Lords Sitting of 13 March 1883

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Lord Greville, after the death of his father.
PUBLIC BILL—Committee—Payment of Wages in Public-houses Prohibition (1).
The Lord O'HAGAN—Chosen Speaker in the absence of the Lord Chancellor and the Lords Commissioners.

PAYMENT OF WAGES IN PUBLIC-HOUSES PROHIBITION BILL.—(No. 1.)
(The Earl Stanhope.)
PAYMENT OF WAGES IN PUBLIC-HOUSES PROHIBITION BILL.—(No. 1.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
  House in Committee accordingly.
  Clauses 1 and 2, severally agreed to.
  Clause 3 (No wages to be paid within public-house. Sec. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 76, s. 16, and 35 & 36 Vict. c. 77, s. 9).
  LORD WALSINGHAMsaid, he had placed on the Paper an Amendment to the clause, to remedy what the noble Earl who introduced the measure (Earl Stanhope) would admit to be something of an oversight. However desirous the noble Earl might be to prevent the payment of wages in public-houses, he (Lord Walsingham) was sure he did not intend to place resident owners and occupiers of such places in a position of considerable inconvenience. It seemed only fair and reasonable to ask that they should at least be allowed to pay their own workmen on their own premises. He had therefore drawn up an Amendment, to enable the resident owner or occupier of any public-house or beer-shop to pay on such premises the wages of any workman bonâ fide employed by him; but he was perfectly willing to withdraw his Amendment in favour of any other form of words better adapted to attain the same object.
  Amendment moved,
  In page 1, line 26, after ("therewith,") insert ("save and except such wages as are paid by the resident owner or occupier of such public-house, beer-shop, or place to any workman bonâ fide employed by him."—(The Lord Walsingham)
  LORD COTTESLOEsaid, he had a somewhat similar Amendment on the Paper, but he should have no hesitation in withdrawing it in favour of that of the noble Lord now before the Committee.
  EARL STANHOPEsaid, he would accept the Amendment, which he fully agreed was an improvement to the measure.
  Amendment agreed to.
  Clause, as amended, agreed to.
  Remaining clauses agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Report of Amendment to be received on Thursday next.
  House adjourned during pleasure; and resumed by the Lord Chancellor.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL— POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOMENT.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOK,in rising, according to Notice, to call attention to
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  the Correspondence on affairs of the Transvaal; and to ask, What steps the Government propose to take in fulfilment of the Convention to save the Natives residing outside and on the borders of the Transvaal from the calamities in which they were involved by the lawless action of subjects of the Transvaal Republic? said, that in putting the Question down for consideration, no one could have been surprised at what he had done, as it was quite impossible to read the Blue Book without seeing that the subject could not be passed over without some notice. The Government should say what they proposed to do to remedy the enormous evils which had been going on against the African Natives; and this was the result, as it seemed to him (Viscount Granbrook), of the surrender which was made on the part of the Government, with certain reservations. He had never concealed the fact that he was one of those who had always held that the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government in relation to the Convention were discreditable to this country, and that they could not tend in any degree to that peace and security of the African Natives, and of the States bordering upon the Transvaal, which it was supposed would result from them. It seemed to him that there had been a surrender by the Government, with a perfectly fictitious reservation; and that, on the part of the Boers, there had been a real triumph, and merely a semblance of respect and acceptance of submission, so long as the English Forces remained in the country, which disappeared as soon as they were withdrawn. The whole history of the Boers showed that they had always regarded the Native Races as inferior in every respect to themselves; and that they thought that everything they did against them was justified by the laws of their country, and, he believed, by the laws of God. From the very beginning, there had been a steady progress in the attacks upon the Natives, whose lands and cattle they only saw to lust for them, and these had resulted in the calamitous condition which was proved by Mr. Rutherford's despatches. That would appear from a perusal of the Blue Book, and the lamentable description which was presented therein. On the 3rd of August, 1881, attacks on the Natives began to be made on the Frontier; and, in Sep-

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  tember, they went on with greater force; and they had been going on ever since, and were going on now. He was not about to contend that there had not been Tribal wars, as well as wars between the Natives and the Boers; but it would seem that they too had been created by the Boers, who went over the borders and then withdrew to their own country with their plunder. It would be found, he asserted, that not one of the Native Chieftains had transgressed the lines of the Transvaal, which England had laid down under the Convention, and that they had not even followed their stolen cattle over the border. Looking at the Papers, he thought Sir Evelyn Wood was fully justified in his protest made at the time of the signature of the Convention. Sir Evelyn Wood had said that he knew his Colleagues were anxious for the protection of the Natives, alike within and without the Transvaal, but that the fact was that the object would not be secured by what was proposed, and that the British Resident would find himself powerless to intervene. In the debate which had taken place last year, the noble Earl who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) said that we were now going to do by right what we had previously done without authority—that we should have a right to intervene between the Natives outside the Transvaal and the people of the Transvaal. He (Viscount Cranbrook) was not going to enter into the affairs of the Natives within the Transvaal, though that was a serious matter, and it had been agreed that this country should use its moral influence in regard to them. Still, the laws of the country were to prevail within the territory. His remarks would apply with greater force to the state of affairs without the Transvaal; and it came, therefore, to this, that England having taken the responsibility of the interior of the Transvaal by moral representation, had taken care of the Natives outside the Transvaal upon much more imperative and important conditions—conditions which seemed, in honour and justice, to compel England to take some steps to show that she was sensible of the conditions which were made with the Natives themselves, and more especially with that part of them that inhabitated Bechuanaland. Mr. Mackenzie, a missionary of the London
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  Missionary Society, under whose labours the country had improved for a great many years, who had long resided in the country, had written a pamphlet showing that infinite cruelties had been practised upon the unhappy Natives. The people had, during 50 years, built churches and schools, had ploughed large quantities of land, and had greatly enlarged the trade of their country. Their condition was shown by statements made by Mr. Hudson and others, whom he (Viscount Cranbrook) did not wish to quote at length; and it was perfectly evident that the sufferers, from Boer encroachment and rapine, were, in every case, those who showed themselves the most faithful allies of the British Government. When Mr. Rutherford went to that country in November or December last, he found that Montsioa had been obliged to enter into a Treaty with Moschette, at an enormous sacrifice. Mr. Rutherford found that from 12 to 15 people were dying every day from starvation and misery, and that, in one place, there was a body of Boers, with a couple of cannon, controlling the whole country. The appropriation of land and the stealing of cattle was going on, as if England was entirely out of the question, and not to be respected at all; 95 per cent of the ploughed land had, according to Montsioa, been seized in his territory, and handed over to these White freebooters. Almost all the best waters and fountains belonging to these people had been taken possession of by the Boers, and if this Treaty was carried out, the entire Tribe, numbering 13,000, would be driven into a corner where only about 2,000 could find means of subsistence. These things showed, as the fact was, that it was to the Boers that these cruelties were duo. According to a despatch of Sir Hercules Robinson, on the 27th of January of the present year, women and children were slaughtered on many occasions, and a list of these atrocities was to be found in the Blue Book. There was one instance in which a Tribe was fighting with the Boers, and 19 men, who surrendered themselves on the promise of their lives being spared, were handed over by the Boers to a rival Tribe, and murdered in cold blood. Although not actually taking part in the butchery, the Boers were within 50 or 60 yards of the spot where it occurred, and took no

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  steps either to prevent or to punish it. It was perfectly clear that the unfortunate men who were murdered surrendered themselves to the Boers on the faith of their lives being spared. In the country of Mankoroane, the farms had been taken and the cattle driven away by the Boers, and nothing was left for the unfortunate Natives but starvation and death. The peace of that country had been destroyed solely by White men, who came from the Transvaal. These outrages commenced some time ago, and had continued up to the present time. He was bound to say that the responsibility for them to a very great extent rested with Her Majesty's Government—that was to say, the responsibility rested upon Her Majesty's Government not so directly as with the Transvaal Government, but it certainly rested upon them indirectly. In a pamphlet written by Mr. Mackenzie, in no violent spirit, for he had favoured the independence of the Transvaal, and desired that the Boers should retain it, it was stated that the country had been for two years under British police, and that an implied obligation rested on this country that protection should be given to the Natives of Bechuanaland, and that something should be done to prevent the sufferings which they were enduring. Further, he said that the responsibility rested upon the Imperial Government, and especially upon the present Government, as being the authors of the Pretoria Convention. The Transvaal Government had stated that they had many excuses. One of these was that the Convention line was drawn in a manner that they thought highly injurious to them; but it should be remembered that they had agreed to the arrangement, and it was too late for them to turn round now and say that they objected to the line. In addition to that, the Transvaal Government alleged that these people wanted to come under their power. Tie was not surprised that the noble Earl then at the head of the Colonial Office (the Earl of Kimberley) showed the strongest disbelief in their statements, for the charges made against the Transvaal Government were confirmed by their own admissions. With regard to Zululand, Sir Evelyn Wood had great difficulty in inducing the Transvaal Boers to withdraw from that country; but it was provided by the Convention that they
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  should withdraw, and that compensation should be given to those who had settled in that country by the authority of the Transvaal Government, by giving them land in the Transvaal, and by giving them other compensation. Last year, however, large bodies of Boers took the whole of their cattle into Zulu-land, and commenced to eat up the pastures because they were better than their own. Remonstrances were naturally made by the British Resident, who asked the Transvaal Government what steps they intended to take? With what feelings people would read the reply of the Transvaal Secretary of State to the great Government whose Suzerainty he acknowledged, he (Viscount Cranbrook) did not know. The Secretary of State (Mr. Van Bok) replied that his Government did not intend to take any steps, considering that the information obtained by themselves did not at all agree with that supplied by Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Henry Bulwer. It should be remembered that Sir Henry Bulwer was Governor of Natal, and Sir Hercules Robinson was the High Commissioner of England, who never interfered except on the strongest possible evidence. That audacious reply showed the spirit which animated that people. When called upon by the British Government, under the Convention, to send to the Joint Commission with regard to the South-West Territory, they said that they had no time, as they were so much occupied with what was occurring in Natal. The event to which they alluded was that a number of Natives, with certain' White men, had gone over to Natal, and the Transvaal Government affected to think that they had been encouraged by us to go there. This was totally false, for Sir Hercules Robinson had practically told them to go away. All that was done was to treat the people with hospitality while in Natal. Mr. Bok, the Secretary of State for the Transvaal, wrote that they would have nothing to do with the Joint Commission, until the Kaffirs and the White men in question had been sent back for trial at Pretoria. It was impossible to conceive anything so audacious and so inconsistent with their undertaking by the Convention. With regard to the projected Treaty of the Boers with certain Natives, it was to be observed that,

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  under the Convention, they had no right to enter into any relations with Natives outside their border. They had pledged themselves not to do so. On the attention of Mr. Bok being called to the fact, that these negotiations were in violation of the Convention, he replied that highly important reasons had induced his Government to send a mission to the Kaffir Chiefs, and they were under the impression that by this step they had deserved the thanks of the British Government. What was done was not, he said, really in contravention of the Convention, but rather technically! That was a most remarkable way to treat the Convention. When Mr. Rutherford arrived at the spot, he found, not only the Natives, but a large number of Boers, who practically prevented him from getting at Moshette. One of them professed to represent Moshette, and it was therefore absurd to say that no responsibility rested with them. The Treaty itself, throwing over Great Britain and adopting the South African Republic, which was approved by the Transvaal Government, was an outrage upon the Convention of Pretoria. The Transvaal authorities had been repeatedly called upon to prevent the inhabitants of their territory from committing atrocities; but they had done nothing, and Sir Hercules Robinson had come to the conclusion that the Transvaal authorities were not only morally responsible for the cruelties that had taken place, but that they had connived at and were accomplices in the wrongs perpetrated upon the Natives. Now, the Convention entered into meant something or nothing. If it meant something, it entailed upon us, in the Transvaal, continual watchfulness and continued remonstrance against the ill-treatment of the Natives there. Besides, it imposed upon us a burden of the heaviest character—a burden which it was most difficult for any Government to discharge. The Government entered into it with their eyes open, and again and again it was impressed upon them by Sir Evelyn Wood, before he left the country, that this would be the result, and it was shown that after the three victories of the Boers there was nothing behind the British Resident, and the consequences were obvious. The Government ought to bear in mind that they were dealing with a lawless race, of whom it was said
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  by Sir Hercules Robinson that territorial encroachment was as their very life blood. As to boundary, Sir Hercules Robinson said that, unless we altered the frontier to a position where there were no Native cattle to be stolen and no Native land to be appropriated, we were only working in vain. It was not to be supposed that it would be stopped by the crushing of these two Chieftains. The appetite of the Boers would be increased by what it fed on, and they would affect more and more the leadership of the Natives in South Africa. This country had under it a large mass of Native subjects, in whose tranquillity it had a deep interest, and the Government had imposed upon it a burden which must be acknowledged, if the English nation were to be saved from dishonour. The Natives were already asking—"Is the Queen's word broken? Has the promise of England, upon which we had relied, failed?" What answer could we give? It should be remembered that when the Boers were in arms against us, Montsioa and other Chiefs did what they could to help us. If we had allowed Sir Evelyn Wood, who wrote when chafing in spirit, when he felt he and his army were being dishonoured, and we were giving a triumph to lawlessness and rapine—if we had allowed him then to act, we should have shown that the English meant to be the predominant race in that country, not that they might receive any glory by it, but that they might exert their influence on behalf of the civilization of the Natives; and, instead of rapine and disaster following the train of these Boers from one Tribe to another, civilization, order, and Christianity would have followed in the footsteps of Great Britain. Did the Government mean that the name of England should be still sullied by disgrace and discredit, or would they take some steps to relieve this country from the responsibility it foolishly undertook, and which we should have fulfilled far better had we acted in a different manner? In conclusion, he begged to ask the noble Earl opposite the Question of which he had given Notice.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I am not surprised, and I do not think that it is in any way a matter for regret, that the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) has brought this question before the House. It is one, undoubtedly, of

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  very great importance, and it is quite right that your Lordships should take notice of it, when the situation is so grave, and when the circumstances are, as I, for one, am quite ready to admit, by no means satisfactory. I think it is well that your Lordships should have an opportunity of correcting exaggerated impressions, and of knowing exactly how matters really stand. I do not think, however, I need follow the noble Viscount on some points; and I am certainly not disposed to offer any defence against his criticism on the good manners and good taste shown, in the official Correspondence of the Boer Government. It certainly is a very remarkable Correspondence; but that is a very small matter, and if there is any discredit to anybody concerned, the discredit falls, I think, rather on the writers of documents which are not couched in the usual terms of diplomatic or official courtesy, rather than on those who received them. Neither have I the smallest intention of making light of the acts of cruelty, although they are of a kind, I am afraid, not altogether uncommon in savage warfare, which appear to have been practised by these people. The noble Viscount expressed a hope that these things were committed by the Black men, and not by the Boers.
  VISCOUNT CRANBROOKsaid, that he had referred to one particular case which he had cited.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: Of course, I might argue that these people were only fighting one another in the manner of their race. But if they did so, and committed cruelties beyond the British Frontier, I do not see that that is a matter of which the responsibility rests with our Government. The war was carried on, in the main, by savages, aided by some White volunteers; and it is probable that many regrettable and lamentable acts have been committed. But, my Lords, what we have to consider is the state of matters with which we have to deal. I do not know whether all your Lordships have read all the Colonial Blue Books. Perhaps it may be well to recapitulate the circumstances of the case, and to explain the position in which we stand. On the West and South-West of the Transvaal, when we held it, and closely connected with it, though not belonging to it, lies the Bechuana country, inhabited by
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  savage Tribes. It does not seem that these Tribes were ever united under one paramount Head. In 1872ߝ3 the South African Republic claimed to have acquired some of this territory, and they endeavoured, at the same time, to put forward one of the leading Chiefs as a paramount Chief, no doubt with a view to negotiate with him. We did not, however, recognize the cession made by the Chiefs, or alleged to be so made; and in 1881 a boundary line was drawn between the Transvaal and the independent territory, which excluded from the Transvaal a good deal of land which the Boers claimed, but with regard to which their claims were disputed. Before the annexation, and I believe for many years previously, these Chiefs had been divided into parties, Montsioa and Man-koroane heading one party, and Moshette the other. When difficulties arose in the Transvaal, the first-mentioned Chiefs took the British side, while Moshette sympathized with the Boers, and between these two parties a war broke out, as far as I can understand, arising from local rather than from general causes. In May, 1881, peace was restored for a time; but it did not last, and in October, 1881, hostilities were resumed, Montsioa being attacked, with the help of some Boer volunteers or filibusters acting on their own behalf. Our Resident (Mr. Hudson) called upon the Boer Government to preserve neutrality. This they did to a certain extent, for they issued a proclamation and consented to place a guard on the frontier for the purpose of preventing Boer volunteers from crossing it. Mr. Hudson also sent an Agent to negotiate with the Tribes with the view to the restoration of peace; but, unfortunately, the negotiations were abortive, the war extended, and Mankoroane, who had sided with Montsioa, was also attacked. Then Boer volunteers began to crowd in; and, as an evidence of popular feeling in the Transvaal, it appears that in one case the very guards themselves, who were placed on the frontier to prevent volunteers crossing over, fraternized with them, and joined them in the war. Representations were made by Mr. Hudson, and a Correspondence followed; but nothing came of it, that I know, until July last year. In July, on the suggestion of Sir Hercules Robinson, Her Majesty's Government adopted a proposal

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  that the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the Cape Government should unite in sending a force of mounted police to clear the country, and drive away the marauding parties. That proposal, as might have been expected, came to nothing, because neither the Transvaal, nor the Orange Free State were inclined to listen to it. In the end, Montsioa and Monkoroane were compelled to place their territory under the Transvaal State, and to grant a large portion of their land to the White volunteers who had taken part in the war. The Transvaal Government accepted the cession, as far as they had power to do so; but it has not received the sanction of the Suzerain Power. The Treaty, therefore, is not a valid document, wanting that necessary qualification, and we have not acknowledged it. In February last, I telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson, asking if the Gape Government was favourable to the organization of a police force in the Colony, not with a view to putting an end to the war generally, but to prevent British subjects from taking part in these quarrels. The answer was that the Cape Government were prepared to consider the proposal; but it was their judgment, and, I am bound to say, that of the Governor also, that it would not be an effectual remedy, and Sir Hercules Robinson has told us that the only effectual remedy would be to clear the country by a military force, and to occupy it afterwards. He stated that the Bechuana territory had been swarmed over and occupied by adventurers coming, some of them, from the Orange Free State, from the Transvaal, and a few from our own Colony. Those from the Transvaal came, not with the direct support of their own Government, but undoubtedly with the very general support of the Dutch population; and it is an important feature in the ease that not only in the Transvaal, but throughout the whole of South Africa, where we know that a considerable majority of the White population are of Dutch descent, the sympathies of that population are, I am afraid, all in one direction. Well, my Lords, what, under these circumstances, are we to do? There are not many alternatives from which to choose. I think that, after what I have stated, and after what has appeared in the Blue Books, your Lordships will be of opinion, as I am, that it will be
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  simply useless to appeal to the authorities at Pretoria, and to call upon them to interfere. It will be of no use asking them to enforce the Convention. We might, no doubt, put pressure upon them, and we might, no doubt, succeed in making them feel that it was for their interest to do what we ask. But I call your Lordships' attention to this, as a material part of the case—could they do it if they tried? The Government of the Transvaal is a popular Government. I mean by that, a Government that rests upon a purely popular basis. It has no regular Army; it has no centralized Administration; it has no organized police. The only force it could possibly bring into the field, would be a force consisting of volunteers; and if such a force were formed and called out, it is, to my belief, as certain as anything can be, that the majority of them would join with the adventurers beyond the frontier, instead of attempting to put down the insurrection. I do not wish to mislead the House, or overstate the case. I am not contending that the authorities at Pretoria would be very willing to interfere, if it were in their power; but I am convinced that it is not in their power, that they could not interfere effectually, however much they might wish to do so. That being so, it seems to me that it is useless to blame those who are nominally in authority for not undertaking what is absolutely impossible for them to perform. Well, my Lords, excluding that alternative, what remains to be done? We may send an expedition on our own account into the disturbed country beyond the frontier. That is, no doubt, possible. It would not be inconsistent with justice, and, for the moment, it would, no doubt, be successful. But let me ask your Lordships to consider what that undertaking would involve. It would be madness, I say deliberately, to send a small force upon such an errand. We have had some lessons in that respect already, and we cannot afford to receive another check such as those we have received once or twice in South Africa before. You may argue that the number of lawless marauders and adventurers is comparatively small—not more than a few hundreds. But it is not the 500 or 600 who are actually on the spot with whom you have to deal. I am afraid you will find that a very large proportion of the Transvaal population and the people of

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  the Orange Free State would be ready to help them. Nor is this a case where, as in the case of the Zulu War, we should fight within easy reach of the coast, within easy reach of our depots, and with supplies reaching us by sea. The Bechuana country is 1,000 miles at least from Cape Town, with no railways, except for a very short distance, and with such roads as you might expect in a country of that kind. There is, it is true, another way from Port Elizabeth not quite so long; but I do not believe that route would offer any greater advantages. The cost of sending 2,000 men into that region, with all the necessary supplies, would be something fabulous. I dare say your Lordships will recollect that we did something of the sort in the case of the Abyssinian War. We thought it would be enough to spend £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 upon that Expedition; but it cost us nearly £10,000,000. I do not pretend that cost or risk are reasons for holding back, if a clear case of duty were made out; but, at least, they are considerations which, when we are dealing with this question, are not to be ignored. But, my Lords, there is something more to be considered. What good should we do by sending out an army merely to clear the country of those filibusters? They would return again directly the very moment our backs were turned. People say—"Send a force that will settle the matter once for all." Well, if we could do that, the object in view might justify some considerable sacrifice on our part. But you might as well talk of brushing off flies once for all; these adventurers will come hack as soon as your force has retired. You cannot permanently protect the Natives except by the one remedy that has been more than once pointed out—namely, that of occupying the country, and holding it with a British garrison. Now, I think that is really the alternative we have to face. It is not a mere question of clearing the country, nor one of sending out an expedition for a short time, and then relying on an armed police to keep the peace afterwards, but one of holding the whole of Bechuanaland, and guarding the frontier of the Transvaal. My Lords, I do not think that would be a wise thing to do, or that Parliament or the British nation would contemplate with pleasure the creation and mainten-
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  ance of a fresh British Province in the interior of South Africa—a Province which would be absolutely useless for the purposes of emigration, for it is not a place where European settlers are likely to go. It is absolutely unproductive for the purposes of trade; and, in fact, there is no countervailing advantage to be gained by the occupation. There is the further consideration that, by placing a force there, we should be laying ourselves open to endless quarrels with the Transvaal State. However much we might be in the right, we should have to face this fact, that we should have against us the sympathies of all the Dutch settlers—that is, of a considerable majority of the White population of South Africa. It appears to me to be the reductio ad absurdum to send out an expedition to such a place for such a purpose. Long before the expedition could arrive at its destination, the cost would far exceed the fee-simple value of the land it was employed to protect. It may be asked whether we are not bound to act under the terms of the Convention? I have studied the terms of the Convention, and I do not think we are. Undoubtedly, the Convention gives us the right to interfere; but it does not follow that it imposes upon us a corresponding obligation. If a man trespasses on my land, and does damage, I have a right to proceed against him; but it would be a strange doctrine to say that, therefore, I am bound to proceed against him, though the cost of law proceedings would exceed the damage done. Bechuanaland is of no value to us for any English, or for any Imperial purposes. It lies beyond the frontier of the Colony; far beyond it for the most part, and, politically, it is of no consequence to us whether Boers or Native Chiefs are in possession. But one obligation, and one only, I am ready to recognize in connection with that country. No doubt, the dispossessed Chiefs have acted as our allies to a certain extent, and they will suffer, to some extent, for taking our part. I say to some extent—I speak with that qualification—because the fighting between the Native Chiefs dates from long before the time of our annexation of the Transvaal, and also because it seems to me very probable that those Chiefs who took the opposite side, and acted as allies of the Boers, will not fare better than the rest

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  at the hands of their White allies I believe that in this matter there has been far less political feeling than a simple desire on the part of the adventurers—as I said in this House before—to get land without paying for it. We cannot, as I believe, restore order to the disturbed country without burdening our own people to an extent disproportionate to any good that we can do to the Bechuana Chiefs. But if we cannot do that, we can discharge our duty towards these Chiefs by compensating them in some measure for their losses. The difficulties and the expense of providing compensation, whether it might be in land or money, will, no doubt, be very great; but that difficulty is as nothing when compared with the only other practical alternative we have to face. I have instructed Sir Hercules Robinson to make inquiries, with a view to action in the sense I have indicated, and to ascertain what the Native Chiefs have suffered. My Lords, it may be said, and I know the argument has been used, that the liability involved in a military occupation would not be permanent, because, if we were to occupy the territory, the Cape Colony would be ready to take it off our hands, when once everything was quiet. My Lords, if that were so, I fully admit it might very much simplify the situation. But I speak with perfect certainty, when I say that that is absolutely the reverse of the fact. We know what has happened in Basutoland. The Cape Government have had quite enough of the responsibility of holding Native territory, and endeavouring to put down Native insurrections. They are thoroughly disgusted with the result of their Basutoland operations, and I am not surprised at it. They are, therefore, much more likely in future to desire to restrict their Native territory than to extend it. Another obvious consideration is this—that even admitting that we occupied Bechuanaland, we should not put an end to these quarrels. We should merely be going from one difficulty to another, for forays would take place in different directions, and if we were to follow these Boer adventurers wherever they might go beyond the Transvaal frontiers, we should attempt an impossibility, for we should have to follow them hundreds of miles to the Northward into the heart of the Portuguese territory. That is the course we
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  have already adopted more than once, and we have compelled the Boers to trek from one part of the country to another. They moved off into Natal. We followed them there. They moved into the Orange Free State, and they went into the Transvaal. We cannot continue the process for ever. As to the more comprehensive questions of the steps that we intend to take for the protection of the Natives in the future, it is hardly possible to give a general or definite answer, because everything depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. It is quite clear that we have neither the right under the Convention, nor the power to take into our hands the police of the Transvaal State. What we can do is to remonstrate, whatever may be the value of that remonstrance. ["Oh, oh!"] Of course, in the last resort, assuming the Treaty to be broken, we have the right of vindicating our claims under it by force; but I think your Lordships will agree that that is not a course to take, except under the compulsion of the most urgent necessity. In such matters, you have to consider not merely the result to be attained at the moment, but what is to follow. I do not think that any Member of this House is very likely to propose that we should endeavour permanently to hold the Transvaal country against the strong wishes of the inhabitants. We do not want another Ireland in South Africa; and I think I may say, with some confidence, that the Transvaal never would have been annexed, but for the assurance of persons on the spot, who were in a position to have known better, but who assured us that the annexation was desired by the Boers themselves, or, at the very worst, was not deprecated. Those assurances turned out to be groundless; and, whatever may be urged against the policy of retrocession, which is really the question involved in the debate raised by the noble Viscount, I think it is preferable to retaining a Province which added nothing while we held it to the strength and security of the Empire, and which would have been a source of endless bitterness and trouble. This, however, is a question which I will not now argue, and to which my noble Friend who preceded me in Office is more competent to do justice than I am. For myself, whatever can be done with the very limited powers at present in our possession, in

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  the interests of humanity, and in the prevention of these Tribal wars, under the Convention, I shall be willing and ready to do; but those powers are very limited and restricted. I hope I have now put the whole state of the ease before the House. I admit that there is much in the present situation which is unsatisfactory, and not what we could desire; but what we have to consider is whether, in attempting to provide a remedy, we might not possibly raise a worse difficulty than the one we are now attempting to solve.
  EARL CAIRNS: My Lords, there was some conversation last night on the question of reporting what was said in the House; and I observed it was said that, whatever might be the acoustic properties of the House, statements of importance were always perfectly heard, and perfectly well reported. I have no doubt that what the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) has said to-night has been perfectly well heard, and will be perfectly well reported, and will go out to the Transvaal, and will be read there with great care. The noble Earl spoke of the remonstrances he means to address to the Government of the Transvaal. My Lords, his speech will pro-cede his remonstrances, and I will undertake to assure him that after that speech, his remonstrances will be received with the most complete contempt. The Blue Book which has been placed before the House is certainly not very agreeable to read. It is not a very pleasant thing to find the Chief of a friendly Tribe addressing our Resident in these terms—
  "I wish to let you know that the Boers who have been fighting against me are now busily erecting beacons in the country given to the Bechuanas by the Convention of Pretoria. I wish to know if the English Government allows these freebooters to seize my country in this way? And whether the Convention they made at Pretoria with the Boers is really destroyed? Are these freebooters really under no government, and will they be allowed to do as they like?"
  And when we sent our Envoy to meet the Chiefs of the Tribes who have suffered, I find this is the report he gives us—
  "The Chief and council then pressed me (just as had been done by Montsioa and his council) to give them some information and some hope of intervention on their behalf; pressed hard upon me how unfalteringly they
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  had stood by the English and respected the English laws and line and 'the Queen's word.' I could only reply in the same general terms as I had done to Montsioa, and assure them that my duty did not extend further than to collect information, to see, to hear, to note down, and carefully report. I warned them against relying upon any active intervention on their behalf, and also against getting into still deeper trouble by recommencing hostilities or acting in any offensive way, and urged them generally to do all in their power to preserve peace and get an opportunity of pursuing peaceful avocations. What I said was received in silence. At last the Chief asked—'Why do you English take so much trouble and come down so far from time to time to make inquiries, and see with the eyes and hear with the ears, if nothing is to come of it? 'I could only say that I had come in pursuance of my instructions to observe and report, which I should fully and faithfully do. All beyond that was in much higher hands. The interview then closed."
  That is the way in which we are spoken to by Tribes who have befriended us, and helped us when we required their assistance. The noble Earl dwelt very much on this point, and in doing so he appeared to be anxious to exculpate, as far as he could, the Government of the Transvaal of all responsibility in these matters. He spoke again and again of filibusters, of individual attempts made to take the land of these Tribes and otherwise illtreat them, and the burden of his remarks seemed to be, I thought, to disconnect the Government of the Transvaal, as a Government, from all responsibility for what has been done. Now, I should like to put the matter on its proper footing. As regards the filibusters, I am not at all sure that that term may not be applied more correctly to the Boers, and if the noble Earl means that, I agree with him; but if he means that the Transvaal Government have not made themselves responsible for what has been done, I can only say that he does not read the Blue Book in the way in which I read it. As I understand the Blue Book, it was recognized by the Transvaal Government, when the work was done, when the Tribes were plundered, and they were forced to give in their adhesion to the Transvaal, that their land formed part and parcel of the Transvaal territory, and the Secretary of the Transvaal Government himself is very far from taking the view now put forward by the noble Earl. The document came from them, and went back to them, making these States part and parcel of the Transvaal territory. The Secretary to the Transvaal practically

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  says—"We are doing exactly what you complain of. We do not deny we have broken your Convention. It was a bad one. The very part we have broken we disliked." So far from attempting to shelter himself, he glories in what was done, and he says—"The British Government ought to be obliged to us for what we have done." I hope the noble Earl, in those violent remonstrances he is going to send, will adhere to the view he has taken here, that the Transvaal Government was not responsible, and it is only a question of filibustering. There is nothing in the matter that requires argument; we have it all in black and white. The whole case, as it presses on my mind, is to be found in this short compass—in the remonstrance or complaint which was made by Mr. Hudson, our Resident at Pretoria, to the Transvaal Government, as to which the noble Earl himself has sent a despatch, stating that he approves the language Mr. Hudson used. What does he say with regard to the breach of the Convention? Writing to the Secretary of the Transvaal State, he says—
  "It appears to me the action of your Government has been clearly inconsistent with the following provision of the Convention:—First, Article 18, section 3, sub-section B, inasmuch as the Government has been communicating and negotiating with Native Chiefs outside the Transvaal without reference to or making the British Resident the medium of such communications; second, the acceptance by the Government of any cession of territory contravenes the very first Article of the Convention, which fixes the boundaries of the territory and the State; thirdly, the promise of the Government to send a Commission to meet independent Chiefs residing outside the Transvaal, and to carry out the objects indicated in the letter, in my view, proposes to violate Article 2, section C, wherein the control of the external relations of the State is reserved to Her Majesty."
  He regards the action of the Government as illegal, in consequence of the violation of the Convention. The noble Earl says of this—
  "Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the terms of Mr. Hudson's letter to the Transvaal Government of the 30th of November, and observe with surprise and regret that his representations as to the undoubted infractions of the Convention of the 3rd of August, 1881, have not been answered in a more satisfactory manner."
  There is nothing to argue about; the Convention has been broken in every term which referred to the maintenance of peace outside the Transvaal. The
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  Resident remonstrates, and the noble Lord approves his language. What is the reply of the Secretary to the Transvaal, which the noble Earl says truly is unsatisfactory? This is it—
  "The Government plainly see by your letter the deep interest you take in this case, and your own conviction that highly important reasons have induced the Government to adopt a line of action which you call, on three points, a violation of the Convention and illegal. It is really so; highly important reasons had induced the Government to send a message to the Caffre Chiefs; but the Government are under the impression that by this step it has deserved the thanks of the British Government, rather than the blame expressed in your letter."
  "It is really so." This is the answer of the Secretary to the Transvaal Government; it is a violation of the Convention, and he says a good many reasons induced the Government to break it. He says—"We have broken the Convention, and you ought to thank us for doing it." Why? "These Chiefs came to us and they asked us to take them under our protection. They were very tired of quarrelling among themselves, and they thought the best thing they could do would be to come into the Transvaal State. Therefore, we took them in." Is this true? Our own Resident was commissioned to investigate the matter, and I am anxious you should hear a few sentences from the authentic Report. This is the view of Sir Hercules Robinson.
  "Mr. Rutherford gives a deplorable account of the straits to which the Chiefs Montsioa and Mankoroane, with their Tribes, have been reduced by the operations of the gangs of White marauders calling themselves Moshette's and Massouw's volunteers, who, without a shadow of a grievance against either Montsioa or Mankoroane, have assailed those Chiefs for the purpose of despoiling them of their lands and cattle. He points out also that, in the pursuit of plunder, these freebooters are regardless of human life, and the annexures to his Report specify, by name, a series of cruel, cowardly, and cold blooded murders of Natives, including even those of women and children. After carefully perusing these papers, it appears to me difficult to resist the conclusion that the Transvaal Government are morally responsible for these proceedings."
  Mr. Rutherford, the Secretary to the British Resident, gives the convictions which were forced on his mind by his mission to and beyond the South-Western borders of the State. He traces the murder of the 15 of Jan Massibi's men, and he says—

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  "I think the complicity of the Boers present at the attack and surrender extends to this, but not beyond this, viz., they promised immunity, but took no steps at all to insure it, before handing over the prisoners to the will and pleasure of the barbarous Chiefs to whom they had hired themselves as 'volunteers,' nor any steps at all, at the time or since, to prove that what happened—viz., the murder of the 15 men—was a thing which they did not anticipate, and against which they afterwards expressed either indignation or remonstrance."
  He further says of Montsioa and Mankoroane—
  "The position and calamities which have fallen upon these Chiefs are very lamentable. It is no exaggeration to say, that during the time of my visit their country was being appropriated by the White people precisely in whatever locality and to what extent they pleased. I have no reason to believe otherwise than this lust of land has day by day since I left that part of the country increased and been practically developed rather than abated, and that immunity from interference in the shape of some powerful factor from outside will daily add to the wrongful acquisition of land and property until an uninhabitable desert or the sea is reached as an ultimate point. The continued immunity from interference by some civilized and sufficiently powerful Government will inevitably lead, is daily leading, to an accession, to the number of 'freebooters' both of land and property from the Transvaal, the Free State, and also from Colonial borders. Tribe after tribe will be pushed back and back upon other tribes, or absolutely perish in the process which is going on; the only 'peace' that will be made will be continually progression, subjugation, or extinction."
  The only other passage I will quote is part of Mankoroane's own account, in which he gives us another touching story. I cannot read it all; but in the course of it he says—
  "'All my cattle which were not sent very far away in time have been stolen, and although it is "peace," they are being stolen every day, even those which had been sent for safety beyond the Griquland West line. I believe I have lost about 25,000 head of cattle and horses during the fighting. The number is uncountable. Most of my people are quite ruined. I have hardly recaptured anything. This place and my people were all locked in, and could not go out to recapture or capture. I have never trespassed over the Convention line. At the beginning of the siege and before it began, I had some slight success (as before Mamusa), but, respecting the Queen's line, did not not follow up my enemies after I had beaten them off, for they went always in and out of the Transvaal. Ever since the pretended peace, my people's goods are being stolen, and they are often fired upon, if they try to herd them not far from the station. A man who went only a few days ago to fetch some cattle from beyond the line which had been sent there to plough for a friend, have been stolen on the road and the man killed. I
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  will make "Daumas" get proper affidavits, and send them to you at Christiana.'"
  There is the story of the ruin and extermination of these friendly Tribes. They appeal to us to know whether we are going to assist them in any way. The Agent of the British Government complains that the Convention is broken. The noble Earl approves his language; there is no doubt it is broken, in every term which relates to these Natives. And then the noble Earl says—"It is broken; but there is nothing in it which binds us to interfere or to take any step." No, my Lords, there never is. I never heard of a Convention in which we stipulated and bound ourselves to do anything; that is not the form in which Conventions are usually framed. The question is, what are we morally bound to do? I recognize as much as the noble Earl does all the difficulties of an expedition in a country like this. He compared it to an expedition to Abyssinia. I could not help recollecting that some two years ago, addressing your Lordships upon this Convention, I anticipated exactly what has occurred. I said—"You are making a Convention; but will it protect the Natives? In order to protect them you will have to interfere and take proceedings; and an invasion of the Transvaal will be like an invasion of Abyssinia, except that you had no troops in Abyssinia, and you have them in the Transvaal." What has happened is this? The fact is, that two years ago Her Majesty's Government were afraid, in the face of the country, of not having something to show in the shape of a Convention, and so they made a Convention which is not worth the paper on which it is written. Yet they persuaded the people of this country that it was a real instrument, and the people were soft enough to believe that it would secure the safety and well-being of these friendly Tribes who were in danger of extermination. I suppose, indeed, that the Government themselves believed the same thing; but, if so, they were labouring under a vast amount of hallucination. It was obvious that the Government would be without the means of enforcing the Convention and would be driven into the dilemma which the noble Earl has so piteously and so mournfully described. I do not want to embarrass the Government by tendering to them advice as to what they should do, or what they should

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  not do; but there is one question which I should like to ask them. If the view of the noble Earl is to prevail, if the Convention is to remain broken, and if nothing is to be done, is the Sovereign of this country going to remain Suzerain over the Transvaal with all its plunder? Is the Sovereign of this country to be Suzerain of this large district of the country which has been filched from its rightful owners by the Transvaal? Are we to be the receivers of stolen goods? Is that the position to be occupied by the Sovereign of this country, who has been dignified with the style of Suzerain at the express device of the present Government? Is the Sovereign of England to be imagined by the Tribes of South Africa to be the Suzerain to the Transvaal, and are they to see that their territory has been violently, wrongfully, and immorally taken from them by the country of which our Sovereign is the Suzerain? That is the question to which I should like to have an answer from Her Majesty's Government.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he would first notice the criticisms of the noble and learned Earl opposite (Earl Cairns) upon some of the observations of his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) with respect to the conduct of the Transvaal Government. He thought the noble and learned Earl had misunderstood his noble Friend's remarks. The noble and learned Earl supposed that his noble Friend was not aware of the fact, that the Government of the Transvaal had directly violated the Convention in the communications to which reference had been made with the Bechuana Chiefs. That that was a direct violation of the Convention there could not be the slightest doubt; but his noble Friend pointed out that he thought the Transvaal Government had not been directly concerned in the proceedings which had led to such lamentable results. That was his (the Earl of Kimberley's) own opinion also; but he was not going to stand up to excuse the Transvaal Government. That, indeed, was the last thing he should undertake to do. What he thought correctly described the attitude of the Transvaal Government in the earlier part of those transactions was a sentence of Sir Hercules Robinson in a despatch which the noble and learned Earl had quoted. Sir Hercules Robinson said they had connived at
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  those transactions when the Convention was made. That was, he believed, a very correct description of what they had done. They took some action in placing some police on the frontier; but, in their hearts and in their wishes, they doubtless desired the success of the marauders. The history of the matter would show why this territory had been the subject of constant dispute for at least 15 years. There were troubles there as long ago as when he (the Earl of Kimberley) was Colonial Secretary in Mr. Gladstone's former Government, and the Transvaal Boers, who occupied a considerable portion of the territory, their right to which we never acknowledged, had always, he believed, intended in some manner or other to get possession of that territory again. When we made the Convention, it was hoped that, by laying down what was believed to be a fair boundary line, it would be possible to put an end to these troubles by satisfying the Boers. It was obvious, however, that that expedient had not succeeded. As regarded the Chiefs Mankoroane and Montsioa, though he would admit that we were under a certain obligation to them, it was necessary not to place that obligation too high. They were never subjects of the Queen, and could not even be correctly described as our allies. Our relations with them did not arise out of the Transvaal affair, but out of certain difficulties which occurred in Griqualand West some years ago, when they acted on our side. In the Transvaal affair they maintained a friendly attitude, but they took no part in the disturbances. The whole question lay in this—whether it was, or was not, necessary to retain by force our position in the Transvaal? He was one of those who, to a certain extent, welcomed the action of the late Government when they took possession of the Transvaal. He did so upon the ground that he was told at the time, and he believed it on the authority of the Government, that we were about to take possession of the Transvaal with the consent of the Boers. Unfortunately, that statement turned out not to have been well-founded, and he said now, as he said then, that it would be a very fortunate thing for this country, if we could have held the Transvaal with the consent of the Boers, for by no other possible means could we secure South

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  Africa against the continual disturbances created by freebooters on the frontiers and in distant parts of the country. But everything depended on our having the consent and assistance of the White inhabitants; and when it turned out that not only were we not acting with the consent of the White inhabitants, but that they were in open revolt, and when that open revolt had the sympathy of the great majority of the Dutch in South Africa, he maintained there was but one alternative—namely, that which we took, of retiring from the country. Having retired, we accepted the consequences of that retirement, and the only question that could be raised was whether it was right or not to make a stipulation such as was made in the Convention for the protection of the Natives after we had retired from the Transvaal. He doubted whether the Natives would have been in any better plight if we had simply retired from the Transvaal without any stipulations. There was one thing which, the Boers desired, and that was that their deeds should be done in the dark, and there was nothing which would have greater effect upon them than that these deeds should be dragged to the light. Formerly Her Majesty's Government had great difficulty in getting authentic information on the subject; but, through the Resident and the Convention, there had been means of bringing to the Boer Government a thorough knowledge of our views and feelings with regard to their action against the Natives, and it was just possible that our remonstrances might create a more healthy public opinion in South Africa on this subject. His noble Friend had pointed out that the sympathies of the majority of the people in South Africa were with these marauders. If they were not, let the Colonies make some sign that they did not sympathize with them. If they made no sign, they were morally accomplices. The difficulty of this country was, that in dealing with South Africa on a Native question, we had not the sympathies of the White population. This prevented Her Majesty's Government from carrying into effect the policy which they naturally desired. Either we must hold South Africa strongly by force and maintain our policy, whether the Colonists like it or not; or, else we must acquiesce in a
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  great many things being done in these Colonies which the majority of the people in this country do not approve. For his own part, he was not favourable to a thorough policy. He would not say—"As we cannot have our own way about all these things, we will not attempt to control these Colonies at all." We must continue to exercise such a salutary influence as we could over the Colonists. In the dealings of the Colonists with the Basutos, he saw that they were beginning to take a sounder view of what their relations with the Natives ought to be. The Orange Free State was more advanced than the Transvaal, although some men had gone from the Orange Free River State to join those marauders. The Transvaal was the great refuge of all the unruly spirits in South Africa; it might, in fact, be called a kind of Alsatia; and, although he did not defend or excuse the Government of the Transvaal, it would not be quite fair to overlook the fact that, from the weakness of their Government, they had a difficulty in controlling such a population. No doubt, their conduct had been marked by a want of consideration for the engagements into which they had entered, which was a disgrace to any Government; and, as regarded one point which had been referred to by the noble Viscount who had introduced that discussion (Viscount Cranbrook), he must say deliberately that a more impudent answer than that given by the Secretary of the Transvaal Government it had never been his lot to read, and any man ought to have been ashamed to give it. As to the pretext that the facts were not true, they certainly demanded a fair and reasonable answer from the Transvaal Government. Sir Henry Bulwer's action had been in every respect what it should be. There could not be a more monstrous assertion than that he had said or done anything inconsistent with the arrangement made with the Boers. Those Natives came down from the country, and, so far from Sir Henry Bulwer giving them any encouragement he simply told them to return as they came. Now, he entirely concurred in the course which his noble Friend said he intended to take. He (the Earl of Kimberley) had himself lately been responsible for the conduct of Colonial affairs, and he said personally, that it was his strong individual opinion that nothing could possibly be

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  more imprudent, nothing could less eon-tribute to the permanent peace of South Africa, nothing could less conduce to the ultimate welfare of the Natives themselves, than that we should undertake to send an expedition into the Bechuana territory. Such an expedition, unless we were able to occupy the country, would be complete folly; and to occupy the country, without holding all the neighbouring country, without holding the most commanding position towards the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State, would put us in a situation in which we ought not to be placed. The question was asked, what course the Government would take in regard to the Suzerainty over the Transvaal? He did not think that the time had arrived for the deliberate consideration of that point; but he had no hesitation in saying that if the maintenance of that Suzerainty meant that we were to be responsible for such atrocities as those committed on the Transvaal Frontier, or to acquiesce in the tone assumed by the Transvaal Government—if it meant that, he thought that, when the time came, it was not difficult to see what the answer of Her Majesty's Government would be.
  EARL STANHOPEsaid, he could not help regarding the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) as a masterly illustration of laisser-faire policy. The noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns) had most convincingly shown that the Convention had not been observed. In that case, he (Earl Stanhope) would like to know what was the advantage of signing a Convention, the provisions of which could be broken without our being able to insist on their observance? The noble Earl who had last spoken (the Earl of Kimberley) had said that there were two courses open to us with regard to Bechuanaland. But there was still a third course, one much better for the credit of the country, and that was to withdraw Her Majesty's Representative from Pretoria, and tear up the Convention. The noble Earl implied that we were not bound to carry out the Convention. If that were so, what object could be served by keeping it in existence?
  LORD BRABOURNEsaid, that he had not known that this question was about to be debated, and should not
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  have risen, but for the speeches of the noble Earls the present and late Secretary for the Colonies. He wished, in the first place, to correct an historical inaccuracy into which the last-named noble Earl had fallen. It was not correct to say that the Government had been misinformed as to the opinion of the White population of the Transvaal at the time of annexation. The truth was, that, although there was a protest on the part of a few officials, the main part of the population were rightly stated to be favourable to annexation at that time. It was when British power had put out of their way the Zulu King, and the other Native Chiefs who had threatened their existence, that a change came over them, and they found themselves able to rebel against the Power which had preserved them from destruction. The condition of the Transvaal and the helplessness of the Boer Government at that time amply justified the annexation. He (Lord Brabourne) had heard with shame and regret the words of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, owning that this Convention had been broken again and again, and having no stronger language to use than that he could not defend the Transvaal Government from the charge of bad manners and bad taste. If, when this country entered into a Convention with another, and that other confessedly broke that Convention again and again, the Minister of the Crown had nothing to say but a complaint of bad manners and bad taste, could anyone wonder that the reputation of England had diminished, that her character suffered, and that her name was despised in South Africa, as it would be if the same course was pursued in other parts of the world? The Government could not fairly say that anything unexpected had come upon them, or that they had not had fair warning. Before they had taken a single step towards quitting the Transvaal, he (Lord Brabourne), as he would humbly remind the House, had fully laid before their Lordships the past history of the Boers, and what would inevitably follow if the country was given up to them. More eloquent tongues than his had prophesied the same, and it was because they had neglected every warning that they had landed themselves in their present difficulties. But a passage in the speech of the noble

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  Earl (the Earl of Kimberley) surprised him still more. That noble Earl had just said that the British Government holding the Transvaal was the only possible means of preserving the peace of South Africa, inasmuch as they were a strong and honest Government—a comparison with the Government of the Boers into which he (Lord Brabourne) would not enter. But if the holding of the Transvaal by the British Government was the only possible way to secure the peace of South Africa, what stronger condemnation could there be of the policy of the present Government in its abandonment? Why was the annexation justified? For that very reason—that the lawless conduct of the Boers, and their quarrels with the Native Tribes, added to the disputes between the Tribes themselves, had reduced the country to such a state that our occupation of it was necessary to give security to life and property. But why had the Government relinquished that occupation? It was but too easy to explain. There had been Governments whose main object was to uphold the honour and reputation of England, and who, when they had taken measures to effect this object, appealed with confidence to Parliament and the country to support them. But the present Government had one idea—to get rid of responsibility. Their endeavour to get rid of responsibility in South Africa had landed them in all their present troubles; and until the Government learned that there were responsibilities which could not be evaded and shirked, but which must be boldly and resolutely borne, they would never govern the country as England had a right to expect.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not know whether the Government are satisfied with the debate that has taken place to-night; but I can hardly think that their supporters will derive much satisfaction from what has passed, because the Government appear to have entirely ignored that which, in the eyes of most people, will be the principal question upon which the country will have to decide. They have addressed themselves simply to this one point, whether they ought to go to war in South Africa or not; but I think the people of this country will be disposed to view the policy of the Government in the Transvaal as a whole, and to ask, Has
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  that policy been a success? They will be disposed to ask whether this Convention, which, two years ago, we were assured was to be so brilliant a means of extricating ourselves from all difficulties in the Transvaal, has effected the results which were expected of it? As a matter of fact, the Convention has absolutely failed. The noble Earl the late Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Kimberley) said that the hope of Her Majesty's Government was that, by drawing a line, they would prevent any further disputes from taking place. When, in the memory of the noble Earl, has such a phenomenon taken place, as that the drawing of a line, without the provision of any force to maintain that line, has effected any settlement of differences that previously existed? The noble Earl who now holds the seals of the Colonial Office (the Earl of Derby), in the pathetic and melancholy speech with which he introduced the subject, asked us, in a manner which excited in us sincere compassion, What shall we do? There is no easier policy for a Government than to ask Parliament what they should do; and there is no policy which the noble Earl himself is better fitted to carry out. But what we wish to know is, whether this Convention was a reality or not—whether the Government two years ago believed that they settled the South African difficulty by signing this Convention; and, when they signed it, what was their intention with respect to it? Did they mean it to be a real thing or not? Did they mean to carry out its provisions? What was their view in case the stipulations on the other side were broken? Did they, from the first, intend this, that the moment the stipulations on the other side were broken, they would themselves treat the Convention as waste paper altogether? It is perfectly true, as the noble Earl says, that we did not bind ourselves to interfere; but was there never any intention to interfere? The circumstances, as has been observed in this debate, are by no means new. The character of the Boers is a well-known character. They have, from the first, treated the claims of the Natives that surround them with little humanity, and shown a constant disregard of their rights. I believe that the origin of the Boer nation—the origin of the emigration from which they sprang—was a dis-

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  satisfaction with the policy of this country in abolishing slavery in South Africa; and what they were at first, they have continued to the end. As Sir Hercules Robinson says, encroachment has been their very life. They have been engaged in a perpetual career of filibustering, broken only by the short interval during which their country was under British rule. These things were known from the first; and if the Government imagined that by simply signing a Treaty, that by simply expressing a wish, they could induce the Boers to give up this habit, which was the habit of their whole history and existence, they might as reasonably have hoped, by lecturing, to induce the Ethiopian to change his skin, or to persuade the wolves, in some woodlands impossible of access, to abandon the habit of feeding upon sheep. I am not here to recommend any particular course of policy in this difficulty in which the Government have placed themselves. I hold that it is not the business of Parliament to advise the Government, but that it is for the Government to take measures, and to submit them to the judgment of Parliament. I am now concerned with asking, What are there-suits of the policy which Her Majesty's Government has already pursued? They appear to think that this character of Suzerain, that these illusory obligations which have been taken up by the Queen on their recommendation, are a matter of very little moment. They can put this character of Suzerainty on as they would a robe at a masquerade, and throw it off again, and then think no harm has been done. It served its purpose at the moment in hoodwinking the public opinion of England. It covered a retreat which otherwise would have been too disgraceful even for the tolerant public opinion of England of the moment; and, having served its purpose, it can be freely and contentedly cast aside. But they forget what abundance of human suffering is caused by this policy of publishing promises which they have no intention to perform. They forget how many Tribes on the borders of the Transvaal have been induced to expose themselves to rapine, to starvation, to murder, to every kind of outrage at the hands of the Boers, on the faith of the Queen's word, which they now find means nothing. We have heard nothing now of the duty of the
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  English Government towards the Native Paces of South Africa. That subject has been passed very lightly over; but it was not passed very lightly over at the time when this Convention was recommended to Parliament. There was one voice, at least, which spoke with authority on that subject; and the assurance that he gave tended more than anything else to assuage that feeling of uneasiness which had taken hold of very influential classes in this country. Because, remember, my Lords, that there were two set currents of feeling opposed to the policy of the Government in respect of the Transvaal two years ago. There were those who were jealous of the honour and interests of England; there were those who thought we were bound to have broken the power of the Boers after all that had taken place; but, besides those, there was a large number of people who had little sympathy, perhaps, with ideas of a military kind, but who felt intensely and deeply for the dangers to which the Native Paces of Africa would be exposed; and it was to that feeling, prevalent largely among the supporters of the Government, that the Government were especially sensitive. How did Mr. Gladstone recommend this Convention? He said—
  "What was still more important was, that we should reserve sufficient power to make provision for the interests of the Natives. And this reservation of foreign relations was a most important one as regards the interests of the Natives, because a very large portion of the Native interests of the community involves the Natives beyond the Frontier of the Transvaal. Therefore, the whole of the interests of the Natives beyond the Frontier of the Transvaal will be retained in the hands of the British Government by the retention of the Suzerainty."
  What mockery that language is now! These Natives, whose interests have been retained in our hands by the retention of the Suzerainty, are the Natives whom we are abandoning without an attempt to defend them from any atrocities which the ingenuity of the Boers can inflict. Mr. Gladstone also said—
  "Now, I contend that we have put ourselves in the position to.….provide a far more efficient safeguard than we could have had for the interests of the Natives if we had retained the Transvaal in the Colonial connection."—(3 Hansard,[263] 1859–60.)
  I have no doubt of the sincerity with which those words were uttered; but I ask, could words, in view of events that

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  have taken place, have been devised more calculated effectually to hoodwink the opinion of the people of England? These Natives, whom Mr. Gladstone wished to retain the power to protect, and whom Sir Hercules Robinson distinctly stated had always been faithful British allies, we have now abandoned. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) stated that the Transvaal Government had no moral responsibility.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: Excuse me; I said nothing of the kind. I said I had not a word to say is defence of the Transvaal Government.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Is this the only injury on these unfortunate people which our policy has inflicted? It is hard enough, after all these professions, that we should abandon them; but it seems to me there is something worse, and that is the contempt with which we are loading the British name in South Africa. I know not whether any Members of the Government think it, at this penitential season, a wholesome exercise to listen to assurances of contempt; but if they desire such a discipline, this Blue Book is full enough of wholesome material for them. Is it possible to concieve contempt in any form of official language—contempt more distinctly, more openly stated than in the letters of the Secretary to the Transvaal Government? Is it possible to conceive contempt more pathetically stated than in the remonstrances of these unfortunate Chiefs, who so long had trusted to our interference, and who, hearing of our language upon the subject, in their after ruin, said what was the use of inquiry after inquiry, if nothing was to be done? My Lords, depend upon it that that contempt will not be confined to those whose mouths have spoken, and whose pens have written, the words we find in these papers. We have been told of the deep sympathy which unites all the Dutch Colonists with the inhabitants of the Transvaal. Depend on it that that sympathy will extend to the contempt with which the Transvaal has evidently learnt to look upon the British name. The Natives and the Dutchmen throughout the whole of South Africa will have learnt from those of their own race and colour that the English word may be passed and nothing may be done, that assurances may be given which, when distress comes, will be en-
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  tirely forgotten, and that those who trust to the British Government run the danger of absolute ruin. You may read in future dangers of other parts of your Empire the utter folly of treating with the levity with which you have treated it the credit and the good fame of this country.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I had not intended to take any part in this discussion, having more limited information upon the subject, particularly with regard to details, than my noble Friends; and I do not think it would be of any use my going again over the ground, which has been trodden by the two noble Earls behind me in the very accurate, very clear, and very frank statements they have made with regard not only to the existing state of things in the Transvaal, but also to the general tendency of the present policy of Her Majesty's Government. But the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) has put very pointedly to Her Majesty's Government what they think must be the result of this debate upon the country. What I remarked most was that the chief object of the noble Marquess was to point out how disgracefully the Government behaved two years ago in ratifying the Convention which they signed, and he says one result of this debate will be to impress this still more strongly upon the minds of the country. I am quite sure that the country will not be inclined to confine its political retrospect to the last two years only. The country, I think, will have the good sense to consider the position we were placed in by the previous policy of the late Government, and, to use the noble Marquess's own words, "the most extraordinary levity" with which they embarked in that most unfortunate annexation of the Transvaal. The country will consider the difficulties in which we were then placed; and when we were left to deal with the matter, that there were really no alternatives left to us which were not open to the gravest objections. What I wish to remark, and what I think the country will not fail to note, is that although the arguments of the noble Marquess, as well as those of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook), were in favour of violent measures at this moment, neither actually recommended them. At the same time, I certainly noticed that the noble and learned Earl

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  who spoke third in the debate (Earl Cairns) freely acknowledged the difficulties of taking any such course, and carefully guarded himself against making any such recommendation. I think that what I have pointed out constitute the most valuable results of the discussion which has taken place.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.