HL Deb 15 March 1883 vol 277 cc527-39
THE EARL OF GALLOWAY,

in rising to call attention to the disastrous results to recruiting for the Militia caused by the changes in the mode of training instituted by Mr. Childers in 1881; and to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether it is owing to the 20 per cent diminution thus caused in the strength of the fourth Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers that it has been just officially decided to reduce its establishment by two companies or 200 men, and officers and non-commissioned officers in proportion, from the 1st of April next; also, if any other Militia battalions are to be similarly reduced; also, to move— For a Return showing the loss in numbers occasioned to Militia battalions trained at the brigade depots under the new system compared with those Militia battalions detached from depots, and, in consequence, permitted to train as heretofore, said, he must remind their Lordships that it was not yet two years ago since he brought before them two special points connected with the Military Service. One was with regard to the then impending re-organization of the Army, which had since become an accomplished fact; and the other was in regard to the waste of the Army. On neither occasion did he receive any support from the Government side of the House, nor on his own side, except from his lamented Friend the late Lord Airey. But now that he had read the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting for this year, and the article of Sir Lintorn Simmons in The Nineteenth Century, he could not say that he had any cause for regret in having troubled their Lordships, and he thought also this present Notice was more than ever desirable. Much had been said in one place and another with regard to the immense benefits the nation had derived from the re-organization introduced within the last three years by Mr. Childers; but he thought there were only three points on which that right hon. Gentleman could be congratulated. The first was for having been induced to increase the term of service for the Army; secondly, having permitted the re-engagement of non-commissioned officers; and, thirdly, having seen fit to increase the strength of the battalions forming the first Corps d'Armée, so as to keep it always ready for foreign service. For those measures the country was indebted to Mr. Childers; but he would remind their Lordships that those three points were recommended by Lord Airey's Committee. He should like to have been able to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on the success of a fourth point—namely, in having raised the age of recruits from 18 to 19. As had been anticipated, however, the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting showed that the alteration had not answered, and that there was a difficulty in obtaining recruits. The subject of the waste in the Army and the Militia was also a matter for most serious consideration. It had been ascertained that, in the three years previous to the Report of Lord Airey's Committee, there was an annual waste in the Army of an average of 9,000 men, at a cost of £500,000. That Committee made two recommendations with regard to waste in the Army. One was, that there should be established large training centres, the object being to check the large amount of fraudulent enlistments; and the other was, that of unlinking the battalions so as to obviate the shifting of soldiers from one battalion to another. He was sorry to say these recommendations had not been carried out, and that the authorities, while neglecting the recommendations of the Committee, had created a number of phantom battalions of Militia. Of about 30 fourth Militia battalions, only half were as yet formed. He wished specially to call attention to the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting. Last year, that officer wrote of the system of drilling Militia recruits on enlistment, that it was too early as yet to form a correct opinion of the probable results of the plan. He stated, however, that, during 1881, there had been a diminution of the waste of the Militia, and that the saving had occurred chiefly among the absentees, and among the men discharged as invalids. He added, however, that it was anticipated that, as the new system of drilling became more general, the waste would be still further reduced. It was to be regretted that this anticipation was not realized, and that, in the following year, the Inspector General should, on the contrary, have had to report a considerable increase of waste. The figures with regard to deserters in the Army again were by no means satisfactory. In the five years 1876–1880, the average number of deserters was 2,631; in 1881, the number was 2,560, and in 1882, 2,612. The statistics of invalids in the Army were as follows:—In 1876–1880, the average number of recruits was 27,614, of whom there were discharged as invalids, in 1876, 408, or 14.7 per 1,000; in 1881, 287, or 10.9 per 1,000; and in 1882, when only 23,801 men were enlisted, 284, or 11.9 per 1,000 were discharged as invalids. Bearing these facts in mind, it seemed to him most unwise to reduce the number of the Militia at present. It appeared from the Inspector General's Report that, according to an actuarial calculation, the number of recruits required for 1883 would be 18,000; and, if the demands of the Service did not exceed its normal requirements, the number would probably be obtained; but the deficiencies from last year, and the increased waste, made it necessary to obtain as many as 22,500 recruits. It was to meet the ad- mitted deficiency that some special measures were necessary; and therefore the manner in which to solve the problem, the Secretary of State for War appeared to think, was to reduce the number of the establishment they already had. According to actuarial calculations of the number of recruits really needed, there must be a deficiency at the end of the year of 5,720; for we were told they had been coming in at the rate of 330 a-week, when the number ought to be 440. This, therefore, was not a time to throw away what we had got, and to reduce the number of the old Constitutional Force of the country. It was, as he had said, a most unwise proceeding; and what he was certain of was this, that they would have to come to in the end, not an Army Reserve, but a Militia Reserve. The Inspector General appeared desirous of doing what he could to bolster up the new mode of bringing recruits on the roll; and he fell into the error of alluding to recruits trained immediately on their enrolment, as being thoroughly-trained soldiers, whereas they had hardly got beyond squad-drill, and had had no opportunity of learning thoroughly how to use their arms. As to the preliminary drill, it appeared that 9 per cent of the recruits failed to present themselves, or to account for their absence. Men would not join the Militia, and there was no increase of Line recruits, nor was there any actual increase of men going to the Army from the Militia, although the Returns would make such appear to be the case, because the men who went to the Army from the Militia as recruits were those who had only enrolled in the one, in order to enlist in the other after receiving the bounty allowed to the recruit entering the Militia, but not allowed when enlisting into the Army direct. In one paragraph, the Inspector General practically admitted that the present system could not be pursued with advantage. The Secretary of State for War was reported to have said that recruits were henceforth to be asked at exactly what time they would be likely to attend drill; but this could hardly be done except in special cases. It was to be regretted that, in one sentence, the Inspector General had insinuated that any want of success in the new scheme was partly attributable to officers commanding regi- mental districts not doing their best; and some officers had written to him resenting this innuendo. Indeed, there was no reason whatever for such remarks upon a body of gentlemen who had the interests of the Service at heart, and whose only desire was to keep up the recruiting. One of the officers wrote— The new scheme has been successful only in the Metropolitan and other large districts, in which a Militiaman proper—viz. a working man (not a tramp or loafer), with a settled habitation and homo—never existed. Another wrote— I am told on all sides that the Army Reserve is what scares men from enlisting. The calling out of the Reserves during the last Russian panic has had a most prejudicial effect on recruiting. Reserve men were thrown out of work, and found it hard to got employment afterwards. But, in addition, the difficulties must be attributed to the effect of the new system of recruiting and of drilling Militiamen in barracks, which was intended so far to popularize the Army, and familiarize it with Militiamen and the working classes, as to render the Militia more than ever a feeder for the Line. Its first effect, on the contrary, was to reduce the feeding source two-tenths nominally, but actually one-fourth, in about a year, in the case, at any rate, of some regiments. It appeared also that, in another part of Scotland, the class of men who did come forward were altogether different from those who formerly filled the ranks. One sergeant, specially told off to recruit in one district, made this significant remark—"Men say they would rather join the Army at once, as the Militia no longer exists." He (the Earl of Galloway) thought that one reason why it was so difficult to obtain recruits was the short-sighted policy of the Secretary of State for War last year in keeping out several Militia regiments for two months, and only allowing them one month's bounty. He should like to quote from the Report which he had been already referring to, the number of effectives given by the Inspector General of Recruiting. The numbers were 118,310 on the 1st of March in 1881, and 112,953 in 1882; while in 1883 they were only 106,054. Therefore, there had been a diminution of upwards of 12,000 men in the effective strength of the Militia in the last two years, and yet this was the time when the Secretary of State for War proposed to reduce the number of the Militia establishment still further. Everybody who read the Report would admit that the natural conclusions to draw were these. First, that, in order to keep up the flow of recruits in the Army, we ought to return to the age of 18 for enlistment, and, consequently, to increase the term of service in the ranks; and, secondly, that it would be necessary to increase, instead of reducing, the numbers of both the Militia and the Militia Reserve. With regard to the proposed reduction in the 4th Battalion of the Royal Scotch Fusiliers, he wished to know whether it was caused by the diminution in the numbers in that battalion last year, caused, as this had been, entirely by the unfortunate changes made in the mode of training the recruit to which he had already adverted? In conclusion, he would move for the Return of which he had given Notice.

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return, showing the loss in numbers occasioned to Militia battalions trained at the brigade depots under the new system compared with those Militia battalions detached from depots, and, in consequence, permitted to train as heretofore."—(The Earl of Galloway.)

THE DUKE OF MONTROSE

said, he must endorse every word that had been uttered by the noble Earl (the Earl of Galloway) as to the difficulty of obtaining recruits under the new system. He (the Duke of Montrose) had the honour to command a battalion of Militia, which required recruits in a great degree, and he put down the difficulty to two new arrangements which were made under the now system. One was that they did not pay the bounty to the men at the time they entered the regiments. In Scotland, the best time for recruiting was the first or second weeks in the New Year. That was the festive season, when men were in need of money to meet the necessary expenses of the time, and, in his case, they never had any difficulty before the new system came in force. Instead of giving the men the bounty at the time they enlisted, as under the old system, they were now given it at the end of the term, which was not a sufficient inducement to them to come forward, because they wanted their money at the time they joined, The other reason of the difficulty was owing to the fact that masters would not keep open employment for the men a second time; and he should he glad to see that difficulty met in some way. The result was that men went to the battalions where the old system was in operation, thus showing a distinct preference for it.

THE EARL OF POWIS

also complained of the operation of the new system of drilling and training the Militia recruits as it affected regiments in the Midland counties of Shropshire and Staffordshire, mentioning, among other things, that the Shropshire regiment was now 200 under its number. He hoped commanding officers would have the option of having their recruits drilled as heretofore.

THE EARL OF MORLEY

said, that if the noble Earl who introduced that subject (the Earl of Galloway) had given Notice that he was going to call attention to the general state of the Army, or to the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, he should not have had any right to complain of the speech he had made; but almost the whole of the first part of that speech was devoted to an elaborate vindication of the speeches which the noble Earl had delivered two or three years ago. As, however, the noble Earl had admitted that those speeches had met with scant encouragement from either side of the House, or from the Cross Benches, it was unnecessary for him (the Earl of Morley) to repeat the arguments which he had used on former occasions in answer to the noble Earl. But, before sitting down, the noble Earl referred to the Question he had had on the Paper for some time; and he (the Earl of Morley) would now endeavour to answer the Questions addressed to him. The first object for which the new system of drilling the Militia on enrolment was introduced was to enable recruits to drill whenever it was most convenient to them. When the noble Earl, last year, called attention to the results of that system, he promised to cause an inquiry to be made into them before another season, with the view of adopting any improvement which experience might render desirable. The noble Earl talked of the disastrous results of the system—rather strong terms to use with the Report, from which he had quoted so largely, be- fore him. He would admit that there had been a falling off in the number of recruits for the Militia in the last year, and that falling off in some cases was considerable. The number of recruits for the Militia, between the trainings of 1881–2, was about 2,500 fewer than in the corresponding time of 1880–1; but the diminution affected not only those battalions which had their head-quarters at the depots of their territorial regiments, but those which were detached from head-quarters where the old system of holding preliminary drill immediately before training was maintained. The system of drilling on enrolment was only applied to the Militia battalions which had their head-quarters at the depots of their territorial regiments; all the other regiments were drilled on the old system, receiving 10s. immediately on enlistment, and the remaining sovereign at the end of the preliminary drill and training, which were continuous. He did not think it necessary to give the figures in great detail on that subject, because they were put with extreme succinctness in the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, to which reference had been made. He quite agreed that the co-existence of the two systems might be undesirable, and that, in some instances, it might act prejudicially on the regiments which had the less popular form of enrolment. But in the view of the War Department it required some wide experience—not an experience confined to single regiments or single districts—to enable them to judge of the results of the system. In some districts it might be more convenient for the men to come into drill when they were out of work; or it might be more popular, both with the commanding officers and the men, that they should come in as they formerly did, and have the preliminary drill of 63 days and the training continuously. It was now proposed that the recruits should have the absolute option in all the regiments of doing as they liked, of drilling either immediately they were enlisted, or at a later period. The object of the Secretary of State for War was to make service in the Militia as convenient and as popular as possible. Under the new system, the recruit would be able to suit his preliminary drill to the requirements of his civil employment. It was rather a remarkable fact that, although the Militia recruits who enlisted between the raining for 1881–2 were somewhat less numerous than those who enlisted in 1880–1, yet the actual number of recruits in the calendar year 1882 were about 1,000 more than the recruits in the year 1881. Therefore, looking at the general effect of the system introduced last year, the number of recruits had not materially diminished. It was not intended to give the 10s. bounty immediately on enrolment; and on this point he disagreed with the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose), because, if it were given to the Militia, it would stop almost every other avenue of recruiting to the Army but that one. If they gave it to the Militia, they must give it to the Army recruits also, or the men would enter the Army only through the Militia. One of the results of giving that sum immediately on enrolment was that a vast number of recruits took the 10s. and never appeared for the preliminary drill, and there was a consequent loss to the country; but last year there were absent from preliminary drill only 200 of those who drilled on enrolment—that was, T30 per cent. Of those who drilled immediately before training, 9 per cent were absent from preliminary drill. In 1881, 13 per cent of the recruits were absent from preliminary drill. So, admitting a diminution in the actual number of recruits, the number of those who went through preliminary drill was not very different in the two years. In 20 cases the regiments in which the recruits were drilled on enrolment showed better recruiting than in previous years. In 14 cases the recruiting was much worse, and in the remainder it was about the same. These figures required some allowance; but it must be remembered that waste was always going on, and, in spite of whatever was done, would continue to go on. He admitted the great importance of making every endeavour to reduce the waste to a minimum. It was now proposed to grant a larger sum to those who did not divide their services into two portions. One pound was at present given for preliminary drill, and a second £1 was given for the annual training; but if the preliminary drill and training were continuous, it was now intended to give 30s. in addition to the £1 at the beginning. As a proof that the Militia was not decreasing in popularity, he desired to call attention to the large number of re-engagements, which were nearly double what they were in former years. In 1880 the number of re-engagements was 4,790; in 1881, 6,000; and last year they rose to 9,000. He believed he had now dealt with most of the points raised by the noble Earl on the subject of recruiting and the methods by which the Government proposed to meet some of his objections. The noble Earl had referred to a paragraph in the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, in which he said that success under the new system depended upon the officers commanding regimental districts; and the noble Earl suggested that this was intended as a back-handed blow at these officers. The Government repudiated any such intention. It was, however, quite true that the success of any system depended on the zeal and efficacy of those by whom it was carried out. The last point raised by the noble Earl was as to the reduction in the establishment of a regiment. In answer to that, the reduction of the 4th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers by two companies was to take place in conformity with the territorial organization of the Forces. It was intended by degrees to give all Militia battalions a uniform strength of eight companies, and to carry out in its entirety the territorial scheme. The Government were gradually adding second battalions of Militia affiliated to regiments in which they did not exist; and they trusted that in a very few years there would be very few districts where there would not be two battalions of Militia as well as of the Regular Forces. It was proposed to complete the system laid clown by Lord Cardwell, and continued by Mr. Childers, of attaching to each regimental district one Line and two Militia regiments, each with its eight companies. The present change was merely part of a system now being carried out in all the Militia regiments throughout the country. The noble Earl had moved for a Return. Of course, it would be granted, if it were insisted on; but he deprecated its being given, on account of the considerable time and expense which would be occasioned without any adequate result. In his opinion, the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting would furnish the noble Earl with all the information that was desirable.

THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN

said, he could not refrain from expressing the regret he felt that the reply just given had not indicated that more encouragement would be given to recruiting in the Militia. He did not, however, agree with the noble Earl (the Earl of Galloway) in his remarks upon the Army, because he was, for one, strongly in favour of the Militia Force being made as efficient as possible under the new system. As to the preliminary drill being undergone at the option of the recruits, he strongly objected to such a system, as it would affect discipline at the very onset. If some recruits preferred to drill at one time and some at another, how could any system be properly carried out? The system, moreover, would entirely do away with the retention of Militiamen under the orders of their own officers, which it was so important to secure. He was glad to see that the subject had received the attention of the Government since the discussion last year, and he hoped that next year they would be able to come to their Lordships and say they would revert to the old system. He thought that the Militia should be drilled by their own officers; and he also thought that the men should be paid 10s. on enlisting. There was another point which did not appear to have received the attention of the War Office—namely, that the class of men who went into the Militia were not at all the same class as went into the Army. With respect to the Militia He-serve, he was in favour of providing as strong a Force as could be got; but he thought that the present system of giving bounties in connection with it was a great waste of public money. Their Lordships could not expect the Government to do more at this moment than they had; but, if they continued in the same road, he felt perfectly certain that everything would be found entirely satisfactory next year.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

said, that he did not intend to follow up the arguments that had been so ably advanced by the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose) and others on the Militia generally in the course of the debate. When the Militia Reserve was last called out he was strongly impressed in its favour, and he thought it should be kept in a much higher state of numbers than it was in at present. It struck him that when one looked at the slow growth of the Regular body of the Army Reserve, there ought to be some stronger Force than that was. That Reserve had, no doubt, increased in recent years, but not to anything like the extent anticipated by Lord Cardwell, who expected that in a very few years it would have amounted to 81,000 men. A more complete delusion never existed; and it was rather based upon arithmetical than practical calculations. When he (Viscount Cranbrook) was at the War Office, great efforts had been made to get additional force into the Reserve, and with considerable success, as had been tested by experience. When the Militia Re-serves were called out in his time, he well remembered that the illustrous Duke at the head of the Army said, after inspecting them, that in a short time it would be difficult to distinguish them from the Army Reserves, showing what excellent drill they had received. He thought that some steps should now be taken to keep up that Reserve. It was probably some 23,000 or 24,000 strong, though, according to the books, it consisted of 27,000 men. After deductions, the 27,000 would be brought down to the number he had named. If the Militia Reserve were increased and kept up, it would be most useful to fall back upon in times of trouble; and it seemed to him that a greater number might very easily be procured. The point, however, which he wished to impress upon the Government was the necessity for giving both the Army and the Militia alike some period of rest, so that men might know what they had to expect. Nothing had more checked recruiting than the continual changes that were made, and which were so rapid and so constant as to cause the utmost disquiet, people having only the most indistinct notion of what was ultimately to become of them. He hoped that they had at last come to the time when the Army and the Militia might understand that they were upon a footing which would not be disturbed for many years.

THE EARL OF LIMERICK

said, he also must be allowed to express his regret that the Government had decided to permit Militia recruits to drill at any time they chose, and trusted the Government would re-consider their decision upon the point. From his experience as the commanding officer of a battalion detached from the depôt, he did not think the plan would work, for the men would come in in small numbers at different periods, and that would be detrimental to good discipline. They now had about 150 or 200 recruits drilled together; but, in the event of there being only a few men, it would be impossible to teach them anything but the most elementary squad-drill.

THE EARL OF GALLOWAY,

in reply, said, that, after the discussion which had taken place, he would withdraw his Motion.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.