HL Deb 04 April 1884 vol 286 cc1629-41
LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL

, in rising, according to Notice, to call attention to the effect produced by the visit of the First Minister to Copenhagen; and to move for diplomatic correspondence on the alleged reunion of Austria, Germany, and Russia, said: My Lords, as a noble Earl and a noble Baron have already drawn the attention of the House to foreign polity, I may be allowed, perhaps, to bring forward a Notice in the same sphere, although I would not do so at this hour, unless your Lordships were on the verge of separation for a period, while there is no further Business coming on this evening. The Notice does not refer merely to the visit of the First Minister to Copenhagen, or the impression it produced, but also to an occurrence of considerable magnitude in Europe which seems to have a place among its consequences. It demands further infor- mation on the alleged reunion of Austria, Germany, and Russia. Unless the inspired Press of Berlin and St. Petersburg, together with a Royal Speech at one, mislead the world—there is no reason they should do so—that reunion has been formed, although it may not have reached the shape of any new convention. Before it gains maturity of that kind is the fittest season to consider it. It cannot be forgotten that the system only closed in 1879, by the remarkable decision of Prince Bismarck at Vienna. Well might the Foreign Office have exulted at that moment. But the revival of the system was inevitable, unless Germany and Austria were assiduously encouraged in their new direction by Great Britain. It always tends to reappear, because it is supported by a Treaty still on record; be-cause habit, which, according to the late Duke of Wellington, is far more powerful than nature, governs States as well as individuals; and because the skilful, subtle, nearly irresistible diplomacy of Russia often toils to re-establish it. But Germany and Austria have been assiduously discouraged in the path they had resolved on; first, by the startling appointment of Mr. Gladstone as First Minister, when he had ceased for years to be the Leader of a Party; then, by the course which policy has taken under his dictation; and, last of all, by his appearance at Copenhagen, which, although it must engage the faithful advocacy of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), has not on that account been less a disturbing influence in Europe.

My Lords, the noble Earl is bound by every expedient to defend it. If he is well aware that, after the impression which has followed it, it cannot be seriously vindicated, he is bound by a well-acted levity to gloss it over. Unless I am mistaken, it is laid down in the very book of rhetoric or logic to which the noble Earl referred on one occasion, by the celebrated Hamilton, that you are always to oppose the grave by the ridiculous. The noble Earl is under a stringent obligation to uphold his Colleague, and to follow his Preceptor. Notwithstanding that, on the 1st of March, he admitted everything which I was anxious to elicit. He admitted that the First Minister had met the Emperor of Russia; he admitted that there were no instructions of any kind whatever from the Foreign Office. If the First Minister had never met the Emperor of Russia, the subject would have dropped; if he had received instructions from the Foreign Office, his case would have been sheltered. To say that a First Minister can never act in our day as a negotiator would be extravagant, when it is only a few years since, in that character, Lord Beaconsfield obtained his strongest title to the admiration of posterity. A First Minister may act as a negotiator; but is not at liberty, when without a mission of any kind, to diffuse a false impression as to the alliances and objects of the country. This is the precise charge to which the First Minister is open, and this charge the noble Earl entirely misconceived in his laudable impatience to defend the Foreign Office. Unintentionally, if you like, thoughtlessly it may be, without the least design, one readily admits it, the First Minister gave further currency to the already prevalent opinion that Russia and Great Britain aimed at partnership in Europe. That this effect has been produced I shall be able to establish. It needs some references: but as, on principle, I hardly ever read an extract to the House, when it is essential to maintain a proposition, perhaps they may forgive it.

The New Free Press of Vienna spoke of the trip as "a demonstration of political importance." According to the Correspondent of The Times in Vienna, the journals of that capital designated the interview of Mr. Gladstone with the Czar "as a move against the policy of Prince Bismarck, and as a confederacy of England with Russia and France." I will add no more as to Vienna. The House will recollect to what extent the irregular return of Mr. Gladstone as First Minister was been in public correspondence of 1880 to estrange the Austrian Empire. They will ask themselves, was it desirable still further to embitter it? If anyone has had occasion to be recently in Austria, he must know that there—wisely or unwisely—antagonism to Russia was never more decided than during the last autumn, and that the proceedings at Copenhagen could not but have been obnoxious both at Vienna and at Buda-Pesth. Let us see the kind of influence the stop created over Russia.

According to The Journalde St. PetersbourgThe Congress of Princes and statesmen assembled round King Christian, to which the First Minister attached himself, represented hundreds of millions of people, and might sooner or later revenge Denmark upon Germany. The Journal de St. Petersbourg is an official paper. It considers the assemblage as a Congress, and the First Minister as having joined it. The Nord, well known as a Russian organ in the West of Europe, contended— That even if the voyage of Mr. Gladstone was undertaken without any political design, the visit of the Emperor of Russia to a statesman who plays so considerable a part in the government of England cannot be a matter of indifference. The noble Earl the Secretary of State is probably the only person to whom it ever did appear one. The Novoye Vermya said that— Coming as it did after the recent journeys and interviews of Monarchs, the visit of Mr. Gladstone to Denmark pointed to a possible alliance of England and Russia. Can it be doubted that all over Russia such an alliance was considered as proclaimed with greater emphasis than hitherto it had been?

As to Constantinople, the Correspondent of The Times informed us that— The interview of Mr. Gladstone with the Czar had created a marked impression, and was regarded as a most significant proceeding. However, I admit that, in Constantinople, the effect was less important, because there, already, the First Minister, on grounds well known to the House, was viewed in such a manner, that no new sentiment of hatred or repugnance could have well arisen.

In Paris, The Temps, far the most enlightened organ of that capital in everything international, augured from the proceeding the growth of an alliance between England, France, and Russia. I have now only to advert to comments at Berlin, or in the German Empire.

The Kreuz Zeitung observed that— The event appears to strengthen the views of those who consider the stay of the Czar at Copenhagen as a counter-demonstration to the meetings of Princes in Berlin and Vienna. And concludes that— Mr. Gladstone probably considers the time favourable for making a bargain with Russia giving her freer action, in order to obtain freer action for himself. Was it desirable to scatter this impression over German? The Post says— Mr. Gladstone is the imitator of the most energetic statesman of our times; because, like him, he goes in person where he wishes to apply the lever. It was not doubted that the lever formed a part of his equipment. The Berlin Tageblatt remarked that— The political importance of the Copenhagen visit of the Russophile British Premier seems to have been detected much earlier in Berlin than Vienna. However that may be, its effect in Berlin was not a rapidly-subsiding one. Having been there in November, I assert, with confidence, that, in political society, it continued to enhance resentment which had long indeed existed. Of course, I cannot give any authority. The noble Earl the Secretary of State may contradict me if he likes it. The House will judge between us. But the safest method of arriving at a correct opinion on the effect produced is to glance at the transaction in the light which subsequent events appear to throw upon it.

The incidents which followed are well known to your Lordships. They consist in the strenuous activity of M. de Giers at Berlin and Vienna; the advance of Russia upon Merv, which has been so ably discussed a few weeks back; and the revival of what is often termed the Holy Alliance, according to the information we possess, according to the estimate which every diplomatist would form of what is probable, when Austria and Germany have reason to believe that the British Government has formed, or rather strengthened and screwed up, a previously-existing resolution to abandon them.

There is no doubt of the effect being bad; but is the First Minister responsible for the bad effect which was created? He is responsible; because, although he may not have known the Emperor of Russia to be at Copenhagen—when all the world could tell him—although he may have been forced to meet the Emperor of Russia on arriving—he was not compelled to make the speech which could not but resound—I as have shown the House it did—in many places. He is responsible; because, through the medium of the noble Earl, the Foreign Office thoroughly repudiate him. The occurrence must be also viewed in connection with the antecedents which belong to it. If, soon after the Crimean War, Lord Palmerston had met the Czar in the same manner, he might have been unblamed, and possibly applauded. Europe would not have been misled by the proceeding. It would have been viewed, not as the concert of allies, but the decorum of opponents. What was the position of the right hon. Gentleman? Out of Office, he had been the flatterer—although, no doubt, the conscientious, the unbought, and the disinterested flatterer—of Russia. He had laboured to identify pro-Russian zeal with Liberal opinion. He had done his utmost to detach the party which he used to lead from their traditionary ground and their traditionary sentiment as to Russia. He had been a powerful incentive of the war in 1877. Bursting into power by a method previously unknown, he had advanced men who did their utmost to bring the Russian armies to Constantinople. He had withdrawn Sir Henry Layard from that capital. He had gratuitously toiled for Montenegro. In every shape he had denounced the Ottoman Empire, and made himself obnoxious to the Sultan. In him, the outward show of deference to Russia was regarded not as a form, but a reality; not as an exception, but a climax. He did, what he was bound over to avoid, by special dictates of propriety and prudence. When columns, which have long been marching and manœuvring in one direction, unite at last, the effect is not the same as when armies recently opposed, during a passing truce, exchange the courtesies of warfare. What is the defence? That it was merely inadvertency, or ignorance, or heedlessness which guided him. The defence sums up the accusation in a more emphatic form than it could otherwise assume.

Your Lordships may observe a rather curious gradation among important personages at this moment. M. de Giers, impelled by thought and swayed by calculation, superior to rest and eager for activity, is moving indefatigably to advance the interests of Russia. He never reaches congresses by accident, and is not blown to harbours it is a duty to avoid. The noble Earl remains at home, which is not culpable on his part, since, not having one ally in his character of Foreign Secretary, as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports he is bound to guard the coast from every possible invader. The First Minister embarks on voyages—as his friends assure us—without political design or geographical direction, by which every capital is alienated it was most important to conciliate, and every scheme advanced it was most essential to retard and to discourage.

I quit that subject, and wish only to reply, if it is possible, to those who ask, Why should the union of Austria, Prussia, and Russia be sedulously deprecated, when the Sovereigns who guide them are so entirely irreproachable? By looking back we gain the admonition which is needed. Long before the name of the Holy Alliance was invented the union of those Powers was directed against a reformed, reconstituted Poland, which had just deserved the homage of surrounding countries, as Mr. Burke and others thought, by hitting on the path of order and improvement which France, in 1780, was seen to be incapable of finding. For a long period this action was forgotten in the vicissitudes and struggles which had the First Napoleon for their centre. But the same union was found, in 1815, to thwart the most enlightened aspirations in the Congress of Vienna, to oppose the British Representative in all his best designs, to annex Genoa and Norway, without consideration of their wishes; to seal the fate of Poland more profoundly, and on the plea of guarding against the danger which had passed; to leave the world defenceless against the new one which succeeded. Equipped with its well-known title in September, 1815, in the name of the Trinity it struggled many years against the birth of freedom, however moderate and guarded, in Italy, in Spain, and South America. Although reduced by Mr. Canning, and counteracted by Lord Palmerston, it still accumulated in the world the revolutionary spirit which broke out in 1848, and nearly devastated Europe. After a long interval, the war of Franco and Germany in 1870 scorns to have recalled it. In its last phase it brought about the drama, with the surprising turns of which this House was occupied too frequently; the drama which, after a long series of Commercial Treaties, Herzegovinian insurrections, Servian wars, Bulgarian disturbances—all well adapted to the simple—at length revealed its purpose when the Ottoman Assemblies were overthrown at San Stefano.

But, even if the past career of such an union were less sinister than it is, it would be easy to observe the British objects which it tends to frustrate at this moment. However, I will pass them over altogether, as some may deem them unimportant, some even pernicious; and it is difficult to fix a general consent on any line of active policy submitted. But something else ought not to be passed over. It is a reference to the immediate, urgent dangers to be traced to the reunion which presents itself. Let me refer to what was lately heard on Central Asia. Whatever eloquence or wit is brought to bear upon the question of Herat and Merv, whatever adjectives are coined to throw a doubt on their importance, whatever animated conflicts between the shadows of departed Viceroys, meeting in the Elysian fields of Parliament, may grow out of this subject, a few distinct conclusions are inevitable. Herat is the gate of India. Lord Lawrence and Sir Henry Rawlinson, belonging to rival schools, have equally affirmed it. Merv, occupied by Russia, does make Herat much more accessible than formerly. It is a military problem. It has been decided by General Valentino Baker, whoso credit is so high, and by Sir Charles M'Gregor, a Quartermaster General in the Indian Service. Herat has now become the nearest stage of Russian progress unarrived at. Is it not certain that Russia is more likely to approach it when Germany and Austria have ceased to be a counteracting influence than when they are remaining one?

Constantinople is always difficult to shelter. The First Napoleon, it is related by O'Meara in the Voice from St. Helena, deemed it almost impossible for Europe to maintain it against Russia, although he thought the effort both desirable and necessary. When Germany and Austria are we n over to the Russian scale, nothing remains except the Western Powers and the Ottoman Empire. If the Western Powers are disunited or disabled, the Ottoman Empire is alone, with Greece on one flank, Russia on the other; while there are three routes to guard—that of the Pruth, that of the Black Sea, and that of Asia Minor. Can it be doubted that the new Alliance adds to the perennial solicitude of which. Constantinople is the object?

But now the care of Parliament devotes itself exclusively to Egypt. We have seen to-day the agitation which it causes. I have not joined in the tide of general attack to which the Government have been exposed. It seemed to me that they were fully justified in their resistance to Arabi. I recognize the military lustre which the campaign against him added to our history. The Government may well defend themselves against those who aim at a Protectorate, and still more easily against those who urge a premature removal of the garrison. But still the situation is a fearful one. General Gordon has apparently been sent for no end except to register the triumphs of the Mahdi. His action is inappreciable; his fate is constantly precarious; his schemes are not adopted by the Government. Admitting that they have well secured the littoral of the Red Sea, the Government have no decided hold on Alexandria and Cairo. The Sultan does not join or approve the occupation. France looks on it with jealousy. It is not based upon a man-date. If the new Alliance, backed by the Ottoman Empire, or speaking in its name, of which they know how to avail themselves, dictated our withdrawal, in what manner would the Government be ready to encounter the dictation? It would be quite in accord with the principle which Russia formerly avowed—that whatever Great Britain gained upon the Nile, she was to have as much upon the Bosphorus.

But there is something yet more serious to be remembered by your Lordships. The right hon. Gentleman the First Minister and the noble Earl the Secretary of State are so placed that they can hardly grapple with the new alliance by either of the methods which in former times have been resorted to against it. Mr. Canning, in the period between 1822 and 1827, was able to divide it. The memorials his Private Secretary has collected throw a searching light upon his policy. No doubt, arguments might be employed for detaching Germany from Russia. Before now they have been methodized or given. Unless such considerations could be urged, or could suggest themselves, the event of 1879 would never have arisen. Such reasons may be found; but it is not open to the Government to use them. They are not able to warn Germany against a concert of which they have themselves been guilty in a measure so extravagant. Rebuke, recrimination without limit, might, although we cannot say it would, be heaped upon them. The name of Mr. Gladstone might, although we cannot say it would, be conjured to repel, and that of Copenhagen to overwhelm them with confusion. The other method of resisting the three Powers was the method of Lord Palmerston. His Correspondence thoroughly elucidates it. We know, from his own words, that he framed his Quadruple Alliance of France, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, not only to compose the wars which raged in the Iberian Peninsula, but also to balance, in some degree, the united force of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. How can the Government aspire to an equivalent of such a Quadruple Alliance when France is hopelessly estranged, or would exact the condominium in Egypt they have just removed, as the least and first condition of her friendship?

My Lords, the conclusion is—and it would be idle to detain the House without adverting to it—that foreign policy requires, both in the First Minister and the Secretary of State, a different agency from that which governs it at present. The agency which, in 1870 and the years which followed, was inadequate to avert a dangerous war, to resist an arrogant pretension, to close a standing controversy with advantage, has now become still more inadequate to neutralize the special difficulty which its weakness as created. It is not by such an agency that you can bring before the world, even reduced and shaded into diplomatic phrase, the language which it calls for.

To resume the circumstances I have urged upon your Lordships. The visit to Copenhagen, although free from all political design, although ingenuous in spirit, amiable in purpose, was construed as a more emphatic mode of proclaiming the close relation between Russia and Great Britain. It has been followed by a singular, but natural development of consequences. A further stage is reached in Central Asia. Egypt is more serious than over. The Holy Alliance re-asserts itself. The First Minister and the Secretary of State are so placed that, with their best exertions, they cannot possibly withstand or counterbalance it. The revival of British influence at Berlin, at Vienna, at Constantinople, is the specific to be aimed at. To that revival they are both insuperable obstacles.

Does the Liberal majority require them? In a. former generation the Liberal majority outlived even the services of the late Earl Grey and of Lord Althorp. It went on for years under a new, although it could not be under a superior direction. The Liberal majority is not, in any manner, the foundation on which the right hon. Gentleman and noble Earl are standing at this moment. Who made the right hon. Gentleman First Minister? The noble Earl, because his diffidence would not allow him to become one when he was the formally accepted Leader of the Party which had triumphed at the General Election. Who made the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary? The First Minister. It was the only voice in the United Kingdom which selected him. Externally, at least, the country is imperilled and degraded by two statesmen, each of whom depends exclusively upon the appointment of the other. The House of Commons, having frequently rebuked it, it would be well for such a combination to exhaust itself, before it yields to civil war, or to incendiary violence; the civil war which the First Minister foreshadowed; the incendiary violence he is not able to suppress.

I have but a word to add upon the Motion. If, indeed, the noble- Earl the Secretary of State declares, in stereotyped phrase, that he has no official knowledge on the subject, it is easy to believe him. The age is led to think that many things exist, and many are preparing, which official knowledge does not grasp within its circle. The official knowledge of the noble Earl instructed him, in 1870, to count on the tranquillity of Europe. It may instruct him now to hold that Germany and Austria have not resumed their old connection with the Northern Power, in spite of the elaborate contrivances and improvised adventures by which he and the First Minister have lured them back to such a system. But this House would not perform its duty to the world, unless, before adjourning, it took the only method open to bring more light to bear upon an ominous—although far from an astonishing—appearance, which lends a graver hue to the embarrassed prospects of the country. The noble Lord concluded by making the Motion of which he had given Notice. Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copy of the diplomatic correspondence on the alleged re-union of Austria, Germany, and Russia."—(The Lord Stratheden and Campell.)

LORD DENMAN

said, he had been nearly 30 years a Member of their Lordships' House, and on three several occasions had spoken respectfully of Prussia, of Austria, and of Russia, for which he referred to his speeches. He would suggest that it would have been better if the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would postpone his answer until the noble Lord (Lord Tennyson) was present in the House. That noble Lord, having been present at the conversations which were stated to have taken place between the Prime Minister and the Emperor of Russia, would have been able to toll their Lordships what exactly occurred, in case previous assurances were doubted.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, a distinguished writer once said that that part of his head was very small which was intended to receive things that were not clear. Now, though am not a distinguished writer, I am afraid my head has the same deficiency. I have been really quite unable to take in the drift of the noble Lord's speech, which he said he had condensed—although he had much more to say—into minutes. My Lords, the noble Lord has quoted extracts from a great many European papers. I think it was Mr. Luttrell who once said that it was hotter that a man should commit murder in May than steal mutton in the Autumn; and, in the same way, in the dead season, I am not surprised that, it having been announced that Mr. Gladstone had gone on a diplomatic negotiation to the Emperor of Russia, the whole Press of Europe and of this country should take it up and speculate upon it. The other day, in answer to a Question put by the noble Lord, I stated in the most explicit manner that which was very well known a fortnight after the visit had taken place—that Mr. Gladstone had no political object whatever in going to Copenhagen; that he had no sort of mission for Her Majesty's Government on the subject; and that, being there, there was not any direct or indirect communication between Mr. Gladstone and the Russian Emperor. That the noble Lord should refer again to that visit, and those other fearful transactions to which he has referred, after what I then said, appears to me perfectly unintelligible. I should be very glad to give these despatches, for I have received confidential despatches on the subject; but I am sure it would be bad to create a precedent for producing confidential despatches on Continental transactions to which we are not parties. It is quite clear that if I did so it would entirely shut up the sources of information open to Ministers at different Courts. I therefore cannot accede to the Motion of the noble Lord.

LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL

I need detain the House but for a moment. As to any personal reflection which has fallen from the noble Earl, it is easy to forgive while he is the compulsory organ of the First Minister, who is not here this evening to defend himself. The noble Earl has not contested a single proposition have offered to your Lordships. Abandoning the First Minister where he is a subject of remark, where no charge is made he goes on pertinaciously excusing him. As to Correspondence, the noble Earl may be entitled to withhold that which the three Powers have had amongst each other. That he has none to offer of his own, the line of observation I pursued would force me to anticipate. On the other hand, the House and country will remark that the union of the three Powers is now much clearer than before, the noble Earl having said nothing to throw a doubt upon, or question its existence.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.