HL Deb 26 July 1883 vol 282 cc507-12
LORD LAMINGTON

, in rising to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether previous to the ratification of the provisional agreement for the formation of the second Suez Canal they will not consider the expedience of advancing £8,000,000 for the formation of the Euphrates Valley line of railway, which would be entirely under the control of the English Government, whereas by the terms of the provisional agreement the second Suez Canal would, like the present one, remain under French direction; and to move for Papers, said, the Agreement had been abandoned; but the fact remained that it had new been recognized that it was a matter of very great importance that there should be a second Suez Canal; but, if there were to be a dozen Canals, it was admitted, as a matter of equal necessity and importance, that there would still be required an alternative line of communication between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. He was not going to discuss the merits of the second Canal through the Isthmus of Suez, beyond calling attention to the fact that, some three or four years ago, Mr. Gladstone wrote an article in The Nineteenth Century, in which he showed that such a line was wanted, using the following words:— Indeed, Russia or no Russia, it seems to be very doubtful whether confident reliance can be placed upon the Canal for our military communications with India under the varied and shifting contingencies of war. Even if it were possible to hold the line, approaching 100 miles, as a continuous fortification, it does not at once appear how the Canal could be secured against the furtive scuttling of ships. If it cannot, what becomes of all the costly care for the military custody of the banks? Upon the whole, it would not surprise me to learn that the authorities of our War Department, aware of all the difficulties of the case, have already discounted them by paying their account with a return to the old route of the Cape for times of war. At about the same time an article was published in the leading journal, The Times, in which these expressions occurred:— The loss to England by exclusion from the Canal route would be political as well as commercial. To any other nation, the fact that the Canal was obstructed, or that the control of it had fallen into hostile hands, could only mean that certain mercantile profits were placed in. jeopardy, though even from this point of view it should not be forgotten that our stake exceeds in magnitude the stake of any rival Power 20-fold or 30-fold, But in our case the necessity of keeping open the great highway between the mother country and her dependencies in Asia and the Southern Seas, is added to commercial interest and our financial interest in the Canal.'' Whether there were two or four Canals through the Isthmus they would all be open to the same objection. Our commerce was particularly interested in this, considering that it was 20-fold that of any other country using the Canal. Politically, we were not less interested in it, as it was all important that we should have an open communication with our Indian Empire. He held that the required alternative line we needed would be found in the Euphrates Valley Line, which was no bubble or visionary scheme. Committee after Committee, of one of which He himself had had the honour of being a Member, had reported on the Line, and had approved of it. The last Committee, which sat in 1872, had examined 35 most competent witnesses connected with India and with trade, and of these, 30 were in favour of the railway, while only five were against it. That Committee said— Speaking generally, your Committee are of opinion that the two routes by the Red Sea and by the Persian Gulf might be maintained and used simultaneously; that at certain seasons and for certain purposes the advantage would lie with the one, and, at other seasons, and for other purposes, it would lie with the other; that it may fairly be expected that in process of time traffic, enough for the support of both would develop itself, but that this result must not be expected too soon; that the political and commercial advantages of establishing a second route would at any time be considerable, and might, under possible circumstances, be exceedingly great; and that it would be worth the while of the English Government to make an effort to secure them, considering the moderate pecuniary risk which they would incur. The objection made to the scheme by the Government last year, was that it would involve too great expenditure. lie trusted that that argument would not be advanced again now; for, if the Government were admittedly in a position to advance £8,000,000 for the purpose of increasing our means of communication with India and the East by a new Suez Canal, he thought they had much better advance it for the Euphrates Line. The advocates of this scheme, however, did not ask Government to contribute anything towards the undertaking. They were ready to find the money themselves, and only asked that a certain amount of protection should be given to them by Her Majesty's Government. Another reason why the question should now be seriously taken up, was that the Turkish Government had now made concessions to a Company with a view to the establishment of the projected Line. That Government had already granted a concession for a Line from Antioch to Aleppo, which was the first part of the scheme, and he saw no difficulty in having it extended to the top of the Persian Gulf. Lord Palmerston had always advocated this scheme in preference to a Canal, and he knew it had also been countenanced by the late Earl of Beaconsfield. Among other advantages of the Line, he might mention the following:—

  1. "1. It would connect the Mediterranean with the head of the Persian Gulf, between which and Kurrachee and Bombay regular communication is now maintained by a line of powerful steamers, subsidized by the Indian Government.
  2. "2. Making Kurrachee the European port of India in place of Bombay, it would save about 1,000 miles in the distance between England and India, and by the substitution of railway for boat transit would reduce the time occupied in the journey by one half—that is, to 10 days instead of 20 days.
  3. "3. It would render it possible to maintain India with a smaller European garrison than is now necessary, and would thus reduce our military expenditure.
  4. "4. It would save the Government large sums in sudden emergencies by the facilities it would afford—and that at all seasons of the year—for the transport of troops and stores.
  5. "5. It would enable troops from England to be landed at Kurrachee in about 14 days, and in two or three days more at Lahore, Peshawur, or Delhi.
  6. "6. It would subject an enemy advancing towards the north-western frontier of India to 510 easy attack in the flank and rear, and would render the invasion of India all but impossible.
  7. "7. It would make the resources of England so promptly available in the East that any hostile movement directed against us, whether from within or without our Indian frontier, might thus be effectually checked before it could assume formidable proportions.
  8. "8. It would give our extensive military establishments in India a direct influence in support of our power and prestige in Europe.
  9. "9. It would give England the first strategical position in the world."
He contended, in short, that the advantages to be derived from the Euphrates Valley Line would be greater than any which would have resulted if the recent Agreement with M. de Lesseps had been carried out; and he thought it would be wise on the part of the Government, oven if they were not inclined to advance any money, at all events to give what facilities they could by obtaining the necessary concessions and the like for the construction of a Railway, as to which it should be remembered there was this difference between it and the Suez Canal—that whereas the former would be entirely under the control of the English Government, the latter, by the terms of the Provisional Agreement lately abandoned by the Government, would have remained under French direction. In conclusion, he would ask the Question of which he had given Notice, and move for Papers. Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Papers respecting the formation of the Euphrates Valley line of railway."—(The Lord Lamington.)

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, the noble Lord opposite (Lord Lamington) is perfectly justified in saying that the question of communication with India viâ the Euphrates Valley, is one that has engaged attention in this country for many years. The subject both of water and railway communication between the Mediterranean Sea and the East, has been presented to the public in different forms. The noble Lord is also quite right when he says that the last Committee by whom the matter was considered reported in favour of the mode of communication to which the noble Lord has drawn attention. But they did not recommend any particular scheme, nor that any guarantee should be given by the British Government in connection with the subject. The last proposal was put forward by that man of great capital and energy, the late Mr. Cazalet, who worked on the proposal to the last hour of his existence; but neither he, nor his living representatives, have ever made any application to the Government for pecuniary assistance as suggested by the noble Lord. I do not intend to refer to the merits or demerits of an Agreement which has now been dropped; but it must be obvious to your Lordships that there is a great difference between advancing public money in support of an enterprize in which you already possess one-half the property, and which is in a state of great prosperity, and advancing it in support of a perfectly embryo scheme as to which there is no certainty of success. I am not aware that there are any Papers that can be produced on the subject, or I should be happy to do SO.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I hardly think that the scheme advocated by my noble Friend (Lord Lamington) is in such a position as to make it desirable to press it on Her Majesty's Government at the present time. There are many difficulties connected with it which have often been recited in this House; and though, perhaps, not so formidable as they were some time ago, yet they appear to me too serious to allow us to entertain any hope that the subject can at present be taken in hand. But I think the popularity of the scheme, and the great attention given to it, are only some of the many signs which should make Her Majesty's Government consider that the subject of connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean is one of the most important questions of the day. All such projects will, of course, depend on the consent of the territorial Sovereign through whose Dominions the lines of communication must pass, whether they are by land or water, and the consent of the Sovereign will largely depend upon the diplomatic influences brought to bear upon him. It is, therefore, a matter in respect of which Her Majesty's Government, though they are not, in the first instance, territorially responsible, will be held largely responsible by the public, if they do not adopt, at an early period, a definite policy on the question —a policy to which they are prepared to adhere, and one which will respond to the feelings entertained by the public of this country. I take it that there is a strong feeling existing in this country upon the question of communication between the Indian and Mediterranean Seas; and, considering the vast proportions of British commerce compared with the entire commerce that desires to pass through that route, it is felt that such communication ought not to be in the hands or under the control of administrators who are not British. That is a strong and dominant feeling in this country, and on that account I do not think Her Majesty's Government can afford to put the question off, or to delay coming to a judgment upon it. I have no wish, at present, to press this particular matter of the Euphrates Valley scheme upon the Government. I do not feel that it is opportune to do so; but I do rise for the purpose of saying that I hope we are not to conceive that this subject, as far as the increase of traffic accommodation goes, is to be considered as entirely closed, but that, before the Session is finished, we shall have some intimation from Her Majesty's Government of a definite policy which they are prepared to follow in respect of it.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.