercial interests. I, like everyone else, have been waiting anxiously for the statement to be made this evening by Her Majesty's Government. I can remember some statements which have fallen from them on previous occasions, intimating their belief that no considerable increase of expenditure was necessary; but I should be the last person to hold them to such statement, and I greatly prefer to see them diverging from such opinions. For it is my honest belief that the safety and the interests of the country are not sufficiently safe-

  415
  guarded, and it is our duty to leave no stone unturned until they are placed in a position of security. In considering the question of proposals to be made, I thought that either these proposals might be wholly adequate to the case, or they might be partially adequate, or else they might be wholly inadequate. I have considered in which of these three classes I have to place the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. I will not go so far as to say that they are wholly inadequate, and I should be wrong if I said that I thought that they were entirely adequate; I think, therefore, that they should be placed in the middle class. As far as they go they are satisfactory; but if the country supposes that the amount of increase now proposed by Her Majesty's Government will give that security which the wealth and interest of the country require, then I think the country will be deceived. My noble Friend deprecates any premature expenditure on new types of war ships. I agree that it is certainly a matter for very great regret that from time to time, as new inventions arise, public money should be expended to a large extent on types of vessel which in a few years become obsolete and inefficient. But this is a risk which every Government of this country must run; and even if we thought that the money had been wasted—which I do not go so far as to say—even then it would be our duty to make that waste simply to keep our Navy abreast of the Navies of other nations. Having said this much on the general view of the matter, I will now proceed to make some comments on what has been said by the noble Earl. He explained at considerable length to us what the policy of the Board of Admiralty had been during the last four or five years, and stated the increase in armoured tonnage and in armour itself. But, although this is very interesting, he does not seem to touch the real point, which is not only the net increase, but what proportion that increase bears to the increase in Foreign Navies. But what is the policy of the present Board of Admiralty? I gathered from the noble Earl that one additional iron-clad should be built.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I said four.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: The noble Earl did not give any particulars.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: Though I did not give particulars, I said they would be laid down next year.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I did not understand that there are to be four additional to those which the Admiralty would, under other circumstances, build. I rather gathered that three would come in the natural programme of the year, and that the net increase is one. Including iron-clads, fast cruisers, torpedo boats, and the other additions proposed to be made, the amount of money is estimated at £3,000,000 for naval construction, £1,600,000 for armaments, and £800,000 for the coaling stations, making in all about £5,500,000. With regard to these different classes of vessels, I am not going now to involve myself in any detailed argument on the subject. My view is broadly and briefly this—that in respect to all those different classes of ships and armaments possessed by other Powers we need to be greatly superior in number. I think that the building of one additional ironclad can hardly be reckoned sufficient to meet the requirements of the case. Ten auxiliary torpedo boats would, no doubt, be of advantage as far as they go; but if you compare your torpedo boats with those of foreign nations, you will see how very much we are now in arrear as compared with France. At this moment I believe that we have no single torpedo boat of the first class, although before the end of the year we may have a certain number. France, if I am correctly informed, has 50 of the first class. Germany has ordered 70 fresh torpedo boats, at an expense of considerably more than £800,000. If you put these figures in comparison with the proposals of my noble Friend as regards torpedo boats, I conceive that even then we are very considerably in arrear. With reference to protected cruisers, I think that five of these ships is a small number in proportion to the commercial interests which they have to defend. Although, looking at the total cost now proposed to be incurred, I welcome this expenditure so far as it goes, I cannot but feel that the outlay upon the coaling stations is being cut down much helow what the limit of safety and prudence requires. The noble Earl said it was extremely difficult for a Minister to compare our naval strength with that of foreign countries; but there has been

  417
  for about 100 years a tacit understanding with France, by which the naval strength of this country should be at least double that of France. Now, I speak under correction; but I believe that what I am about to say would be accepted as a very fair statement of the case. First, as regards our ships, we are numerically somewhere about on an equality with France; but we have more ships of the old type, and fewer of the new type, than she has. In the same way our armour, taking it all round, is about the same; but the French armour is newer than ours—a very important matter. Then, as regards guns, I believe there is no doubt that our guns are very much fewer, and are also distinctly inferior to those of France, although we are endeavouring to exchange muzzle-loaders for breech-loaders. Again, our sailors are inferior in number to those of France. I have a statement of the numbers of French and English sailors at three different periods, and it is a very remarkable one. In the year 1860, England possessed 85,000 sailors, and France 34,000. In 1868, England possessed 67,000 sailors, and France 42,000. In 1883, England possessed 59,000 sailors, and France had got ahead of us, and possessed 66,000 sailors. I speak under correction. These figures may be wrong; but they have been cited publicly, and there has been no attempt, as far as I am aware, to contradict them. We have absolutely suffered a serious diminution in the number of our sailors during the time to which I have referred; while, on the other hand, Franca has largely increased hers, and is now very considerably superior to us in respect to the number of her sailors, and also of her Naval Reserve. Again, the guns of a large class which we possess may be pronounced in a certain sense obsolete. A revolution in gunnery has taken place, and it is clear that breech-loaders must supersede muzzle-loaders. We depend for the armament of our ships upon the supply from Woolwich, which is so limited that an expenditure of money upon works which would enable the production of Woolwich to be doubled would be money well laid out. Elswick, your other source of supply, is overwhelmed with foreign orders. To this must be added the fact that you are short of ammunition, short of powder and shell. Actual tor-
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  pedoes, I understand, are to be provided. But the noble Earl said nothing about one other very important point—namely, the condition of the boilers in many of our ships. Besides all this, you ought to have an adequate Reserve. Even with what has been proposed tonight, there is no provision made for securing anything like the amount of reserve in ships or in material which is absolutely essential for a time of war. A rather ominous expression fell from the noble Earl. He spoke of the great advantage that would be derived in time of war from the employment if private firms. But if you count upon those private firms in time of war, you depend absolutely upon a rotten reed; because all modern wars have been so extremely short, that it would be impossible for you to fall back upon private firms. This is all the more true when you have to deal with the scientific character of ship and arm, which you have to deal with at the present day. There is a true saying of a distinguished Frenchman that there can be no rapid improvisation of means in naval warfare. There is one other point which I think ought to be pressed, because it is essential. First of all, it is to be remembered that, if you compare yourselves with your great neighbour France, you will find that not only in the material means of war, in all conditions, so to say—geographical and commercial conditions—you are placed at a disadvantage. The seaboard of this country is at least double that of France, and the commercial interests of France are probably a quarter of ours. Our food supply comes to us principally by sea, while that of France comes to her overland; and, lastly, if you consider the military force at the disposal of France, you find for one soldier of ours that they have at least five or six. Therefore, it seems to me that, from whatever point of view you institute your comparison, you find hitherto, up to this time, we have been placed in a position of great inferiority. I fear that the proposals which Her Majesty's Government have made, though they tend, no doubt, to reduce in some degree this position, do not go far enough to do that which is essential for the real safety of the interests of this country. What, then, is really required? It seems to me, to sum it all up, that we need, first of all, a much

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  larger outlay than that which has been indicated by my noble Friend opposite. It should be a capital outlay, to be expended within a reasonably short period of time. My noble Friend opposite spoke of five years, and he spoke even of five years with a certain amount of indifference. My Lords, I hold this is wholly below the mark. Whatever changes are made now should be made as rapidly as possible, because until these changes are effected this country is not in a position to hold its own. I do not say how this money is to be raised. That is a large question, and one into which I shall not enter. Secondly, however, I wish to say that there must be, I am satisfied, a considerable annual increase for some time, even independent of that large outlay. In 1868, not so very long ago, it was calculated that the four Great Powers of Europe—France, Germany, Italy, and Russia—spent about the same amount collectively which we spent alone upon our Navy. Since that time, so great has been the advance which they have made, they are now spending very nearly £5,000,000 additional to the sum which we are spending. That is a very serious matter. I will not take upon myself to say what the precise amount is which the French Naval Estimates involve; but I have seen it stated as high as £10,350,000. If that be so, and the figure is very near our Estimate, and even though there may not be any intentional rivalry on their part, it is a state of things which I think this country will not or cannot tolerate. Again, I am convinced, for my own part, of the necessity of some very great change in what I may call the executive machinery of the Navy. Anyone who has had the opportunity of observing must know how enormous a waste there is of time, of power, of money, in the circuitous communications which go on in the interchange—the needless interchange—of opinions, and the maintenance of many arrangements which I venture to call obsolete. The other evening, when I was arguing on the question of the coaling stations, my noble Friend threw the responsibility of the figures which I impugned upon the Defence Committee. I must say one word on that point. I do not know whether most of your Lordships have heard of the Defence Committee before. It is composed, no doubt,
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  of most able and eminent officers in the Army, and it is presided over by the illustrious Duke whom I see opposite (the Duke of Cambridge). But does my noble Friend know how many times the Defence Committee, as a rule, meet in the year? Could you not number their meetings on one hand? Will my noble Friend tell me that the Report of the Commission on which I was arguing had been before the Defence Committee? I should be glad, indeed, to hear if my questions can be answered satisfactorily. In the next place, I think the shipbuilding operations in this country must be vastly accelerated. I cannot see the advantage, either as regards efficiency or as regards economy, in keeping a ship nine years on the stocks, and, when at last she is launched, finding out by some means or other that she would not work as was expected. It therefore comes to this—that hitherto the programme, say, of 1874, agreed upon by the Board of Admiralty, is carried out in 1880. It takes 10 years for that programme to be worked out, and that at a time, as my noble Friend says, when everything changes from year to year, and at a time when you require to be abreast of your neighbours. Such a policy is, no doubt, extremely cautious; it is very thrifty; but it is a policy which, in dangerous days like these, will not safeguard a great country like this. I must now say one word with regard to the Parliamentary system. For that system your Lordships are not responsible; the Government is not responsible; but, at the same time, it appears to me to be extremely difficult to keep the defence by land and sea of this country in a satisfactory condition under our present Parliamentary system. When I first knew Parliament there was, in the other House of Parliament, a great deal of sound and acute criticism in regard to naval and military matters, combined, fortunately enough, with a steady policy on the part of those who managed these affairs. Now, it seems to mo, there is neither sound criticism nor steady policy. Her Majesty's Ministers are not wholly free from blame, and Parliament itself is certainly to blame. The Board of Admiralty, I think, ought not merely to tell us what, under the Parliamentary system, they expect to obtain, and frame their calculations accordingly; but they ought to tell

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  us what is essential to the safety of the country, and then the responsibility rests with Her Majesty's Government. As it now stands, this is the state of things—that on many of those vital questions where there is an inter-departmental action, you have, perhaps, the India Office, the Colonial Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, all pulling in different directions by interchanging opinions; and at last, in final resort, the question is sent up to the Treasury, which cut and pare Estimates down, and this is a state of things which is sometimes literally absurd. There is no one single Body who possesses the knowledge of the whole subject, and which can gather up the threads of it into its own hands and assert the necessary authority to carry it out. On the other hand, parties are so engrossed with questions of an ephemeral and temporary character of far less importance that when the time arrives they can give no aid or attention to the subject; and the House of Commons, which ought to keep all those parties at their work, fails signally and utterly to do so. For these reasons, I am satisfied that nothing short of a total reconsideration of the whole system will ever place this country, both as regards naval and military matters, in a satisfactory position.
  LORD ALCESTERsaid, there were two points, both of a purely professional character, on which he desired to say a few words. First of all, with regard to the Reserve. Ever since the days of Colbert, the French Navy had been supplied with men by conscription; and unless England was prepared to adopt a maritime conscription she must always be behind France in Reserves. The noble Earl who had just spoken must be aware that now the whole of their seamen in the Royal Service were recruited from boys brought from the training ships. There were but few exceptions, perhaps not amounting to two or three men a month, who came from the Mercantile Marine. It was, therefore, to the boys alone they must trust. In 1874, when there was a change of Ministry, 3,000 boys were voted for the supply of the Navy. In 1880 that number had been cut down to 2,000 boys annually. In the meantime, the country sustained two great losses, involving the loss by drowning of 450 young seamen—the loss of the Ewrydice
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  and the Atalanta. One would have thought that fact would have induced the authorities to maintain the number of boys at the former figure, instead of cutting the number down. On the present Ministry entering Office, attempts were made to bring the number up to the original figure. They proposed, he believed, to take 350 additional boys this year beyond those asked for last year; and, being responsible to a certain extent as to the numbers, he had involved himself in a great difficulty, because without the consent of his Colleagues he had gone further on with the recruiting than, perhaps, was absolutely necessary, but solely with the view of filling up the vacancies in the number of boys. With respect to the condition of the boilers, some boilers might not be quite satisfactory, because they had been kept constantly going; but generally the condition of the boilers was satisfactory.
  LORD DUNSANYsaid, he thought the strength of the Navy wholly insufficient. The First Lord was of a different opinion; but First Lords were generally quite satisfied with the state of the Navy under their own management. They were told that everything necessary was to be done with a due regard to economy. Of course, economy was a matter not to be pooh-poohed; but this was not a matter for economy. Did the French at this moment study economy about their Navy? When all the circumstances were taken into account, Franco, indirectly, spent a great deal more than England. The French sacrificed personal liberty for one thing to the Navy. The Government had allowed the English Navy to go down very much. Even the First Lord placed their naval strength compared with that of France at 46 as against 31. That was not by any means a satisfactory proportion. The First Lord made it out that with their powerful Navy they did not require so many torpedoes; but their Colonies required torpedoes, and had not got them.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNremarked that, to adequately criticize the important statement which the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) had made, some time would be required; and he, therefore, for the present, proposed only to make a few general observations upon it. He quite agreed that Parlia-

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  mentary institutions were not very well adapted in some respects either for the administration of the Navy or for the perfecting of such matters as Colonial defence; but even in that respect very much improvement had been made. The Navy had ceased entirely to be a subject of Party discussion, and it was the desire of one and all to use every endeavour solely for its improvement. In discussing this question, let them not indulge in anything in the way of a scare or panic; but let them look at the matter exactly as it was. He was far from saying that the Navy was in a perfect condition; but whatever they might say, the English Navy was, at all events, the strongest Navy in the world. Taken in connection with crews and officers, they had many of the most splendid fighting ships, and a number of the most powerful iron-clads in the world. However much they might decry the Admiralty, that was not the feeling held abroad; and he was inclined to think that Englishmen were rather inclined to under-rate the skill of their constructors, and the qualities of their ships. Comparisons with Foreign Navies—the French, for example—were to be deprecated very much as a general rule; because out of such a comparison they could bring any result they chose, as had sometimes been done in both Houses of Parliament. Those who were inclined to detract from the English Navy would point out the weak qualities in individual ships, and would deny that those ships were to be regarded as of any value at all; whereas ships of the same class and in the same condition belonging to a Foreign Navy they would maintain were perfectly sufficient for the purpose of defence. However strong England might be in her Navy, she could not expect to be as powerful as every other country in every part of the world at the same moment. Only the other day he saw it stated that France, being at war with China, and having a strong Squadron in the Chinese Seas, had English commerce absolutely within her power. Of course, cases of that kind must arise, and England could not expect to be superior to every Maritime Power in every part of the world. But he quite admitted it was necessary to compare themselves in some degree with Foreign Powers; because it was only by a balance taken on the whole that they
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  could arrive at what their true state was. The reasons for the increase of expenditure upon their Navy at the present time went far deeper than that. Some more important reasons were the great growth of the population and of the Empire; the great increase in the imports and exports of the United Kingdom and of the Colonies, and the enormous increase in British shipping. Then there was the increase in the cost of building the ships, and the increase in the cost of the engines, which were now made of gun-metal and steel; lastly, and most important of all, the great increase in the cost of guns and fighting material. They must take into consideration that the aggregate expenditure on their Navy remained very much the same as it was 20 years ago, while a large system of retirement had come into force, and a considerable increase had taken place in the amount for pensions—an increase which he believed was amply repaid by increased efficiency of both officers and men. On that head alone there was an increase of about £1,200,000; and as the total expenditure remained the same as 20 years ago, it followed that that £1,200,000 had to be withdrawn from some other branch of the Navy. It appeared to him that, not for the present only, but for the future, they must look forward to an increase in the Navy Estimates. Another point was that the British nation, much to its honour, insisted upon a perpetual crusade against slavery in all parts of the world. If that crusade was to go on it must be paid for; but the ships that were used for that purpose might be so made as to be serviceable for war. From the statement of his noble Friend he rather gathered that an inquiry of some sort would take place, and, indeed, he hoped it would; for he thought that if it should appear from the inquiry of impartial men that an increased expenditure was necessary, such a statement would come with more force before the country than if it were based merely upon the opinion of the Admiralty. He was very glad to hear his noble Friend intended to adhere to a steady policy, as he was sure that was the key to the whole position, and many of the defects in the Navy were to be traced to the want of it. He hoped the noble Earl would insist on completing his pro-

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  gramme of shipbuilding and repairs every year; and that when he had laid down the ships he had told them of he would press them forward to completion as soon as possible. He did not agree that it was desirable that the country should be building a very large number of iron-clads, though he admitted that England ought to be represented on every station by a large iron-clad. But he very much questioned whether it was for the true interest of the country that the Fleet should consist to a large extent of very big armoured vessels—for it seemed unlikely that those great vessels would meet in line-of-battle in the naval engagements of the future. The types he would like to see largely increased were the protected cruisers and torpedo boats, for he was certain that it was those classes of vessels of which England was chiefly in want, and it was in those classes of vessels that foreign countries had relatively at the present time a considerable superiority. In regard to the question of the supply of guns, he feared there might be some difficulty. He very much questioned whether during the next five years they would be able to provide the ships that were to be built with the necessary complement of guns. That question ought to be considered at once. It seemed to him more than doubtful whether the establishment at Woolwich ought not to be very considerably increased. If a sudden demand were to arise, or if a war were to break out unexpectedly, Woolwich would be found quite inadequate to the necessities of the case; and he did not know where else they would be able to turn for the armaments that would be absolutely necessary.
  THE EARL OF CLANWILLIAMbelieved that the country would be very glad to give the money necessary to put the Navy in a strong and efficient state. He argued that the Channel Fleet was very much too small; when its composition was considered it would be found totally incapable of blockading a port of the enemy. The Flagship—the Minotaur—wanted new boilers. Would the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) say what could take her place—whether the Black Prince was ready, although she was only a second-class iron-clad, and besides her there was only one other iron-clad available at all—the Iron Duke
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  —which was also a second-class obsolete type? The proposals of the First Lord of the Admiralty were not sufficiently large to meet the wants of the country. They ought to have more 43-ton guns, and steps ought to be taken to enable the manufactory at Woolwich to produce guns with much greater rapidity. The Navy ought to have the control of the manufacture of their own guns, or be able to obtain them from the private trade; at present Woolwich was quite unable to supply the wants of the Navy. The Navy not only lacked sufficient guns, but was also sadly in want of powder; two small quantities from Germany of about 1,800 lbs. were obtained last year and used in experiments. They were, as yet, unable to make the powder themselves, and had none in store. He would like to know from the noble Earl, if he had ever asked his Naval Advisers what was actually wanted? Would he send a Minute to the three Naval Lords and the Controller, to put down on paper what they required; not what they expected they might get for the asking, but what they considered was actually required for the Service to put the Navy into a state of efficiency? He also trusted that the noble Earl would hasten the construction of the ships that were to be built, in order that they might be ready in the coming year.
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHobserved, that the views of the First Lord of the Admiralty in regard to the efficiency of the Navy as compared with the Navies of other countries differed much from the views of other eminent authorities. The naval programme of Sir Edward Reed, as announced at a recent meeting of the United Service Institution, was thought insufficient by many critics well qualified to express an opinion, and yet his programme was much more extensive than that of the noble Earl opposite. His noble Friend had not thoroughly explained two points. If their Lordships would turn to the Report of the Committee over which his noble Friend (the Earl of Ravensworth) presided, they would see that when Mr. Barnaby was asked why the ships were so long in building, he said the reason was that the vessels had to depend on the Army not only for the guns, but actually for their construction. They had to spin out the building of the vessels for eight or nine years, because they could not

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  get the guns required; and therefore the construction had to be proceeded with deliberately, and repeated alterations were made necessary. After what had fallen from his noble Friend (the Earl of Clanwilliam), he hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would take into account the vast importance of allowing the Navy to superintend the construction of its own carriages and ordnance, as was done in other Services. As to what had been said about the scanty number of their ships on foreign stations, it should be remembered that they could not compare the present with the former state of things. There were points springing up all over the world where the ships of foreign nations were to be seen, but where they were never seen before. There was Germany, for example, which was sending her ships to the coast of Africa, and such was our ignorance that we did not know what a very important Power was doing in the Pacific. Some time ago, if a war had broken out with this country, that Power was prepared to swoop down upon the Australasian Colonies. These Colonies, which possessed a large amount of wealth and great stores of coal, had provided a Navy at their own cost. That Navy was not recognized by us, nor had the smallest step been taken by us to put it upon an efficient footing. He had had some correspondence on this subject with the Naval Authorities, and last year he asked the noble Earl a Question about it, and suggested that it was most important that he should put himself in communication with the Government of the Australian Colonies, with a view to utilizing their Navy and rendering it efficient. The following were the vessels of war possessed by, or being prepared for, the Australian Colonies:—Victoria.—Cerberus, turret armoured ship, four 18-ton M.L.K. guns, used for harbour defence only; Nelson, receiving ship, old two-decker. (This vessel was not accounted as available in case of war for even port defence). Victoria, gunboat, one 8-inch 12-ton gun, one 6-inch 4-ton gun; Albert, gunboat, one 8-inch 12-ton gun, one 6-inch 4-ton gun; Childers, first-class torpedo boat; two second-class torpedo boats. The guns for six hopper barges (one 6-inch 4-ton gun for each) were about to be sent out to Melbourne, and by next year those barges would be
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  available for port defence. They were well built and well sub-divided. New South Wales.—The sloop Wolverine, proposed to be armed with two medium guns. This vessel was used by the Naval Volunteers. It formerly belonged to Her Majesty's Navy, and was presented to the Colony by Her Majesty's Government. The New South Wales Government had under consideration the purchasing of two fast gunboats and two torpedo boats and steam launches for the defence of Port Jackson and Newcastle. South Australia.—The cruiser Protector, 700 tons, armament one 8-inch 12-ton gun, and five 6-inch 4-ton guns. No torpedo boats yet obtained. Queensland.—Now at Brisbane, sloop Mavis, believed to have two 6-pounder guns. En route to Brisbane the gunboat Patuma, one 8-inch 12-ton and one 6-inch 4-ton guns, to be used as a surveying vessel; expenses shared by Colonies and by Her Majesty's Government. Also about to leave the Tyne for the Colony, the Gayundah, sister ship to above, and armed in the same way. Now in the Colony, the second-class torpedo boat Wasp. No Whiteheads yet supplied for it. Tasmania.—It was believed that no armed vessel yet belonged to this Government. There was in Hobart a second-class torpedo vessel; but it was without Whiteheads or a machine gun, and depended for power of attack on its spar torpedo. New Zealand.—Four torpedo boats (second class), built in 1883 by Thornycroft. No torpedoes yet supplied. One of the boats armed with a (1-inch two barrels) Nordenfelt gun. These Colonies had a fighting force of 400,000 men, and looked to this country for training them. Could not the noble Earl devise some plan by which the many gallant officers now unemployed might get employment in that way? One point more, and that was as to the utter uselessness of the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty. Within the last few years one post-captain and two or three clerks were appointed, whose duty it was to get intelligence as to Foreign Navies. Considering the importance that Department had now assumed in the Military Service, he ventured to ask the noble Earl whether something could not be done to increase its efficiency in the Navy?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK,in reply to the noble Viscount (Viscount

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  Sidmouth), said, he had no intention to imply that the expenditure of the £3,100,000 upon new ships would be dependent upon the Committee upon our Naval and Military Defences which was to be appointed in the other House. The intention of the Admiralty was to enter into contracts as soon as they could—he hoped before that Committee could commence its labours. He did not intend to reply to any remarks made by Sir Edward Reed. Sir Edward Reed was a Member of the other House, and his observations would be better discussed there. The impression of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) as to the guns was not a correct one. They had larger breech-loading guns than he supposed—43-ton guns—of which as many, he believed, as 11 had been delivered. He wished to say very distinctly, in order to remove any impression to the contrary, that the ships at this time being constructed were not waiting for guns; and they had every reason to believe that none of the ships now being built would have to wait for them. As respected the 43-ton gun, the delay had not been caused by the constructors at Woolwich, but by a difficulty in the particular working of a small part of the hydraulic machinery; but he hoped it would very soon be set right. Ho did not agree that the delay as to the guns had arisen from not going to Mr. Whit-worth or some other manufacturer, though he should be glad to go to them if necessary. The real reason for the delay was that the orders for the new guns were given rather too late. He was not surprised at that, for in the attack on the forts of Alexandria the old muzzle-loading guns were used without any serious accident. He would be glad to find any system producing the same results. But the change to breech-loading guns had become a necessity, and the mistake had been that it was not set about soon enough. In the last four years they had been doing work which ought to have been done some years before. They were now getting right; but everyone who knew the subject would agree that this delay had occurred. With regard to the question whether any arrangement had been made for increasing the plant for the manufacture of the new guns at Woolwich, a sum of £100,000 was to be set apart for that purpose. It was
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  not intended, however, to set up the manufacture of steel there. His noble Friend the Secretary of State for War had thought it better to go to the trade, and to encourage the great manufacturers of steel. With regard to the length of time that this programme was to take, it had been objected that five years was a very long time. But one of the principal merits of this programme was that, by the very facts of the case, if they wont to contract these ships would be finished as soon as they could be; because in that case there were no delays. Once they had entered upon a contract they must go on, and the smaller class of ships would take less than five years. With regard to torpedo ships of the scout class, speaking generally, they would be built by contract, and therefore would be completed rapidly. The case of the Agamemnon had been referred to, which had taken 10 years to build. That was one of the particular cases which had induced the present Board of Admiralty to alter the system they had found of proceeding so slowly with the construction of ships. It certainly was a great pity that ships should have been so long in building; and he agreed with his noble Friend behind him (the Earl of Camperdown) as to the importance of taking a Vote sufficient to allow of steady progress being made with iron-clads when once laid down. It had been said that the five cruisers proposed were not enough; but it must be recollected that they were in addition to the other ships of the same class which they had been building during the last four years, and that it was proposed to build 10 other cruisers which, though smaller, would be effective and valuable ships for the protection of commerce. He hoped that their Lordships would not run away with the impression that these five cruisers were all that we had for the protection of commerce. Those cruisers were much more powerful than those of the same class belonging to any other nation. A complaint had been made that they were only building one more iron-clad. He must have failed in making his explanation of the policy of the Admiralty clear if he had not shown that their policy was to increase the building of ironclads. He had also shown how this had been done; and he would have condemned his own policy if he had thought

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  it necessary largely to increase the building of armour-clad ships. With respect to other classes of ships, the progress of events and the improvements which had taken place justified the spending of more on those other classes of ships which he did not think the country would have agreed to spend in a large programme of iron-clads. Then the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had suggested that the Defence Committee might be got rid of, apparently because it had not altogether agreed with the recommendation of the Commission over which the noble Earl had himself presided. In his own opinion, the Defence Committee was a most valuable Body.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that he had not complained of the recommendations of his Commission being overborne by the Defence Committee, which consisted of most eminent men. His question was, whether the Defence Committee had ever had the Report of the Commission over which he had presided before them?
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, that the noble Earl had suggested that the Defence Committee should be improved off the face of the earth. Although the Defence Committee met very seldom, yet it was composed of the very men to whom a question such as the present one of fortification could be most properly referred. With regard to the defence of the coaling stations, a very important work could be done at a comparatively small cost. At Alexandria the forts which had been heavily protected with masonry had been those which had suffered most; and the most powerful battery which their Fleet had had to attack on that occasion was the Mex Fort, which consisted of three or four guns, which could hardly be distinguished from the foreshore, and which were simply mounted upon earthworks. He believed that the present view of many most distinguished engineers was that more could be gained by placing guns without elaborate fortifications in positions where they could command the channels by which harbours were approached, than by the construction of batteries in the ordinary sense of the word. The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth) had spoken, as he understood him, of complaints from some of the Australian Colonies that they had not received encouragement
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  from the Admiralty in respect to the ships which those Colonies had so patriotically provided for their own defence. He could assure the noble Viscount that, if any such representations had been made to him, they had not the slightest foundation. The Admiralty, had constantly, to the best of their ability, given every possible assistance to the Colonies in regard to their naval defence, and especially in regard to the provision of officers belonging to Her Majesty's Navy to be employed in connection with those ships. At that moment some of the best young officers in the Service were so employed. Therefore, he could not understand how such a misapprehension as appeared to exist on that subject could have arisen. If the noble Viscount had anything to communicate to the Admiralty which could in any way assist them in furthering the efforts made by the Australian Colonies in respect of their defences—efforts which must be of great advantage to the Empire—there was no man who would receive it with more cordiality than he should do.
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHsaid, that he wished to observe that the vessels which those Colonies had provided required trained officers; and unless they had some they could not be of the great service they otherwise would be—they had the raw material, but not the trained officers.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKrepeated that the noble Viscount must be under a misapprehension as to the action of the Admiralty on that point. With respect to an observation that fell from the noble and gallant Admiral (the Earl of Clanwilliam) with respect to the powder for the 110-ton guns, he had to state that the noble Earl was correctly informed that the best powder for this class of gun was some German powder; and that it was not till recently that the War Office had been able to purchase the right of manufacturing it.
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, One o'clock.