Lords Sitting of 6 April 1883

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Elementary Education Provisional Orders Confirmation (Cummersdale, &c.)* (23).
Second Reading—Contempts of Court (15).
Committee—Report—Consolidated Fund (No. 2)*.

CONTEMPTS OF COURT BILL—(No. 15.)
(The Lord Chancellor.)
CONTEMPTS OF COURT BILL—(No. 15.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Beading read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR,in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that he had already explained the provisions of the Bill to the House, and he did not, therefore, intend to make a detailed statement, but would only refer to some Amendments he contemplated making in Committee. Since the Bill had been introduced objections had been taken to the 16th clause, which provided that in case of disobedience to any order of a Court of competent jurisdiction made against the holder of any office within the meaning of the Act, it should be lawful for the Court by further order to fix such limited time as the Court might consider reasonable for compliance with such
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  order on pain of deprivation of such office; and if within the time so limited such order should not be duly complied with, or should afterwards be wilfully disobeyed, the office so held by such person might be declared vacant; and in that case such person should not be capable of being again appointed to the said office until after the expiration of three years from the time when the office was declared to be vacant. The 19th clause defined what offices—legal, municipal, and ecclesiastical—were to be subject to this provision. Since the Bill was introduced, the objections which had been urged against the 16th clause had been carefully considered; and they had been thought, upon the whole, to preponderate over the reasons which had led to the insertion of that clause in the Bill. He might explain, in the first place, that the 16th clause was thought to be hardly consistent with the general object of the Bill, which was to place certain limits upon the punishment inflicted for contempt of Court, and to limit the maximum fine to £500; while to give a power of deprivation for the same causes of offence might be the means of taking away a man's whole livelihood. In the second place, with regard to the motive of the clause, it appeared that in most, if not in all cases in which such a power would be useful, there would be some means of accomplishing the same object by an independent proceeding, either before the same or before a different authority. For instance, if a Judge of a Superior Court ordered a County Court Judge or Coroner to do a certain act, and he refused to do it, the proper authority to deprive him was the Lord Chancellor, who was subject to Parliamentary responsibility. In ecclesiastical cases the same thing might be done, for any sufficient cause, by means of a substantive proceeding properly taken for that purpose; and the whole subject of the constitution and power of the Ecclesiastical Courts, including necessarily the means of confirming junior judgments and orders, was now under the consideration of a Royal Commission, and it was thought better to wait for the Report of that Commission than to legislate at the present time on that part of the subject. Under these circumstances, he proposed to withdraw Clause 16, and so much of Clause 19 as might be found necessary.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD FITZGERALDsaid, that, although he accepted the principle of the Bill, he wished to point out that in reference to one matter it fell entirely short of public requirements. The Bill was one to amend the law as to contempts of Court, which was a very comprehensive subject. These contempts, for present purposes, might be roughly divided into two classes—one, a very large and extensive one relating entirely to civil and ecclesiastical matters, in reference to which it was a mistake to call them contempts of Court at all. For instance, if the Lord Chancellor made an order directing a trustee to bring into Court a sum of money, and he was unable to do so, the trustee would be liable to be committed for contempt. In the great majority of cases the contempt was in name only, and related to processes for enforcing civil rights. As to these, he did not intend to mate any observation. But there was, in addition, another class of contempts, which, to distinguish them, he might call criminal contempts, for which, in many eases, the persons committing them would be liable to punishment, either summarily or by indictment for a misdemeanour. For instance, there was the misconduct of persons in open Court. A man might be guilty of conduct in open Court which impaired the dignity of the Court, and the Court would immediately take cognizance of that which took place before the Court itself, and inflict summary punishment. That, however, was a power which it was rarely necessary to enforce. He had had the honour of a seat on the Bench for 22 years, embracing periods of great public excitement, and he had never had occasion to exercise that summary authority. But he had always felt that it was the knowledge of the existence of that power which, enabled him to maintain the order and dignity of the Court. If they conferred jurisdiction upon a Judge, they impliedly furnished him with authority to enable him to enforce that jurisdiction, and to preserve order and dignity in its administration. He was far, therefore, from objecting to the summary jurisdiction, as it at present existed for contempts in open Court, with a fine limited to £500, and the period of imprisonment to three months. But
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  behind that class of contempts there was, again, another still more important, which was popularly known as "constructive contempts of Court." They arose, not in the presence of the Court, not in open Court, but outside the Court, and not in the presence of the Judge; and as to them, time and place had no application. They arose sometimes from speeches, but principally from the publication of newspaper articles in reference to some trial about to take place, or which was then actually going on. This constructive contempt depended entirely upon the inference that the party speaking, writing, or publishing intended in some way to interfere with and impede the administration of justice, and they had been known to our law for a very long period. It was unnecessary to consider when the practice arose—as far back as Edward III. they had it in practice—and from that time down to the present, though it was a power which was rarely exercised in modern times. There was one recorded case of a rev. gentleman, John Barker, who, having called a meeting of his parishioners in the churchyard, and made a speech on local affairs, in which he spoke disrespectfully of the King's Bench, and for that was called up and sentenced summarily to a term of imprisonment; and in another case, where, in a Petition to the Corporation of London, the party libelled the Aldermen, and also used words disrespectful of the King's Bench, he was indicted for the first and tried before a jury, but was summarily imprisoned for the last. No doubt these cases would not now be followed. In modern times this power of commitment had been confined solely to articles in the newspapers which were thought to interfere with the administration of justice. The doctrine of constructive contempt was one which he was not inclined to favour. It appeared to him that, if dealt with at all, it should be dealt with on some broad foundation. The present course of proceedings was exceedingly objectionable. If an article in a newspaper appeared, which was alleged to be such a contempt, and which, was one from which an inference could be drawn that it was intended to interfere with the administration of justice, the party was called up summarily, and the matter inquired into, the Judge being at once Judge of the law, of the

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  fact, of the intention, of the sentence, and his decision was without any power of review. That was most unsatisfactory, and there could be no doubt that the doctrine had a tendency unduly to fetter the freedom of the Press, and in that light was important to them all. No doubt, there was a difficulty in dealing with it; but he would rather see the doctrine done away with altogether than continue to exist in its present form. There was no such law in any of the American States. The New York Code said—
  "Every Court of Record may punish summarily disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behaviour in the immediate presence of the Court tending to interrupt its proceedings and impair the respect due to authority;"
  but it could not punish for publication out of Court where the remedy was by indictment; and he believed such a practice as ours of summary punishment for constructive contempts did not exist in any other country. Its effect was to enforce silence on the part of the Press, where the public interests required the fullest publicity and the closest criticism of what was going on. He had such an objection to the doctrine and practice, that he should prefer being guided by the maxim—"Nil falsi audeat, nil veri non audeat dicere." He need not say that constructive crime was in all cases contrary to the genius of the English law, I and that in such cases it was usual to interpose a jury for the protection of the subject. The objections to the present system were that it was uncertain, undefined, and depending on capricious discretion. There would be a great difficulty in defining constructive contempts; but he would suggest that it might be hedged round with some protections, and that in all cases a right of appeal should be given to the Court of Appeal. The effect of that would be to render the Judges more cautious, while it would leave them free in their action; and, above all, in time a series of decisions would be built up which would regulate and control the discretion of the Judges in the exercise of their summary power.
  EARL CAIRNSsaid, his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had expressed an intention to omit the 16th clause in Committee. That clause appeared to him to contain the most important part of the Bill. He thought it desirable that in a Bill of this kind the
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  opportunity should have been taken of drawing a distinction between contempts, property so called, and those that were not so. There was contempt of Court, such as that of insulting Judges, and interfering with juries, so as to thwart the administration of justice. These were strictly contempts, and ought to be severely punished. But then there was another species of contempt which was entirely different. Under certain circumstances, Courts of Law called that which was merely the non-fulfilment of an order contempt of Court. But that was not a contempt at all. He was afraid that this Bill would keep alive that confusion of the two kinds of contempt which ought to be kept perfectly distinct. There could be no doubt that the Bill had originated out of certain things which occurred in a recent ecclesiastical suit. He should be glad to see the punishment of imprisonment put an end to altogether in cases of that kind. He did not believe that it ever did any good. In his opinion, it would be much wiser, instead of making a martyr of a man who offended against the Ecclesiastical Law, to allow him a locus penitentiœ, and, in the event of his not being able to conform within a specified limit of time, to inflict on him a punishment leading up to deprivation. If the 16th clause had been properly dealt with, he believed it could have been made to produce that result; and he owned to the greatest astonishment and regret when he heard his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack express his intention of withdrawing the clause.
  LORD COLERIDGEsaid, he could not agree with his noble and learned Friend behind him (Lord Fitzgerald) that a material alteration should be made in the law as to constructive contempt. Judging from his present experience, he thought the practical importance of the subject had been a good deal over-estimated. He himself had never imprisoned but one man for contempt, and that was only for 24 hours; and he was a person who could not be got rid of without ordering his removal out of Court in custody. But with regard to constructive contempt, his noble and learned Friend had forgotten that offences were sometimes committed, not in the face of the Court, which, nevertheless, impeded the administration of

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  justice. Those came within his noble Friend's description of constructive contempt. It not uncommonly happened that offences amounting to an interference with the course of justice were committed that did not take place within the walls of the Court—as in the case of threatening witnesses or interfering with persons serving on the jury. Those offences, although not committed within the walls of the Court, and, therefore, not being cognizable by the Court or capable of being dealt with summarily, might cause a serious interference with the course of justice in this country. More than once he had happened to know that the course of justice was interfered with in the manner he had suggested; and he was clearly of opinion that if there was no power vested in the Court of visiting summarily and at once such acts of contempt—though his noble and learned Friend had called them constructive only—the result would be disastrous to the administration of justice. So far as he knew, the cases in which this power of committal was exercised were extremely rare. He had hardly ever seen persons committed for contempt except in cases where the contempt was outrageous; and he did not believe that instances of constructive contempt were at all common. Tie thought, therefore, it would be bettor to leave the matter where it was, and there was no reason to believe that Judges would exceed their powers. A Court of Appeal could not be such a good judge of what particular act amounted to constructive contempt as the Judge who had tried the action in which the contempt had been committed.
  LORD BRAMWELLsaid, he entirely concurred with the remarks of his noble and learned Friend beside him (Lord Fitzgerald). Among instances of contempt there might be the case of a witness refusing to answer a question, or behaving in an offensive way. In such cases it would be impossible to review the Judge's decision. In that case he thought there ought not to be a right of appeal, as it would be impossible for a Court of Appeal to say whether the language, demeanour, and expression of the offender had been misconceived by the Judge. He did not make these remarks from any love for the power of committal. His noble and
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  learned Friend had been on the Bench for 22 years, and had never had to commit for contempt. He himself had been on the Bench for 26 years, and had had only one case—that of a lad from the other side of St. George's Channel, who, when hearing evidence he did not like, persisted in expressing his disapprobation so loudly, that he was obliged to take notice of it. But as to what his noble and learned Friend had called "constructive contempt," it was different. Many acts of constructive contempt were-not, in reality, meant to be a contempt of Court. It often happened, for instance, that a plaintiff or defendant discussed the merits of an invention while the trial was going on. Although neither the Court nor the law was really offended by what he was doing, still the discussion was supposed to be an impediment to the Judge or jury making up their mind impartially. His noble and learned Friend on his left proposed that there should be a right of appeal in such cases. What reason could there be for allowing appeals in ordinary civil cases, and not allowing them in cases of this description? Take the case of a Judge who had held that a paragraph in a newspaper was of such a character that it might interfere with his duty, and accordingly, acting to the best of his judgment, he had fined the offender and sent him to prison—though it generally happened that the offender apologized and there was an end to the matter—why should not the offender have a right to appeal? The case could be brought before the Court of Appeal in the same way and with the same material as it had been brought before the original Court. He was satisfied that it would be a good thing to give some power of reviewing the decision of the Judge. If that decision enjoined silence where there ought not to be silence, surely it ought to be open to review. He did not himself see any difficulty in giving a right of appeal. As to what the noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns) had said, especially with regard to the case of the clergyman who had been referred to, he thought the object desired might be obtained in the following manner. The great difficulty in such cases was that the offenders considered that, notwithstanding the sentence, and although they were told they were not to continue to exercise their functions,

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  it was their duty to continue what they called their duty; they did not recognize the validity of the sentence. What, therefore, occurred to him as a remedy in such cases was this—that when these persons were in contempt, and persisted in performing those duties which they maintained belonged to their position, they should be treated in the same manner as a person who unlawfully intruded into the pulpit.
  THE EARL OF MILLTOWNsaid, he must express his regret at the absence from the Bill of any provisions for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. There was one case which had occurred some years ago on the old Home Circuit where a choleric Judge had fined the High Sheriff £500 for thanking the Grand Jury for their services, a duty which the Judge ought to have performed himself. Such cases were, no doubt, rare; but Judges were only mortal, and in sentences inflicted in the heat of the moment such an extreme case as that might occur again, where a power of revision by the Home Secretary might be desirable.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR,who was indistinctly heard, promised to consider the suggestions that had been made before the Committee stage of the Bill. He should not, however, feel himself at liberty to recede from the statement he had made respecting the 16th clause. He agreed with the noble and learned Earl (Earl Cairns) in his desire to get rid of imprisonment, as far as possible, in ecclesiastical cases. The real truth was that cases such as those alluded to by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Bramwell) might result in acts of forcible opposition to the law, which could not possibly be dealt with without imprisonment. He hoped, however, that what had been said on that subject during the debate would receive the consideration of the Commission now sitting with reference to the Ecclesiastical Courts.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday the 20th instant.

THE GOVERNMENT—SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND.

  QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
  THE EARL OF MINTOasked Her Majesty's Ministers, with reference to the
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  demand which is being pressed upon them by certain parties in Scotland for the creation of a Secretary of State for Scotland, Whether they have arrived at any definite conclusions on the subject; whether a re-arrangement and consolidation of Scottish business are intended; and if so, whether the administration of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1872, will be transferred to the new Scottish Department? The noble Earl said, he knew propositions had been made to the Government on this subject; and he therefore thought it right to ask them whether they had made up their minds to do anything, and, if so, what was the nature of the changes they proposed to make? He confessed that he could not see himself what were the precise duties which ought to be made to devolve on a Scottish Minister. There were many things which he might superintend, and in regard to which his influence might, perhaps, be usefully exercised. But, taking the great Departments of the Army, of the Navy, Foreign Affairs, and the Home Office, to some extent, it was obvious that they could not have a separate arrangement as to matters concerning these great Departments available for Scotland. But there were certain matters which were peculiarly Scottish; and, perhaps, something might be done by giving a person of high political rank a kind of superintendence of those specially Scottish matters. He did not know definitely what the proposals were; but there were certain offices peculiarly Scottish which might be, perhaps, superintended to advantage by a purely Scottish Minister. There were many Boards in Scotland of which there was no counterpart in the other two Kingdoms—such, for instance, as the Board of Supervision for the relief of the poor, a very well-conducted office he believed; the Lunacy Board, the Fishery Board, and another as to which he felt very strongly, the Education Department. There used to be a Board in Edinburgh dealing with the subject of education, which had now been transported to London. He had always felt, from the beginning of that great change of policy, the giving of Imperial grants for education, very great regret that it was not resolved that Scotland should have the government and management of the whole of its educational matters as heretofore. Formerly the whole of the educational institutions

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  in Scotland were managed in Scotland, and there was no reason why that should not be continued. He thought that was the only great and important matter connected with Scotland, as to which some benefit might be obtained by making a new arrangement which should enable the Scottish nation to manage its own educational concerns entirely without interference from Whitehall. He thought he was so far justified in entertaining that opinion by what occurred two years ago, when Lord Advocate M'Laren, at the instance of the Prime Minister, made a suggestion that certain taxes should be allotted to Scotland, and that the management should be left to local control much more than it now was. The argument was that these subventions to local rates constituted an expensive system. That, of course, was a very wide question; but what he now asked was that the Government would enlighten the House as to the nature of the changes which he imagined they had in contemplation; what were to be the duties of the new Department, if a new Department was made, and what was to be the local position of the Department—whether it was to be at Whitehall or at Edinburgh?
  THE EARL OF FIFEasked to be allowed to say a few words on this subject. There was much that fell from the noble Earl with which he could hardly agree. For instance, he had very good reason for knowing that there was a considerable amount of genuineness in the demand which had been put forward by the Scottish people for a Minister, although, not necessarily for a Secretary of State; and he believed that some considerable re-arrangement of Scottish Business was desirable. With regard to the administration of the Education Act, to which the noble Earl had alluded, he was bound to say that, on the other hand, there was considerable divergency of opinion. His object in raising this question two years ago was simply to endeavour to rescue Scotland from the irresponsible government of a Board located in Edinburgh, and the administration of the country from the hands of an Edinburgh lawyer, who, the more eminent he was in his Profession, the less likely he was to have much time to devote to Parliamentary Business. There was a strong
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  desire on the part of Scotchmen for the dignity of a Cabinet Minister; but he had carefully guarded himself against urging such a proposal, if they could obtain by other means the practical advantages which they deemed necessary. He was well aware that there was a very considerable section of the Scottish people, and, perhaps, even a more considerable section of the Scottish Press, who were loudly demanding a Secretary of State for Scotland. He confessed that he had never been one of those. He had always been of opinion that the case might fairly be met by the establishment of a Scottish Department, presided over by an independent and responsible Minister, to whom Scotchmen might refer, and who might be able to acquaint himself with Scottish affairs and Scottish needs on the spot, a thing which it was impossible the Home Secretary could do. A very short time after he raised this question in their Lordships' House—he thought two months—a re-arrangement of Scottish Business did take place; and all Scotchmen heard with very great pleasure, which no one joined in more heartily than himself, that his noble Friend (the Earl of Rosebery), the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, had been made responsible for Scottish Business. But a rumour had lately gone forth that his noble Friend declined to be considered Minister for Scotland; and, therefore, it seemed to him that they were likely to drift into their old deplorable condition, without having even the forensic ability of the Lord Advocate to guide them. He would not now inflict on their Lordships the old arguments and counter-arguments on this somewhat worn subject. They had been told that the tendency of the day was to demand a Minister for everything; but he confessed he was utterly at a loss what possible connection there could be between the demand for a Minister for Agriculture and the demand for a Minister for Scotland. In Scotland the religious institutions, the educational institutions, the local government, and a variety of other things were all on an entirely different basis from what they were in England; and it seemed to him that when they abolished the Irish Office, and established similarity of customs in the Three Kingdoms, it would be quite, time to

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  oppose this Scottish demand upon the ground that it would be an unnecessary increase in the number of Government Departments. He hoped the Government would not allow themselves to be prevented from taking action in this matter by criticisms in this House, but that they would really attempt to redress a real grievance, which had been calmly and patiently put forward by a people who had consistently proved themselves to be practical, orderly, and loyal.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, it was an advantage to Her Majesty's Government to have had the opportunity of hearing the remarks of his two noble Friends, who were well acquainted with this subject; but at present the only answer he could give was that the matter had been for some time under the consideration of the Government, and they hoped soon to be able to state their intentions with respect to it.

PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN.—QUESTION.
THE BISHOP OF ROCHESTERinquired of Her Majesty's Government, If it is still likely that a Bill will be laid before Parliament this Session for the better protection of women and children?
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYsaid, that a Bill dealing with that subject was in process of drafting; and he hoped to have an opportunity of announcing the intentions of the Government with regard to it during the ensuing week.

CHANNEL TUNNEL—THE JOINT COMMITTEE.—RESOLUTION.
Message of the House of Commons, of yesterday, considered (according to order).
LORD SUDELEYin rising to move—
"That a Committee of five Lords be appointed to join with the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, as mentioned in the said Message, to inquire whether it is expedient that Parliamentary sanction should be given to a submarine communication between England and France; and to consider whether any or what conditions should be imposed by Parliament in the event of such communication being sanctioned,"
said, that this was a question which was of great national importance, and had of late excited very considerable interest in the public mind. The Government considered, having regard to the negotiations which had been carried on
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for many years with the French Government, together with the results obtained from the International Commission which sat on the subject, that the Executive Government, to a great extent, had their hands tied until Parliament should have an opportunity, with all the facts before it, of expressing a decided opinion on the whole subject-matter. In the opinion of the Government, this was no longer to be regarded as a purely national question, but was now an international one. It was fully recognized in France that Parliament was the master of the situation, and had a perfect right to speak plainly, and that nothing final could be done without its sanction. In order to put the matter clearly before the House, he would endeavour to state briefly what had taken place up to that time. As long ago as 1867 the subject of the Channel Tunnel was raised by an Anglo-French Company; and, although certain negotiations were entered into, no practical results were arrived at for three years, owing to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. In 1871 the matter was again opened up. Correspondence took place between the promoters of the French and English Companies on the one hand, and the French and English Governments on the other. In 1872 the Channel Tunnel Company was incorporated. On June 2, 1872, Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, wrote to the English Ambassador in Paris, informing him that Her Majesty's Government did not consider it advisable to give its consent to the Tunnel—if ever constructed—becoming a perpetual private monopoly; but that, subject to that observation, it saw no objection in principle to the proposed Tunnel between England and France. In 1873 the Board of Trade again raised the question, and informed the Foreign Office that, while opposing any monopoly, it would be glad to see an improvement in the communication between England and the Continent, and would, therefore, be well satisfied to hear that the British railway system was likely to be connected with the European railway system, by means of a Tunnel between France and England. These views of the Board of Trade wore communicated by Lord Lyons to the French Government. Therefore, even before the late Government came into Office, the principle of a Tunnel had been agreed to, though the matter had

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not advanced beyond that stage. In 1874 the French Government granted a concession to the Company, contingent on making arrangements with the English Company for carrying on the English portion of the work. In October of that year the French Government forwarded a Report of their Committee on the subject, and asked to be informed of the views of the English Government. Thereupon Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, expressed his opinion to the Board of Trade in these words—
"That it is very desirable to support any well-considered scheme, the result of which may be to increase the facility of communication between the two countries,"
provided that such support was not confined to any one undertaking. In the following December Lord Derby wrote to the French Ambassador in London—
"I have to state that there appears no reason to doubt that the Government will offer no opposition to the scheme, provided they are not asked for a gift, or loan, or guarantee in connection therewith."
In 1875 a Bill was introduced into the Legislatures of both countries, and passed without opposition. In March of that year a very important step was taken. At the request of the English Government, an Anglo-French Commission, consisting of three gentlemen from each country, was appointed to consider the conditions on which the undertaking might be carried out; and to that Commission the Admiralty, War Office, and Treasury Departments were parties. The Commission met in London and Paris, and reported in 1876 on the question of the management of the traffic and jurisdiction, and suggested that the Government should be able to suspend the traffic or destroy communication in the ease of war. The late Administration considered the Report of that Commission, and arrived at the decision that negotiations for a Treaty with the French Government on the basis of a Protocol should be entered into. Owing to the financial collapse of the Company nothing further was done; but when the present Government came into Office it was clear they found their Predecessors committed in favour of the project. In 1881, the South-Eastern Railway Company obtained additional power to purchase land between Folkestone and Dover. In the same year the House of Commons had before them the rival projects of that
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Company and the Channel Tunnel Company; and the attention of the Board of Trade was called to a report of a meeting of the Railway Company, in which the Chairman had held out the possibility of completing an experimental Tunnel in five years. A Departmental Committee was thereupon appointed to consider the conditions which ought to be imposed on the undertaking, and that Committee took a great deal of evidence. The question of the national security was then brought forward for the first time; and a most able Report was presented to the Committee by Lord Wolseley, in which reasons were stated for considering the Tunnel as a danger to the country. A Report of an opposite character was presented to them by Sir John Adye. It was immediately seen that that was a matter of vital importance, far too large to be dealt with by a small Departmental Committee; and they were, therefore, relieved of their functions; and the Secretary of State for War then decided that before the military question could be properly considered by the Government the opinion of a mixed body of military men and civilians should be obtained as to the practicability of effectually closing the Tunnel when necessary. That Committee took a great deal of evidence, and reported in May, 1882. On receipt of that Report, the Government considered what further steps they should take in the matter; and they came to the conclusion that the inquiry up to that time had related almost exclusively to the military aspect of the question, and that it would be necessary to consider the advantages of greater facilities of communication between the two countries, and the general effect of the Tunnel on commerce, before a settlement could be arrived at. The Government then determined that the best manner to complete the inquiry would be by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament; and that was the present position of affairs. The negotiations entered into by the late Administration, and the conclusion of the Protocol laying down the basis for a Treaty, left not the slightest doubt that the late Government was pledged to a very great extent to the French Government to allow the scheme to be carried out; and, that being so, the matter had undoubtedly assumed an international character. It would be a

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precedent of the worst kind if the Executive Government were to take steps to upset these almost final negotiations, which had been entered into with the French Government by their Predecessors, unless they had the strong opinion of Parliament at their backs; and he apprehended the Government had no choice in the matter. The 18th clause of the Protocol entered into by the late Government in 1876 for the basis of a Treaty distinctly stated that—
"The provisions of the Treaty to be concluded shall not come into force before they have been sanctioned by the Legislatures of the two countries;"
and it was obvious that Parliamentary inquiry into so large a matter was highly desirable, and would certainly be demanded, before Parliamentary sanction was given to such a Treaty. The Government did not shrink in the smallest degree from their responsibility; and after the Parliamentary Committee, in accordance with the Protocol, had fully inquired into the matter, it would, undoubtedly, be the duty of the Government to finally decide whether the Channel Tunnel should be made or not.
Moved, "That a Committee of five Lords be appointed to join with the Committee appointed by the House of Commons, as mentioned in the said Message, to inquire whether it is expedient that Parliamentary sanction should be given to a submarine communication between England and France; and to consider whether any or what conditions should be imposed by Parliament in the event of such communication being sanctioned."—(The Lord Sudeley.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I have listened with interest to the speech of the noble Lord; but I must confess I have not gathered from it any reason to justify so remarkable a step as the appointment of this Committee to consider matters which are usually decided by the Executive Government itself. The noble Lord does not even tell us what are the precise questions to be submitted to this Committee. For the questions, as he observes, are of various kinds and of different natures. There are technical and commercial questions which are usually considered when a railway is to be made, and those would be referred seriatim to Committees of the two Houses and dealt with by them. But the noble Lord, at the beginning of his speech, appeared to indicate that very much more than this was to be submitted to the Com-
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mittee, and he gave as his reason for a Joint Committee certainly the very oddest reason I ever heard; for he said it was an international matter, and was, therefore, a very proper thing for a Joint Committee of the two Houses to consider. It would be a very proper thing, indeed, if we could get a Joint Committee of the French and English Assemblies; but the Government do not appear to contemplate that. Now, what are the questions this Committee have to decide? There are military questions raised in this discussion as to whether the entrance to the Channel Tunnel on this side can, or cannot, be adequately defended. But these questions have already been submitted to a competent tribunal, and I do not suppose that any Joint Committee of the two Houses would ever dream of reviewing that decision. Behind that there are large questions of policy. It is known that this scheme is opposed very strongly, and by very influential personages in this country; and I suppose the ground on which it is opposed is the presumed intention and capacity of Foreign Powers to invade this country, and the presumed difficulty which this country might find in meeting any such hostile attack, supposing the Channel Tunnel existed. Are these questions to be submitted to the Committee? Is the Committee to be asked to consider what is the disposition of France, her past history and present condition? Is the Committee to be asked to consider the power of France; what is the amount of the Naval and Military Force she possesses; what are the chances of an invasion; what an invader would do; and in what way his position would be affected by the existence of the Channel Tunnel? One of the arguments relied upon by those who are opposed to the Tunnel is that, whatever precautions you may take for the purpose of stopping it up or rendering it useless when made, such is the clumsiness of our Executive Government, and such the disinclination of our public men to assume responsibility, that it is probable that at the critical moment it would not be closed, and would fall into the hands of the enemy. I do not for a moment give any opinion as to the justice of the estimate which is formed of the Government of this country, or of its public men; but that is one of the most commonly used arguments

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in reference to this question. Is the Committee to form an opinion as to that? Is the Committee to hear evidence or the arguments of counsel as to what sort of people the public men in this country are, and how they are likely to view their responsibilities in regard to the Tunnel in case of an attack on this country? I must say we are launching this Committee upon a kind of inquiry to which the Committees of both Houses are quite unused—in fact, to use the words of the Prime Minister, we are engaged "in a delegation and devolution of duties" wholly strange to the Constitution of this country, and no satisfactory result can come from their deliberations. The noble Lord says that the Executive Government is bound partly by the acts of the Government of 1869, and partly by those of the Government of 1874. But if the Government is bound to a Foreign Power, no decision of a Committee of the two Houses can unloose that bond, and the decision of the Committee would not have the slightest weight in respect to the question of International Law. The Government appear to wish to occupy the position of some firm of money-lenders, in which there is a very obliging and agreeable partner, who sees all the clients, and says—"I should be very happy to do your business for you; but my partner, who is very obstinate and disagreeable, will not permit me." This Committee is to take up the position of that obstinate and disagreeable partner; and the Government will go to the French Government and say—"We are internationally bound, and nothing would give us greater pleasure than to fulfil our engagements; but there is that Joint Committee, which is composed of very obstinate men, who have come to a resolution to prevent us from gratifying our desire." I am afraid, if this is the intention of the Government, the device, however ingenious, will be penetrated by the French Government, and that if there are any international engagements they will not be disposed of in that way. But the noble Lord has said that, after all these investigations, the Government will not hold themselves in any way bound by the decision of the Committee, so that the Committee will come to their duty with a consciousness—and I do not envy them the feeling—that if they decide the way the Government
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mean to go, they will be covering the action of the Government; but, if not, they will be calmly pushed aside. If the question had been proposed to your Lordships in the first instance, I think your Lordships would have done well to hesitate before embarking on a Constitutional precedent of such a grave and serious character; but as the House of Commons has decided on appointing a Committee, I do not see that the precedent will be made any the less objectionable by your Lordships refusing to acquiesce in the decision of the House of Commons. I do not, therefore, propose to ask the House to resist the proposition of the noble Lord; but with reference to the nomination of Members on the Committee, as it seems they are to take the responsibility of the Executive Government, at least in name, the Government must take the whole responsibility of nominating them; and I hope that when the task of the Committee is ended they will be satisfied with the way in which their suggestions are treated by the Government.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My Lords, the noble Marquess has certainly not spared remarks of a condemnatory kind upon the proposal before your Lordships; but he has conjured up evils, some of which, at all events, do not exist the noble Marquess went into a number of matters which he said the Committee would have to consider, and among these he mentioned the disposition of the French Government towards us. I think, whatever else the Committee may have to consider, it appears to me that they cannot possibly have to consider that, nor whether that country has a more or less considerable Military Force, because everyone knows that the French nation in time of war would be a very formidable Power; and that, therefore, may be accepted as indisputable. Happily, at the present time, this country is on friendly terms with Franco, and we all hope we may long continue to be so. But it is useless to inquire into the disposition of the French nation unless you can show that under no circumstances could its disposition be unfriendly to us; and it is clearly in reference to the possibility of disagreement that we have to discuss this matter. Therefore, I think those matters of foreign policy will not be considered by the Committee. Then the noble Marquess says that the matter

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is of a very delicate and difficult character. That I admit, and the reason must be sought in the peculiar position of the question. Both the Government of which I had the honour to be a Member in 1868 and the late Government made some communications to the French Government as to there being no objection whatever against proceedings of this kind. The noble Marquess has said that there does exist in this country a considerable body of opinion adverse to the making of the Channel Tunnel. While, therefore, on the one hand, the Government find that two successive Governments have stated to the French Government that there would be no objection to the scheme, on the other hand they have to deal with a large section of public opinion which holds that there are considerations of the gravest kind which require to be weighed with reference to it; and although there may be inconveniences in referring this question to a Committee of Parliament, there is also the inconvenience of going to the French Government, and saying—"We have changed our minds." That condition of things would be still worse, if we were not able to say that we had been to Parliament, and that the country had changed its mind on the question. The matter having assumed a new position, it is eminently one which a Committee of both Houses of Parliament may examine fully into, and without any of that prejudice which attaches to an examination by the Government. That is a reason for referring the question to a Joint Committee; but the Committee will not enter upon a technical examination of the scientific or the military details—these will be dealt with by a Committee of each House in the ordinary way. What they will have to determine is whether there are considerations arising from the Report which has been placed before the Government by the military officers, looking to the general result which a Tunnel might have as regards the position of this country, which render it, on the whole, not desirable that sanction should be given to the projects laid before Parliament. I do not think myself that the proposal is an objectionable one; and I heard with satisfaction that, notwithstanding his criticism, the noble Marquess does not consider he would be justified in refusing to assent to it.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, that the course proposed, was an unusual one; and he should like to ask whether the Government would consider themselves bound by the Report of the Committee?
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: The minds of the Government will be absolutely open, and they will certainly attach very great weight to the suggestions of the Committee.
THE EARL OF REDESDALE (CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES)asked when it was proposed to name the Members of the Committee?
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: It is impossible to state with perfect certainty; but I think the names of the Committee will be selected on Tuesday.
Motion agreed to.

ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (CUMMERSDALE, &C.) BILL [H.L.]
A Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders made by the Education Department under the Elementary Education Act, 1870, to enable the School Boards for Cummersdale, Cumberland; Hayfield, Derbyshire; Little Eaton, Derbyshire; Stroud, Gloucestershire; and Treuddyn, Flintshire, to put in force the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and the Acts amending the same—Was presented by The LORD PRESIDENT; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners. (No. 23.)
House adjourned at a quarter past Six o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock,