MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS. (Hansard, 19 March 1883)

LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL,
in calling attention to the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government, and moving for a copy of the Treaty formed between Germany and Austria in 1879, said: My Lords, let me return my thanks to the noble and learned Earl upon the Woolsack, who has withdrawn the Notice which stood first upon the Paper. He merits thanks, whatever reasons have directed him, since his Notice might have led to the exclusion of other topics for the evening. It is superfluous to point out that this House ought sometimes to devote itself to foreign 757 matters, as it has done in recent years with credit and advantage. It is clear that the best time for such a purpose is the interval between the first day of the Session and the Recess at Easter, when legislation makes no great demand upon your Lordships. The debate on the Address gives no sufficient opportunity—if it gives any opportunity—of this kind. We have two ceremonial performances—a speech from the Opposition, a speech from the Government, when the House at once collapses, unless an Amendment has been moved, which scarcely ever happens. Besides, foreign policy has no special title to discussion at that moment. It is only before the House in a congeries of topics. If this Notice is a wide one, its intention is merely to give noble Lords a choice of the ground they may resolve to tread, which, at all events, is limited to the transactions of three years, all more or less conducing to the present state of Egypt. As to the Motion I conclude with, everyone knows that the agreement between Germany and Austria has led to more discussion in the autumn which has passed than it did even soon after the celebrated journey of Prince Bismarck to Vienna, which is thought to have produced it.
With the permission of the House, I will go back a minute to the formation of the Government under its present Head in 1880. I shall be cautious not to wound the sensibilities of those who are indebted to him for their Offices or Peerages. It is only necessary to remark that his sudden elevation—no outcome of the General Election—when he had ceased for many years to be the Leader of a Party, begot a certain antecedent probability as to the tenour of the foreign policy he influenced. Men who recollect—perhaps with admiration, or, if you like it, with well-founded admiration—his pamphlet on Bulgaria, his movement at St. James's Hall, his speeches in January, 1877, when war upon the Eastern Question was impending, those which followed at Mid Lothian—above all, his laudatory criticism of a Russian work intended to direct opinion in this country, must acknowledge that his unexpected advent to political supremacy had a tendency, at least, to stamp two characteristics on the direction of the Foreign Office. They had a tendency to stamp upon it undue antagonism with the 758 Porte and frequent deference to Russia, by which grave difficulties might be possibly created. I propose to touch on one or two transactions—there have not been many—which may show how far that antecedent probability has been supported by events, and verified in action. If it has, a practical conclusion may suggest itself, or I would not detain the House this evening.
The first conspicuous step was the recall of Sir Henry Layard from Constantinople. No doubt, as the noble Marquess who leads upon the other side once pointed out, every Government must exercise its judgment in the choice of representatives, as, indeed, it must do in the choice of legislative measures. But it does not follow that the judgment is correct. It does not follow that a bad and culpable decision may not arise in one sphere or the other. The motives for that recall may have been excellent and virtuous. They may have been free from all vindictive animosity. They may have had no reference to any previous differences between the First Minister and the Ambassador. The consequences, as may be quickly seen, have been deplorable. Sir Henry Layard had this particular advantage. Appointed by another Government, even if he went on serving under this one, in the eyes of the Sublime Porte, he was not thoroughly identified with the implacable hostility the First Minister had shown to that Power. Whoever came directly from the Government inevitably was so. Sir Henry Layard was the only person who had any chance of influence at Stamboul, under a Government at home, so thoroughly obnoxious to the leaders in that capital. The Government destroyed a force for gaining their own objects; they could not possibly replace by any force they might create—however good—because they had created it, because it was their offspring and their reflex. But the recall of Sir Henry Layard had another consequence, which has never yet been properly appreciated. It finally restored the arbitrary power of the Sultan. Sir Henry Layard was the convinced and zealous patron of the Ottoman Assemblies. Among his last despatches he insisted on them as the only safeguard against risks which were approaching. He would have had a prospect of restoring them after the fall the Russian 759 war had brought upon them. He was acquainted with their mechanism; he had seen them at work, and he could dwell upon their action before the war and after it began down to the time the Russian Army reached San Stefano. No one else could hold such language as was open to him. It would have been absurd for Mr. Goschen—although he was instructed in some manner—to attempt it. This untoward step restored to confidence and vigour the despotic system of the Palace and its labyrinth of influences. The triumph of the Softas, the fall of Abdul Aziz, the kind of revolution which had happened and been so favourable to our objects, were quite obliterated, or wholly thrown away, when Sir Henry Layard was compelled to turn his back upon Constantinople. But if the Government determined to fence round the arbitrary power of the Sultan—an extraordinary scheme for those who had a Liberal majority behind them—but one course remained—namely, to draw towards themselves such an important and necessary factor in our policy. Having rendered him omnipotent when he might have been restrained and counteracted, they were forced either to propitiate or lose him altogether.
Can it be said, my Lords, if we refer even in a perfunctory manner to the transactions which ensued, that there was any such conciliating effort? The affair of Montenegro followed. No doubt, the Prince of Montenegro was entitled, by the Treaty of Berlin, to certain acquisitions. It is true that great embarrassments arose from the revolt of the Albanians against the transfer stipulated; that many substitutions were invented for what the Treaty had laid down, and that a long time elapsed before the princely claim was satisfied. But we were not bound to interfere in any manner beyond the other signatories of the Treaty. The aggrandizement of Montenegro was ceded by the Treaty, as many other things were ceded, to the position of the Czar, the force of arms, the vestiges of conquest. It was not a British object to enforce or to accelerate it. The gain, if any, was to Russia, who, in the Prince of Montenegro, sees a vassal and a pensioner. Russia may have been entitled to a leading and energetic part upon the subject. It was not so with Great Britain. She ought to have stood still, when another Power 760 was quite sufficient for the difficulty. But the language which was held, the naval combination which was organized, the menace about Smyrna, without gaining to any great extent the Prince of Montenegro—if that had been desirable—were inevitably calculated to alienate the Sultan, whose power of reprisals the withdrawal of Sir Henry Layard had imprudently consolidated.
The case of Greece was stronger in the same direction. Greece had no title of any sort under the Treaty of Berlin. No acquisition was secured to her. The signatory Powers were engaged only to mediate between Greece and the Sublime Porte as to any change which they desired in their frontier. The Government were ready, by means of violence and arms, had other Powers concurred, to deprive the Sultan of his territory, to enforce an act of useless spoliation, to insist upon a frontier recommended by a Conference indeed, but which that Conference had no authority to settle, unless both parties acquiesced in it. To establish it, the Government were ready to make an unprovoked, unjust, unprofitable war upon the Sultan. It would have been unprovoked, as he had done nothing to their prejudice. It would have been unjust, as no ground for it existed. It would have been unprofitable, because the extension of Greek territory, although it may be an Hellenic, is not in any way a British object. It has been long ago established that to extend Greece does nothing for the permanent solution of the Eastern Question, and that a Grecian régime at Constantinople would be useless to defend it. Greece, like any State, is perfectly entitled to look for acquisition by the ordinary methods, such as marriage, which conferred Bohemia upon Austria; such as purchase, which drew Louisiana to the United States; such as conquest, which re-united Alsace and Lorraine with the German Empire. But that Great Britain should contemplate, by land or sea, a war for her aggrandizement, would be incredible unless the Papers thoroughly disclosed it. Who ventures to deny that our conduct on this question was adapted to lead the Sultan—whom we had rendered more despotic—into new and well-founded resentment?
The further system of the Government was to incite, to animate, and keep up 761 an European Concert, as they termed it, to direct him. It is true that Spain and Sweden were excluded from it. The European Concert having passed away is not entitled to much notice. We need not trample on a spectre. Nothing of the kind had ever been invented since the Concert which so long struggled to assert itself at Carlsbad, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona. It may have arisen partly from the Congress of Berlin attempting to maintain itself in other shapes and modes after its business was accomplished. The principle on which a Congress sometimes endeavours to perpetuate itself admits of serious objection. The normal object of a Congress is to restore the balance of power, when war has interrupted it, or been occasioned by its absence. It is so laid down, at least, among the Treaties of Vienna. But if a Congress which unites the great preponderance of European States resolves to be immortal, the balance of power can have no existence. The Congress defeats itself when it survives the temporary object which created it. I merely throw this out for the reflection of diplomatists. Whether it is just or not, there can be no doubt that the so-termed European Concert was most obnoxious to the Empire against which it seemed to be arrayed, and that for a long time the Government exulted in the shibboleth.
At last the well-known mutinies of February, 1881, and September, 1881—for I have brought the House to Egypt—created so much apprehension that the Sultan—arbitrary Sovereign as we had made him at Constantinople—became far more essential to us than he had been. On those events it must have been seen at once that we might have to ask his military succour—as we did—and that the whole value of that succour would depend upon the mind and temper with which he looked upon Great Britain. What course was taken to improve them? By what measures was it sought to calm the deep and bitter animosity so long and so elaborately kindled? He was ordered not to send even Commissioners to examine a disturbance in his Empire. When his Commissioners proceeded, adverse gunboats counteracted them. The Dual Note—allowed to have been useless—was resolved on in defiance to his wishes. Against his protestation, French and British ships advanced to 762 Egypt, to do no good to Europeans—their sole pretext—but to remain the idle and humiliated witnesses of massacre. Alexandria was bombarded, for no purpose which has ever been explained, against the judgment of the French implied in their departure, to the dismay and horror of Mahometan society. At last a Conference—against the usages of independent Powers—was forced upon his capital. The antagonism of the First Minister could not go much further. In the meanwhile there was a long course of retaliation from the Sultan. His measures were, in a high degree, precipitate and hostile. He thwarted us on every chance, on every occasion. He declined to send troops to Egypt on any acceptable basis. He gave a decoration to Arabi, which was utterly unwarrantable. He seemed to foster every movement with which Great Britain was contending. The fact is, he had a long course of outrage to excite, and no political Assemblies to control him. Her Majesty's Government had administered the one, and been a fatal bar to the revival of the other. Your Lordships will remember they had organized the arbitrary power which they were unwilling to assuage, and, as it seems, unable to contend with.
The outcome is complete incompatibility between Her Majesty's Government and the Suzerain of Egypt. It is avowed, however, that the state of Egypt is embarrassing. It is not necessary to establish it by details. The Government avow it in a manner pointed and emphatic. They avow it by withdrawing Lord Dufferin from Constantinople at the time when he is indispensable to the post which properly belongs to him. The accord of the Porte is seen to be desirable. Along despatch—unanswered still—is seeking to obtain it. It can hardly be obtained by a Chargé d'Affaires, who, according to the law of nations, is but accredited to the Minister, and has no access to the Sovereign. But still the pressure of embarrassment in Egypt is so urgent that—to bring Lord Dufferin to bear upon it—the British Embassy at Constantinople is virtually shut up when nearly all depends upon its action. The British Embassy at Constantinople is virtually shut up when the person who directs it, in times like these, has no sufficient locus standi to demand an audience of 763 the Sultan. It cannot happen otherwise in the despotic system which the Government determined on reviving, when they withdrew the only person qualified to alter it. To keep up tranquillity in Egypt there are but two agencies—one, cordial relations with the Sultan; the other, a British garrison permanently settled in that country. Cordial relations with the Sultan have been, as I hold, wantonly destroyed—at all events entirely abandoned. The occupation therefore promises, or rather threatens, to be lasting. Some Members of the Cabinet have pointed to the hazards of a lasting occupation. They are so great that even now the subject has not been exhausted, and I should wish to add a few remarks upon it.
A lasting occupation is a strain on our Military Force in one direction, when Ireland is a strain upon it in another. We are not strong enough to bear it. Let noble Lords read what General Sir Lintorn Simmons has lately written on the Army. Suppose, however, that by changes brought about we become stronger, and the objection ceases altogether. A lasting occupation, in the Continental world would be regarded as possession. When Great Britain possesses Egypt, we know by the avowal of a former Czar that Russia will conceive a valid title to Constantinople to have come into existence. Some men have blindly reasoned or asserted that, so long as we are placed in Egypt, Constantinople is indifferent to us. They forget that a strong Power at Constantinople would make our garrison in Egypt utterly untenable. They forget, also, that we uphold Constantinople not only to secure a passage into India, but far more immediately in order to defend the Mediterranean from an adverse force, and Asia Minor from a conquering invasion. Who ever stood upon the Bosphorus without perceiving that the Mediterranean and Asia Minor may be equally commanded from it? The lasting occupation in Egypt, towards which we are inclining by the want of any hold upon its Suzerain, tends to draw Russia across the Pruth, and make two Powers, at least, less vigilant in watching her.
Such is the effect in Egypt of the line into which foreign policy, since 1880, has been driven. But it is worth while to estimate its tendency in dif- 764 ferent capitals which the Egyptian difficulty renders more important to us than they would have been. In Constantinople—but that was rendered clear before—Great Britain is not listened to. Do you require an authority? A week ago, upon the 12th of March, the Under Secretary, speaking for the Foreign Office, declared, in "another place," that remonstrances addressed to the Sublime Porte about the Treaty of Berlin are wholly ineffectual. The catastrophe we always have to fear has come about. The Sultan appeals to Russia for protection against the conduct of Great Britain. It is affirmed by M. de Giers in the despatches now before us. What comes from him will not be lightly disregarded. In St. Petersburg the kind of Russian banner we hold up in the person of the First Lord of the Treasury gives strength to the Party who are restless for the Treaty of San Stefano, and weakness to the Party who are contented with the Treaty of Berlin. In Vienna we all know—as we were officially informed—in what manner our Ministerial position is regarded. In Berlin its effect may be more positively dangerous, although I would not speak with confidence upon a workshop of events so difficult to penetrate. In that capital the Seven Years' War must still be recollected, although with us it is forgotten. Its great lesson was that Austria, France, and Russia may possibly unite against the House of Hohen-zollern. In exact proportion as Great Britain proclaims her deference to Russia it is more hazardous for the German Empire to maintain a separation from her. The influence of Russia over Germany in its disjointed state was formerly supreme. If we look back to the accounts of travellers or residents in Germany some 50 years ago they will abound with illustrations of it. In the Crimean War it had not vanished, as recent memoirs have explained to us. Down to 1877 it still continued, or the war of that year would scarcely have been possible. In 1879 anew departure was inaugurated, and we are doing our utmost to reverse it. But if it is reversed, how long can you depend upon the safety of Constantinople?
It may be said that these are speculative arguments, and that the capitals referred to have not pronounced themselves in such a sense as I ascribe to 765 them. The answer is that they have done so. So far back as last May, when all the world, in common with ourselves, was under the impression of the tragical occurrences in Ireland, there was a chorus from the European Press, anticipating the immediate downfall of Mr. Gladstone as a Minister. I have at home a chain of telegrams to prove it. On what ground was the result anticipated by nearly all the organs of the Continent, except the eager wish of many States for its arrival?
In the outset I adverted to a practical conclusion as not unlikely to suggest itself. It is idle to dilate on inconveniences without adverting to a remedy. I would not come down to the House or trespass on your Lordships for that purpose. The remedy is not, indeed, original. In requires neither meditation nor invention to produce it. It is the project of the First Minister himself. For six years he incessantly explained to us that if a Liberal majority was formed it ought not to be directed by himself, but by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this House, and by a noble Marquess well known in the other. Whoever shares in that opinion, whoever fearlessly proclaims it, is but the organ of his judgment, although he may not be the minion of his power.
To return, however, strictly to the domain of foreign policy, it is seldom you are able to give it an augmented dignity or an improved direction, or more security and steadiness upon terms so easy. It generally happens that to accomplish such results, some extraordinary armament, or some costly work, or some difficult alliance, or some adventurous decision is required of you. It now arises from the turn of history that to gain confidence in States where confidence is necessary, to inspire fear where fear is more desirable, to win gratitude where gratitude is useful, and to encourage fortitude where fortitude would aid you, you have only to take down from the facade or frontage of the Empire a human emblem which never should have been set up—if you believe the gifted personage who forms it.
To bring that end about we do not want the action of the Legislature, although it might be grave and patriotic. We do not want the interference of the 766 Crown, although principle and precedent would justify it. We only need the resolution of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the noble Marquess with whom he used to be associated. When they resolve to imitate the high-minded example of their departed Colleagues in the two Houses of Parliament the problem will adjust itself. It will be but a temporary sacrifice. It will only be the movement of a lifeboat. They will come back into the air of place, after a rapid plunge into the sea of honour and integrity.
In my remarks upon the course which foreign policy has taken, I have not intended to deny that the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may frequently have exercised a wholesome influence upon it. But for him Sir Henry Layard might have been replaced, with far less judgment than he has been. But for him Smyrna might have actually been occupied. But for him we might have afterwards become in the defence of Greece the criminal invaders of the Sultan. But for him the European Concert might have longer been prepared, in the Old World and the New, to overthrow the boundary of Empires, and to disturb the equanimity of Sovereigns. But Secretaries of State were not invented to control and mitigate First Ministers. In looking back to these events we see two mighty elements of force erroneously distributed. The balance, which Europe deeply wants, is found to work with energy in Downing Street. The Concert, which Downing Street imperatively asks for, is suddenly exported to the Continent; although it does not flourish in that region. Let me add that I have never for a moment censured the decision of the Government to go to war in Egypt by themselves rather than leave it to the perilous dominion of Arabi. It was the remark, however, of a philosopher in the last century that, when heroic virtue is required, it is usually to overcome the difficulties which wisdom might have previously averted. There is a primâ facie case against a Government which sends a warlike expedition. No doubt, the laurels of a soldier are an impenetrable barrier to guard the nudity and weakness of a Minister. They ought at times to be withdrawn from what they shelter. They will not fade by such a process.
767 Before sitting down, I wish to add another word about the Motion. It is not a merely formal one. The greatest possible importance ought to be attached to the concurrence in 1879 of Germany and Austria. The Holy Alliance which had re-appeared was interrupted, possibly concluded by it. It is a landmark in the diplomatic history of the world. It is a germ from which the European balance may be gradually elicited. It revived a hope which had become almost extinct. It suddenly bestowed what reason and persuasion had laboured idly to appropriate. And if, since 1880, we have done our utmost to subvert it, by indirectly driving Germany towards Russia, it now requires acknowledgment and tribute from your Lordships and the country. It is not irregular that we should have a Treaty between two independent Powers, which Great Britain never signed, or that of Unkiar Skelessi would not be before us. At the same time, should counsels in Berlin, which I have no pretension to interpret, withhold it from the light until a later period, I am the last person, upon many grounds, to urge the Motion on your Lordships.

EARL GEANVILLE
My Lords, it is, perhaps, my fault; but I had very great difficulty in following the long and discursive speech of the noble Lord. I entirely agree with him that on the Address it is very often impossible to discuss very important questions of foreign policy except in a very general and desultory manner; and I think, as regards particular points of foreign policy, it is clear that they can be advantageously raised and thoroughly discussed in this House at a subsequent period. But, for that purpose, I think it is desirable that some indication should be given, not only to the Government, though that is important, but also to the House at large, as to what are the points of foreign policy it is intended to discuss. The noble Lord, so far as his Notice of Motion goes, was to have called attention to the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government; but he might as well have quoted from the poet— Let observation, with extensive view, Survey mankind from China to Peru. 768 I speak under correction; but the only indication of what the noble Lord intended to discuss was the Notice of the Motion he has just made. The noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) may know something more than I do of this matter, and this Treaty may exist; but we have no official knowledge of it in the Foreign Office. The text of that Treaty has never been officially communicated to the Government during the three years I have been there; and I have very great doubt as to whether it was communicated to the noble Marquess before me. But the use made of it by the noble Lord raises an interesting question. Anything that affects the relation between two such great military countries as Germany and Austria is highly important for every country in Europe to consider; but, so far as we are concerned, our interest is not one of a direct character. It is of the highest importance that these countries should be on friendly terms with one another, for the purpose of maintaining peace; but, so far as this Treaty goes, the noble Lord has hardly said one single word about it. He began by referring to the appointment of Mr. Goschen in the place of Sir Henry Layard. I remember, three years ago, hearing the noble Marquess say that these things must, except under exceptional circumstances, rest upon the discretion of the Secretary of State. If there is any truth in that observation, it surely does apply still more strongly, three years afterwards, against a complaint of a change which I think I justified, not upon personal, but upon political grounds. The pith of the speech of the noble Lord seemed to be that our policy had been entirely based on enmity to Turkey. I am content to deny that statement; but, seeing the noble Lord so favourably disposed towards Turkey, I think it will be, on the whole, more prudent that he should not force me, in my own defence, to make out the different grounds of any complaint I might possibly have against the Ottoman Government. The views of the noble Lord with regard to Egypt are also very cursory. On the whole, he appears to approve our having interfered with that; country; and he seems to think that it was a mistake that we did not induce Turkey to interfere. I think, however, your Lordships are all aware that Turkey 769 was not willing to interfere. I do feel that it is rather difficult, after the speech of the noble Lord, to make a defence of the whole foreign policy of the Government, not knowing to what portion of it his observations apply.

§ TRE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I do not wish to carry any further the discussion raised by the noble Lord (Lord Stratheden and Campbell), because I infer from the criticisms of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) that the noble Lord's Motion includes matter for several debates rather than for one debate, and that it would not lead to any unity of sequence to pursue the very interesting subjects which the noble Lord touched upon. The precise questions the noble Lord, has touched upon are of so extensive and varied a character that I hardly think we could usefully pursue them now. At all events, as far as I am concerned, I only rise for the purpose of saying—having had no opportunity of consulting documents, and speaking only from memory, though I have a very strong impression on the subject—that no official communication whatever has taken place of the terms of the Treaty to which the noble Lord referred, and I do not think that the details were ever brought to my knowledge. Of course, I have a general knowledge, in common with the noble Lord, as to what the Treaty meant to enact; but no text or copy was ever given me, and I do not think I was ever informed, by any authority on which I could rely, of the precise conditions it contained. A great deal of speculation undoubtedly took place as to what they were, and I dare say most of us know pretty well what the provisions are; but, as far as my recollection goes, I must entirely confirm the statement of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it would be impossible for him to assent to the Motion, even if he desired to do so, because the Materials are wanting.

LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL,
in reply, said: I need not detain the House, as no answer has been given to the views I brought before it, and as the noble Earl has not received the Treaty which I moved for. Whatever the noble Earl the Secretary of State may have expected, I have not endeavoured to "survey mankind from China to Peru;" but, on the contrary, have gone over a series of transactions all belong- 770 ing to one region, all linked with one another, and all contributing to form the great Egyptian difficulty which engages us at present.