§ LORD STRATHNAIRN,in rising to call the attention of the House to the speech of the late Secretary of State for War, delivered at Pontefract on the 13th of March, 1882, in which he stated that recruits and under-age men are unfavourable features in the corps of 12 battalions, of 1,250 men each, which he had organized to meet an emergency or sudden war; and, further, to the necessity which had occurred before the Egyptian operations of transferring inefficient men from battalions who were the first for foreign service, and replacing them by men of the First Class Army Reserve; also, to call attention to the alarming state of the present recruiting organization, said, he was anxious to give expression, with one exception, to the gratitude of all friends of the Army and the country for the wise and manly admission of the noble Marquess the present Secretary of State for War, that the short-service without pension—the Civil Minister of War's system—had 1840 broken down, and was to be replaced by the long service with pension—the Duke of Wellington's system, which had proved itself triumphant. The exception was, that the measure was only to be temporary. He had, however, to complain of the ever-varying regulations of the War Office, which engendered much distrust and inefficiency; and he considered that, at the present time, the right course was to forget all differences, and unite in a common effort in working out the remedy for the present unsatisfactory state of things. Without any exultation over the fulfilment of the predictions of himself and his Colleagues, there was nothing they would not do to assist Her Majesty's Government in restoring to the Army its efficiency and the prestige and position which it had, by Heaven's mercy, ever held, and would hold, in the estimation of the world. But, on the other hand, there was nothing they would not do, in fairness and honour, to avert the calamity of such an evil as the revival of the short-service system and its adjuncts, which bore the evidence of the omnipotence of a Civil Minister of War, and his profound ignorance of military matters, but especially of the sine quânon of an Army, its recruiting, by his disregard of the opinions and advice of the Commander-in-Chief, and of an official promise made to His Royal Highness in Parliament—he meant the pari passu case upon which the whole question hinged, which, with attraction of pension, would have insured the triumph of long service. The consequences of those errors were desertions from the regiment itself, and from one regiment to another; fraudulent enlistments without a parallel for a series of years, and want of discipline and esprit de corps in peace. And in war, panics, a fearful military massacre, defeats, and humiliations, such as in Zululand and the Transvaal, unknown before in our annals of war. It was the War Minister's complete ignorance of the vital attraction of long service with its pension, an attraction re-echoed by every officer of experience from the Duke of Wellington downwards, which had brought the Army to the brink of ruin. In 1870 a radical change, so vast and comprehensive as to be a revolution in our military organization, took place under the direction of the Civil Minister 1841 of War, who was its author, and to whom was intrusted, for the first time, the quasi-independence of the War Office of the Commander-in-Chief. He did not even possess the military instincts so frequently found in civilians. His antecedents were unmilitary. He had been Private Secretary — he (Lord Strathnairn) had no doubt a good one—to a very pacific Prime Minister, and had held some such other employment. But so long as British statesmanship countenanced the Civil government of the Army—that was a Civil Minister of War, who knew nothing about war or armies, and who acted, not only without the concurrence, but against the advice and opinions of the Commander-in-Chief, with plenary powers to carry out what reforms he chose, and with carte blanche on the Treasury to pay for them—so long should we have to deplore waste of millions of money, when the expense of short-service wars and reverses were taken into calculation, and a great waste of human life, and young recruits called on to bear trials in the hardship of war which the unanimous opinion of the Medical Department declared they were unable to bear. [The noble and gallant Lord then gave a history of the short-service system, and called attention to the number of desertions and the shortcomings of the system.] Resuming, he said he would call their Lordships' attention to the remarks of Sir Frederick Roberts after his return from India, when, in returning thanks for the toast of his health, he said that it was his duty to tell the country the truth as to his experience in the field of the two systems, which he made perfectly intelligible by saying that when his superior in Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart, justly selected for his high merits to be Commander-in-Chief in India, offered him the privilege of selecting his own force, a favour from one brother officer to another, which, as Sir Frederick Roberts said, could not be surpassed, he took all the old soldiers, and left all the young ones behind. He (Lord Strathnairn) himself and his Colleagues entertained the same belief, that it was their duty to tell Parliament and the country the truth as to these two Services; and whatever might be the result of this military crisis, it would always be a consolation to them to do their duty by their Sovereign and their country.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Morley), who spoke for the Government, seldom failed to justify any deficiencies that might be pointed out in the state of the Army, and it was useless, therefore, for him (the Earl of Longford) to enumerate the acknowledged defects of the Service. The noble Earl was apparently satisfied with the official answers that were given, and content to consider an Army on paper as equal to one ready to take the field. None of the present authorities of the War Office were immediately responsible for these defects; but he might earnestly beg those now in power to consider very seriously some matters to which the attention of the Department might be advantageously directed. Without wishing to throw blame on anyone, it must, he thought, be admitted that the present organization of the Military Service of the country had not had satisfactory results. When short service was established, it was announced as one of the first conditions essential for its success that there should always be a Force, sometimes called a Division, and sometimes called a Corps, ready for service. But no such thing had ever been approached; and on the two occasions when Expeditionary Forces of no great strength had been called for, it had not been forthcoming. First, they had had to draw volunteers from other regiments; and, secondly, it was necessary to begin by using the Reserve. He also doubted whether the enrolling of recruits below the standard was filling up the ranks in a satisfactory manner. The system of linking battalions, too, could hardly be said to have realized the intentions with which it had been adopted—the foreign battalion was to be kept complete, without exhausting the home battalion. Result—the home battalion was exhausted, and the foreign battalion was not complete. And as to the territorial system, they did not find it had been successful in bringing their recruits from every corner of the Kingdom, as it was expected it would do, for it was found that the recruits preferred to go to some other regiments than those of their several districts. In one Militia regiment 120 men volunteered for the Line, on the distinct understanding that they were not to go to the local corps. These facts necessarily had some reference to the opinions prevalent amongst 1843 officers; and, although he scarcely liked to say anything about their grievances in that connection, he might point out that the prospects of many officers had been so interfered with, and their expectations so disappointed by the endless changes which had been made, that if the noble Earl had the same opportunities that he (the Earl of Longford) had, of hearing their views, he would consider some improvement in the present arrangements. As a matter of administration, he might ask where the new War Office was which they had been in such a hurry last year to protest against as standing across the Mall? There were no signs that the erection of the building was about to be taken in hand, though the necessity for it had been recognized for the last 20 years. In his opinion, the time had come when these questions should be faced; they were but a few of the complaints usually made as to the Army, but they were, he was convinced, so well founded that the efficiency of the Service largely depended on their removal.
THE MARQUESS OF HERTFORDsaid, he felt that there ought to be no politics in military matters, and after the very candid and lucid way in which, three weeks ago, his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for War (the Earl of Morley) responded to a Question put by the noble Earl below himself (the Marquess of Hertford), who had held the office of Under Secretary of State for War (the Earl of Longford), he should not feel justified in saying a word which could increase the difficulties of the War Office. But all that had been adduced by the noble and gallant Field Marshal (Lord Strathnairn), who had preceded him, was thoroughly true, and his opinions, and the opinions of the noble Earl who had just spoken, were in effect the opinions of 99 out of 100 of the regimental officers of the Army. They were the last who had been consulted during the last 12 years, and they had scarcely had a word to say about the changes that had been made. The failures, which were being somewhat tardily confessed, arose from the English system of trusting her Army to civilians, which was adopted by no other civilized country in the world. If they were allowed to remain in Office, and to acquire the necessary experience, the Army would have far less to complain of. But the practice 1844 was that Secretary of State after Secretary of State was changed, and the moment a man got a smattering of experience in the War Department he was superseded by another. While subaltern Officers of the Army were required to pass very stringent examinations, no steps whatever were taken, by way of examination, to ascertain whether the Secretary of State for War knew anything about Army matters. So long as we went on this way, so long should we have serious failures. He knew he should be told that there were military men in the War Office, who were from time to time consulted; but if they inquired who they were, they would find that there was hardly a regimental officer among them. He was afraid it was now most thoroughly ascertained that, year after year, during the last 12 years, military affairs had been more and more taken out of the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and placed in those of the Secretary of State for War. The noble Viscount (Viscount Cardwell), whose absence from the House he regretted, he was sure was prompted by the best wishes for the welfare of the Army when he propounded his scheme contrary to the opinions of regimental officers. Twelve years had elapsed, and it had entirely disappointed the expectations that had been upheld as to its success. Our first line of defence was crumbling away, our Reserve was hardly worth the name, and we had about 20,000 men instead of the 80,000 men the noble Viscount promised us. At a cost of £3,500,000 we had erected extensive barracks to carry out the territorial system, which had broken down; and we had given up our grand old regimental system, which the Duke of Wellington and others had considered the best system in Europe. The fact was the barrack was no longer the home of the soldier; the time of service was so short that the officers could not possibly become accustomed to the men, and the drill, consequently, could not be properly performed, for they did not know each other as they used to do; the men could not settle down and feel at home; and the men did not feel the same confidence in their officers as they once did. In the old days of long service, an officer knew that, if he lost his life in the Service, his widow and children would be taken care of; but now, they knew little of each 1845 other. The medical men knew nothing of the rank and file, were less able to detect malingering, and had no opportunity to become acquainted with the constitutions of the men, and to win their confidence. Then the men could have no confidence in new doctors whom they had, perhaps, never seen before, as they could have in the old regimental surgeons. The short-service system was not applicable to a volunteer Army. It might be all very well in Germany or France, where the Army was enlisted by conscription; but with our voluntary system it was not possible to make it work. He would, therefore, appeal to the Government to revert, as soon as it could, to the long-service system, though, of course, it would be a question of time. He was glad to see that the Marquess of Hartington, a short time after he became Secretary of State for War, allowed service with the Colours to be extended to 12 years; but he was afraid the mischief was done. The men who had been three years in the Service would not accept the offer to be made to them. They had not been living comfortably, and they were anxious to get away to their former employments. They would, however, find in many cases that their places had been permanently taken by others, and they would have to begin life again. Thus, the Reserves would become the worst enemies of recruiting, and their complaints of the Service and of their own condition would deter others from enlisting. He had seen in The Times of June 6, a letter from Captain Walter, a gentleman well known to many of their Lordships as the head of the Corps of Commissionaires, in which he stated that, during an experience of many years, he had heard no complaint of the strictness of officers, but the greatest possible dissatisfaction with the many recent alterations, and the total abolition of the old regimental system; that the system of double battalions had destroyed the possibility of the officers taking that personal interest in the men which they used to take. Captain Walter went on to state that, when an officer began to take interest in his men, they were liable to be drafted off to a fresh battalion, where they would never see them again, and that the men felt the uncertainty of a position which they would soon have to give up and start life afresh. The 1846 feelings expressed by Captain Walter were, he believed, shared by almost every officer in the Service.
THE EARL OF MORLEYsaid, that the Rules of the House with respect to Questions were not very strict; but, on that occasion, they had been stretched to the utmost limits of laxity. Whilst the Notice of the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Strathnairn) was to call attention to the state of recruiting, he (the Earl of Morley) had had, upon that Notice, a large number of Questions put to him, he was afraid to say upon how many points, few, if any, of which had anything to do with the Question on the Paper. Short service, the building of the now War Office, the constitution of that Office, and other matters, had been brought forward, which he had great difficulty in connecting with the Notice of the noble and gallant Lord. How ever, he had no wish to complain, though he felt at rather a disadvantage in having to face the formidable triumvirate of noble and gallant Lords opposite. He did not know whether the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook), or any other noble Lords who had been in Office, would endorse all the statements of his noble and gallant Friends opposite. It appeared to him that the bulk of the speeches was against the Civil constitution of the War Office. That was a question undoubtedly of importance, on which he was not then prepared to enter; and as to the constant change from one Office to another, he must say that he should regret extremely any change at the present time, but he was not so sure that noble Lords on the other side of the House entertained the same opinion. The debate had practically resolved itself into a debate on the merits of long service v short service. The noble and gallant Lord (Lord Strathnairn) had stated that three results had followed the establishment of the short-service system—first, that desertion had increased; secondly, that there was a great deal of fraudulent enlistment; and, thirdly, that there was a deficiency of recruits. He (the Earl of Morley) had already dealt with all those questions over and over again. It had been said that our disasters in South Africa were mainly owing to the number of short-service men. The fact really was that in almost all the actions in South Africa, 1847 in which we had suffered reverses, the proportion of old soldiers was very much greater than that of young ones. Then with respect to desertion, from what had been said, you would imagine, unless you looked at the figures, that desertion was the result of the short-service system; but he found that there was but little increase of desertion since that system had been introduced. Those figures showed that, during 10 years of long service, there was more desertion in proportion to recruits than during the same period of short service; and it was to be remembered that a large proportion of desertions took place during the first years of service. He knew his noble and gallant Friend sneered at and despised official statistics; but he had no others to give, and his noble and gallant Friend had given no facts or figures at all in support of his statements. If he would tell him (the Earl of Morley) what other figures he could quote from, he should be happy to know. The noble and gallant Lord was equally inaccurate on the subject of recruiting. It was idle to say that the short-service system was shown to be unpopular by the difficulty of obtaining recruits. It was that difficulty which formed one of the reasons why the old system broke down. The fact was, that so far from short service being more unpopular than long service with the recruits, during the last 10 years of long service, that system had been so unpopular that it was never possible in any single year to keep the Army up to its Establishment. On an average, on the 1st of January every year, it was 4,000 below its proper strength, and in those 10 years there was a total decrease of 39,000 men; whereas since the short-service system had been introduced, with one exception—that of last year—there had been no year in which the Establishment on the 1st of January had not been quite full, whilst almost in all cases it had been considerably more than full. He was not speaking on his own authority only with respect to the long-service system. The Report on Recruiting, in 1867, would give the noble and gallant Lord information on the subject, and he would see that it was a question then whether the whole Army was to collapse for want of recruits. How was the fact to be explained, that, up to the present, they had been able to get an ample number 1848 of recruits to fill the Establishment, whereas under the long-service system it had been found impossible? He did not wish to quote figures, but would just mention that up to the year 1870 it was barely possible, except on one occasion, to get more than 15,000 recruits for the year, whereas for the last 10 years the number obtained had varied from 25,000 to 30,000 recruits. There was that number of approved recruits, and when the number of men who offered themselves was reckoned, the comparison was still more favourable. Last year, indeed, there were over 45,000 men desirous of entering the Army. He could not see how any noble Lord could say, after that, that short service had rendered the Army less popular. There was another thing he wished to refer to. His noble and gallant Friend, who had given rise to the debate, had put down a most inaccurate Notice, with a reference to a speech of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers) at Pontefract on the 13th of March, 1882. Now, his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War could not be in two places at once, and it so happened that he did not speak at all on that day at Pontefract, although he did speak in the House of Commons. If the noble and gallant Lord had read the whole of the speech, he would have seen that his right hon. Friend explained how it was that the 1st Army Corps, at that time, could not be considered in a thoroughly satisfactory state. It was there explained at length that the high establishments of the battalions of the 1st Army Corps—namely, 950 strong, exclusive of depot battalions—had only been sanctioned a few months before, and the Secretary of State for War was not a wizard who, by a stroke of the pen, could bring up every battalion in the Army to its full strength. Then the noble and gallant Lord, not being satisfied with one inaccuracy, went on to speak of certain battalions of 1,250 strong. Certainly, these must have been evolved out of the noble and gallant Lord's own inner consciousness, for nobody ever proposed to have battalions of that strength. The 12 battalions were to be 950 strong, with depots varying from 50 to 150. It was also said that the futility of the system was shown by their having to call out the Reserves to fill up the ranks; but he had already 1849 said that the plan had only been in existence for five months and had not had time to be fairly tried. On the whole, only 1,500 men of the Reserve were transferred to the 14 battalions which were sent to Egypt; and, indeed, he believed only 1,300 were actually employed in the ranks out of 10,000 who were called out from the Reserve. He hoped that they would now have heard for the last time that the Army sent to Egypt was insufficient, and that it had to be made up with Reserve men. The noble and gallant Earl opposite (the Earl of Longford) alleged that the territorial system had failed, and asserted that the only way to get men into the Army was to enlist them in regiments away from their depôts. If the noble and gallant Earl would refer to the annual Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, he would find a table, showing the number of men in each regiment who were born in the district to which their territorial regiment was attached. He was at a loss, therefore, to understand how the noble Earl could justify his assertion. The noble and gallant Earl had said that he would, on a future occasion, bring before the House the whole question of the Civil administration of the War Office. Thus he (the Earl of Morley) was relieved from the necessity of entering upon that Constitutional question at the present time. He must, however, disclaim the compliment paid to the Secretary of State for War, for having replaced the short-service system by the long-service system. They intended to make an experiment in order to meet a temporary emergency; but the allegation that they had returned to long service he absolutely denied. Moreover, he denied that the Government, in the changes they had made, had, in any way, departed from the principle upon which short service was based; and he thought it would be a great misfortune if they did so. He felt perfectly certain that they could not get recruits under the old long-service system; whereas under the present system, recruits were actually obtained. The fact that we had in our First Army Reserve 30,000 men who, on all occasions when they had been called out, had come out almost to a man, showed, he ventured to think, in spite of the opinion of the noble and gallant Lord, that they added a great 1850 strength to the military power of this country.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Morley) had made an excellent official explanation; but if he would go down to Aldershot he would be able to see for himself the kind of Army provided by the present system. He was glad to find he had been misinformed with regard to the influence of the territorial system upon recruiting, because he himself had belonged to a regiment which had been unable to get any recruits at all in their own district.
§ LORD STRATHNAIRNbriefly replied.