Lords Sitting of 14 June 1883

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE — First Report—Office of the Cleric of the Parliaments and Office of the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod. (No. 93.)
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Local Government Provisional Orders (Poor Law) (No. 2)* (89); Public Health (Dairies, &c.) (92).
Second Reading—Committee negatived—Consolidated Fund (No. 3)*.
Report—Municipal Corporations (Unreformed)* (59&–04).
Third Reading—Naval Discipline and Enlistment Acts Amendment (70); Cathedral Statutes (58); Lands Clauses (Umpire)*(71), and passed.

EGYPT (MILITARY EXPEDITION)—THE MANCHESTER REGIMENT AND THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS—FIELD ALLOWANCE.—QUESTION.
VISCOUNT ENFIELDasked the Secretary of State for India, Whether any decision has been arrived at with regard to granting "Field Allowance" in the recent Egyptian campaign to the 1st Battalion of the Manchester Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the Seaford Highlanders? The subject had been alluded to some weeks ago in Parliament, and the noble Earl had promised to give it consideration.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI am happy to be able to inform my noble Friend that I have approved of the grant to both the battalions in question of the full six months' field allowance. The War Office has been duly informed of this decision.

NAVAL DISCIPLINE AND ENLISTMENT ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 70.)
(The Earl of Northbrook.)
NAVAL DISCIPLINE AND ENLISTMENT ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.—(No. 70.)

  THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a."—(The Earl of Northbrook.)
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHsaid, that if he had thought there was any chance of success, he would have moved the rejection of the Bill even at this stage; but he should have to content himself with a simple protest against it. He wished to take this opportunity of explaining that on the second reading of the Bill he had advocated the retention of corporal punishment only for the very gravest offences. The cases of corporal punishment which the Leader of the House had cited in the debate on the second reading were instances which had been held up to universal abhorrence by the whole Navy. He believed that they occurred some 60 or 70 years ago. The noble Earl might as well have referred to the Bloody Assize, and endeavoured to induce the public to believe that the judicial descendants of Lord Jeffreys, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, would crop the ears of any recreant Tory who might be guilty of "veiled Obstruction" or any similar offence. It was a most painful thing to propose that the power of inflicting corporal punishment in the Navy should he, in the face of public opinion, retained; but he contended that public opinion had not been expressed against the retention. The noble Earl had referred to the House of Commons; but there had been no expression of opinion there against this punishment in the Navy. No single instance had been given in which a man had been deterred from entering the Navy by the prospect of corporal punishment. It was certain that all professional opinion was in favour of the old system, which had always been regarded as essential to the discipline of the Service. Much as he detested corporal punishment, his opinion of its necessity corresponded with that of the Profession at large; and he submitted that it should be retained, in order that the committal of crimes of a disgraceful character should be deterred. For his own part, he wholly failed to see

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  how the substitutes proposed could be either effectual or convenient. Nothing could be less satisfactory than that a man should be court-martialed, and sentenced to imprisonment while his ship was engaged in a blockade, or was kept at sea for any length of time for any other reason. It seemed to him, too, that imprisonment was much more likely to injure a sailor's morale than corporal punishment. He supposed it was useless now to oppose the Bill; but he protested against it, and believed that in time of war it would he impossible to maintain discipline without the old punishment. Unless it was resorted to in such a crisis, the British Navy would fall into a disgraceful state.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, he wished to bring before their Lordships the hard case of a man who had not been flogged. He was a very young sailor, and had struck a petty officer, and had got five years' penal servitude for this. The Admiralty had reduced this to three years; but that amount of penal servitude was too much, and would ruin him for life. This happened in the Pacific Ocean, and the man had already been in prison for a long time on board ship. Ho was sure this man would much rather have had a flogging and have done with it.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, he could not agree with his noble Friend (Lord Stanley of Alderley) that this punishment was by any means disproportionate to the offence. The noble Viscount (Viscount Sidmouth) had not touched the contention of his noble Friend in the speech to which reference had been made. His noble Friend (Earl Granville) asked in the speech whether it was likely that our officers were not as able to maintain discipline without flogging as the officers of Foreign Navies were? The Bill, as a whole, had been carefully considered by, and had met with the unanimous approval of, the Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty, on whom it was his duty to rely.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, that the observations of the noble Earl differed very much from the view of the case which he presented when the Bill was last before the House. He then represented the matter as a political one, and said that, as practical men, we could not keep up a punishment that
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  public opinion had condemned. He did not tell the House that the Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty had arrived at the conclusion embodied in the Bill.
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKsaid, what he represented was, that the position the Government took up was that flogging could not be maintained in the Navy, and that this position, and the provisions of the Bill for altering the law, were entirely and unanimously accepted by the Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, the first was a political question, as to which the authority of the Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty was worth less than that of the Members of the House. Whether the particular punishments to be substituted were practicable might be more an opinion for the Naval Lords. As far as he heard Naval opinion, apart altogether from the political question, it was that considerable injury would be done to the Navy by the abolition of this punishment. He did not think the matter was one on which it was desirable their Lordships should interfere, for this reason—that, to a certain extent, the Executive Government had power to disregard any opinion their Lordships' might give. They had already forbidden the practical application of the punishment; and, so long as the present Government was in Office, the punishment of flogging would not be inflicted. He did not think, therefore, there would be any advantage in going through the form of refusing to pass the clauses, seeing that the Government had the power to disregard the opinion to which they might come. Corporal punishment might be required in time of war, and it was possible it might be restored. When the noble Earl spoke of the experience of the other Navies of the world, he ought to remember what he had apparently forgotten, that they resorted to a much more free application of capital punishment than we did. Practically, that was the issue; in times of crisis, if we did not allow of the application of the milder punishment, there was no doubt that the death penalty to offenders on board ship would be necessary to save the lives of others.
  VISCOUNT SIDMOUTHsaid, that, in conversation with Germans, he had been

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  told that the disgraceful punishments that were inflicted in the Army prompted Germans to maim themselves in order to avoid the Service.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 3a accordingly; Amendments made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

CATHEDRAL STATUTES BILL.—(No. 58.)
(The lord Bishop of Carlisle.)
CATHEDRAL STATUTES BILL.—(No. 58.)

  THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
  THE BISHOP OF CARLISLE, in moving that the Bill be now read the third time, said, he hoped the Bill might be sent down to the other House with such momentum as to give it some chance of passing. The speech made upon the second reading by the right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Peterborough) had been much considered, and had had a great effect in the country; but he (the Bishop of Carlisle) was disposed to hope that, notwithstanding that speech, the Bill would have a better chance of being passed than the right rev. Prelate had prophesied. The right rev. Prelate said that he (the Bishop of Carlisle) might just as well read tie) Bill a second time in his own study as in that House; and he pointed out that the Government would not pass a Bill of this sort through the other House. The right rev. Prelate referred to the position of Parties, and said that the passing of any ecclesiastical legislation would be impossible, and that the Bill would never get beyond that House; but ho (the Bishop of Carlisle) wished to point out that this was not a Private Bill, but that it had been prepared, after mature consideration, by a representative body of noblemen and gentlemen, who wore appointed by the Government to deal with the questions referred to them, and this Bill was the result of their consideration. It was absolutely necessary to prevent the labours of the Commissioners from being altogether futile; and, therefore, it ought not to be on the footing of a Private Bill, which had to knock its way through the House of Commons in the best way it could by its own unaided efforts. He thought ho bad a right to appeal to Her Majesty's Government to give a Bill of this kind something in the nature of sympathy and support.
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  He did not ask them to adopt the Bill as their own, but only to give to it such an amount of sympathy as would secure for it a reasonable consideration in the other House, and so do that which would be very much to their own credit—namely, utterly refute the description and prophecy made by the right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Peterborough). The Bill in itself was so simple, so reasonable, and so necessary, that if it were only brought before the House of Commons he had not the slightest doubt that the justice of that House would pass it. In conclusion, the right rev. Prelate moved the third reading of the Bill.
  Moved," That the Bill be now read 3a."—(The Lord Bishop of Carlisle.)
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYremarked, that, as regarded the intention of the Bill, he need hardly assure the right rev. Prelate that the Bill received the general approval of the Government; but he was unable to promise that facilities would be given by the Government for passing it through the other House, because any such facilities must depend upon the state of Public Business there. Considering the uncertainty of doing Business in the House of Commons, the right rev. Prelate could hardly expect him to give an assurance that the Bill would be taken up by the Government.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 3a according; an Amendment made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

SOUTH AFRICA—BASUTOLAND.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD EMLYin rising to ask the Secretary of State for the Colenies to inform the House what are the proposals ho has made to the Cape Colony for the settlement of the Basuto question; and whether he intends that the carrying out of these proposals should be contingent in any way on the action of the Orange Free State? said, if the news published that morning of the annexation by the Cape Colony of a part of Bechuanaland were true, this was an auspicious day to bring forward any question with regard to South Africa; for it showed there was a desire on the part of the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and his Colleague—Mr. Merriman—to settle in a fair way the questions which affected the Native races

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  there. After briefly sketching the history of Basutoland since the year 1869, he urged the desirability of reverting to the state of things which at one time prevailed, under which the Basutos were united with this country. We had a clear duty to perform towards the Basutos; and he did not see why the performance of that duty should be made contingent on the action of the Orange Free State. The question for the Basutos lay between annexation by us and utter extinction. Unless they were supported by us they would be forced to emigrate or starve. A French missionary, M. Cassilis, had given an interesting account of Basutoland, where he had laboured for 40 years, and had done more than any other man to bring the Native Tribes into their present civilized condition. They were subjects of the Queen, and the great majority of them would desire to return to the state of things which existed in 1869. Basutoland was the Switzerland of South Africa, commanding Natal, Griqualand, and the Orange Free State; and if we desired to stay in South Africa it would be little short of madness to abandon Basutoland. He believed his noble and gallant Friend (Lord Wolseley) would bear him out in saying that whoever held Basutoland held the key of South Africa. Unless we took measures to protect that country it would be occupied by people whom we should little desire to see there. He earnestly hoped the Government would take this opportunity of settling the last difficult question with which we had to deal in South Africa.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I am glad to hear from my noble Friend that he considers that I have taken the direction of South African affairs at a peculiarly opportune moment. I was not aware of it myself, so far as the general condition of things in South Africa is concerned, for, however hopeful one may be as to the ultimate result, it is impossible to say that they are in an altogether satisfactory condition at the present time. But, my Lords, to return to the immediate subject before us, I think I shall probably be able to give a more satisfactory answer than I could otherwise give, if I say a few words of explanation as to the antecedents of the Basuto territory, and as to the circumstances which have led to the present
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  complications. My noble Friend described the geographical position of the Basuto country. He laid more stress than I should be inclined to do upon its military importance. But there is no doubt that it holds a central position as regards the British Possessions in South Africa, having the Cape Colony on the West, the Orange Free State on the North, Natal on the East, and a large number of protected or semi-independent Native Chiefs on the South. In that position it is clear that any disorder or disturbance there is calculated to create considerable trouble and uneasiness in other parts of South Africa. The Basuto Tribe were free and independent up to the year 1868 or 1869. Like most other African Tribes in that condition, they had been frequently involved in quarrels among themselves and disturbances with their neighbours on the Borders, which finally resulted in a war with the Orange Free State. That war, after various vicissitudes, ended in a complete defeat of the Natives, and the almost entire conquest of the territories by the people of the Free State. Great alarm was caused by that state of things in the Cape Colony and South Africa generally, not arising entirely out of sympathy with the Basuto Tribes, but from a very natural and reasonable calculation that if a considerable number of warlike Natives were to be driven out of their homes and thrown loose upon the world, that would be a source of disorder and confusion in all the surrounding districts. Pressure was, in consequence, put by the Colonial authorities upon the Government at home. The Colonial Office yielded to that pressure; they intervened, and saved the Basutos from the destruction which was impending over them. They settled terms of peace, and then annexed the Basuto territory with the consent of the inhabitants; all went well for some time; but in two or three years it was found desirable to transfer the management of the Basuto country from the Imperial Government to the Government of the Cape Colony. Shortly after that a responsible Government was given to the Cape, and so the management of Basuto affairs passed out of the hands of the Colonial Office into the hands of the Ministers of the Cape Colony. I do not attempt to enter into the details of the transactions of that time. They are not material now. I have not

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  studied the questions of that day with sufficient care to pronounce judgment upon them; but whatever may be the cause, or whoever was in fault, it is quite certain that the Basutos, who, at the time of coming under the Imperial Government, were entirely favourable to us, became alienated from the Colonial authorities, and the attempt—undoubtedly, in the circumstances, an unwise and injudicious attempt — to enforce a general disarmament produced the war which has continued through several years, which has been carried on unsuccessfully on the side of the Colonists, and has cost the Colony more than £3,000,000, and has ended in the Basutos remaining unsubdued. The authorities of the Cape are naturally tired of that state of things, and are anxious to put an end to it. They want to get rid of this dependency which has cost them so much without bringing any compensating advantage; and, although the Bill for that purpose now before the Cape Parliament has not actually passed, it is well understood that it will pass within the course of the next few weeks. The question is, what, in these circumstances, are we to do? There are the usual three courses open to us; but only one of them is really possible. It is, of course, theoretically possible to disallow the Bill when it is sent home for approval. But that would be a very high-handed proceeding — and a very unusual proceeding in the case of a Colony having responsible government. Moreover, it would be one entirely useless for all practical purposes. We can prevent the authorities of the Cape from effecting the separation of Basutoland in a formal and legal manner; but we cannot prevent them withdrawing from the territory, and leaving it in a condition of practical independence. Therefore, that alternative must be set aside as outside the region of practical politics. It comes to this, then—that either we must let the Basutos go under their former conditions of independence, or else we must renew the Protectorate under the Imperial Government. With regard to the proposal for letting them go, it is not very easy to justify turning out of the Empire men who are willing to remain in it, merely on the ground that they are likely to be inconvenient subjects. If they were to be so turned out, and if they were to be left to
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  themselves, they would relapse into a condition, probably, of partial or total anarchy; and we should have exactly the same state of things reproduced which we thought it our duty to put an end to many years ago. We have, therefore, been compelled to adopt the third proposal, under certain conditions and restrictions which I will state to your Lordships. In the first place, we have required a satisfactory assurance that the Basutos themselves really desire to return to their former political connection with us. No doubt, a considerable number of the Basutos are anxious to return to that connection; but what we have a right to require is that there should be practical unanimity of opinion on their part that that connection should be restored—such unanimity as may save us from the necessity of employing coercive measures. The second condition is this —we think it not unreasonable that the Cape Coleny and the Basutos, between them, should make themselves responsible for, at any rate, the greater part—I do not say the whole—of the expenses attending this change. It is reasonable that the Cape Colony should pay towards the expense of maintaining order in Basutoland, at least, the equivalent of that part of their Customs' duties derived from the imports passing into Basutoland; and this we believe will be sufficient. The Basutos are, for Natives, well off, and are able and willing to pay a moderate hut tax, and any other tax which may be necessary to meet the expenditure. We do not propose to make Basutoland a Crown Colony, or to introduce the costly machinery of European officers. We wish the Basutos to enjoy Home Rule in the strictest sense of the word. We wish them to employ their own machinery of government, and that they should be governed, as far as may be, according to their own customs. I do not anticipate that in such circumstances as these the cost of their government will be very heavy. We also think that the Orange Free State should be required to do their fair share in the matter of keeping order within their own boundaries. If these conditions are complied with, we are ready to resume control over the Basutos. We shall be ready to lay upon the Table of the House the Papers embodying our proposals as soon as those proposals are in the hands of the Cape Colony audio-

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  rities. We cannot lay them upon the Table earlier, because, if an imperfect telegraphic summary of them were sent out, it might lead to a mistaken impression as to our intentions on this subject, and prejudice the case before those concerned had time to consider it.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he congratulated his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) upon this change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, though he must remind their Lordships of the despatch written only a short time since by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley), to the effect that Her Majesty's Government could not hold out any expectation that steps would be taken to relieve the Cape Coleny from their connection with Basutoland. So strongly was that fact impressed on the mind of the Colonial Government that the Colonial Prime Minister commented upon it in terms of no little regret. He did not, however, now blame Her Majesty's Government for this change of policy; and he thought the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had decided right. Both the noble Earl and the noble Lord who had introduced this question had given certain reasons in favour of this change, which he thought wore sound, for the re-admission of the Basutos within the British Empire, and he would add one or two more. In the first place, the Basutos themselves had distinct and decided claims upon us, although, perhaps, his noble Friend hardly did justice to their case. In 1871 Basutoland had been annexed to Cape Coleny, then a Crown Coleny; and in 1872 a responsible Government was forced upon the Cape. The Basutos wore then placed under a system of government for which they did not bargain, and to which they strongly objected; and out of their enforced union with the Cape Colony it seemed to him not improbable that much of the difficulties with the Basuto race had arisen. But the Cape Colony, no less than the Basutos, had claims upon us, because their general policy with regard to Native Tribes had been considerate and humane, although they might have made mistakes. The great reason of all, however, why he thought they ought to take this step was that he believed we could govern the country well, and, comparatively speaking, with little outlay, because, as had
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  been pointed out, the Native taxation had always been sufficient to bring in a very large return. The noble Earl proposed, as one of the conditions of annexation, that the Cape Coleny should give a contribution, which was to be a matter of bargain, and, if he understood rightly, that they should give en equivalent for the Customs duties. Now, he should regret very much if the noble Earl accepted an equivalent for the Customs duties in lieu of the Customs duties themselves, because if they took over Basutoland they would have to take over something more. He was satisfied they would have to take over the country, including Pondoland, down to the sea coast; and if they took over that tract of country they must maintain their power over the Customs duties.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, there was no proposal to take over that district. He was not dealing with that state of things at all.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that it was of no use to blink this question, which was an essential part of the matter—that ho warned the noble Earl that he would have to consider the point now raised, because of the contingency that he had indicated, and that this would necessitate a revision of the whole scheme. But there was one other reason why he thought this step was a prudent one. In his opinion, the system of magistrates which could be devised from this country was a better system than that which it was in the power of the Cape authorities to arrange. He should not be thought to find fault with the Cape Government when he said that, as far as he was aware of the facts of the case, the magistrates who had been appointed in Basutoland had, in many respects, failed in maintaining the system for the carrying out of which they were appointed. With regard to the difficulties in the future, he wished to point out, in the first place, that the Border population was not at present under control; and, from that point of view, he was not disposed to quarrel with the condition that the Orange Free State should use their best means to maintain order along the Frontier. It was very desirable to make the Orange Free State parties to this transaction. At the same time, it was desirable to know what the noble Earl meant by "keeping order." If it

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  was meant that the Orange Free State were to keep strict order along their own Frontier without crossing the Border and interfering with the people of Basutoland, he had nothing to find fault with; but if a door was to be opened to their interfering with the Basutos, then, he feared, complications would sooner or later arise. His noble Friend said that the Basutos must accept our rule cheerfully. So far as the bulk of the people were concerned, he believed that it was probable that our rule would be welcome. It must, however, be borne in mind that in recent years the power of the Chiefs in Basutoland had undergone considerable alteration. Their power had, on the whole, been waning; and their position now was this—that in some respects they had too much power, in other respects they had too little. He was tolerably confident that at present the great part of the people would accept our rule cheerfully; but a few years hence questions might arise as to how far the Chiefs themselves were prepared to accept it, and it would be very desirable indeed if some steps could be taken — some practical and unquestionable test proposed and accepted—to show that the Chiefs, as well as the people, were prepared to accept our government. That was a view in which anyone who knew South Africa would agree. There were three important considerations which seemed to him to arise out of this question. In the first place, there had been a remarkable change of policy in the last five or six years in South Africa. Since he held the Seals of the Colonial Office an enormous change of feeling and policy on many important questions had taken place, alike in the Cape, in the Colony of Natal, and the Orange Free State, to which must be added the important fact that the Basutos had had the best of the Cape Government in war, just as the Boers of the Transvaal had beaten us. These changes and circumstances had produced very great effects in South Africa, effects which went far beyond the limits of the present transaction. In the next place, recent events had shown that a responsible Government, with a Parliamentary Government, though very desirable in many respects, was by no means the best instrument for dealing with the Natives or Native affairs. These Native Tribes looked with much more
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  confidence to a single head, such as the Queen or a Resident Governor, than to an Assemby of responsible Representatives or a Parliament. The very system of Parliamentary government involved a frequent change of officers and functionaries; and it was impossible, in such circumstances, there could be that fixity and continuity of government which was absolutely essential in dealing with Native races. He did not, in this instance, desire to see what was called a Crown Colony system of government established. 'What was needed hero should be of the simplest possible kind. There was no need for Councils, or any of the machinery which existed in some Crown Colonies. The country could be governed by Residents and magistrates, making every Native feel that justice was administered as between man and man; and, on the other hand, using, as far as possible, the instrumentality and the agency of the Chiefs.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, he did not intend to follow the noble Earl in his observations on the course adopted by the Government on this question. The noble Earl had, however, alluded to a despatch which he (the Earl of Kimberley) had written last year, when he had the honour to hold the Seals of the Colonial Office. In that despatch he had said it was not the intention of the Government to take any steps to relieve the Cape Colony from responsibility in connection with Basutoland. If her Majesty's Government interfered in any way prematurely, it was only too probable that there would be a recurrence of the difficulties which had already boon experienced. The object of Her Majesty's Government had been to test whether the Cape Colony could settle this matter of Basutoland to their own satisfaction. He had always thought that the time might come when that Colony would come to a determination to repeal the Annexation Act, and that it would then be for the Government to consider whether they should resume Basutoland. For his own part, he heartily and entirely concurred in the determination which had been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government in the present juncture. At the same time, it was quite as well that Her Majesty's Government, in undertaking this course, which he believed to be the only one adapted to the circumstances, should

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  not disguise from themselves the gravity of the step as regarded the whole of our position in South Africa. The noble Earl who had just spoken might remember that some years ago ho called on the Cape Colony to contribute towards the expenses of the troops in that Colony. They were asked to contribute, he thought, some £40 a-man, which was the contribution asked from certain other Colonies. The Cape Colony at that time, having Parliamentary institutions, steadily refused to make any such contribution; and his noble Friend informed the Cape Government that if they were not prepared to contribute towards the cost of their defence they must be left to take in their own hands the defence of their Frontier, and that, though it might be a question of time and opportunity, Her Majesty's Govern-merit would reduce the Forces employed in South Africa to a garrison of Cape Town. This policy, from the time his noble Friend received that refusal, had been more or less steadily pursued by successive Colonial Ministers. There was, to his mind, one most unfortunate departure from that policy, which was when Sir Bartle Frere dismissed his Ministry because they wished to carry on a frontier war without the assistance of the Imperial troops. From that moment everything had gone wrong in the Cape Coleny with regard to those matters. When the Colony found they were to be relieved from the responsibility of defending their Frontiers, and that the old system was to be pursued of the Frontiers being defended at the expense of the Empire, fresh difficulties arose in consequence of the steps taken in pursuance of Sir Bartle Frere's policy. With respect to the Disarmament Act itself, that was a perfectly wise step to take, as it merely enabled the Government by Proclamation, where it was thought necessary, to disarm the Natives; but the attempt to disarm the Basutos was most impolitic. The position in which this country found itself in regard to those matters was, that we were, more or less, going back to the old state of things, which we had for many years abandoned, but going back with one serious difference, and that was the reason why ho made those observations. Practically, if the Cape Government agreed to the condition which Her Majesty's Government proposed with
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  reference to expense, we should be arriving by another road at that which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) wished to bring about many years ago—namely, that the Imperial Government should undertake to manage the Frontiers, but that the Cape Government should contribute a fair share of the expense. He would not say that in the peculiar condition of South Africa at the present time this might not be the best and wisest system; but that was a very different thing from saying that the Imperial Government should bear, not only the responsibility, but the whole of the expense of the ordinary control of those Frontiers. In some great crisis we might be called upon to assist the Colony; that was perfectly reasonable, and might hold good with regard to all our Colenies; but in ordinary times it was fair to expect that we should receive from them a reasonable contribution towards the expense and responsibility which were undertaken. Because it must be remembered that, although the Cape Government now in their distress came to the Imperial Government and were desirous that they should take over the charge of Basutoland, that Government had not taken this course until they had exhausted all the moans at their command in gallantly endeavouring to discharge the responsibilities which they had undertaken; and when a Coleny came to ask assistance under such circumstances it had a right to expect that the Empire to which it belonged would give it. That was his view of the present situation as regarded Basutoland, and he hoped that the condition that his noble Friend had laid down would be accepted. The present circumstances were favourable to it, as we had the concurrent opinion of the Cape Coleny and the Orange Free State. The latter point he considered to be of the highest importance, and he thought it was probable that the Basutos themselves would be willing to recognize our authority; but, as the noble Earl opposite had said, we must have the consent of the Chiefs; for if we were to go back to Basutoland without the distinct consent of the Chiefs, and without an unmistakable indication that they would submit to the Imperial authority, we should only embark in troubles, the end of which we should not be able easily to foresee.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACTS.

  MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.
  Moved for—
  "An Address to Her Most Gracious Majesty for, Copy of all orders given with respect to the operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts since the vote of the House of Commons in reference to compulsory examination."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
  THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, a statement was made on Tuesday by the noble Viscount (Viscount Lifford), on the authority of a correspondent of his, that on the arrival of a transport at Portsmouth with troops, 30 women had left the Lock Hospital at Portsmouth uncured. I promised to make inquiry. It seems that some similar story appeared in one of the London papers; and the visiting surgeon for Portsmouth, Dr. Parson, wrote to the Admiralty at once on seeing it, to say that—
  "There is no foundation whatever for the statement therein contained of women having left the hospital, nor have any expressed any desire or shown any intention to do so until cured."
  Motion agreed to.

PUBLIC HEALTH (DAIRIES, &c.) BILL [H.L.]
A Bill to make further provision for the Regulation of Dairies, Cowsheds, and Milkshops—Was presented by The LORD PRESIDENT; read 1a. (No. 92.)
House adjourned at a quarter past Six o'clock, till To - morrow, a quarter past Ten o'clock.