VISCOUNT ST. VINCENT, in rising to inquire, Whether Her Majesty's Government propose to retain our representative in the Transvaal; and, if so, whether they intend to modify or cancel any or all of the provisions of the Convention of 1881? said, that in view of the apparent intention of the Government to abandon the Natives', both within and without the boundary of the Transvaal, to their own devices—and of allowing the Boers to work out the policy of revenge that they appeared to have inaugurated since the signing of the Convention of 1881—he would ask whether the more honourable course for the Government to pursue, short of declaring their fixed determination to abide by the spirit, if not the letter, of this Convention, would not be to withdraw our Representative from the Transvaal, and to cancel a Convention the terms of which they appeared to be either unable or unwilling to carry out. Without wishing to revive any old contentions on this question, it seemed but just to observe that the possible consequences of a war with these Boers had not been previously sufficiently considered by the Government before they undertook that war; that the information received by them prior to the commencement of that war had been of a distinctly misleading character; and that, after the deplorable series of reverses suffered by our troops at Brunker's Spruit, Lang's Nek, the Ingogo River, and the Majuba Mountain, it became a question of our future operations having 1286 to be conducted, not only against the Transvaal Boers themselves, but also against the Boers of the Orange Free State, and possibly against a rising of the whole Dutch population of South Africa. Under these circumstances, in view of such a contingency, what wonder that our Government should be anxious to come to terms with these Dutch farmers at almost any sacrifice short of the entire sacrifice of national honour and tradition? Moreover, in order to lead the English people to believe in their philanthropic and disinterested motives in so doing, it became necessary that a Convention of some sort should be entered into, to grace our retirement from the country, and to smooth the ruffled feelings of the English nation. But was it by the Government for one moment believed, any more than it was by any single Colonist of any standing in Natal at the time, that the Boers would abide by one single Article of that Convention, if at any time it became their interest, as it most undoubtedly would become their interest, not to do so? Were they aware that the Boers themselves—and he had an opportunity of talking to a number of them soon after and before the signing of this Convention—openly and avowedly declared their disbelief in its terms being carried out, and, further, their intention of not abiding by them? These Dutch farmers knew, if the English people did not, the futility of any terms in such circumstances. They, moreover, knew that the English Government would scarcely be prepared to make any fresh sacrifices to retain a merely nominal authority in a country, the inhabitants of which were avowedly hostile to their rule. It did not matter to the Boers themselves that in following their traditional policy with regard to the Natives, both within and without their own boundary, they would ruin all that had hitherto been done in the interests of civilization in those parts. It did not matter to the Boers themselves that in that land-greed and love of annexation which appeared to be a part of the Boer nature they would trample under foot the interests of those Native races that might stand in their way towards the attainment of that object. Such being the case, the question must naturally arise, how did all this affect the English nation? Were we to pose 1287 as the champions of civilization in a country which would repudiate our Suzerainty, and owned to little or no controlling influence of ours? As to Suzerainty on these terms and in such circumstances, the country wanted none of it. The Colonists of Natal, the Boors of the Transvaal, even the Natives themselves, had learnt to say that they, too, wanted none of it. Whatever our future policy with regard to this country was to be, let it be no longer one of procrastination, hesitation, and delay; and, if needs be, let us accept the situation we had created, retiring whence we came, learning, from experience gathered in the past, lessons which might serve as a guide to our actions in the future. Or if it were decided in any way to control the actions of those outside our own boundary, then let them be taught to know clearly and intelligibly what they had to expect, and how far we meant to go in the protection of civilization and Native interests in that portion of the globe. We should thus, he ventured to predict, avoid those harassing complications which seemed so persistently to follow us in our dealings with these South African questions.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I am not quite sure that I fully understand the argument of the noble Viscount. This is my fault, however, and not his, as I was unable to hear all he said. But I understand his contention is this—that the Convention into which we entered two years ago with the Government of the Transvaal was now practically inoperative, and that, being inoperative, it had better be put an end to. That is a very fair matter for argument; but I do not think it would be possible to enter upon it on the present occasion. I have no objection to admit as much as this—that the Convention, as it now stands, does not give Her Majesty's Government any large amount of power, and that it is an arrangement which cannot be made to work satisfactorily unless it is carried into effect with the goodwill and sincere co-operation of both parties. Up to the present time, I have only received a general and unofficial statement of the wishes of the Transvaal Government. They have communicated with me, but not through an accredited agent. The next step to decide upon is whether we shall enter into formal and official negotiations with that Government with a view to consider 1288 the expediency of a revision of the Convention. That is a matter which is still under consideration. If the negotiations, as is probable, be continued, then, undoubtedly, the matter which is the subject of the noble Lord's Question—that of continuing or withdrawing the British Representative at Pretoria—will be one of the points which will have to be considered. I have no doubt, before the present Session closes, I shall be in a position to give more information to your Lordships than I am at the present moment.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I only wish to observe, on the somewhat important statement of the noble Earl, that this Convention differs from the case of a Convention entered into by two parties of their own full and free will for the purpose of carrying out an object in which both are equally interested. It was a Convention which was imposed, or supposed by Her Majesty's Government to be imposed, by us upon the Boers as a consideration for that relinquishment of our dominion over them which we had possessed before the outbreak with the Boers and before the disaster of Majuba Hill. I think if the nation had understood at the time that this Convention, which was to be a substitute and re-imbursement to us for all that was sacrificed then, and which we were told was to exercise so large an influence for the protection of the Native races to whose protection we were so especially bound, was to depend for the whole of its validity and value upon the hearty co-operation of those who were on the other side, it would have been received in a different spirit and in different language from that which actually met it.