§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, seeing the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his place, I wish to make a personal explanation, or rather reference to two charges which the noble Earl made against me last night. I heard them with considerable surprise; but I had spoken, and had not the right to speak again; and hearing such charges from a person of the noble Earl's authority, I wished to have an opportunity of looking at the documents again before I said anything to your Lordships on the subject. I have looked at the documents carefully, and I confess I am still surprised at the view the noble Earl takes of the matter, and at his having found himself in a condition to make these charges. His assertion was that at Edinburgh I had been guilty of a gross inaccuracy, and also of a gross inconsistency. Now, it appears to me that my statement was perfectly accurate, and was in perfect consistency with the sentiments I had previously expressed. The complaint of the noble Earl in respect of inaccuracy was that I held up the Government to reprobation because they had asked the permission of Europe to invade Egypt, and, having received a refusal, they proceeded to take Egypt. That is the language in which the noble Earl stated it. There was a slight inaccuracy in his quotation from my Edinburgh speech. He says I used the word "Egypt." I did not do so. I said "to invade a country." I was using a general phrase, and the distinction is important, because I was not referring to Egypt as a whole, but to that limited part of Egypt which is in the vicinity of the Suez Canal. So that, if I had spoken of Egypt generally, as the noble Earl fancies I did, I might have misled my audience. Now, the question is, Did the noble Earl ask permission to invade the Suez Canal territory, and did he receive a refusal, and 156 proceed to take it? These are the three assertions, and they seem to be supported by the Papers on the Table of your Lordships' House. I have here a despatch of Lord Dufferin's of the 19th of July, as follows:—
I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of the proposal which I, in compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 17th instant, in common with my French colleague, made today at the ninth meeting of the Egyptian Conference for the protection of the Suez Canal."—[No. 325.]The extract from the telegram is as follows:—England and France propose in consequence to the Conference to designate the Powers who should be charged in case of need to take the measures specially necessary for the protection of the Canal. In order to save time, the Powers so designated, and who should have accepted the mandate, shall be authorized to decide on the mode and the moment of action. This action would be exercised in every case on the principle of the Self-denying Protocol.There is no doubt about the nature of the action; it would be the occupation of places on the Suez Canal. But, if there were any doubt, the Correspondence of the noble Earl with the French Government, in which the positions to be occupied are discussed and marked out, would sufficiently settle the question. This, then, is the application for the mandate—authority to enter upon, to invade, the territory of Egypt in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. How was that proposal received by the Powers to whom it was made? This is what Lord Dufferin says—Both Baron de Calice and the German Chargé d'Affaires exhibited a marked unwillingness to discuss our propositions. The Austrian Ambassador observed that, inasmuch as the risk to the Canal constituted an obvious case of force majeure, it would be preferable that England alone, or France and England, should, in case of necessity, deal with the matter on their own initiative, without involving the Conference in any responsibility in the question of issuing a mandat to one or more specially designated Powers. M. de Hirschfeldt, the German Chargé d'Affaires, followed in the same sense, and declared that he had no instructions authorizing him even to consider the question."—[No. 432.]You have, then, this state of things—England applying for a mandate to occupy the territory of the Suez Canal, and the Austrian and the German Minister refusing even to discuss the proposition, much less to grant it, and refusing even to refer to their own Government 157 for authority to discuss it. Surely when I described that as a refusal I was expressing the fact in the language which every diplomatist would use. Indeed, it was impossible to convey a refusal without an absolute breach in a manner more peremptory or definite. The application for a mandate was thus made and declined. Then the noble Earl complains that I said he "took" the territory in question. His objection, as I understand it, is that he does not admit the statement because he did not keep the territory. But I never said that he took it, as lawyers say, animo furandi; it is possible that he means to give it up—I dare say he does; but will the noble Earl tell me that the Russians did not take Sofia because they gave it up? In 18S5 the Allies entered into the same Protocol of self-denial with respect to all Russian territory, and they gave up the territory they occupied. But will the noble Earl tell me that they did not take Sebastopol? They took Sebastopol, and the noble Earl has undoubtedly taken Port Said and Ismailia. I am far from implying that the noble Earl has consciously misrepresented my statement; but I maintain that my statement made at Edinburgh was literally and absolutely true, and that I could not have made it in so short a space in more exact words. Then comes the second charge of the noble Earl, that I was guilty of gross inconsistency in saying that the sending of the Fleet as it was sent into the Harbour of Alexandria was contrary to International Law. Now, I venture respectfully to say that I never used language approving the sending of the Fleet as it was sent into the Harbour of Alexandria. The noble Earl, with an air of great indignation, said that such language would be perfectly consistent on the part of Mr. Bright or Sir Wilfrid Lawson, because they always objected to the despatch of the Fleet to Alexandria. That, by the way, is a curious admission, because Mr. Bright was in Office for five weeks after the Fleet was sent. But the noble Earl goes on to say that it is not possible to conceive how I could lay down the principle that I approve of the action, and then hold up the Government to execration at Edinburgh for taking a course I entirely approved of at the time. I entirely deny that I approved of it at the time. The noble Earl, on the occasion 158 referred to, in answer to a Question from my noble Friend (Earl De La Warr), stated at some length the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and informed the House in the course of that statement that ships had been sent to Alexandria. I then said that there was nothing in the statement of the noble Earl to which I could take exception. I must altogether demur to the principle, which I think the noble Earl is laying down, that because at a critical moment a Member of the Opposition declines to take exception to a particular act of the Government, therefore he is estopped from criticizing it later. I said, in fact, over and over again, in the course of these discussions, that I abstained from criticism solely for the sake of the public interest; and I think it will be an evil precedent if the Opposition is held to acquiesce in the policy of the Government because they do not at a critical moment object to it. Besides, movements of a warlike nature are always by prescription exempt from Parliamentary criticism at the moment, it being obvious that those movements and their effect on Foreign Powers might be injured by criticism. Though I think it right to enter this general protest, there is another very strong reason for objecting to the noble Earl's interpretation of my words, by which he makes me admit that the sending of the Fleet to the Harbour of Alexandria was in accordance with International Law. What was it that the noble Earl stated at the time? I do not think he could have looked back to the precise statement he made to the House. He said—In these circumstances England and Franco have agreed to send orders to the three British men-of-war at Corfu, and to the French men-of-war at the Piræus, to rendezvous at Suda Bay, and to go to Alexandria, where they would find that order had preceded them, we having informed Turkey and all the Powers of these measures in support of the policy already agreed upon.I do not know what the noble Earl meant by those words; but at that time it obviously appeared that the Fleet was sent in agreement with Turkey and the rest of the Powers, and if that had been so, undoubtedly there would have been no breach of International Law in its presence in the port. The reason why the proceedings could be condemned as contrary to International Law was that it was not sent with the will, but against the will, of the Power to which Alex- 159 andria belonged. I must repeat, in the most emphatic language I can use, my protest against the supposition that we take no exception to acts of the Government which, at a particular time, we may not think it right to criticize. For many reasons, in view of the attitude of the Sovereign in Turkey, in view of the absence of any military force, in view of the long delay to which the Fleet was condemned, in view of the very dangerous position of the British subjects on land which its presence created, I should, if I had spoken freely at the time, undoubtedly not have approved of sending the Fleet as it was sent. But because I allowed it to pass without criticism, especially when the noble Earl's statement was accompanied by words which clearly indicated that it was sent with the consent of the Powers and Turkey, the noble Earl accuses me of inconsistency because I subsequently criticized that proceeding. I must enter another protest. Last night I said that I highly admired the conduct and energy of Lord Spencer in dealing with Ireland; but the noble Earl twisted that into an assertion that I could find nothing to object to in the conduct of the Irish Government since the Recess. I decidedly demur to that interpretation. There are many acts of the Irish Government to which I take the strongest objection, though I do not think it expedient to discuss them at the present time. As the noble Earl has laid, down this doctrine, I must reserve to myself the right of criticizing these acts as well as the action of the Government in regard to foreign affairs at a future period, in spite of that reserve which we have observed during the actual crisis of affairs.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, with regard to Ireland I think my observations last night were correct. I think I had a right to feel gratified that the noble Marquess could not find anything to complain of. Although he, as Leader of the Opposition, and criticizing the Queen's Speech, had gone over all the topics mentioned in it, and found fault with the Government generally, he did not find fault with a single act of the Government with regard to Ireland during the last six months. I really could not find out from what was said what charges were likely to be made, and I was confirmed in my conclusion by the entire abstention from any accu- 160 sation on the part of the noble Marquess, who is not generally very reticent when any fault is to be found. It is the fact that he did not find fault with a single action of the Irish Government since August. Then the noble Marquess complains of my having misrepresented what he said at Edinburgh. He asserts he was justified in saying that we had asked leave to take Egypt.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYA country.
§ EARL GRANVILLEWell, the distinction is one of so subtle a character that I cannot reproach myself with inaccuracy in failing to make it.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYBut all you asked the mandate for was to take a portion of territory in the vicinity of the Suez Canal.
§ EARL GRANVILLEAt a particular moment France and ourselves made an application to the Powers to specify some particular Power, not naming ourselves, to exercise authority as the mandatory of Europe on a particular occasion. The Powers were not willing to take upon themselves to specify any particular Power; they were not willing to give the mandate. I am bound to say—and the distinction is important—that while we received great encouragement to go on, the Powers gave reasons why they did not wish themselves to give a mandate, such as the noble Lord says was asked for and refused. I utterly deny, as I denied yesterday, that we have ever asked permission to do that which we did. I further state that permission was never in the slightest way refused to us. The noble Marquess says that we took the country in the same way that we took Sebastopol; but there is this enormous difference—that in the Crimea we were fighting against the Russians, while in this case we were fighting on behalf of the Khedive and his authority, and to put down the rebellion and the anarchy that existed in the country. If we had taken advantage of that to seize and hold the country, then we should have invaded in the sense in which the language used at Edinburgh was understood. The inaccuracies of the noble Marquess at Edinburgh were all taken as texts upon which an elaborate accusation was brought against us in the leading Conservative review, in order, by sustaining a theory entirely false, to prove how 161 wrong we were in going into the war. The writer of the article makes the most extraordinary use of official Papers, and he takes one by one the observations made by the noble Marquess at Edinburgh. With regard to the noble Marquess having apparently approved of what was done, he says that he merely abstained from criticism because he did not wish to interfere with warlike operations; but still, to the common mind, what he said appeared to have more meaning than that. When a statement was made that the Fleet was on its way to Alexandria he went out of his way to say that he had no objection to make to the statement. To the common understanding it must appear that he gave his approval to the course we were going to pursue. The noble Marquess now says that we committed a breach of International Law in making certain demands. But last year he said that if the instructions to our Admiral prevented his taking any action consistent with International Law while the forts were being armed against us, we committed an act of the greatest imprudence and risk, and it was still more humiliating that the Fleet should have to remain inactive without exacting compensation for the insults offered.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYIt will be better if the noble Earl will quote my words. My recollection is that what I deprecated on the part of the Fleet was its watching the massacre of British sailors without interfering.
§ EARL GRANVILLEThe noble Marquess began his speech by saying—
I think there is nothing in the statement of the noble Earl to which I can take exception."—(3 Hansard, [269] 650.)
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe statement referred to the agreement of the Powers.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy statement included a declaration of policy in favour of maintaining the authority of the Khedive, improving the government and institutions of the country, and the putting down of anarchy; and yet the noble Marquess said—
There is nothing in the statement of the noble Earl to which I can take exception.The noble Marquess afterwards said—With regard to Egypt itself, it appears to me that Her Majesty's Government, both by the engagements which they themselves have en- 162 tered into, and by the engagements which they have necessarily inherited from their Predecessors, are bound to give their support to the present Viceroy of Egypt, so long as his government is in accordance with principles which they approve. They are bound to give him that support, not only as a matter of sentiment, not merely in words or in notes, hut in something stronger if the need should arise."—(Ibid. 651.)The noble Marquess further said that—Whatever measures Her Majesty's Government may be inclined to adopt, whatever policy they may pursue, whatever language they may hold, these things will have no effect whatever upon the population of Egypt, or upon the intriguing men who have laid hold of supreme power in that country, unless it is well known that, behind all these words, there is the possibility, nay the certainty, of deeds."—(Ibid.)The noble Marquess further expressed the hope that the sending of the Fleet would be no mere idle demonstration. When the noble Marquess impressed upon us the duty of using force in the eloquent and strong language I have just read, I cannot conceive how we and the country should have been deceived in believing that the noble Marquess approved of the statement. The noble Lord also said that no decision the European Concert might come to would relieve the Government of the necessity of acting up to the demands they had made, and sustaining the honour of the country by maintaining the safety of the Khedive, so long as he acted upon their counsel. I can quite understand the Leader of the Opposition being so discreet as to reserve his opinions; but when he uses language of this kind it is impossible to doubt that at that time he was most anxious we should continue to do what we were doing. If all this was language to deter us from entering into war on behalf of the Khedive, and from using the Fleet at Alexandria, then I shall be ready to apologize in the most complete manner to the noble Marquess for having misrepresented him. To my humble understanding I hardly know of any more eloquent appeal being made since the days of Demosthenes than the appeal made to the Government by the noble Marquess, not only in this House, but at the celebrated meeting at Willis's Rooms. That being so, I am afraid I cannot make the apology which I otherwise should gladly offer.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I must explain again what I do 163 not seem to have conveyed to the mind of the noble Earl. I was of opinion, and I am of opinion still, that having pledged the honour of the Government, as they had done, and having certain British interests to succour, Her Majesty's Government was bound to redeem that honour, and to succour those interests, if need be, as it ultimately was, at the cost of war. But at Edinburgh what I censured was the policy, in the first place, which brought us into that condition, and in the second place the particular act of taking the Fleet into the position which led to the calamitous bombardment of Alexandria. Those two points did seem to me to be points in the conduct of the Government calling forth criticism. The censure that I passed on them in no way affects my opinion that where the British word had been pledged, as it had been, we were bound to redeem our pledge.
THE LORD CHANCELLORThe noble Marquess has just now repeated an expression used by him at Edinburgh, and not defended by him in the early part of this debate, and which was justly observed upon by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That expression—"the bombardment of Alexandria"—is of a very offensive kind, not merely to Her Majesty's Government and the British nation, but to those gallant officers upon whose reports, and upon whose word the statement of Her Majesty's Government on the subject depends. They have over and over again assured Her Majesty's Government that all that was said by the enemies of the Khedive, and of this country, as to the bombardment of the commercial City of Alexandria was entirely false, the bombardment being carefully directed against those forts only, the existence and menacing character of which was observed upon by the noble Marquess last Session, as calling for vigilance on the part of the Fleet. While I am addressing your Lord-ships, I will venture to say that in his reply to the first part of the noble Marquess's explanation, my noble Friend was somewhat more mild than he was called upon to be. The noble Marquess himself, in justifying and explaining his language at Edinburgh, was compelled to read from your Lordships' Table passages from despatches which appear to me more completely to refute and condemn 164 the statements made by the noble Marquess than anything else could do. For it appeared, by those passages, that although the German and Austrian Ambassadors did not think it expedient that any mandate should be given by Europe to every Power to take action in Egypt, they distinctly encouraged the Governments of this country and of France, or either of them, to do so without any such mandate, on their own responsibility. On the whole, I cannot but think that the noble Marquess would have done well to leave the matter as it stood last night.