HL Deb 15 June 1883 vol 280 cc658-87
THE EARL OF CARNARVON

My Lords, I desire to move— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for copies or extracts of any engagements subsisting between this country and any States or Native Tribes in South Africa; and to call attention to the execution of the Transvaal Convention of 1881. In doing so, I may observe that we are in the habit of speaking of South Africa as a place with one nation and one Government, though, as a matter of fact, there are in that portion of that great Continent several nations, and at least four different forms of Government. There is the responsibly-governed Colony of the Cape of Good Hope; the Colony of Natal, which possesses a Government that may be said to stand midway between that of a Crown Colony and a responsible Government; and there are also the Dutch Republics of the Orange River Free State and the Transvaal Government, however they may be described, and a great variety of forms of administration in the Native territory. We have thus to deal with a very complex system of politics to which we are bound by a network of Treaties. I will not now enter into the subject of these Treaties; but it will be for the convenience of the House on future occasions if Returns are made, showing the different engagements to which we are parties in South Africa. There are, in the first place, those which we have entered into with such States as the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State; there are also the engagements which we have exacted from Chiefs in the position of Cetewayo and Usibepu; and, lastly, there are such obligations as those which we have entered into with the Bechuanas and the Basutos. I desire chiefly to call attention to the Convention with the Transvaal Government made in 1881. It was imposed at the end of a not very successful war; but it was represented as a Treaty of very great importance by the Prime Minister, who said of it— "Under the Convention we felt it our duty to take the best securities for the welfare of these Native Tribes, counted by hundreds of thousands, who inhabit the Transvaal, and towards whom we could not forget the responsibility we had assumed. We provided that power should be retained for that purpose. … I must now speak to you in few, but I trust clear words. We have great duties to perform; we have made large concessions. We have been censured and vituperated for these concessions. … We never for a moment forgot what was due to other considerations, to the rights of the Native Tribes, and to the general peace of South Africa... And those men are mistaken, if such there be, who judge that our liberal concessions were the effect of weakness or timidity, and who think that because we granted much it was only to encourage them to ask for more. I do not care to make any comments on that statement; I take it in its naked and unadorned simplicity. But a few nights ago my noble Friend the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Derby) gave us an instructive comment on the statement of the Prime Minister. He was questioned with regard to the Convention; and, in substance, he said that the Convention gave us little power, and that its success depended on the sincere good-will and cooperation of the contracting parties in the Transvaal. That, I think, is a now doctrine to introduce into the history of Conventions by the Power assumed to be the stronger. He further gave us the important information that negotiations were pending for the revision of this Convention, and that they might end in the withdrawal of the Resident in the Transvaal at Pretoria. I wish to ascertain how and why it is that the Convention has failed altogether; and, if not, what portion of it is so valuable that the Government think it worth maintaining; and, above all, if that be so, what guarantees we are to take in order to prevent the revised Treaty becoming as ineffective as the existing Treaty? I will next consider the Articles of the Convention — there are 33 of them. Article II. provides for the appointment of a British Resident, with certain duties and functions. I wish to ask whether there has been anything in practice which corresponds to the theory of this Article; and as two years have passed since the Convention was signed, and this official has been appointed, I should also like to ask whether he has done anything more than simply to send home some Correspondence upon the question of revising the Articles? All we know of him is that, on one rather remarkable occasion, he was present at a banquet at which the name of the Queen was not treated with the respect which is its due, and that he was called to account for his conduct on the occasion. We know nothing further of him, except that he has, from time to time, made various remonstrances, which are recorded in these Blue Books, and those have been treated with the most absolute contempt. All this had been predicted by us; we had asked what powers you were going to give the Resident; and had said that, without them, the arrangement would end in complete failure. It has so happened, and I do not believe you can point to any one case in which he has interfered with success. Article V. provides, so far as it can, for the due and proper punishment of all offences committed contrary to the rules of civilized warfare; and, in reference to the point, I have repeatedly drawn attention to the committal of several disgraceful murders; there was no question as to the facts; they were committed in broad daylight; and, although some of the offenders were brought into Court, I do not think that one has met with punishment; or, if they have, it has only been in the shape of a very light and altogether inadequate penalty. The next Article to which I will refer, and some others connected with it—Article VII.—relate to the liabilities of the Transvaal Government. A Commission was appointed, on which, with ingenious inequality, there was but one Englishman to two Boers; but it did its work in a fair spirit, and it divided the obligations into two categories. The first charge included Debts which were a charge upon the Transvaal at the time of annexation. We did not pay them off, and the Transvaal could not be justly censured for leaving them in the position in which we found them. There was a second charge of £261,000 representing the legitimate expenses of the Government during the time we were in the country, or the excess of expenditure over income. The Transvaal agreed to pay this off, and partly, by the payment of a lump sum. In addition, there was £130,000, which represented compensation awards charged against the Transvaal. The total Debt was £400,000, which was due to us, and which the Transvaal was reasonably and fairly bound to pay, and they were to have paid £100,000 within 12 months. Has any part of that been paid? I apprehend not. Then there were awards made by the Commission against us and against the Transvaal—this country had to pay £30,000, and the Transvaal Government £130,000, and we paid our £30,000 at once. We have also advanced the Transvaal the money to meet the awards against it, and nothing has been repaid; nor has anything been paid towards the salaries and expenses of the Commission, amounting to £4,100. I will not go into particulars of the counter-claim, as Sir Hercules Robinson sums up its character in these words— I need hot attempt to do more than offer a few general remarks on each item, which I may preface by observing that it is difficult to conceive that such a claim could have been seriously put forward. It was for the enormous sum of £175,000. Indeed, the terms of the counter-claim were so preposterous that Sir Hercules Robinson said he could only imagine that they were advanced in order to cover the contemplated failure of the Transvaal State to meet the claim of £100,000 under the Dutch Convention. Then I come to the next Article—No. XII.—which says that no person who has remained loyal to Her Majesty's Government during the recent hostilities shall suffer any molestation. How has that been carried out? There were, no doubt, three parties concerned. There were the English, there wore the loyal Boers, and there were the Natives. As regards the English, I apprehend that a good many of them sold their property some time before the crisis at forced prices, and left the country. That was probably the wisest course they could take. I do not care to go into the case of the loyal Boers. That has been discussed on former occasions, and I think the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies admitted that there had been great hardship in certain instances. As regards the Natives, however, it is a much harder case. To the North of the Transvaal they have not been much persecuted, because there they were in greater numbers, stronger, and more capable of taking care of themselves. They are, in fact, reserved for a later fate. To the South, however, where they were more isolated and much feebler, the Natives were exposed to the attacks of filibusters. They have been exposed to robbery, the seizure of their land, and very great oppression. I will take one single case within the Transvaal as it is recorded in the Blue Book of last year. A Chief of the name of Ikaniki, who lived within the Transvaal boundary, was stated to have erected walls at his kraal, but was not shown to have taken any active part in the hostilities beyond the Border. Nevertheless, it was urged that ho had given notice of his intention to take part in the disturbances. A Boer Commando was sent to the station, and a clean sweep was made of the property of the Chief, who was completely impoverished. I call that a disgraceful and wanton act; for, although this man had never been accused of any greater act than "intention," he was so far impoverished that he was obliged to proceed to Pretoria to sue for mercy and assistance. This, your Lordships will observe, was within the Border of the Transvaal. As to what has occurred outside the Border, we know a little more. There you come upon such tribes as those presided over by Mankoroane and Montsioa. They have been driven from one point to another on account of their tried and devoted loyalty to us. It should be remembered that it stands recorded, beyond doubt, that, at a most critical time, they were loyal to us; and that, when they were attacked, we practically abandoned them to their enemies. And here I may say that I desire to draw a distinction between the Boers of the Transvaal and the rascaldom gathered on the Border, under the name of filibusters and marauders. They come from all nations and races, and are probably as disgraceful a set of men as were ever drawn together. Mr. Hudson has shown that it was no exaggeration that tribe after tribe was pushed back on the other tribes, or actually perished altogether during the hostilities. Did Sir Hercules Robinson give any better account? No; he simply says— The condition of this country is deplorable; and I am unable to hold out any hope of inducing the Transvaal Government to restrain those of its subjects who are engaged in the acts of brigandage referred to. And he adds, in another despatch— After carefully perusing those Papers, it appears to me to be difficult to resist the conclusion that the Transvaal Government is morally responsible for these proceedings. I come now to the next Article, with regard to which there is one point which successive English Ministers and Governments, no matter what their politics might be, have insisted on in their dealings with the Transvaal—namely, the suppression of slavery. One of the Articles of the Convention of Pretoria provides that no slavery or "apprenticeship" shall be tolerated by the Government. In the strict sense of the former term, I should not be prepared to affirm that such an institution existed in the Transvaal; but under the latter term there has existed for years a species of veiled slavery which is called by another name, but which is in reality the same thing. Can anyone who has held the Seals of the Colonial Office doubt or deny that? Our traditional policy in this country has been to preserve ourselves absolutely clear from the slightest taint of slavery. The Boers, on the other hand, held an entirely different view. They looked upon a Native as being in the position of au intelligent animal, to be kindly treated in the same way as a horse or an ox is treated, but nothing beyond that. If he is alive he best discharges his human function as a bondsman; and if he is inconvenient, it is well to remove him out of the way. It is a matter of history that that has been the practice and view which the Boors have entertained. And when you come to "apprenticeship" it differs very little from veiled slavery. Till within a very recent period it was the practice in storming a Native town to kill husband and wife, and to take the child and train him up as a so-called apprentice. Then there are Articles XIII. and XXI., which provide for the creation of a Native Location Commission. I believe that Commission has been in existence for some time, and has sat and done business; but I do not agree that it has ever done anything of a practical nature; it is so encumbered with forms. Then there is an Article—No. XVIII.—which provides that the British Resident shall always be a medium of communication with the Chiefs outside British territory. The object of that is very obvious. It was necessary and essential to the safety of the position of the Resident—essential, also, to the protection of the adjoining tribes. My Lords, that Article has been not only infringed, but distinctly violated. There has been a cession of territory from these Chiefs outside. They were remonstrated with, first, by Mr. Hudson, and then by my noble Friend (the Earl of Kimberley), who was then Colonial Secretary. What was the answer of the Transvaal Government? It is so remarkable that I must trouble your Lordships with it. I find that I am compelled to read many extracts to your Lordships; but it is inevitably necessary to enable mo to discharge, even in a most imperfect way, the task which I have undertaken. I pray your Lordships to mark, not merely the substance, but the tone of that answer. My noble Friend had remonstrated against the violation of this Article. In reply to that remonstrance the Transvaal Government said, in effect, that what they had done was, at the worst, a breach of the form of the Convention rather than an actual contravention of its terms; what they had done was simply to send a messenger to the Native Tribes outside their boundaries. That was the very thing from which they are debarred by that Article of the Convention. Then they go on to say that they are perfectly convinced that the Queen's Government will be satisfied with the explanation which they had given. My Lords, I do not think so insolent an answer has ever been sent to this Government for generations and generations past. Now, what was the answer which my noble Friend made? Well, he observed with surprise and regret that his representations as to the infractions of the Convention had not been answered in a more satisfactory manner. He further expressed a hope that, if the Transvaal Government desired to be relieved of its obligations, it would make proper representations on the subject to the Agents of the Crown. I think that is an indication which the Transvaal Government have not been slow to accept; for they have, ever since the date of that letter, shown themselves less and less disposed to fulfil the duties to which they wore solemnly pledged. Now I pass from that to almost the last point to which I need call attention—that is, the question of the boundaries in Article XIX. Now, if there was any one part of this Convention which possesses value it is the Article that regulates boundaries. Almost all our South African difficulties have arisen out of this question of boundaries. At the time of the Pretoria Convention, we made great sacrifices in order to satisfy the Boers. If there, then, is any value in this Convention, it is in the observance of those Articles which deal with boundaries. I will not go into the case; but there is one question which deserves the careful attention of the House. On the South-West Frontier of the Transvaal there is a new settlement which is said to have sprung up, composed, I believe, originally of some 300 or 400 families, of whom some 60 families are represented by English deserters, the scum of the earth. They have established a form of Government and Executive, appointed a President, and, I think, they have issued an official Gazette. They have imposed taxes, and have afforded every possible facility for the introduction of spirits into the district. They have plundered the Natives and seized their lands. We have, I believe, remonstrated; but the answer of the Transvaal Government is, that they have no power themselves to restrain these robbers. I will come to them presently. But I beg your Lordships to observe, in passing, that there are some ominous precedents of the establishment of these settlements in South Africa. The Transvaal itself is the aggregation of three separate Republics, which were subsequently amalgamated when they had settled their differences, and the seat of Government was removed. In the same way, this settlement may be embodied as an independent Republic for a time, and then be merged in the Transvaal. There are two points to which I would call attention. As to the alleged inability of the Transvaal Government to control those men, I think two instances of what occurred quite recently will dispose of that argument. When Sir Bartle Frere was at Kimberley certain Boer freebooters made raids into Bechuana territory. Sir Bartle Frere sent about 150 policemen, and those ravages were immediately stopped. What Sir Bartle Frere did then the Cape Government did only a few months ago. Two or three hundred police put an end to the incursions of bodies of marauders, and quickly restored order. None are so blind as those who will not see, and none are so weak as those who will not use force. I must point out to the House the very serious relations which arise from the existence of this Republic, which is called Stellasland. It fills up the whole space intervening between the South-West corner of the Transvaal and the great Desert beyond, and commands the great line of road running North and South in Africa. Lines of roads are generally lines of watershed; and along those lines generally travel all the civilizing influences of missionaries and commercial enterprize. But immediately you have that Republic thrown across your road you lose control of it. You enable them to seal up the country, and to prevent the spread of all those social, political, and civilizing agencies which would otherwise be at work. Before I end, I wish to say one word more as to this recent Blue Book which has been laid. on the Table, and it is that I have never read a Blue Book which has given me so much pain and so much humiliation. From first to last there is not one redeeming feature in the despatches recorded therein. We call upon the Transvaal Government to keep their obligations. Their statement that they are unable to do is unworthy of credit. They communicated with the Chiefs outside the Transvaal territory behind our backs, and without our consent. They annexed territory. A deputation of Native Chiefs waits upon Sir Henry Bulwer to make complaints. They resent this, and they use language as arrogant and as insolent as any that I have ever read, and they call upon us to justify our proceedings; and they threaten to seize and imprison both the Whites and the Natives who formed the deputation. Mr. Hudson, Sir Henry Bulwer, and Sir Hercules Robinson, all agree with one voice in viewing these transactions from a common point. There were several things provided for in the Convention—there was the payment of the Debt, there was the punishment of offences, there was the protection of the Natives, there was the observance of the boundaries, there was the control of foreign relations; but in every one of these matters—except, perhaps, in the last case—I will take upon myself to say there has been a most dismal failure to observe the terms of the Treaty on the part of the Transvaal Government. And now, in conclusion, I wish to ask what is the course which Her Majesty's Government really mean to adopt in this matter? I understand my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) has confirmed the statement of the Prime Minister that a Special Commissioner has been appointed to carry out the terms of the Treaty. I do not ask who that Special Commissioner is; but I must, however, express considerable sympathy with him, for I will venture to express my doubt as to the success that that Commissioner will meet with; because I am afraid that he will have a task before him that no human individual can accomplish, unless he is supported in a manner very different from that in which it has been the custom of Her Majesty's Government to treat its Representatives abroad, and especially those exercising its authority at the Cape. If the Commissioner is not to be backed up, I think that a very serious step is being taken in reopening the Convention, and thereby inviting the Transvaal Government yet more and more to break its terms. It seems to me that, as usual, there are three courses which may be followed by Her Majesty's Government. They may, in the first place, give up the Convention altogether, and swallow all the promises and threats in which they have indulged. They may, in the second place, find some terra firma on which to stand, which, for my part, I fail to find. They certainly look for the good-will and the co-operation of the Boer Government. In the third place, they may do that which no one who respects the honour and credit of the country would desire to see them do—namely, to permit the Treaty to rest in its present condition. The simple effect of that Treaty, up to the present, has been to delude the Natives to their ruin, and to associate us with discreditable and disgraceful proceedings. The result of our past policy in South Africa has been to create a complete want of confidence on the part of the English population in the Home Government. They say, and feel, that what is done one day is undone the next; and unless confidence on their part is renewed by a steady policy I am afraid that a very great catastrophe will occur. I believe there is only one process that can be safely adopted by Her Majesty's Government by which this conflict can be averted, and that is to cease from this drifting and sliding policy, and to be firm both in speech and action; and I believe, also, that we must accept our position, and be prepared to discharge the duties of a great paramount Power in South Africa. I will move the Address of which I have given Notice. Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for copies or extracts of any engagements subsisting between this country and any States or Native tribes in South Africa."—(The Earl of Carnarvon.)

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, there are very few of the statements in the interesting speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) from which I am prepared to differ. The noble Earl has evidently studied this subject with great care and diligence, and he has laid his view of it before your Lordships with no unnecessary expenditure of words, or of time. I agree in some of the general propositions which he has laid down. I agree with him as to the variety and complexity of the questions that have arisen in South Africa. I agree that the affairs of that country are in a critical condition; but, at the same time, I would observe that they have been in that condition not only ever since I have had the honour to be appointed to my present Office, but almost ever since I can remember. I agree, also, that the complications the noble Earl has referred to have been aggravated by a bitterness of feeling, erected by the difference of race between the English, Dutch, and Native inhabitants. I cannot follow my noble Friend from point to point through his speech; but, while agreeing with some, and dissenting from others of the general statements which he has made, I certainly cannot admit that the majority of the Articles of the Conven- tion have been useless, or that the Convention, as a whole, has been a failure. In reference to the quotation which the noble Earl has made from a speech of the Prime Minister two years ago, I think that my right hon. Friend was perfectly justified in the language he then used. The noble Earl has found fault with the declaration which I made the other night in this House, to the effect that it was impossible to work an arrangement such as that made by the Convention, without the goodwill and the co-operation of all parties. I made that declaration deliberately, and I am not now inclined to retract or to modify one word of it. We need not go as far as South Africa to discover the extreme difficulty, even in a thoroughly civilized and organized country, of enforcing and maintaining a law which is contrary to the feelings of the population. If the object of the Convention is admitted to be the facilitation of order and good government, and of friendly relations between the Natives and the White population, that object cannot be accomplished over a country of immense extent, thinly populated and without a centralized Government, by any mere exercise of force. The only power we can employ to assist us is the cooperation of the people themselves. If this is to be treated, as my noble Friend seems inclined to treat it, not as an arrangement to which two parties are to be freely consenting, and in which both are to operate, but as an arrangement to be upheld by military force, it is not a Convention that is wanted; it is not a Resident; it is a military occupation, and the administration of the country by English officials. The noble Earl has complained that the Resident has not done enough under the Convention; but it was perfectly well understood that he was not appointed as an official charged with the duties that would belong to a Resident in an Indian State. He was not appointed to direct and practically control the administration of the country. His instructions were expressly laid down in the Convention; and, in my opinion, so far as I know, the present Resident has discharged his duties in a very satisfactory manner. Those duties are to advise and report; and it is not fair to blame him for not doing that which he has no power to do, or for not exercising authority which is not entrusted to him. I do not agree with the noble Earl that the power of the Resident to report what is done amiss by the Transvaal Government is of no great value, because I believe that the fear of European public opinion which would thus be invoked is extremely powerful in a country like the Transvaal; and the knowledge that cases of cruel oppression of the Natives would be brought to the knowledge of the British Government through their Resident, and for that reason made public in Europe, would exercise a considerable deterring influence upon abuses. The noble Earl has referred to an alleged failure of justice in certain cases of murder, by which certain persons have managed to escape punishment. As this happened before I had any personal connection with the Office I now hold, I must confess I am not acquainted with the minute details; but, as far as I can learn, there were a few cases in which the evidence was really doubtful, and where, therefore, the acquittals were just. In nearly every case the offenders were, I believe, brought to justice before the regularly constituted Courts of Justice; but in some instances it is understood that the prisoners escaped the justice they deserved, in consequence of the sympathy of the witnesses, and possibly of the jury also. If that is so, it is, no doubt, a lamentable fact, and one to be much regretted; but it is a fact with which we are acquainted nearer home. We ourselves have not found that occasional sympathy at home of juries with prisoners so very easy to deal with that we should be justified in making it a subject of report or complaint to the Transvaal authorities. It may be very unfortunate that such a feeling should exist among the people of the Transvaal; but, under the circumstances, I do not see what the Transvaal Government could have done in the matter. My noble Friend then raised the question of the Debt that is owing to us from the Transvaal. I am not going into that question in detail, for I have not the figures before me; but I believe the general fact is that a certain amount of pecuniary liability has been discharged by the Transvaal Government, though the full amount promised has not been paid.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

Has any part of the capital sum been paid? My contention and belief is that nothing whatever has been paid except the interest.

THE EARL OF DERBY

They have paid the interest on the Debt. I am not sure if they have repaid any part of the capital. I quite agree with one remark made by the noble Earl. He spoke of the counter-claim which the Transvaal Government has set up against us as one that is unjustifiable, and altogether unreasonable. I am bound to say that I quite agree with him in that respect. It was a very foolish thing on their part to put forward a counter-claim of this kind; but I can hardly think that it was done seriously, or with any idea that it would be allowed. The position of the Transvaal Government, I believe, is one of utter impecuniosity; and, with respect to their Debt, they have a much better defence than they have chosen to put forward. You cannot enforce payment of a debt when the debtor has no means to pay it. The noble Earl then went on to quote the Article of the Convention, which provides that no person living in the Transvaal should be made to suffer in consequence of having sided with us in the war, or in any political quarrel; and he spoke of that Article as having been broken by the Boers in the case of English residents. I dare say it is true that certain English residents there, who disliked the change that had taken place, and who felt their position among the Dutch population to be unsatisfactory, and perhaps even unsafe, have consequently sold their estates and whatever they could not remove, and have left the country. That is very likely to have happened. It is impossible to protect men against the consequences of local unpopularity; but the authorities are not responsible for the state of local feeling; and, as far as my recollection goes, I am unable to call to mind a single case in which complaint has been lodged against the Government of the Transvaal by a British subject, on the ground that this Article has been violated. I do not actually pledge myself so far as to say that it has not happened in any case; but, if it has, I am certain that it has been in some isolated case only, and that there has been no habitual violation of that engagement. With regard to the Na- tives, I was rather surprised to find by what a scanty supply of evidence my noble Friend justified his allegations and the strong language which he used. We do know of one case in which a Native Chief was treated, as I believe, with undue hardship; but there is no reason, as far as I am aware, to suppose that he was so dealt with because he had been friendly to England. It is easy for anyone who may be involved in a difficulty with the Transvaal Government to put forward that statement, and to say that he is ill-used because he is a Friend of the English; but, in the case referred to more especially by my noble Friend, the man was supposed to be contemplating insurrection. I do not know what evidence the Transvaal Government had to justify their action; there can be no doubt that they proceeded with undue severity; but there is no reason to suppose that their motive was that which has been imputed. I believe there is one other case of a similar character; but I would submit that, bearing in mind the vast number of Natives within the Transvaal, and the unsettled condition of the country, the fact that two men, who were supposed to be actively displaying disaffection to the existing Government, were punished more severely than they ought to have been, does not establish, even in general terms, a charge of oppression, and that still less does it establish a charge of the violation of this particular Article. With respect to the question of the Bechuana Frontier, that is a by no means pleasant subject, which has been fully discussed on a previous occasion, and I do not wish to repeat what I then said; but it practically comes to this—that I do not believe the Boer Government encouraged the marauders in that matter. Certainly, I do not contend that they did all that they ought to have done to prevent incursions into Bechuanaland. But it is only just to the Boer Government to say that, if they had had the best will in the world, it would have been utterly impossible, considering the condition and organization of the Transvaal State, for them to have opposed any effectual resistance to the system of filibustering with which they had to deal. They have no Regular Army, or organized Force of Police, but only Volunteers, who are called out for special service. They did, on one occasion, call out a number of Volunteers to prevent the marauders from crossing the Frontier and I believe the result was that the Volunteers themselves, sympathizing with the marauders, joined the very parties whom they were sent to repress. It was no easy matter, therefore, for the Transvaal Government to enforce the law. My noble Friend next turned to the question of slavery. He said, what was perfectly true, that the Boers took a lower view of the position and claims of the Native races than is taken by the English Government, or by English settlers. I am not quite sure as to the English settlers; but, undoubtedly, the Dutch and the English views of their relations to the Native races are not altogether the same. I should be very sorry to hold the Transvaal Government in any manner responsible for all the acts which the Boers scattered over South Africa may commit; but the question is, whether the noble Earl has laid any ground for the charge which he brings against the Government and the people of the Transvaal—that they have, in an indirect and covert way, restored slavery? In my opinion, there is no evidence to support that charge. Neither Mr. Hudson nor Sir Hercules Robinson have been particularly reticent, or particularly disposed to speak with reserve, where the shortcomings of the Boers are concerned; but as far as I eau recollect, speaking from memory, there is not one word in the despatches of these gentlemen which goes to prove that there has been any attempt on the part of the Transvaal Government to restore slavery. The noble Earl has also stated that the reply given by the Transvaal Government, in answer to a communication from us, calling their attention to an alleged violation of the Article of the Convention relating to their intercourse with the Native races, was of a very uncourteous character. He spoke of it, in fact, as insulting; but that appears to me to be an unnecessarily serious way of looking at the matter. The answer was certainly not particularly courteous in style; but I put that down to ignorance more than intention, for we can scarcely expect any great degree of refinement in South Africa in this respect. The question as to the manner in which the Transvaal authorities are to hold communication with the Native Chiefs is, it seems to me, precisely one of those points that may very properly be considered with a view to establish a mode of working that will be satisfactory to both parties. My noble Friend has alluded to, and laid some stress upon, the fact of the foundation of two so-called Republics by adventurers outside the Transvaal. I am not defending these adventurers, or justifying their action towards the Natives; but I do not think that the foundation of these small Republics is to be imputed to the Government of the Transvaal. They took no part in it; and, undoubtedly, they would very much have preferred, as they stated from the first, that they should be allowed to include these boundaries within their own Frontiers and to establish order there. As I said before, I am not here to fight the battle of the Boers, or to contend that their conduct has been what it ought to be in all respects. But I think my noble Friend has put a very black construction upon some matters which are not important, and which might bear a different interpretation. I have never contended, nor is it my business to contend, that the present state of things with respect to the Transvaal is satisfactory. If it were, we should, probably, not be debating the matter here, and there would be no question as to the Convention. But what I think my noble Friend really objects to is our desire, if possible, to act with the Transvaal Government instead of acting against them; and, if it be possible—and I believe it is—to settle the disputes that have arisen in a conciliatory manner. What is the other alternative? It is to to employ force. If you threaten the Boers with coercion, you must be prepared to act on your threats—to send up a force to Pretoria and re-occupy the Transvaal. There is not the slightest doubt that we can do that if we think fit. It would be an easy thing, no doubt, to find a cases belli in what has taken place as regards breaches of the Convention. Having declared war, there is no military resistance to be apprehended that need make us hesitate to take that course. But suppose we had done that, and suppose we had reconquered the country, and held it, what next? That is the real question. You are not dealing merely with the present; you will have to consider what you are to do in the future. When we discussed the question some months ago, I ventured to say I could not conceive how anyone could desire to establish another Ireland in South Africa. But that is necessarily what would be the result. We could hold the country; but we should do so against the will of the inhabitants. We should hold it by a military force; and, apart from the question of expense, on which, I think, the British taxpayers would probably have something to say, it is a very serious consideration whether we should be justified in locking up in that distant and remote country what would be not a very inconsiderable portion of our numerically small Army. I cannot conceive a greater source of military weakness, for all other purposes, than to be obliged to maintain a strong military garrison in the interior of South Africa. Really, these are the only two alternatives—either to take the people and Government of the Transvaal as we find them, and establish a modus vivendi with them as we best can; or else to accept that alternative which my noble Friend may not be indisposed to accept, and to re-establish the state of things that existed after 1876. I do not think that in 1876 there was the smallest suspicion of what the real opinion of the Transvaal people was as regarded British connection. If that feeling had been known, I do not think anybody would have desired to take possession of that territory; and I cannot conceive anyone so foolish as to say that we ought to do it now, not because any advantage would be gained by it which could not have been gained then, but simply because it seemed to to us that we had been defeated, and it was necessary to show our power. I have a much higher belief in our power, and of the opinion entertained of us throughout the world, than to suppose that any measure of that kind is necessary either for our reputation or our influence. With regard to the Motion which my noble Friend has made, I do not think that the number of engagements and Treaties into which we have entered with South African States and Chiefs is considerable. I believe that all these engagements are already in print; but I agree with my noble Friend that it may be convenient that they should be put before the House and the public in a form in which they can be more easily referred to; and, therefore, I have no objection to their being laid on the Table according to the terms of the Motion.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

My Lords, I did not intend to take any part in the debate; but, after the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Derby), I must make a few remarks, as I really think it calls for some comments. We have been told that we have a Suzerainty over the Transvaal, and that we have entered into a Convention. That being the case, I must ask, then, what does that Suzerainty mean, and whether we did not take upon ourselves any obligations with regard to the Convention? So far as the noble Earl is concerned, it makes very little difference. When the people and Government of the Transvaal say they will do nothing, Her Majesty's Government simply submits; and when they say they cannot pay anything, Her Majesty's Government submits to that also. What I want to call the attention of the House to is this—that, by the Convention of 1880, obligations were undertaken by this country, and an engagement was given by the Prime Minister, on the part of the Government, that care should be taken of the Natives both within the State and beyond the Borders—a duty which has been entirely neglected, and which is admitted to have been neglected. Take the despatches and Reports made by the Residents, I do not wish to refer to them further than to say that their duty has been discharged by those on the spot. But the way in which these authorities in the South African Colonies are treated is sufficient to make any man who is placed in the responsible position of a Governor in those Colonies feel that he is thrown over and neglected by those whom he represents. Look at the Blue Book which has been put into our hands, and you will see how Sir Henry Bulwer was treated with respect to Cetewayo, and how his advice was neglected. And so with regard to Sir Hercules Robinson and Mr. Hudson. Her Majesty's Government have done nothing to maintain the Convention to which they have put their signature. It is not a question of what is to be done in the future. If you are to allow the Transvaal to enter into a Convention upon the terms which the noble Earl has just now laid down—namely, that under no circumstances would you use force to maintain principles which it is essential to the honour and good faith of this coun- try to maintain, then I say you had better let the Convention go altogether and say the Transvaal shall be an independent State, and wash your hands of all interference with its concerns; for you are undertaking now a responsibility which you will throw over when any difficulty occurs. As to Bechuanaland, it is not a question of terms; and when the noble Earl talks of diplomacy, I say it is not a question of diplomacy. Whatever Suzerainty may be, it is Sovereignty of some kind; and, therefore, to speak of diplomacy is wholly inconsistent with the facts of the case, and with the relations which exist at present between the Transvaal and this country. The people of the Transvaal were treating with the Suzerain; they were, in fact, subjects of this country. You have had the Convention discussed by my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Carnarvon) Article by Article. I will not say that the Transvaal Government have violated every Article; but the noble Earl himself admits that they have violated several.

THE EARL OF DERBY

No, no!

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

The agreement to pay was part of the Convention, and they have not paid.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I said they could not pay.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

But, nevertheless, it is a breach of the agreement not to pay. If you sign a Treaty with a State which you know to be impecunious, and one of the terms of the Treaty is that it shall pay a certain sum which you know it can never pay, you are treating the country you represent with dishonour. When the Transvaal was annexed it had 12s. 6d. in its Treasury, and you knew it. If a few days had been allowed to elapse, the country would have fallen into your hands, because there was no money in the Treasury, and therefore no one was able to discharge the State obligations. The Transvaal cannot pay, and yet it insults you by sending in a bill, calling upon you to pay a sum of money you do not owe, and which they know you do not owe. Then, when they send to negotiate with the Chiefs over the Border, to whom you were bound by obligations irrespective of those which bound you to the Transvaal, the noble Earl says, in the tone of one who is employed as the Attorney for the Trans- vaal—"It is true they have done something wrong, but it is not as bad as you say; it is only a breach of the Convention that they entered into these negotiations; but, poor fellows, even if they wished to keep the Frontier clear of these marauders, they could not do it." The fact is, you have made a Convention which is a shadow and a sham, though it was held up to this country as a kind of counter-balance to the dishonour which had been inflicted on your arms, and you do not dare to enforce a single one of its provisions. That is the position to which you have reduced the country. Having, first of all, submitted to a military success on the part of these people upon your own soil, within the limits of Natal, then, when the Government had to enforce the rights, duties, and responsibilities which this country had undertaken, and to show that the country was in earnest, not for the retention of the Transvaal only, but for your position as the paramount Power in South Africa, it was reduced to nothing, and you have now still further reduced the position of the country by what I cannot but call the ignoble speech to which we have just listened on the part of the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, for my part, I can see nothing ignoble in the speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) as alleged by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook). It may be said, I think, that there is nothing more ignoble in the speech of my noble Friend than in that of the noble Viscount. I suppose the speech of the noble Viscount means that if the noble Viscount was responsible ho would take steps—and therefore he thinks the Government ought—immediately to despatch an Army to the Transvaal.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK

If I was in Office.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

It is all very easy to make a grand speech when men are not in position of responsibility; but I want to know what the noble Viscount would have done if he had been in power? I suppose he would have taken all the steps which he has pointed out. The noble Viscount's arguments simply come to this—that he would have done something else if something else had happened; but the question before us is the present state of affairs in South Africa, and the failure and breach of the Convention. That is a fair enough subject to discuss, and it is important to find a remedy. But does the noble Viscount help us to find one? If he merely meant to sound the loud trumpet and the drum, he means nothing, and I have nothing to say; but if he meant anything, it was that we should proceed to force, and compel the Transvaal Goverment to observe the conditions of the Convention. My noble Friend behind me took the ignoble course of showing that that would have been an extremely foolish thing to have done. We embarked some years ago upon a very foolish course when we annexed originally the Transvaal; but for that we were indebted to noble Lords opposite.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

You agreed to it yourself.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

What I said was, that if the information before the Government proved that the Transvaal people were desirous of accepting our rule, then I thought the course defensible. But I had not the means of judging whether the people of the Transvaal would accept our rule. I thought that if there were evidence enough to satisfy my noble Friend opposite that the Transvaal people were willing that we should take over the country, the late Government were justified in the policy of annexation.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) agreed to it.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I was anxious to give a reasonable support to the Department with which I had been connected; but I am not responsible for the error of judgment which was made by noble Lords opposite, who, upon the facts before them, annexed the Transvaal. However, we are now called upon to explain what course we mean to take with regard to the Convention, and my noble Friend has, I think, sufficiently answered the points to which our attention was directed. It has been said that the Convention was directly violated in more than one particular, and I admit, as my noble Friend admitted, that the non-payment of the promised money was a distinct violation of the engagements of the Transvaal Government; but the fact was they had no money. A great deal, however, that is wholly erro- neous has been said as to the other Articles of the Convention. It is generally supposed, and many people believe it, that there has been a general violation of the Convention as regards the Natives in the Transvaal. Now, there is no proof of that. I entirely admit the importance of the case of the Natives outside the Frontier; but the main objects of the Convention were directed to the condition of the Native inhabitants of the Transvaal itself, and the most important question is, how the Transvaal Government behaved to them. There have been one or two cases mentioned as to Natives inside the Frontier, in which the punishment inflicted by the Transvaal Government on disobedient Chiefs may have been too severe. I must remark, however, that severe treatment of Natives is not a peculiarity of the Dutch, for there is the recent case of the treatment of Langalibalele by British Colonists; and it has not unfrequently happened that the apprehensions of White settlers of danger from Native Chiefs has led them to treat the Natives with what we consider undue severity. The contest of the Dutch with Mapoch has been mentioned, and, as regards him, he was an important Chief who distinctly refused submission to the Transvaal Government. What, then, could the Transvaal Government do? They must either acquiesce in the defiance of their authority by a Chief in their own territory, taking as an inevitable consequence the rebellion of other Native Chiefs, or they must take forcible measures to compel his submission. They did exactly what we ourselves did with Secocoeni. He was a Chief near Mapoch's country; he defied the Government, and was compelled by Lord Wolseley to submit; and I always understood that, if we had remained in the Transvaal, it was exceedingly probable that Mapoch, who never paid taxes to us, would have defied us also, and we should have had to attack him, and compelled him to submit himself to our authority. I do not go into the merits of the quarrel between Mapoch and the Transvaal Government; but I do say that, in compelling him to submit, the Transvaal Government have not violated the Convention. As regards the Natives outside the Frontier, we have heard over and over again the state of affairs in Bechuanaland, which I know is very deplorable. The Frontier is a matter of dispute which has never been settled in my recollection, and I admit fully the failure of the Convention in doing what we had hoped it would do—namely, by defining a new boundary to establish a settled state of things. That, however, is a matter which my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) is now endeavouring to deal with. But, however much this may distress us, it is not reasonable to confuse the state of the Natives in Bechuanaland with that of the Natives in the Transvaal, and, because the spirit of the Convention has been violated in Bechuanaland, to assume that it has been broken everywhere. My noble Friend opposite has made a slight mistake in saying that the Convention was signed under protest because Sir Evelyn Wood had withdrawn his men beyond striking distance.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

That is not the meaning of what I said.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I accept my noble Friend's explanation; but I wish to say that, in point of fact, there was great hesitation in ratifying the Convention, and it was ratified because we gave the Transvaal Government to understand that we would not withdraw the troops. It was ratified, then, under pressure; and it is not an altogether unnatural consequence that, on a Convention so ratified, a disposition to rescind it should now be found to exist, or that there should be considerable difficulty experienced as to carrying out all its provisions. The Transvaal Volksraad, in fact, complained of certain provisions of the Convention, and asked me whether I would consent to a reconsideration of it? I answered, however, that one could not reconsider a Convention directly it was signed, and that it would be time enough to do so when we had had experience of the working of it. You are in this dilemma—either you must reconquer and occupy the country, knowing the deep-seated hostility of the inhabitants, and that the disaffection of our own Dutch population would be aroused, perhaps, to a dangerous extent —a course which seems to me absolutely impossible; or you must find out whether there is not some reasonable arrangement that can be made with the Transvaal Government by which some of the provisions of the Convention may be carried into effect. That is a reasonable course. I do not think that because Her Majesty is called Suzerain, it is therefore necessary she should employ force. Is that the case with any Treaty or Convention? Is it always the case that the instant you have to complain that some provision is not carried out as you wish, you are to use an army to enforce it? Is the Porte carrying out its obligations with regard to Armenia, and are we absolutely compelled to send an army to compel the Sultan to fulfil his engagements? We do not take such a view of the matter; and it is the same with regard to this Convention. It deserves fair consideration with the Transvaal Government in the way indicated by the course my noble Friend intends to take. As to the speech of the noble Viscount opposite, unless he is prepared to recommend that this country should embark in a series of expensive and warlike operations in South Africa, his speech comes to nothing at all.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I did not understand that our discussion was to be limited to the question as to what we are to do now. I thought we were also to inquire as to the wisdom and justice of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. What Her Majesty's Government have done, as I understand it, is this. They had to retreat—at least, they thought that was the policy which they had to pursue—in the presence of a victorious foe. They might have done so frankly and simply, if that was the view which they took of their position, and the obligations imposed upon them by the honour of this country. But they did not do so simply. They did not face the unpopularity which would have resulted from a concession —from yielding in the face of rebellion, and giving way, after a defeat, upon their own territory. They would not abandon those Native races, for whom so many in this country feel so deeply, and whose cause is so especially dear to the classes and interests on which Her Majesty's Government themselves so greatly rely. Therefore, they interposed a screen—they adopted a Convention, which some of us told them at the time was mere waste paper, but which we then believed they fully intended to try to make an effective document. By the avowals made this evening, we are now, I am sorry to say, forced to the conclu- sion that no such intention was entertained. At that time, Mr. Gladstone—some of his words have been quoted tonight—dwelt with the utmost emphasis on the protection this Convention, or Treaty, was to afford to the Natives beyond the Frontier—not the Natives inside the Transvaal. That was what Mr. Gladstone said in his speech of the 25th of July, 1881; so that it was not the protection of the Natives inside the Transvaal that he had in view, at least at that time, but the protection of those beyond the Frontier. That he considered to be one of the most important objects to which, in the judgment of the Government, the Convention was principally to apply. The same view was taken by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack. Now we are told that the Treaty was accepted by the Boers under pressure. Well, that sounds to mo rather a strange admission, because we are told that pressure is the one thing that must not be applied now. We are asked to contemplate the most terrible prospect that can be held out to us—that of having another Ireland in the Transvaal. I think the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) is rather hard on our relations with Ireland. If we had there 500,000 people passionately fond of our rule, and 40,000 adverse to us, my impression is that our task would be easier than it is. If the fear of establishing another Ireland, with all the terrors which the noble Earl has conjured up, as the consequence of a military intervention, could not originally prevent the application by us of pressure, then, when the Government were ready to threaten to use the sword, in the shape of Sir Evelyn Wood's troops, in order that the Convention might be passed, and are not prepared to use the slightest military pressure for the purpose of insuring that the Convention shall be observed, it follows that Her Majesty's Government attached immense importance to the passing of that Convention, which was to have an immediate influence on the opinion of the people at home, but that they attach little, if any, importance whatever to the observance of the provisions of which they were then so earnest in procuring the adoption. I thought the noble Earl had somewhat forgotten the character of the duties which were imposed on the British Resident. He represented that the Resident had nothing to do but to advise and report—that he was a sort of cross between a Missionary and a Special Correspondent. But nothing so absurd was put into the Convention at that time, or I think some of us would have noticed it. Other duties were imposed upon him, for, according to the 3rd sub-section of Article XVIII., the Resident was enjoined, in regard to Natives not residing in the Transvaal, to report to the High Commissioner and the Transvaal Government any encroachment reported to him as having been made by the Transvaal residents on the lands of such Natives, and in case of disagreement between the Resident and the Transvaal Government as to whether any encroachment had been made, the decision of the Suzerain was to be final. I want to know what was the intention with which those words were put in? Was it, as we are told, that we are to depend upon the goodwill and co-operation of the Transvaal Government as to whether the decision of the Suzerain should be accepted or not? What was the use, then, of setting up this arbitration? I wonder what, in the noble Earl's mind, are the prospects of the Commissioner he designs to send out to the Transvaal? He has announced, in the most distinct terms, that he has an insuperable objection to the use of military force; he has pointed out that it involves us in the most serious embarrassment, even one so great as the possession of another Ireland; and with that announcement, speedily telegraphed to South Africa, the noble Earl sends out a Special Commissioner to negotiate. What arguments is the Commissioner to use in negotiating; what motives can he appeal to? Is he going simply to preach, merely to enlarge on the ethical value of the Convention, to impress on the Government of the Transvaal, by means of lectures, the moral duties they have forgotten? The noble Earl represents that the Convention rests for its sanction, not upon the prospects of any enforcement by the British Government, but upon the sensitiveness of the inhabitants of the Transvaal in general, and of the filibusters on the Frontier in particular, to European public opinion. That is the one sanction he recognizes and is prepared to enforce. So this Commissioner is to go out to induce the Transvaal Government to revise its engagements inasense favourable to those poor Natives who have been so betrayed and mal- treated, and the only argument which will be placed in his hands will be the assurance that the public opinion of Europe will condemn them if they do not accede to our wishes. I fear that the Special Commissioner, though he may enjoy a pleasant trip, will return empty-handed, unless he is to receive a hint from the Government that they would not be sorry to wash their hands entirely of the interests of all those Native races whom they have hitherto undertaken to protect. My Lords, I confess that I entirely agree with my noble Friend who spoke on this side (Viscount Cranbrook), that if there is to be nothing more definite or more determined in the interference of Her Majesty's Government, they had far better wash their hands of the whole territory altogether. This nerveless diplomacy, these feeble negotiations, this helpless policy—they confer no advantage upon anyone of the parties to whom they are applied. They leave the Natives, who may be still simple enough to trust in you, to expose themselves, without a chance of protection, to the deadly hostility of their hereditary foes; and they leave a slur upon the good name of England, both for valour and good faith, in the minds of all the inhabitants of South Africa, which may be dangerous to our power in many parts of the Empire, and more especially to our South African Colonies.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I can say, as the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) said, that I had not the slightest intention of taking part in this discussion; but, after what has fallen from the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), I should like to say one or two words. I quite agree that it is the duty of an Opposition to criticize—and a very useful duty it is—the acts of the Government. Most Oppositions carry that useful operation rather further than is sometimes necessary; and I am bound to say that no Opposition I ever remember deserves such credit as the noble Marquess and his Friends for finding fault with everything which Her Majesty's Government do, and for never allowing that, in any one particular point, Her Majesty's Government are in the slightest degree right. The noble Marquess has, to-day, stated, in the most definite manner, what is the intention of this discussion. In the long, elaborate speech of the noble Earl the former Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Earl of Carnarvon) and the fiery speech of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) very severe critical observations have been made in addition to the nobly Marquess's own severe remarks. Ha entirely disdains giving the Government or the country the slightest assistance as to our future policy, and as to what we ought to do at this moment; but he expressly states that the object of all this discussion is merely to see whether any dirt has adhered to Her Majesty's present Government in struggling out of that slough of mire into which we were led by the noble Earl the former Secretary of State for the Colonies and his Colleagues by their act of annexation of the territory. We are told that it was done under mistaken information, and that they would not have gone so far if they bad had the slightest idea of the real facts of the case. But now, with all this disclaimer, the noble Marquess not only gives us no assistance in our policy, but attempts at once to damage, as much as he can, the measure we propose to take of sending out a Special Commissioner. "How can you expect any results," he asks, "if you announce beforehand that you are not going to war under any circumstances? "That is very much the position in which the noble Marquess himself was once placed, when he went to Constantinople, after the declaration of Lord Beaconsfield and others that we were on no account to go to war.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

No, no!

EARL GRANVILLE

I think the noble Marquess exaggerated what has been said by Her Majesty's Government. We have no intention of going to war; we see every possible reason against it. Therefore, we are against going to war; but we have never said that there are no conceivable circumstances in which force may not be resorted to. The noble Marquess said he would not give us advice; but he ended by giving us most distinct advice, for ho said—" If you will not exert your force in order to establish a right state of things in South Africa, I advise you to do nothing at all, but to wash your hands of the whole affair." I do not think that is good advice; and I hope Her Majesty's Government will not follow that advice, But the whole inference from his own speech, and still more from the speech of the noble Viscount, is that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Ministers, for the honour—I do not think anybody could say it would be for the interests—of the country that we should use forcible means. I remember a speech of the noble Marquess, at a public meeting a short time since, in which he said that when he heard of the bombardment of Alexandria it added six inches to his stature. But a scalded dog sometimes fears cold water; and I cannot help feeling, supposing we came to the same opinion as the noble Marquess and his Friends, that it is a judicious thing, either for our interest, or for anything else, to go to war with the Boers on this occasion. I venture to differ from that opinion. I am afraid that it is possible that, when the war was begun, if it was carried on favourably, we might expect, as in the case of the bombardment of Alexandria, that, for months after that, we should hear peace speeches from the Opposition, and the denunciation of the bloodthirstiness of her Majesty's Government in undertaking the war. I do not regret the present discussion. I think the speeches of both the noble Earls who have been closely connected with the Colonies will be useful in enlightening the public on the real merits of the question; but I hope the discussion will not induce the country to believe that we are not, on the one hand, going to war with the Boers at all, or that, in a state of hopelessness, we entirely wash our hands of the whole question.

Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock.