§ LORD EMLYin rising to ask the Secretary of State for the Colenies to inform the House what are the proposals ho has made to the Cape Colony for the settlement of the Basuto question; and whether he intends that the carrying out of these proposals should be contingent in any way on the action of the Orange Free State? said, if the news published that morning of the annexation by the Cape Colony of a part of Bechuanaland were true, this was an auspicious day to bring forward any question with regard to South Africa; for it showed there was a desire on the part of the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and his Colleague—Mr. Merriman—to settle in a fair way the questions which affected the Native races 521 there. After briefly sketching the history of Basutoland since the year 1869, he urged the desirability of reverting to the state of things which at one time prevailed, under which the Basutos were united with this country. We had a clear duty to perform towards the Basutos; and he did not see why the performance of that duty should be made contingent on the action of the Orange Free State. The question for the Basutos lay between annexation by us and utter extinction. Unless they were supported by us they would be forced to emigrate or starve. A French missionary, M. Cassilis, had given an interesting account of Basutoland, where he had laboured for 40 years, and had done more than any other man to bring the Native Tribes into their present civilized condition. They were subjects of the Queen, and the great majority of them would desire to return to the state of things which existed in 1869. Basutoland was the Switzerland of South Africa, commanding Natal, Griqualand, and the Orange Free State; and if we desired to stay in South Africa it would be little short of madness to abandon Basutoland. He believed his noble and gallant Friend (Lord Wolseley) would bear him out in saying that whoever held Basutoland held the key of South Africa. Unless we took measures to protect that country it would be occupied by people whom we should little desire to see there. He earnestly hoped the Government would take this opportunity of settling the last difficult question with which we had to deal in South Africa.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I am glad to hear from my noble Friend that he considers that I have taken the direction of South African affairs at a peculiarly opportune moment. I was not aware of it myself, so far as the general condition of things in South Africa is concerned, for, however hopeful one may be as to the ultimate result, it is impossible to say that they are in an altogether satisfactory condition at the present time. But, my Lords, to return to the immediate subject before us, I think I shall probably be able to give a more satisfactory answer than I could otherwise give, if I say a few words of explanation as to the antecedents of the Basuto territory, and as to the circumstances which have led to the present 522 complications. My noble Friend described the geographical position of the Basuto country. He laid more stress than I should be inclined to do upon its military importance. But there is no doubt that it holds a central position as regards the British Possessions in South Africa, having the Cape Colony on the West, the Orange Free State on the North, Natal on the East, and a large number of protected or semi-independent Native Chiefs on the South. In that position it is clear that any disorder or disturbance there is calculated to create considerable trouble and uneasiness in other parts of South Africa. The Basuto Tribe were free and independent up to the year 1868 or 1869. Like most other African Tribes in that condition, they had been frequently involved in quarrels among themselves and disturbances with their neighbours on the Borders, which finally resulted in a war with the Orange Free State. That war, after various vicissitudes, ended in a complete defeat of the Natives, and the almost entire conquest of the territories by the people of the Free State. Great alarm was caused by that state of things in the Cape Colony and South Africa generally, not arising entirely out of sympathy with the Basuto Tribes, but from a very natural and reasonable calculation that if a considerable number of warlike Natives were to be driven out of their homes and thrown loose upon the world, that would be a source of disorder and confusion in all the surrounding districts. Pressure was, in consequence, put by the Colonial authorities upon the Government at home. The Colonial Office yielded to that pressure; they intervened, and saved the Basutos from the destruction which was impending over them. They settled terms of peace, and then annexed the Basuto territory with the consent of the inhabitants; all went well for some time; but in two or three years it was found desirable to transfer the management of the Basuto country from the Imperial Government to the Government of the Cape Colony. Shortly after that a responsible Government was given to the Cape, and so the management of Basuto affairs passed out of the hands of the Colonial Office into the hands of the Ministers of the Cape Colony. I do not attempt to enter into the details of the transactions of that time. They are not material now. I have not 523 studied the questions of that day with sufficient care to pronounce judgment upon them; but whatever may be the cause, or whoever was in fault, it is quite certain that the Basutos, who, at the time of coming under the Imperial Government, were entirely favourable to us, became alienated from the Colonial authorities, and the attempt—undoubtedly, in the circumstances, an unwise and injudicious attempt — to enforce a general disarmament produced the war which has continued through several years, which has been carried on unsuccessfully on the side of the Colonists, and has cost the Colony more than £3,000,000, and has ended in the Basutos remaining unsubdued. The authorities of the Cape are naturally tired of that state of things, and are anxious to put an end to it. They want to get rid of this dependency which has cost them so much without bringing any compensating advantage; and, although the Bill for that purpose now before the Cape Parliament has not actually passed, it is well understood that it will pass within the course of the next few weeks. The question is, what, in these circumstances, are we to do? There are the usual three courses open to us; but only one of them is really possible. It is, of course, theoretically possible to disallow the Bill when it is sent home for approval. But that would be a very high-handed proceeding — and a very unusual proceeding in the case of a Colony having responsible government. Moreover, it would be one entirely useless for all practical purposes. We can prevent the authorities of the Cape from effecting the separation of Basutoland in a formal and legal manner; but we cannot prevent them withdrawing from the territory, and leaving it in a condition of practical independence. Therefore, that alternative must be set aside as outside the region of practical politics. It comes to this, then—that either we must let the Basutos go under their former conditions of independence, or else we must renew the Protectorate under the Imperial Government. With regard to the proposal for letting them go, it is not very easy to justify turning out of the Empire men who are willing to remain in it, merely on the ground that they are likely to be inconvenient subjects. If they were to be so turned out, and if they were to be left to 524 themselves, they would relapse into a condition, probably, of partial or total anarchy; and we should have exactly the same state of things reproduced which we thought it our duty to put an end to many years ago. We have, therefore, been compelled to adopt the third proposal, under certain conditions and restrictions which I will state to your Lordships. In the first place, we have required a satisfactory assurance that the Basutos themselves really desire to return to their former political connection with us. No doubt, a considerable number of the Basutos are anxious to return to that connection; but what we have a right to require is that there should be practical unanimity of opinion on their part that that connection should be restored—such unanimity as may save us from the necessity of employing coercive measures. The second condition is this —we think it not unreasonable that the Cape Coleny and the Basutos, between them, should make themselves responsible for, at any rate, the greater part—I do not say the whole—of the expenses attending this change. It is reasonable that the Cape Colony should pay towards the expense of maintaining order in Basutoland, at least, the equivalent of that part of their Customs' duties derived from the imports passing into Basutoland; and this we believe will be sufficient. The Basutos are, for Natives, well off, and are able and willing to pay a moderate hut tax, and any other tax which may be necessary to meet the expenditure. We do not propose to make Basutoland a Crown Colony, or to introduce the costly machinery of European officers. We wish the Basutos to enjoy Home Rule in the strictest sense of the word. We wish them to employ their own machinery of government, and that they should be governed, as far as may be, according to their own customs. I do not anticipate that in such circumstances as these the cost of their government will be very heavy. We also think that the Orange Free State should be required to do their fair share in the matter of keeping order within their own boundaries. If these conditions are complied with, we are ready to resume control over the Basutos. We shall be ready to lay upon the Table of the House the Papers embodying our proposals as soon as those proposals are in the hands of the Cape Colony audio- 525 rities. We cannot lay them upon the Table earlier, because, if an imperfect telegraphic summary of them were sent out, it might lead to a mistaken impression as to our intentions on this subject, and prejudice the case before those concerned had time to consider it.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he congratulated his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) upon this change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, though he must remind their Lordships of the despatch written only a short time since by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley), to the effect that Her Majesty's Government could not hold out any expectation that steps would be taken to relieve the Cape Coleny from their connection with Basutoland. So strongly was that fact impressed on the mind of the Colonial Government that the Colonial Prime Minister commented upon it in terms of no little regret. He did not, however, now blame Her Majesty's Government for this change of policy; and he thought the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had decided right. Both the noble Earl and the noble Lord who had introduced this question had given certain reasons in favour of this change, which he thought wore sound, for the re-admission of the Basutos within the British Empire, and he would add one or two more. In the first place, the Basutos themselves had distinct and decided claims upon us, although, perhaps, his noble Friend hardly did justice to their case. In 1871 Basutoland had been annexed to Cape Coleny, then a Crown Coleny; and in 1872 a responsible Government was forced upon the Cape. The Basutos wore then placed under a system of government for which they did not bargain, and to which they strongly objected; and out of their enforced union with the Cape Colony it seemed to him not improbable that much of the difficulties with the Basuto race had arisen. But the Cape Colony, no less than the Basutos, had claims upon us, because their general policy with regard to Native Tribes had been considerate and humane, although they might have made mistakes. The great reason of all, however, why he thought they ought to take this step was that he believed we could govern the country well, and, comparatively speaking, with little outlay, because, as had 526 been pointed out, the Native taxation had always been sufficient to bring in a very large return. The noble Earl proposed, as one of the conditions of annexation, that the Cape Coleny should give a contribution, which was to be a matter of bargain, and, if he understood rightly, that they should give en equivalent for the Customs duties. Now, he should regret very much if the noble Earl accepted an equivalent for the Customs duties in lieu of the Customs duties themselves, because if they took over Basutoland they would have to take over something more. He was satisfied they would have to take over the country, including Pondoland, down to the sea coast; and if they took over that tract of country they must maintain their power over the Customs duties.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, there was no proposal to take over that district. He was not dealing with that state of things at all.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that it was of no use to blink this question, which was an essential part of the matter—that ho warned the noble Earl that he would have to consider the point now raised, because of the contingency that he had indicated, and that this would necessitate a revision of the whole scheme. But there was one other reason why he thought this step was a prudent one. In his opinion, the system of magistrates which could be devised from this country was a better system than that which it was in the power of the Cape authorities to arrange. He should not be thought to find fault with the Cape Government when he said that, as far as he was aware of the facts of the case, the magistrates who had been appointed in Basutoland had, in many respects, failed in maintaining the system for the carrying out of which they were appointed. With regard to the difficulties in the future, he wished to point out, in the first place, that the Border population was not at present under control; and, from that point of view, he was not disposed to quarrel with the condition that the Orange Free State should use their best means to maintain order along the Frontier. It was very desirable to make the Orange Free State parties to this transaction. At the same time, it was desirable to know what the noble Earl meant by "keeping order." If it 527 was meant that the Orange Free State were to keep strict order along their own Frontier without crossing the Border and interfering with the people of Basutoland, he had nothing to find fault with; but if a door was to be opened to their interfering with the Basutos, then, he feared, complications would sooner or later arise. His noble Friend said that the Basutos must accept our rule cheerfully. So far as the bulk of the people were concerned, he believed that it was probable that our rule would be welcome. It must, however, be borne in mind that in recent years the power of the Chiefs in Basutoland had undergone considerable alteration. Their power had, on the whole, been waning; and their position now was this—that in some respects they had too much power, in other respects they had too little. He was tolerably confident that at present the great part of the people would accept our rule cheerfully; but a few years hence questions might arise as to how far the Chiefs themselves were prepared to accept it, and it would be very desirable indeed if some steps could be taken — some practical and unquestionable test proposed and accepted—to show that the Chiefs, as well as the people, were prepared to accept our government. That was a view in which anyone who knew South Africa would agree. There were three important considerations which seemed to him to arise out of this question. In the first place, there had been a remarkable change of policy in the last five or six years in South Africa. Since he held the Seals of the Colonial Office an enormous change of feeling and policy on many important questions had taken place, alike in the Cape, in the Colony of Natal, and the Orange Free State, to which must be added the important fact that the Basutos had had the best of the Cape Government in war, just as the Boers of the Transvaal had beaten us. These changes and circumstances had produced very great effects in South Africa, effects which went far beyond the limits of the present transaction. In the next place, recent events had shown that a responsible Government, with a Parliamentary Government, though very desirable in many respects, was by no means the best instrument for dealing with the Natives or Native affairs. These Native Tribes looked with much more 528 confidence to a single head, such as the Queen or a Resident Governor, than to an Assemby of responsible Representatives or a Parliament. The very system of Parliamentary government involved a frequent change of officers and functionaries; and it was impossible, in such circumstances, there could be that fixity and continuity of government which was absolutely essential in dealing with Native races. He did not, in this instance, desire to see what was called a Crown Colony system of government established. 'What was needed hero should be of the simplest possible kind. There was no need for Councils, or any of the machinery which existed in some Crown Colonies. The country could be governed by Residents and magistrates, making every Native feel that justice was administered as between man and man; and, on the other hand, using, as far as possible, the instrumentality and the agency of the Chiefs.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he did not intend to follow the noble Earl in his observations on the course adopted by the Government on this question. The noble Earl had, however, alluded to a despatch which he (the Earl of Kimberley) had written last year, when he had the honour to hold the Seals of the Colonial Office. In that despatch he had said it was not the intention of the Government to take any steps to relieve the Cape Colony from responsibility in connection with Basutoland. If her Majesty's Government interfered in any way prematurely, it was only too probable that there would be a recurrence of the difficulties which had already boon experienced. The object of Her Majesty's Government had been to test whether the Cape Colony could settle this matter of Basutoland to their own satisfaction. He had always thought that the time might come when that Colony would come to a determination to repeal the Annexation Act, and that it would then be for the Government to consider whether they should resume Basutoland. For his own part, he heartily and entirely concurred in the determination which had been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government in the present juncture. At the same time, it was quite as well that Her Majesty's Government, in undertaking this course, which he believed to be the only one adapted to the circumstances, should 529 not disguise from themselves the gravity of the step as regarded the whole of our position in South Africa. The noble Earl who had just spoken might remember that some years ago ho called on the Cape Colony to contribute towards the expenses of the troops in that Colony. They were asked to contribute, he thought, some £40 a-man, which was the contribution asked from certain other Colonies. The Cape Colony at that time, having Parliamentary institutions, steadily refused to make any such contribution; and his noble Friend informed the Cape Government that if they were not prepared to contribute towards the cost of their defence they must be left to take in their own hands the defence of their Frontier, and that, though it might be a question of time and opportunity, Her Majesty's Govern-merit would reduce the Forces employed in South Africa to a garrison of Cape Town. This policy, from the time his noble Friend received that refusal, had been more or less steadily pursued by successive Colonial Ministers. There was, to his mind, one most unfortunate departure from that policy, which was when Sir Bartle Frere dismissed his Ministry because they wished to carry on a frontier war without the assistance of the Imperial troops. From that moment everything had gone wrong in the Cape Coleny with regard to those matters. When the Colony found they were to be relieved from the responsibility of defending their Frontiers, and that the old system was to be pursued of the Frontiers being defended at the expense of the Empire, fresh difficulties arose in consequence of the steps taken in pursuance of Sir Bartle Frere's policy. With respect to the Disarmament Act itself, that was a perfectly wise step to take, as it merely enabled the Government by Proclamation, where it was thought necessary, to disarm the Natives; but the attempt to disarm the Basutos was most impolitic. The position in which this country found itself in regard to those matters was, that we were, more or less, going back to the old state of things, which we had for many years abandoned, but going back with one serious difference, and that was the reason why ho made those observations. Practically, if the Cape Government agreed to the condition which Her Majesty's Government proposed with 530 reference to expense, we should be arriving by another road at that which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) wished to bring about many years ago—namely, that the Imperial Government should undertake to manage the Frontiers, but that the Cape Government should contribute a fair share of the expense. He would not say that in the peculiar condition of South Africa at the present time this might not be the best and wisest system; but that was a very different thing from saying that the Imperial Government should bear, not only the responsibility, but the whole of the expense of the ordinary control of those Frontiers. In some great crisis we might be called upon to assist the Colony; that was perfectly reasonable, and might hold good with regard to all our Colenies; but in ordinary times it was fair to expect that we should receive from them a reasonable contribution towards the expense and responsibility which were undertaken. Because it must be remembered that, although the Cape Government now in their distress came to the Imperial Government and were desirous that they should take over the charge of Basutoland, that Government had not taken this course until they had exhausted all the moans at their command in gallantly endeavouring to discharge the responsibilities which they had undertaken; and when a Coleny came to ask assistance under such circumstances it had a right to expect that the Empire to which it belonged would give it. That was his view of the present situation as regarded Basutoland, and he hoped that the condition that his noble Friend had laid down would be accepted. The present circumstances were favourable to it, as we had the concurrent opinion of the Cape Coleny and the Orange Free State. The latter point he considered to be of the highest importance, and he thought it was probable that the Basutos themselves would be willing to recognize our authority; but, as the noble Earl opposite had said, we must have the consent of the Chiefs; for if we were to go back to Basutoland without the distinct consent of the Chiefs, and without an unmistakable indication that they would submit to the Imperial authority, we should only embark in troubles, the end of which we should not be able easily to foresee.