HL Deb 12 April 1883 vol 278 cc40-52
VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH,

in rising to move for the appointment of a Select Committee— To inquire as to the adequacy of the present naval forces of this country to meet the increasing demands made on their services, and such further demands as may hereafter arise in consequence of the augmentation of foreign navies, said, that he had no desire to make any attack upon the Government. He was well aware that they had been restricted in their operations by the great money question. It had always been the tradition of the country that the Navy of England ought to be superior to those of all others in the world; whereas the fact was that the other great Powers were making more progress with their Navies than was being made with our own. If he could prove that that was so, he thought that the Committee for which he would move ought to be granted. The conditions of the Navy were quite different from those of that arm of the Service in former days. It was now necessary to keep portions of the Fleet at nine different stations over the whole globe in order to protect our trade. The number of ships, moreover, which were actually available for service was not that which we were represented to have—in fact, it was only a paper Navy, for many were included in the list which had only just been laid on the stocks, and which would not be ready for three or four years to come. [The noble Lord read statistics showing the number of iron-clads, armoured cruisers, corvettes, and vessels for coast defence already built or in course of construction, and stated that the number of Marines was 12,400, of which 6,000 were on shore, and that the Dockyard workmen numbered 18,000; and then proceeded to explain the naval condition of France.] There were at the present moment 10 French iron-clads ready for sea. There were 11 other vessels, wooden ships, pronounced by competent authorities to be capable of meeting in action a large number of the vessels in the British Navy. There were 18 very large and powerful iron-clads included in the French Naval Estimates—not in the backward state in which the vessels were in our own Dockyards, for eight of them would be fit to go to sea this time next year, and the remainder of them were promised to be ready by 1885. In 1885 there would be 39 French vessels ready for sea, while our own programme was 41, of which a very large proportion would not nearly be ready for sea by 1885. To carry out their programme, the French had voted a large sum of money for building purposes; and they had increased their Vote for men by 1,100; and they had 23,000 Dockyard men, as against our 18,000. The French were also building ships by contract, and were pushing forward those contracts with the greatest zeal and industry. They had 43,000 officers and seamen, and 26,000 Marines. He asked, therefore, their Lordships to consider what the relative condition of this country and France would be in 1885. Whether as regarded ships or men, it could hardly be said that the English Navy of 185 would be such as to on-able us to cope with that of France, should we unfortunately be engaged in hostilities with that country. Moreover, looking back to history, there was no reason to suppose that the Navy of France would act alone. Such a case happened when the French Navy took possession of the Spanish Fleet in an unexpected manner in 1805; and, had it not been for her naval superiority at that time, England would not have been able to meet France at Trafalgar. This country was always in a state of unreadiness, and had always experienced the misfortune of being behindhand with warlike preparations when war broke out; and that remark applied to the Navy as well. In 1805 war could not be said to have taken England unexpectedly; but yet she had to build hurriedly about 40 ships, of which some were built in India, some in our own Dockyards, and others were adapted from the Indian Merchant Navy. It should be remembered that first-class iron-clads could not be constructed in less than five or six years; and it was out of the question to use merchant steamers, for they were quite unfit to perform the duties of men-of- war. Speaking of the unpreparedness of this country at the time of war breaking out, he would remind their Lordships that the country was lulled to sleep by the great victory of Trafalgar, with the result that in 1813, when the war with America broke out, England found that she had allowed America to build ships with which she could not cope. Isolated instances, no doubt, occurred—such as the fight between the Shannon and Chesapeake—which showed the superiority of the British seaman; but still the British Fleet suffered seriously. It had become customary to throw discredit upon prestige; but a reverse to the British Navy would be disastrous to the country. If the Navy were defeated at sea, the means of communication with India would be cut off, and the great Colonial Empire of England would be imperilled to an extent that would entirely damage her position in the European world. He wished, further, to mention to their Lordships a source of weakness he had noticed in the Navy. The weakness to which he referred was that naval officers now had to deal with guns with the powers of which they were not fully acquainted. Under the present system, guns were selected for the Navy by the Woolwich authorities, who knew nothing at all of naval matters. In the French Navy the guns were selected by an Ordnance Committee of naval officers, who knew what the requirements of naval gunnery were. Another point to which he wished to refer was with regard to the fitting-up of masts and yards, formerly used by sailing ships, to vessels which in action would be most impeded by them. In addition to the French Navy, the Italian had also attained a considerable degree of efficiency. Moreover, of late years Germany was making great strides in the direction of becoming a Naval Power, while China, Japan, and the United States possessed vessels of great power; and there could be no doubt that foreign nations would have an immense superiority over England in the event of their forming a combination against her, which was not impossible. In the event of war, a crowd of vessels would be poured forth to prey upon the commerce of this country, and it was of the greatest importance that we should have the means of protecting it. He trusted that what he had said proved there was no justification for the hope expressed by the Prime Minister, when he said that the Navy of England would be equal to all the other Navies of the world. The country was not justified, at the present moment, in entertaining any such hope with regard to the state of its Navy, either as it was, or as it promised to be at the period to which he had referred. The noble Viscount concluded by making his Motion. Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire as to the adequacy of the present naval forces of this country to meet the increasing demands made on their services, and such further demands as may hereafter arise in consequence of the augmentation of foreign navies."—(The Viscount Sidmouth.)

LORD DUNSANY

said, that the noble Viscount (Viscount Sidmouth) was not singular in the opinion he had expressed that the present state of our Navy was not such as it ought to be. That was the opinion, not only of many officers of professional distinction, but also of those who had served at the Admiralty, and who would be considered by the noble Earl at the head of that Department (the Earl of Northbrook) to be entitled, from the weight of their authority, to speak on the subject, and to be received with consideration and respect. A letter had recently appeared in The Times, written by Sir John Hay, in which the danger we ran of being outstripped by the French in naval matters was clearly shown. There had been times when our Navy had been in a disgraceful state, in consequence of a craze for economy; and, now, whenever complaints were made about the inefficiency of the Navy, the stereotyped reply was that we could not afford to do more than was being done. The French, however, it should be remembered, did not allow any such argument to influence them, and they were always prepared to make greater sacrifices than ourselves to secure a strong Navy. In fact, France went so far that she sacrificed her commercial marine to her Navy. It was rather remarkable that France should be taking such pains to rival our Naval Force, for she was much less dependent for her commerce upon her ships than we were. It must be because the course of history had taught them the value of powerful Navies. Recent events must have convinced everyone what an embarrassing position we should have been in if the policy of crippling the Navy had prevailed for the few preceding years. If it had, in what position would our Fleet before Alexandria have been, if the Fleets of France and Italy had combined to attack us?

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

My Lords, the subject brought before your Lordships this evening by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth) is one of great importance, and merits the great amount of interest which is felt in it. With reference to the words the noble Viscount quoted, as having been used by the Prime Minister, perhaps he will be able to tell me where and when the Premier made the observation? I saw it myself in one of the periodicals of the day; I think it was quoted at the head of an article in one of the reviews—I think The Nineteenth Century—but I have been unable to trace it. Can the noble Viscount inform me where it is to be found?

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH,

in reply, said, his conviction was that the remark was made by the Prime Minister at a public meeting. He had seen it several times reported, but had not been able to trace it.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

I am in the same difficulty. I have seen it quoted somewhere; but I have been unable to trace any authentic authority for the quotation; and I think it would have been better, perhaps, if the noble Viscount had refrained from using a quotation which he was not able to verify. My Lords, I have always felt it an exceedingly delicate course, and one I should prefer not to enter into, to make comparisons of the strength of the Navies of England and France. We are, fortunately, on the most friendly terms with our neighbours across the Channel, and it is not desirable, I think, to make these comparisons. At the same time, I can assure the noble Viscount that the comparison which he has given to the House, from the want of sufficient information, is not borne out by the facts of the case. The Board of Admiralty accept their responsibility in this matter, and it is their duty to ascertain what are the real facts. I am not about to make any elaborate comparison tonight, but I will allude to one matter on which the noble Viscount laid great stress. He compared what would be the state of the French and Eng- lish Navies in 1885, and I have seen a similar comparison in the newspapers made by a gallant Admiral, whose figures the noble Viscount appears to have used. Now, there is a great error in the comparison. There are put down for the year 1885, 10 ships belonging to the French Navy, none of which have been launched up to the present day, whereas, on the other side of the comparison, there are put down only two English ships that have not been launched. We know at the Admiralty that if a ship is launched this year, it is exceedingly unlikely that that ship will be ready for sea before two years. With machine guns, and all the complicated appliances required to fit out an armour-clad of the present day, a very considerable time is required, after a ship is launched, for getting her ready for sea. In that way I explain the extraordinary statement which I have seen in the newspapers, and which I suspect has been the reason of the noble Viscount's mistake in the assertion that in the year 1885 there would really be any equality between the Navies of England and France. I do not wish in the least to say anything offensive to our neighbours across the Channel. They have in their discussions, and in the Reports of their Committees, especially in the Report of a Commission presided over by no less a man than M. Gambetta in 1878, frankly admitted that England stands unrivalled in regard to her Navy. I hold that no Government of this country—and certainly not the present Government—would for a moment allow any nation to take a position of equality with England at sea. Such a policy would be discountenanced by whatever side or Party might be in Office. There can be no doubt, as the noble Viscount pointed out, that for the last six or seven years great activity has prevailed in France, in the construction of ships. But this activity is due to a policy, which has been openly declared, and the reason of which I have no scruple in stating, because it has been stated in authentic documents which have been laid before the French Chamber. During the Franco-German War—as your Lordships may well understand—the French Government were unable to devote the average attention and expenditure to their Navy, added to which they have taken a different course to ourselves in respect to the construction of their iron-clad ships. Almost all the French iron-clads, up to a recent date, have been built of wood; whereas we have adopted iron and steel from a much earlier date in our construction. Those of your Lordships who have a knowledge of the subject are aware that wooden ships have not the same length of existence as iron and steel vessels; and, therefore, it was the opinion of a Commission of the French Chamber in the year 1872 that, in a certain number of years, a considerable number of wooden armour-plated ships in France would become unserviceable, and that it would be necessary to replace them with new ships. The programme laid down in accordance with that Report is being gradually carried out by the French Government. No one who has considered the question will think that the gradual fulfilment of such a programme ought to give rise to any susceptibility on our part. Now, that is the history of the increased expenditure on the part of France in ships during the last seven or eight years. That being so, what has been the actual tonnage of ironclad ships acquired by England and France from the time this increased expenditure on the French Navy took place? It must be recollected that when the expenditure began, this country was in a position of great superiority to France in respect to iron-clad ships, and that the expenditure of France was in order to bring up her Navy, which had been reduced to a low ebb, to a moderate and fair strength. Notwithstanding this exceptional expenditure, I find that the tonnage of the ships launched in the years referred to, and added to our ironclad Navy, was greater than the tonnage added to her Navy by France, and, therefore, there has not been, as some people suppose, a greater addition to the strength of the iron-clad Navy of France than of that of England during that period. This, I hope, will satisfy the noble Viscount that the figures he gave with regard to the assumed superiority of the French Navy compared with our own are not accurate. I will take another point which the noble Viscount has raised. He made some comparison between the Navy Estimates of England and France; and on this point, he will admit, I trust, that the money spent on the labour employed upon the construction of ships may be taken as a fair test of the work being done. With respect to that, the total sum taken in the French Estimates for 1883 for the cost of labour engaged upon construction and repairs is £877,272; whereas we are taking a sum of £1,219,146 for those purposes; so that the noble Viscount will see that the sum we have taken very much exceeds the sum taken in the French Estimates; and if the sums taken for construction alone are compared, it will be found that we take a larger sum than the French.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH

Is the rate of wages the same in the two Navies?

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

Although the rate of wages may differ, the results obtained for the same expenditure is probably much the same; but, at any rate, the money we take in our Estimates is considerably in excess of that taken in the French Estimates, and that shows, I think, that the noble Viscount need not suppose there is any extraordinary endeavour to increase their Naval Force on the part of the French Government. No doubt, in France a different system is pursued from ours; and it has been the habit there to lay down a considerable number of ships at one time, and, therefore, the general impression is that a great increase is being made in the number of ships, whereas many of the ships to which allusion has been made have been a long time on the stocks, and some have not even been laid down. I saw, not long ago, in one of the newspaper statements, one ship counted as to be ready in 1885, which had not been launched, and another included in the same statement which was to be laid down in the slip from which the other was to be launched. I will just allude to one other point in the comparison the noble Viscount made, because mistakes are constantly made upon the subject. The noble Viscount drew a comparison between the English and French forces of Marines, and said that there were 26,000 French Marines. That may be true; but they are not, in any way, the same force as our English Marines, who would in time of war be capable of manning guns afloat, and of becoming a most valuable reserve to the Navy; whereas the French Marines are simply Colonial troops. I do not like these comparisons; but I thought I was forced to give one or two striking instances to show how difficult it is to make these com- parisons usefully. In comparing the two Navies, any officer or gentleman who wishes to make it as bad as possible for us, can omit a lot of ships from the list of our Navy as being obsolete, and can leave ships of the same class in the list of the Navy he is comparing. I can assure the noble Viscount I have carefully considered the question, and I do not share his apprehensions. I am bound to say that I think it is desirable to increase very materially the amount of construction; but I must explain to your Lordships that, in saying that, I by no means wish to lay any blame upon the Board of Admiralty which we have followed, because, some years ago, it was discovered that greater power was produced in a gun by means of the use of slower powder, which very much revolutionized the construction of ships, by making it necessary to place much thicker armour upon the ships. Then, again, there have been important improvements in engines and other matters with which I need not trouble your Lordships; all of which changes may have delayed construction, and I have no doubt they had a material effect upon the policy of the Board of Admiralty which we succeeded. But, however this may be, the present Board of Admiralty decided to increase the amount of armour-plated tonnage constructed, not at an extravagant rate, but at a rate more in accordance with the rate of former years. The figures which I will quote to your Lordships will show that there has been a considerable increase in armour-plated tonnage since the year 1879. Whereas in the year 1879–80 there were 7,427 tons' weight of hull of armour-plated ships constructed, in the year 1880–1 the total was increased to 9,235 tons; in 1881–2 to 10,748; and in 1882–3 to 11,500; while in the year 1883–4 it is proposed to bring the total up to over 12,000 tons. That will show that the Board of Admiralty are not unmindful of the necessity of increasing the number of armour-plated ships. The noble Viscount alluded to another and most important matter, the question of guns, and he is right in thinking that there has been considerable difficulty in obtaining the right sort of gun. These difficulties have existed in adapting the new inventions in gunnery to the service of the Navy; but, owing to the exertions of the Ordnance Committee, in which officers of the Service, as well as some of the most distinguished Civil engineers in the country, have assisted, and also to the able officers at Woolwich and Elswick, we now stand in a better position in that respect than we ever stood before. The noble Viscount seems to think that we are putting guns on our ships of inferior power to the guns put on board the French ships.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH

I referred to the difference between breech-loading and muzzle-loading guns.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK

At all events, I have seen it stated, and I am glad to have the opportunity of saying, that there is no foundation for this statement. The 43-ton gun we are to mount in the ships we are now completing for sea may be said, speaking roughly, to be of the same power as the gun being put on board the French ships which are now being completed for sea. In the ships now building of the Rodney class we propose to put a 63-ton gun, which has a charge of 625 1bs., and a projectile weighing 1,250 1bs. The muzzle energy is 36,415 foot tons, and the penetration of wrought iron at 1,000 3'ards 28.6 inches. The gun is to be constructed of steel, with steel hoops. This powerful gun we propose to place on board some of our ships; but the Admiralty thought, powerful as the gun is, that it would be desirable to have a still more powerful one, and we therefore propose to place two 100-ton guns of much the same pattern as those constructed by the Elswick Ordnance Company for the Italian Navy. These guns will be supplied by that Company. At the present moment we feel considerable confidence as regards the working of these large guns; and it was very satisfactory to find that at Alexandria, the machinery on board the Inflexible answered admirably. The trial of the 100-ton gun constructed at the works of Sir William Armstrong, which took place at Spezzia, gives us much confidence in the breech-loading mechanism of that gun, and it is of the same type as that which we propose to use. I may say, generally, that the condition of the Navy in respect to guns is more satisfactory now than it has been for some time past; but I should be very over-confident if I stated that the system of breech-loading gave us as much satisfaction as regards safety as the old muzzle-loading system; and it is most creditable to all concerned with the manufacture of our present guns that no accident involving any loss of life occurred during the engagement at Alexandria. It is necessary to employ the breech-loading gun, but it is a more delicate weapon. In former years the Government was reproached with not introducing it earlier, but I am not sure that the delay was a disadvantage, because meanwhile the weapon has been improved, and the country has thus been spared a considerable expenditure upon guns which would have been inferior to those now being made. The noble Viscount expressed some doubt as to the value of merchant cruisers in time of war, and suggested that they would be useless against armour-clad vessels. They would not, it is true, be of use in attacking ships of war heavily armoured; but armour-clad vessels are not the only ships we shall have to meet in war. There are many ships which are not armour-clad at all, and there are very few armour-clad vessels indeed so protected as to be unassailable by such vessels. In my opinion, therefore, merchant cruisers will be of great value. The noble Viscount has spoken of the position of this country as a great Naval Power. That position by no means depends entirely upon the number of our ships; what it mainly depends upon, in my opinion, is the gallantry and the knowledge of the officers and men in the Navy, and the state of training in which, they are kept. Next, in importance, come the ships and the other naval appliances; and after them comes the power of this country in the possession of a flourishing Mercantile Marine, and its unrivalled capacity for manufacturing steel ships and all kinds of naval appliances. These, for the most part, are made in England, and therefore, in my opinion, we never yet occupied so powerful a position as a Naval Power as at the present time. I trust that the Motion for a Committee of Inquiry will not be pressed to a division, and I think your Lordships will not be inclined to accede to such a Motion. A matter of this kind ought, I venture to think, to be left to the Executive Government of the day, unless it appears from the facts of the case that the Ministry of the day does not recognize the necessity of keeping up the force of the country to a proper state of efficiency. Her Majesty's Government feel that it is necessary to maintain the naval supremacy of this country; and with this object we have very considerably increased the expenditure upon armour-clad ships and guns, that increase amounting to between £800,000 and £1,000,000 per annum since we came into Office. I therefore trust that this Motion will not be pressed. In answer to the noble Viscount regarding the armour of four new ships, I may tell him that the Impérieuse and Warspite are armoured, the armour on the sides of the belt is 10 inches, and above water 9 inches, on the barbettes 8 inches. The Mersey and Severn are not armoured; but they have decks protected by steel, and a conning tower with from 8 to 9 inches armour protection.

LORD ELPHINSTONE

said, he thought that, having regard to the rapidity with which foreign Powers had increased and were increasing their Navies, it was of the greatest importance that this country should be prepared for war. There was a feeling prevalent in the country that, in the event of a general war, England did not possess a sufficient number of vessels to protect its own coasts, besides placing a Fleet in the Mediterranean, guarding the Colonies, the Mercantile Marine, and the bread supply. He thought the appointment of the suggested Committee might have allayed the anxiety felt in this connection. Great difference of opinion also existed among persons of authority as to the armament of our ships, and as to the mode in which our ships were constructed, many authorities condemning the present system of box-building. Moreover, reforms were necessary in the Constructive Department of the Admiralty; some endeavours should be made outside the Department to secure the services of the best designers in the country. He much regretted the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) would not consent to the Motion of the noble Viscount.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH,

in replying to the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook), said, he thought the public ought to have the the whole of the facts relating to the Navy placed before them, and that if a Committee were appointed these facts would be fully brought out, and full information would be obtained as to the strength of the Navies of foreign Powers. Many distinguished naval officers had expressed their alarm at the present condition of the British Navy as compared with the Navies of foreign Powers. He was certainly not satisfied with the statement of the noble Earl; but, having regard to the small number of noble Lords at present in the House, he would not press his Motion to a division.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.